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iDonna G. STARR-DEELEN 
United States Use of Force against Terrorism and the Threat of 
Terrorism:  
An Analysis of the Past Four U.S. Presidents’ Use of Force to Combat 
International Terrorism
 The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response 
to incidents of international terrorism.  Key players in each administration and 
whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm 
approach to counterterrorism are examined.  In addition, Koh’s pattern of 
executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms 
a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations.  An 
assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations’ 
counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests 
future administrations will adhere to it.  During the George W. Bush 
administration, Koh’s pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like 
Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance 
combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to 
create a “perfect storm” known as the “war on terror”.  The research also 
analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by 
international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN 
Charter.  On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which 
American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations.  
Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all 
four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush 
administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.   
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1Chapter One 
Introduction 
One of the most enduring expressions from George W. Bush’s 
administration was the claim (or a variant) that “everything changed on 
September 11, 2001.”  As most people on the planet watched on TV that day, 
19 hijackers in four hijacked planes shocked the world by flying into the World 
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania.  The final death toll 
was almost 3,000 with thousands more injured and the U.S. traumatized 
(Duffy, 2005:1). 
The terrorist attacks were attributed to Osama bin Laden and the al 
Qaeda network which was blamed for previous attacks on American 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000.  
A noted American expert on terrorism wrote that “bin Laden himself has re-
written the history of both terrorism and probably of the post-Cold War era--
which he arguably single-handedly ended on September 11th” (Hoffman, 
2001:4).  
The terrorist attacks in the United States had a profound effect on how 
Americans and the American government viewed terrorism and 
counterterrorism.  After the attacks, the Bush Administration began a “war on 
terror” that emphasized the use of military methods in combating international 
terrorism.  As a result of the attacks, the U.S. removed the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan late in 2001 because of its support for Osama bin Laden and the 
al Qaeda network. The Bush Administration also articulated a doctrine of “pre-
emptive self-defense” in its National Security Strategy which permitted the 
2U.S. to strike militarily at any state that threatened its security before the U.S. 
was the victim of an armed attack. 
 In March of 2003, the administration of George W. Bush led an 
invasion of Iraq, which eventually toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein and 
led to his capture.  This invasion was justified as a part of the “war on terror,” 
even though there is currently no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved 
in the attacks of September 11th.  While the U.S. led military action in 
Afghanistan was largely accepted by the world community as legitimate, the 
legality of the invasion of Iraq remains hotly disputed.  Also, the quality of the 
intelligence that was used to advocate invading Iraq remains controversial. 
The dramatic events of the second Bush administration (reaction to the 
9/11 attacks, “war on terror”, invasion of Iraq, establishment of Guantanamo) 
often appeared to be drastic departures from earlier administrations, 
particularly the preceding administration of Bill Clinton.  This research closely 
examined how different the second Bush administration was, and explored the 
constraints on Presidents in their foreign policy decision-making as it pertains 
to using force against international terrorism.  In particular, the roles of the 
American legislature, the Congress, and the judiciary were analyzed to 
determine whether balanced institutional decision-making was evident 
regarding decisions to use force in counterterrorism operations.       
As this thesis will argue, there is a special dynamic at work regarding 
the expansion of executive branch powers and terrorism that was not unique 
to the Bush II administration.  Not only is the executive more likely to grab 
3power in its counterterrorism operations, the other branches of government 
are most likely to acquiescence to the power grab.  The evidence indicates 
this is due to the combination of several factors: 1) the special dynamic of 
terrorism in which a frightened public demands action after an attack while 
accepting government secrecy; 2) lack of congressional incentives and 
political will to practice effective oversight of the executive when it uses force 
against international terrorism; 3) tendency of American courts to defer to the 
executive branch regarding national security decisions.  Furthermore, if an 
administration pursues a war instead of a law enforcement approach to the 
problem of international terrorism, there are more theoretical constraints on 
executive branch action than real constraints.                  
A serious examination of the constraints faced by modern American 
Presidents regarding their foreign policy decisions on the use of force in 
counterterrorism indicates that there are fewer constraints than one assumes.  
In this regard, the notion of an “imperial president,” where presidential power 
is not adequately balanced by the other branches of government at the 
expense of presidential accountability, forms an essential part of the analysis.  
The approach and underlying assumptions of Schlesinger’s concept of the 
imperial president underlie the use of force by the past four administrations.  
(Schlesinger, 1973)  A pattern of “executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance” regarding presidential actions in foreign 
affairs emerges. (Koh, 1990:5)  Finally, the common themes and norms of 
behaviour among the administrations reviewed suggest what the Obama 
administration might do if faced with the option of using force after what it 
considered a major “armed attack” by terrorists.  Although the past can never 
4perfectly predict the future, to the extent there are discernible patterns of 
behaviour, they may point to the most probable course of action. 
An examination of the four administrations indicates that a confluence 
of factors involving terrorism, the balance of power among the world’s 
strongest states, and domestic political realities, shaped various Presidents’ 
decisions to resort to force against terrorism.  In addition, the threat posed by 
international terrorism changed during the course of the four administrations 
from state-sponsored to non-state terrorism with resulting repercussions.  At 
the same time, the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
which eliminated the superpower rivalry and encouraged a more multi-polar 
world.  Despite the promise of a “new world order,” the U.S. retained its 
nuclear arsenal, a large standing army, and the capacity to project its armed 
forces around the globe.  The basic rules allocating the power to deploy force 
in the American system of government were written at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, under vastly different circumstances.  The evidence in 
this research tends to suggest that these factors encourage an executive 
more imperial and unfettered than constrained and accountable when using 
force to prevent international terrorism.  
  
Research Questions 
Was the Bush Administration’s Use of Force to Combat International 
Terrorism different from previous American administrations? 
Secondary questions: 
51. What was the administration’s policy on the use of force to prevent 
international terrorism?   
2. Who were the key players in the administrations and were there major 
differences between the departments regarding the use of force? 
3. What was the role of Congress in making the administration’s use of 
force policy?  
4. Did international legal norms on the use of force operate as a constraint 
in the administrations? 
5. Did American legal norms on the use of force operate as a constraint in 
the administrations? 
6. Are there common themes in the four administrations? 
Aims of the research 
 This research questions whether the claim that “everything changed 
on 9/11” applies to the use of force by American administrations to combat 
international terrorism.  Specifically, it explores whether the administration of 
George W. Bush was significantly different from the previous three 
administrations regarding decisions to use force.  To answer this question 
adequately, several concepts need to be defined and discussed.  For 
instance, what is meant by the term “terrorism”?  How has international 
terrorism changed during the course of the four administrations from 1980 to 
2008?  The first chapter addresses these questions and the international legal 
norms regarding the use of force.  Finally, the constitutional allocation of 
6foreign affairs powers in the U.S. political system and the pattern of executive 
initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance are the subject 
matters of chapter 3. 
At first blush, claiming that one extremely spectacular terrorist attack by 
non-state actors “changed everything” appears like an exaggeration.  It seems 
improbable that 19 hijackers with four planes could seriously damage the 
international legal regime that the U.S, the UK and other countries laboriously 
built after WWII to restrain the resort to force.  Perhaps the more accurate 
claim is that the Bush administration’s reaction to the terrorist attack of 9/11, 
i.e. the use of military force against the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
the doctrine of pre-emption, changed everything. 
 The purpose of the research is to compare and contrast how the last 
four American Presidents have used force during their administrations to 
combat international terrorism.  Other uses of force by the four administrations 
may be mentioned but the focus of this research is on the use of force against 
international terrorism. An interdisciplinary approach, using methods and 
perspectives from both political science and law, is appropriate because the 
problems posed by international terrorism and how to respond to it are both 
political and legal.  The dilemma of combating international terrorism by non-
state agents with the use of military force by the world’s greatest military 
power poses both legal and political questions, so focusing on either the legal 
or the political elements would be too narrow.  
7 Although a great deal could be written about the Bush administration’s 
human rights approach and international legal norms regarding Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, this is beyond the scope of this 
research.  In addition, practices like “extraordinary rendition” whereby a non-
American suspect is taken to an undisclosed location outside of the U.S. for 
interrogation are examined briefly as part of the “war on terror”. All of these 
issues are part of the “everything changed on 9/11” mindset that prevailed 
during the Bush II administration. The question of whether the second Bush 
administration intended to transform the parameters of customary international 
legal norms with these practices cannot be addressed in this research due to 
the limitations on length.   
 The first chapter is both an introduction to the topic and an 
explanation of the methodology used in this study.  The remaining chapters 
are presented as follows: 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 3: Principles allocating foreign affairs powers 
Chapter 4: Administration of Ronald Reagan (1981-1988)  
Chapter 5: Administration of George H.W. Bush (1989-1992) 
Chapter 6: Administration of Bill Clinton (1993-2000) 
  
8Chapter 7: Administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) 
Chapter 8: The Legacy of the Bush II Administration 
Chapter 9:  Conclusions 
The following section explains the methodology used in this thesis and 
discusses some of the primary and secondary sources which are used. 
Methodology 
 My interest in writing a thesis on terrorism and the use of force under 
international law came about as a result of living near Washington, DC on 
9/11 and experiencing the changes in tone, if not substance, that occurred in 
the Bush administration’s post-9/11 foreign and domestic policies.  I noted that 
“everything changed on 9/11” was used as an excuse for pursuing all types of 
questionable policies and accusing someone of a “pre-September 11th” 
mindset was as effective as calling them a communist in the 1950’s for closing 
down political debate.  The climate of fear that pervaded Washington, DC on 
September 11, 2001 continued in the autumn of 2001 and extended into 2002 
and 2003 as the public grappled with al Qaeda, the anthrax attacks, sniper 
assaults, and various terrorism scares that unnerved people and may have 
unwittingly facilitated the Bush II administration’s plans for a “war on terror.”  
The Bush administration’s links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein prior 
to the Iraq war in 2003 were troubling and the uncertain nature of compelling 
constraints on the administration was unsettling.  Due to my background in 
9international law, it seemed natural to evaluate the status of the norms 
governing the use of force and what constrained American presidents 
regarding the use of force. 
Qualitative methods were used throughout the research because they 
were most appropriate for the type of questions the research attempted to 
answer.  For each of the four administrations, case studies involving the use 
of force against international terrorism examined the administration’s 
interpretation of war powers.  The bulk of the data collection was 
accomplished by finding and analyzing relevant primary and secondary 
sources regarding the histories of the past four administrations and 
international law and international relations.  In addition, at the end stages of 
the data collection, I interviewed members of the four previous 
administrations, and academics who work in the fields of law and terrorism to 
cover lacunae in the research. 
 The following list sets forth the data collection scheme.  The primary 
and secondary sources analyzed how the previous administrations used force 
in their attempts to prevent international terrorism. 
Primary Sources
• United Nations Charter, particularly articles 2(4) and 51 regarding the 
use of force 
• United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iraq and terrorism 
• Policy statements from the Reagan Administration 
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• Policy statements from the Bush I Administration 
• Policy statements from the Clinton Administration 
• Policy statements from the Bush II Administration 
• War Powers Resolution of 1973 
• War Powers letters transmitted to Congress from each President 
• U.S. State Department documents from all 4 administrations explaining 
the official views on the use of force 
• Congressional hearings and reports regarding the allocation of foreign 
affairs powers and international terrorism 
• Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (2001) 
• Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002) 
Secondary Sources 
• Scholarly texts on the use of force 
• Academic literature on terrorism and international relations 
• Newspaper accounts detailing terrorist attacks and responses to them 
• Constitutional law and political science texts on the allocation of foreign 
affairs power among the three branches of the U.S. government 
Interviews 
• Members of the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton administrations who have 
been involved in the formation of their use of force policies 
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• Members of the Bush II administration who have been involved in the 
formation or execution of the “war on terror” 
• Academics with expertise in international law, terrorism, or the 
allocation of power among the three branches of government 
At the end of my data collection, I conducted interviews with seven people 
with either first-hand experience in conducting the “war on terror,” or special 
expertise in terrorism, international law, or international relations.  The 
possibility of interviewees having an “axe to grind” is an important 
consideration, so educated scepticism was essential when analyzing this type 
of information.  One problem I encountered during this phase of the research 
was the unwillingness of former members of the Bush II administration to 
discuss the administration’s “war on terror” with me.  Despite my reassurances 
that the questions were for research purposes only, it was difficult to get any 
one to discuss the administration’s policies.  However, I was able to interview 
Colin Powell’s former Chief of Staff, Lawrence Wilkerson; Paul Pillar, formerly 
at the CIA; and another CIA analyst working in the Counterterrorism Center 
during 9/11.  The rest of the interviewees are listed in Appendix Five, along 
with their background information. 
U. S. Constitutional Law Sources
• Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. v. United States 
• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
• Hamdan v. Rumsfeld  
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These U.S. court cases were discussed briefly, primarily in chapter 3, for their 
impact on the current allocation of foreign affairs powers between the 
legislative and executive branches. The discussion examined the domestic 
legal constraints on presidents, reflecting the multi-disciplinary focus of the 
research. 
In addition to these sources, my research was also fostered by ideas and 
knowledge generated by lectures and conferences I attended in Washington, 
DC and the UK from 2002 onwards.  Some of the more productive encounters 
include the following: a discussion by Philippe Sands on his book Lawless 
World; panel discussions on the use of force at the annual conferences of the 
American Society of International Law; and various conferences on terrorism 
organized by the New America Foundation.  I also attended thought-provoking 
conferences at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and the 
Brookings Institution examining various topics such as executive power and 
the nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda.  These stimulated further research 
and facilitated data collection in new directions. 
The table below summarizes the most significant terrorist events, dates, 
and responses during the four administrations in the thesis. 
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Bombing    
October 
23, 1983    
US military formulated plans for 
retaliatory air strikes which were not 
carried out.  Marines withdrawn from 
Lebanon by February 26, 1984. 
Hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847    
June 14, 
1985    
Negotiations with hijackers result in 
eventual release of hostages. 
Hijacking of Achille 
Lauro    
October 7, 
1985    
After Egypt allows hijackers to board a 
civilian airliner, US Navy jets force the 
plane to land in Sicily.  Delta troops 
surround the plane and there is a four 
hour standoff between US and Italian 
forces.  Italians tried and convicted 3 of 
the 4 hijackers; fourth one is caught by 
US in 2003. 
Attacks at Rome and 
Vienna airports    
December 
27, 1985   
George Shultz argued for military strikes 
against Libya; Caspar Weinberger 
opposed the idea.  Reagan imposed new 
economic sanctions against Libya in 
January 1986. 
Explosion aboard 
TWA Flight 840 
April 2, 
1986    
Part of response to La Belle disco 
bombing; see below 
Bombing of La Belle 
Disco, Berlin 
April 5, 
1986    
Reagan ordered US Air Force and Navy 
planes to bomb targets in Libya. 
Bombing of Pan Am 
108 over Lockerbie   
December 
21, 1988    
Reagan does not respond.  US and UK 
investigate jointly and issue indictments 
against 2 Libyans.  These 2 Libyans are 
eventually tried in 2000 and one is 
convicted; he served eight and a half 
years of his life sentence before being 
granted release on compassionate 
grounds. 
George H.W. Bush Administration 
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Bombing of UTA 
Flight 772    
September 
19, 1989   
No response by first Bush administration, 
but 6 Libyans were tried in absentia in 
Paris in 1999 and convicted. 
Clinton Administration 
First World Trade 
Center Bombing    
February 
26, 1993   
Capture, trial, and imprisonment of 
conspirators.  They are currently serving 
life sentences in US federal prisons 
Federal building in 
Oklahoma City 
bombed    
April 19, 
1995    
Timothy McVeigh tried and executed; 
Terry Nichols imprisoned for life.  
(Domestic terrorism) 
Khobar Towers 
bombing    
June 25, 
1996    
FBI investigation along with the Saudi 
investigation.  Note: FBI Director Louis 
Freeh was not satisfied with Clinton’s 




1996    
Eric Rudolph caught in 2003, tried, and 
imprisoned for life.  (Domestic terrorism) 
Attempted 
Assassination of 
George HW Bush in 
Kuwait    
April 1993  On June 26, 1993 Clinton launched 23 
cruise missiles against targets in Iraq; FBI 
determined that Iraqi Intelligence service 
was behind the plot.  Kuwaiti court later 
tried and convicted 16 suspects in the 
plot. 
Bombing of US 
embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania   
August 7, 
1998    
On August 20, 1998 Clinton launched 79 
cruise missiles against targets in 
Afghanistan and Sudan. 
Bombing of USS 
Cole    
October 7, 
2000    
None 
George W. Bush Administration 
Four hijacked planes 
flown into the World 
Trade Center 
towers, Pentagon, 
and field in 
Pennsylvania 
September 
11, 2001    
War on Terror involving ground forces in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003.  
Also, discreet military operations 
including the use of armed drones in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria. 
Bush II administration established a “New 
Paradigm” for the war on terror involving 
extraordinary rendition, secret prisons, 
and “enhanced interrogation” techniques. 
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Terrorism Defined 
  One particular challenge of this study is the subject matter of 
terrorism; there is no one generally agreed upon definition of terrorism and, in 
fact, the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights noted that 
109 definitions were put forward between 1936 and 1981. Many 
commentators and states have struggled for a common definition when 
negotiating international treaties, but it remains elusive, mainly due to the oft-
stated proposition that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”  
In addition, there are many variants of terrorism including terrorism by the 
state, state-sponsored terrorism, religious terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, 
and transnational terrorism, to name but a few categories (Townsend, 2002).  
The notion of “catastrophic” terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and high levels of casualties became common in academic literature 
written after 9/11. 
  My research will not explore the many types of terrorism or attempt 
any social, political, or economic explanation for its occurrence, as those 
questions are beyond the scope of the current study.  To the extent that 
WMD's are discussed, it is in the context of the Bush administration’s rationale 
for invading Iraq in 2003.  The focus will be on international, not domestic, 
terrorism and the definition used in this work is “premeditated, politically-
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national 
groups or clandestine state agents, normally intended to influence an 
audience” (Reich, 1998:262).  The most relevant elements of that definition to 
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this research are twofold: the use of violence for political ends, with the agents 
using the violence being non-state entities.  
Methods of Preventing International Terrorism 
 Scholars and national security experts have written a great deal about 
the merits of different methods of preventing terrorism and responding to 
specific acts of terrorism.  According to one analyst, the U.S. has employed 
different tools since WWII to combat international terrorism including 
international legal conventions outlawing specific acts, defensive measures, 
addressing the causes of terrorism, articulating a policy of no concessions, 
economic sanctions, prosecution of perpetrators, preemption, disruption, and 
the use of military retaliation (Tucker, 1997: 72).  This paper will focus on the 
use of force because, in addition to being controversial, it illustrates one area 
of foreign policy making where the President encounters few real constraints 
imposed by the other branches of government.   
Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought regarding modern 
approaches to combating international terrorism by liberal democracies.  One 
approach is to categorize international terrorism as not “merely” criminal 
activity, but as a national security threat.  According to this view, if 
international terrorism is truly a national security threat, then the use of military 
force to protect the nation is warranted.  Long before the second Bush 
administration used military force in response to the 9/11 attacks, George 
Shultz (Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989 under Reagan) advocated 
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proactive measures against state sponsors of terrorism and terrorists involving 
the preemptive use of military force.  
On the other hand, academics like Paul Wilkinson represent the other 
school of thought.  He warned that liberal democracies should avoid a “total 
militarization of Western response” to terrorism because it would “encourage 
the very anarchy in which terrorism flourishes.” (Wilkinson, 1986: 299)  
Wilkinson was careful to differentiate the skilful and targeted “utilisation of the 
military within a carefully controlled overall judicial” response to terrorism 
(which he approved of) with the “world war against terrorism” approach 
favoured by some members of the Reagan administration and prominent think 
tanks.  The use of judicial methods means pursuing international terrorists 
with enhanced police work and security cooperation leading to the arrest and 
trial of the perpetrators or their extradition.  Often this approach is derided by 
its detractors as a law enforcement paradigm which fails to adequately 
address the national security issues faced by the victim country.  How 
influential members of an administration viewed international terrorism (is it 
criminal activity or war?) naturally affected the administration’s 
counterterrorism policies and responses to acts of terrorism. 
 Another challenge posed by the subject matter of this research is the 
fact that terrorism as a tactic is not static.  Indeed, international terrorism 
changed significantly from Ronald Reagan’s administration in the 1980’s when 
the focus was on state-sponsored terrorism to the Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism that dominated the Bush II administration.  Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 
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trace the changing nature of the terrorist threat faced by the four 
administrations.   
International Legal Norms and the Use of Force 
  The phrase “use of force” in this work refers to either the employment 
of military force by a state against another state or a group of non-state armed 
bands or insurgents who are engaged in international terrorism.  The use of 
force may involve a threat to use force, naval blockade or reprisal; it includes, 
but is not limited to, resorting to war.  The term “use of force” is thus broader 
than the technical term “war” because war is “a contention between two or 
more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each 
other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.” (Dinstein, 
2001:4) As discussed below, the UN Charter goes beyond forbidding the 
recourse to war; it also prohibits member states from using force and 
threatening to use force. 
One of the larger issues surrounding the use of force against terrorist 
organizations is the problem that the UN Charter was intended to apply to 
nation states and not to non-state agents, such as al Qaeda, because the 
greatest threat to world peace in 1945 (when the Charter was written) was the 
potential of aggression from hostile states.  The menace of state-sponsored 
terrorism and the potential of catastrophic terrorism with large numbers of 
casualties were not upper most in the minds of those who drafted the UN 
Charter. 
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  As World War II ended in 1945, much of Europe and parts of the Far 
East were in ruins; the scale of the destruction and human suffering led 
governments around the world to a consensus that the international 
community required better methods of restraining the use of force and 
promoting peaceful relations among States.  The United Nations was founded 
at the end of the war and one of its main purposes is the maintenance of 
“international peace and security” (Preamble, UN Charter).  The Security 
Council, whose permanent members included the victors of the war and 
China, was designed to have “primary responsibility” for this. (Art. 24, UN 
Charter)  Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN was supposed to have 
its own standing army to respond to threats to the peace but this never 
materialized. (Gray, 2004:195)  The concept was “collective security,” the 
institution of communal commitments whereby states undertake to join in 
common actions against those which threaten the territorial integrity or political 
independence of other states. (Evans and Newnham, 1998:77)  
The formal scheme of collective security under Chapter VII was not put 
into action because after the Second World War ended, the U.S. and the 
USSR disagreed profoundly on political, economic, and military matters and 
the “Cold War” which ensued prevented cooperation at the UN.   The 
permanent members of the Security Council were able to use their veto (or 
simply threaten to use it) to prevent the effective functioning of the UN 
collective security system.  Although no major conflict as large as the Second 
World War occurred after the creation of the UN, many smaller conflicts, civil 
wars, and wars of national liberation erupted and shattered the initial optimism 
about the UN system.  Particularly relevant as far as the effort to combat 
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terrorism goes, one of the system’s shortcomings is its emphasis on inter-
state conflicts, leaving the norms regulating non-state actors somewhat 
ambiguous. 
  Outside of Chapter VII, the most important articles regulating the use 
of force are articles 2(4) and 51.  From the start of the UN era, there was 
disagreement on how article 2(4) and the prohibition on the use of force 
should be interpreted.  Some scholars believed that this article “reflected 
existing customary international law” while others saw the same article as a 
“radical departure from previous customary law, to be narrowly interpreted.”  
(Gray, 2004:29)  The debate centers on the phrase at the end of article 2(4), 
i.e. “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN.”  It remains 
unsettled as to whether that prohibits all uses of force against another state, or 
merely using force when the goal is the overthrow of another state’s 
government or the acquisition of the territory of another state.  (Franck, 2002; 
Gray, 2004) 
  States and different scholars applied various interpretations of article 
2(4) since the creation of the UN Charter.  For example, in 1983, President 
Reagan ordered the U.S. invasion of Grenada and tried to justify the use of 
force.  In debates in the Security Council, the U.S. suggested that article 2(4) 
should not be interpreted in isolation; rather it was appropriate to view the 
article as providing “justification for the use of force in pursuit of other values 
also inscribed in the Charter, such values as freedom, democracy, peace.” 
(Gray, 2004:31)  This interpretation of article 2(4) is not widely shared by other 
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states, and the U.S. bolstered its argument regarding the invasion of Grenada 
by relying on “the right to protect its nationals in danger and on an invitation by 
the Governor-General of Grenada,” suggesting that the U.S. realized its 
interpretation of 2(4) was controversial. (Gray, 2004:31) 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention illustrates the continuing 
debate over the correct interpretation of article 2(4).  Humanitarian 
intervention is “the use of armed forces by a State, a group of States or an 
international organization” to prevent or alleviate widespread suffering or 
death. (Evans and Newnham, 1998:231)  Until the 1990’s the doctrine was not 
used widely by states to justify their uses of force and “during the Cold War it 
was writers rather than states that argued in favour of the doctrine.” (Gray, 
2004:32)   
Two other significant debates about the proper interpretation of article 
2(4) follow similar lines of argument.  The first, the use of force to ensure 
democratic government in a particular state (known as “pro-democratic 
intervention”) and the second, the use of force to further the right of a people 
to self-determination, produced bitter divisions among states whenever one 
country attempted to use them as justification for the use of force.  For 
instance, some American writers in the 1980’s postulated that the breakdown 
of the UN collective security system in the Cold War resulted in a situation 
where article 2(4) should be read as permitting the use of force “to further 
world public order and to justify pro-democratic invasions by the USA.”  (Gray, 
2004:50)  These writers were associated with the “Neorealists” and 
proponents of the Reagan Doctrine and, not surprisingly, their theories about 
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the limits on article 2(4) were not widely accepted outside of the USA. 
(Scheffer, 1989:11) 
The right of a people to self-determination sparked a great deal of 
controversy as national liberation movements used force to expel colonial 
powers; occasionally other states assisted them in their pursuit of 
independence.  The General Assembly made no mention of the use of force in 
its fist major resolution on the right to decolonization, the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples in 1960. (Gray, 2004)  
“Deliberate ambiguity” was the only means to arrive at a consensus regarding 
UN declarations on the self-determination of peoples. (Gray, 2004)  The USA, 
along with many former colonial powers, opposed any express authority to 
allow the use of force in the struggle for self-determination.  The debate over 
the use of force to pursue self-determination has lost much of its significance 
now that the decolonization process is almost complete, but it is relevant 
regarding the Palestinians’ claims for statehood.  Some countries, for 
example, Lebanon and Syria, refuse to condemn Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization partially because they believe it is struggling for Palestinian self-
determination against Israel. 
 Any discussion of the use of force under the UN Charter must include 
the debates surrounding article 51, which provides states with the “inherent” 
right of individual or collective self-defence.  While collective security under 
Chapter VII could be invoked “whenever the Security Council determines that 
there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression,” individual or collective self-defence is allowed only in response to 
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an armed attack.  (Dinstein, 2001:250) State practice since 1945 shows a 
tendency for countries to invoke self-defence under article 51 rather than 
attempt a justification for using force under 2(4). Indeed, that was the pattern 
of the four U.S. administrations in this study. The scope of the right of self-
defence and certain doctrines such as anticipatory self-defence have been 
debated since the Charter was signed. (Dinstein, 2001:159)  The Bush 
doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence only exacerbated the controversies. 
 There are two main camps regarding article 51; those writers “who 
support a wide right of self-defence going beyond the right to respond to an 
armed attack” and those who argue that the right is a narrow exception to the 
norm in article 2(4) which only arises after an armed attack occurs. (Gray, 
2004:98)  The issues are whether the UN Charter preserves customary 
international law on self-defence and if so, exactly what was that law in 1945?  
In addition, what constitutes an “armed attack” triggering the right to self-
defence?  It has been argued that a large scale terrorist attack, similar to the 
9/11 attack, involving nuclear devices, would qualify as an “armed attack” 
giving the victim state the right to defend itself.  Furthermore, the right of 
individual self-defence is not always treated in the same way as collective self-
defence even though the distinction between them may not be clear in 
practice. 
The U.S. relied on the concept of collective self-defence to justify using 
force against Nicaragua in the 1980’s; in that instance, the U.S. claimed it was 
using force to protect El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras.  In a famous 
case brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1986, Nicaragua 
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argued that the U.S. had violated article 2(4) by supporting the military and 
paramilitary activities of the contras opposing the government.  The ICJ had to 
consider whether this was justified under article 51 as collective self-defence.  
In a decision that has been widely discussed and disputed, the Court decided 
that U.S. aid to the contras in “recruiting, training, arming, equipping, 
financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding and 
directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua was a 
breach of the prohibition against the use of force.”  (Nicaragua v. United 
States, ICJ Reports, 1986:14)   
 Two other doctrines related to self-defence under article 51 have 
generated considerable debate, even though they are rarely used in practice.  
The first, the use of force to rescue nationals in a foreign country without that 
country’s consent, occurred in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 when Israeli forces 
rescued Israeli citizens who were held on a hijacked plane.  During the 
Security Council debate on the matter, Israel argued that the use of force was 
justified as the protection of its nationals abroad after an “armed attack,” i.e. 
the hijacking occurred.  Only a few states such as the US, the UK, and Israel 
accept that a legal right to protect nationals abroad exists. (Gray, 2004:127) 
 The second doctrine is the concept of anticipatory self-defence, which 
occurs when states claim the right to take action in anticipation of an attack, 
not merely in response to an attack which has started.  (Dinstein, 2001:164)  
Only a few states, notably the U.S. and Israel, defend the right to use force 
prior to their territory or forces being attacked and it is rare for this doctrine to 
be invoked.  (Gray, 2004:130)  The thesis research revealed that American 
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legal sources tend to accept that anticipatory self-defence is a valid 
international law doctrine, while non-American writers doubt whether it 
qualifies as a part of customary international law.  For example, a former legal 
advisor to the National Security Council, American James E. Baker, wrote, 
“the concept of anticipatory self-defense is generally accepted as black-letter 
law by most governments and scholars, notwithstanding” the ruling in the 
Nicaragua case.  (Baker, 2007:198)  In contrast, Christine Gray, a reader in 
international law at the University of Cambridge wrote, “It is only where no 
conceivable case can be made that there has been an armed attack that they 
(states) resort to anticipatory self-defence.  This reluctance expressly to 
invoke anticipatory self-defence is in itself a clear indication of the doubtful 
status of this justification for the use of force.”  (Gray, 2004:130) (emphasis 
added) 
Many scholars outside of the U.S. and Israel view anticipatory self-
defence as a dangerous concept because of the inherent difficulties in 
containing it.  If an “armed attack” has not occurred, how can one state be 
certain about the evidence an attack is about to happen?  How can the 
international community judge whether the intelligence presented by a state 
using force in anticipation of an armed attack was sufficient, and not just a 
subterfuge?  The right to take anticipatory action against a future attack is 
closely related to the Bush II administration’s elaboration of a doctrine of pre-
emptive or preventive war.  The issues presented by the Bush II 
administration’s use of these doctrines are explored further in later chapters. 
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 As the preceding discussion about articles 2(4) and 51 illustrates, 
there was controversy regarding the use of force under the UN Charter prior to 
9/11.  The subsequent reliance by the second Bush Administration on several 
controversial doctrines of international law to justify counterterrorism 
measures taken after the attacks only increased the unease with which other 
states viewed American activities.  This research will not attempt to categorize 
any particular administration’s use of force against terrorism as legal or illegal, 
but will instead describe, compare, and contrast the four administrations’ 
views on using force as a means to prevent terrorism.  As this thesis will tend 
to show, the administration of George W. Bush built its “war on terror” upon 
foundations from previous administrations, particularly the Reagan 
administration, and the pattern of executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance characterized all four administrations.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review  
 The purpose of this chapter is to critically review and identify areas of 
controversy in the literature that forms the basis for my research.  My research 
seeks to explore the context in which four administrations used force in 
response to international terrorism. To accomplish that effectively, it is 
necessary to examine the phenomenon of modern terrorism and one of the 
most important constraints on the executive branch of the U.S. government, 
i.e. law.  Legal constraints on the executive branch may be divided into two 
complementary but usually separate spheres: domestic legal sources that 
may limit what the executive may lawfully do; and international legal sources 
that may limit what the U.S. as a state may do lawfully under international law. 
 The first part of the chapter will focus on the literature discussing the 
modern forms of sub-state terrorism.  Many of the important contributions to 
the literature on terrorism came from scholarly journals such as Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism and Terrorism and Political Violence, or from 
international relations journals such as Foreign Affairs and Survival.  The 
second section will examine the legal sources and commentary, both legal 
and political, evaluating the executive branch’s ability to use force in the field 
of counterterrorism.  Both sections of the chapter will rely on several different 




 Some of the exhaustive literature on terrorism will be reviewed in this 
section although it is important to note that the topic of my research, which 
combines terrorism with legal constraints on the modern presidency, inevitably 
narrows the selection of literature on terrorism.  Scholarly works on the 
psychology of the factors influencing who may become a terrorist are not 
reviewed, nor are the numerous works exploring the important nexus between 
the media and terrorism, as they are not directly relevant to the overall 
research questions.  The research questions focus on non-state terrorism and 
the particular reactions of various administrations to acts committed by sub-
state agents against the U.S.  Therefore, cases of state terrorism where the 
state engages in terror for internal control or repression, or for external 
aggression, are by definition not part of this analysis.   In addition, it is 
tempting to organize the terrorism section chronologically with a “before 9/11” 
list and an “after 9/11” list of works based on the enormous impact that attack 
had on the literature about terrorism.  Indeed, one of the most prolific writers 
on terrorism prior to 9/11, Walter Laqueur, explained in his book No End to 
War that “After 9/11 there was a veritable explosion of books and articles on 
terrorism; on the first anniversary, many academic journal published special 
issues devoted to this subject, including both analysis and policy 
recommendations by leading political science theorists.  While this new 
interest in a hitherto neglected field was welcome, the value of these 
contributions was not obvious.  They reminded one all too often of a medical 
diagnosis by a leading physician of a patient with whom the doctor had had no 
29
direct contact.”  (Laqueur, 2003: 251-252).  The strictly chronological 
approach to literature on terrorism is not adopted here.   
Instead, the literature on terrorism after 1980 may be organized around 
the issue of whether the phenomenon of terrorism is properly categorized as 
an act of war, a criminal act, or something sui generis.  As illustrated in 
subsequent chapters, frequently, an administration’s policy preferences for 
counterterrorism are correlated to the administration’s views on whether 
international terrorism was best characterized as an act of war or a criminal 
act.  The year 1980 serves as a watershed of sorts because Ronald Reagan 
was elected in November of that year, partially as a result of the inability of 
President Carter to end the hostage crisis in Iran, which began on November 
4, 1979 when radical Islamic students took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran.  
Reagan, in contrast to Carter, was perceived by the American public as better 
able to handle international terrorism and promised a new policy of “swift and 
effective retribution” against terrorists, discussed in greater detail in the 
chapter on Reagan.  With Reagan’s election, writers analyzing international 
terrorism and policy makers in his administration began referring to acts of 
terrorism as acts of war.  Since that time, the argument has been that acts of 
war require different and more militarized responses than criminal acts. 
Most of the terrorism literature begins with a chronicle of the struggle to 
define terrorism; as noted in the introduction, there are at least 109 definitions.  
Alex Schmid, one of the early scholars on terrorism, developed a definition 
based on academic consensus which is widely used and quoted: 
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Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to 
assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. 
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes 
between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets 
are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending 
on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
(Schmid, 1988: 28) 
 Walter Laqueur, another early scholar of terrorism, wrote of his long-
standing scepticism that a definition of terrorism was possible in light of the 
heavy social and political consequences tied to the use of the word.  
According to Laqueur, “The character of terrorism tended to change in time 
and space.  What was true for one terrorism movement in a certain country 
during a given period did not necessarily apply to a group in another country, 
at another time, heir to different politics and traditions.”  (Laqueur, 2003: 139)  
In his book on the subject, Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman traced the 
changing meaning of terrorism from the French Revolution to modern times, 
noting that the term has acquired negative connotations to the point where 
modern terrorist groups try to avoid being labelled as “terrorists.”  Hoffman 
also articulated a definition of state-sponsored terrorism, a term that became 
quite important during the Reagan administration.  According to Hoffman, 
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state-sponsored terrorism is “the active and often clandestine support, 
encouragement and assistance provided by a foreign government to a terrorist 
group.”  (Hoffman, 1998: 23)  
Other scholars have pointed out the obvious truism that generally 
speaking, like pornography, people know terrorism when they see it.  Some 
have even questioned the utility of the long quest for a definition of terrorism, 
preferring instead to focus on its main characteristics.  These typically include 
the following: 
• Demonstrative use of violence 
• Threat of further violence 
• Deliberate production of terror in a target group 
• Frequent targeting of civilians and non-combatants
• Purpose is to intimidate, coerce, or spread propaganda 
• Act is predominantly political 
• Act is a tool of psychological warfare  (Schmid, 2005: 140) 
Martha Crenshaw, another early scholar of terrorism who examined the 
National Liberation Front and the use of terrorism during the Algerian war 
against France, began Terrorism in Context by noting, “Attempts to specify the 
unique qualities of terrorism and to establish the boundaries between 
terrorism and other forms of political violence invariably provoke dispute.”  
(Crenshaw, 1995: 4)  She correctly highlighted the point that terrorism is 
related to the social, political, and economic environment but the links 
between violence and historical conditions vary and “no analyst would claim 
that specified sets of conditions invariably produce terrorism.”  (Ibid)  After 
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decades of teaching courses on terrorism, Crenshaw joined the Center for 
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and edited a 
book in 2010 about the costs of counter-terrorism.  The Consequences of 
Counterterrorism compared the reactions of various states such as the UK, 
France, Germany, Spain, Japan, and Israel to acts of terrorism to explore the 
costs and benefits of different approaches to counterterrorism.   
Some of the scholars of terrorism in the 1970’s and 1980’s began to 
explore other aspects of the problem, reasoning that if the phenomenon of 
terrorism could not be defined with enough precision to satisfy social 
scientists, politicians, and the public, then other aspects of terrorism merited 
analysis.  For example, Walter Reich, a former psychiatrist at the National 
Institute of Mental Health, edited an important book entitled Origins of 
Terrorism examining the psychologies of terrorism.  In his book, Reich, a 
senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, acknowledged the 
utility of studying psychological accounts of terrorism but nevertheless 
cautioned that it was “futile” to “attribute simple, global, and general 
psychological characteristics to all terrorists and all terrorisms.”  (Reich, 1998: 
263)  After the 9/11 attacks and other attacks involving suicide terrorism, 
scholars such as Robert Pape at the University of Chicago built on Reich’s 
approach and explored suicide terrorism campaigns from 1980 to 2003.  In his 
book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Pape 
distinguished suicide terrorism from demonstrative or destructive terrorism 
and argued that at the strategic level, suicide terrorism was intended to exert 
coercive power on democracies to cease a foreign occupation.  Thus, the high 
rates of suicide attacks against American troops since 9/11 were best 
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explained, according to Pape, not by the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, 
but rather as responses to foreign military occupation. 
 Other scholarly works on terrorism have focused on how states 
respond to sub-national terrorism by noting the asymmetric nature of the 
violence employed and its effect on the victim state.  In an influential article in 
the July 1975 issue of Foreign Affairs, David Fromkin detailed the strategy of 
terrorism, noting that it is a “sort of jujitsu” in which an opponent’s own 
strength is used against him by the terrorist group.  “By itself, . . . terror can 
accomplish nothing in terms of political goals; it can only aim at obtaining a 
response that will achieve those goals for it.”  (Fromkin, 1975: 11)  Decades 
before the second Bush administration launched a “war on terror” in response 
to 9/11, Fromkin was insightfully focusing on the critical question of how to 
respond to terrorism without inadvertently achieving the goals of the terrorists.  
My research incorporates Fromkin’s analysis and examines how the use of 
force, usually perceived as an American strength, may result in unintended 
and largely negative results in the four administrations.  The question of 
appropriate response to terrorism, which underlies Fromkin’s article, arises 
throughout the four administrations and guided the research. 
  Other noted scholars of terrorism have attempted to explain the 
origins of terrorism by exploring the history and specific actors engaged in 
terrorism.  For example, J. Bowyer Bell meticulously interviewed many actors 
involved with the IRA in Ireland and then wrote a history of the IRA entitled 
The Secret Army.  In addition, he also extensively interviewed many involved 
in the Jewish underground in Palestine and the formation of Israel when he 
wrote Terror out of Zion.  His last book was Murders on the Nile: The World 
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Trade Center and Global Terror in which he sought to explain the emergence 
of jihadi defined as “fundamentals who insist that an armed crusade against 
either the corrupt Islamic regimes or the infidels, especially the West and the 
United States in particular, is the only way to achieve a just Islamic society.”  
(Bell, 2003: 181)  According to Bell’s analysis, many of the answers can be 
found in the last one hundred years of history in Egypt where sheikhs and 
imams have been preaching holy war as a means of creating a perfect Islamic 
society.  Bell identified Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called “blind 
sheikh” imprisoned for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as a 
particularly potent source of the anti-Western rhetoric and inspiration for 
terrorist conspiracies against the U.S. and its allies.  However, one 
shortcoming of Bell’s last book is his neglect of the discussion of the range of 
appropriate responses to the religiously inspired terrorists confronting the 
American government and its allies. 
The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism by Sean Anderson and Stephen 
Sloan provided a useful reference guide for the study of terrorism; the third 
edition of 2009 included valuable information about al Qaeda and its related 
affiliates.  It also included a discussion of the role of the internet in the 
changing face of terrorism.  The authors based their dictionary on a typology, 
which divided the types of terrorist objectives into three categories: repressive, 
revolutionary, and limited, and classified types of terrorist actors as state, 
revolutionary, or entrepreneurial.  (Anderson and Sloan, 2009: 20)   They also 
meticulously set forth a list of abbreviations and a chronology of terrorist 
incidents and personalities, along with an extensive bibliography to guide 
research. 
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 Long before terrorism became a popular topic for research, Brian 
Jenkins was examining aspects of terrorism and groups that embraced it while 
advising RAND about the implications of terrorism.  Jenkins is well known for 
his analysis and for his pre-9/11 quote that “terrorists want a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead” which correctly summarized the desire of 
terrorist groups in the 1970’s and 1980’s for publicity.  He frequently noted the 
relationship between communications technology and the rise in modern 
terrorism.  Beginning in 1974, he examined the possibility of “nuclear 
terrorism,” the frightening prospect that terrorists might use a nuclear weapon 
either to blackmail governments, or simply for maximum shock value on 
civilian populations unprepared for nuclear war.  Although the prospects and 
potential of WMD use by terrorists are beyond the scope of the current 
research, the use of WMD as a reason to expand the war on terror into Iraq is 
central to the history of the second Bush administration.  In this context, 
Jenkins’ book Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? which was written in 2008, was 
illuminating for its ability to discuss rationally the threat of nuclear terrorism.  In 
addition, the book draws attention to the debilitating effects of fear on the 
formulation and implementation of effective counterterrorism policy.  Jenkins 
writes, “After 9/11, the government relentlessly promoted a message of fear, 
declaring that next time around, terrorists could be armed with nuclear 
weapons.”  (Jenkins, 2008: 213)  He contrasts this message of fear with 
Franklin Roosevelt’s assurances in an earlier age that “the only thing we have 
to fear is fear itself.”  (Ibid)  Building on Jenkins’ work, this research expands 
on the second Bush administration’s use of the general public’s fears 
regarding WMD possession by al Qaeda in the chapters on George W. Bush. 
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The Crime versus War Dichotomy 
 As the number of terrorists incidents involving Americans or American 
interests expanded in the late 1970’s, the search for effective 
countermeasures became more urgent.  Some scholars and policy-makers in 
the U.S. and Israel began to advocate for more forceful responses due, in 
part, to their view of terrorism as more like a war, with its signature violence 
and indiscriminate killing, than a crime, where the primary motive is often 
economic.  According to this view, treating terrorism as a crime (and by 
implication, terrorists as criminals) was ignoring its true nature and was not 
effective because it would preclude proactive measures which were necessary 
to protect the institutions of the state and retain public confidence in the 
workings of government.  An example of the literature advocating a fully 
militarized response to terrorism, based on the assumption that terrorists are 
actually waging a war is Terrorism: How the West Can Win (1987), edited by 
Binyamin Netanyahu, the current prime minister of Israel.  According to 
Netanyahu, states that are “neutral” regarding international terrorism need to 
be forced to take a stand against it; foreshadowing President George W. 
Bush’s words, you’re either with us or against us. Netanyahu wrote there is no 
“middle ground of neutrality” in the war against terrorism.  (Netanyahu, 1987: 
219)  The salience of the crime versus war debate was renewed after the 
September 11 attacks with many policy-makers in the Bush II administration, 
like those in the Reagan administration, clearly viewing terrorism as an act of 
war, requiring much more than the “ordinary law enforcement” approaches.  
 Many of the authors of literature on terrorism discussed previously 
mention the problem of formulating appropriate responses to acts of terrorism, 
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but none dissects and analyzes this issue in as much depth as Paul Wilkinson 
did in his numerous books and articles.  The problem of how a liberal 
democracy such as the United States should response to acts of international 
terrorism lies at the heart of this research, so Wilkinson’s analysis was 
particularly important to the overall direction of this thesis.  The books 
Terrorism and the Liberal State (1977 and 1986) and Terrorism versus 
Democracy: the Liberal State Response (2001 and 2006) were especially 
useful in reviewing the use of force by the four administrations in this study.  
As some members of the Reagan administration began to call for forceful 
military responses to international terrorism and Reagan himself announced a 
“war” on terrorism early in the 1980’s, Wilkinson rejected such an approach as 
counter-productive.  According to Wilkinson, “there were some strident voices 
in Washington demanding what was misleadingly called ‘proactive’ measures 
against such states (referring to states that sponsor terrorism), by which was 
apparently meant the bombing of terrorist training centres and bases, or even 
the removal of the regime by force.  If such dangerous policies were ever 
implemented they would not eradicate international terrorism.  They would 
only succeed in substituting the greater evil of full-scale war, with all its 
attendant death and devastation and dangers of escalation, for the lesser evil 
of terrorism.”  (Wilkinson, 1986: 282-283)  
 Long before al Qaeda dominated the literature on terrorism, Wilkinson 
studied the conundrum facing liberal democracies confronted by sustained 
campaigns of terrorism: how to protect and defend the democratic institutions 
of the state against terrorists without sacrificing essential liberties and the rule 
of law in the process.  His advice to democratic states was to maintain 
democratic institutions without over-reacting to the threat of terrorism and not 
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to rely exclusively on “military solutions” which would “encourage the very 
anarchy in which terrorism flourishes.”  (Wilkinson, 1986: 299)  In the second 
edition of Terrorism versus Democracy, Wilkinson examined post 9/11 efforts 
to combat terrorism and noted that there were three dimensions to 
counterterrorism: the use of politics and diplomacy; the use of law 
enforcement and criminal justice systems; and the role of the military.  
(Wilkinson, 2006: 61)  Unlike other commentators who view these dimensions 
as “alternative models,” Wilkinson clearly maintained they were not mutually 
exclusive and should be skilfully applied together.  (Ibid)  In addition, he 
cautioned against “under-reaction,” or toleration of terrorism, and “draconian 
overreaction, leading to serious infringement of civil liberties.”  (Wilkinson, 
2006: 203)  He also reaffirmed the principles he first identified in Terrorism 
and the Liberal State as instrumental in improving measures against terrorism; 
these include defeating terrorism within the “framework of the rule of law and 
the democratic process” and bringing terrorists to justice “by prosecution and 
conviction before courts of law.”  (Wilkinson, 2006: 207)  Thus, while 
acknowledging that the armed forces could be useful in counterterrorism, 
Wilkinson remained firmly convinced that waging “world war against terrorism” 
was the wrong approach.   
 Another noted academic in the field of terrorism who counselled 
against the war paradigm, Louise Richardson, was “struck by how futile 
counterterrorist policies are likely to be when they are based on a view of 
terrorists as one-dimensional evildoers.” (Richardson, 2007: xii)  In her book, 
What Terrorists Want, Richardson criticized the “war on terror” approach of 
the second Bush administration and examined the motives of terrorists with 
the objective of better formulating more effective responses to terrorist 
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campaigns.  According to Richardson, “terrorists are motivated by both long-
term political objectives and short-term immediate objectives and that the 
most powerful of these are the three Rs of Revenge, Renown, and Reaction” 
(exacting revenge, attaining renown, and eliciting a reaction).  (Richardson, 
2007: 106)  She argued that the “war on terror” could never be won and that 
by responding to the 9/11 attacks with a declaration of war, the Bush II 
administration “played right into the hands of the terrorists.”  (Richardson, 
2007: 199)  Instead of a “war on terror” reaction, Richardson advised the U.S. 
government to pursue a more nuanced approach, which was based upon 
other countries’ experiences with terrorist campaigns and incorporated the 
following rules: 
• Have a defensible and achievable goal 
• Live by your principles 
• Know your enemy 
• Separate the terrorists from their communities 
• Engage others in countering terrorists with you 
• Have patience and keep your perspective 
(Richardson, 2007: 200-239).  As the chapters on George W. Bush document, 
the likelihood of the administration pursuing this approach was extremely 
limited due to the high concentration of administration members who 
articulated the parameters of the problem as one of waging war.   
Richardson evaluated counterterrorism from a pragmatic point of view 
asking the question, what works best in combating terrorism?   However, this 
is not the only way an administration formulates counterterrorism policy, which 
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is part of its overall foreign and security policies.  Other goals such as 
projecting U.S. power around the globe or enlarging the powers of the 
executive branch may be combined with the goal of eliminating terrorist 
attacks.  In this regard, the counterterrorism objectives of members of the 
second Bush administration, particularly Vice President Cheney, are relevant 
and will be discussed in latter chapters.   
Abraham Sofaer is one of the most prolific writers on the subject of 
terrorism and the law; he was the Legal Advisor to the Department of State 
from 1985 to 1990 and heavily influenced the Reagan administration’s views 
on the use of force in response to international terrorism.  In the 1980’s he 
was critical of UN efforts to agree on international methods to reduce 
terrorism; in an article in Foreign Affairs Sofaer wrote, “international law has 
been systematically and intentionally fashioned to give special treatment to, or 
to leave unregulated, those activities that cause and are the source of most 
acts of international terror.”  (Sofaer, 1986: 922)  Sofaer also justified the use 
of force by the Reagan administration when it bombed Libya in April 1986 as 
an act of self-defence arguing, “National self-defense is the only protection 
against the criminal state.”  (Ibid)  Sofaer and Reagan’s Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, foreshadowed proponents of “going on the offense” against 
terrorism in the second Bush administration when they advocated an “active 
defense” against terrorism, arguing that the U.S. could lawfully use force to 
prevent, preempt, and deter further attacks.  It remains unclear to what extent 
the option of “going on the offensive” or an “active defense” is available to 
states other than the United States. 
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 After the 9/11 attacks, Sofaer, now at the Hoover Institution, 
supported the Bush II administration’s embrace of the concept of preventive 
action with the “objective of preventing terrorist threats before they are 
realized---rather than primarily treating terrorism as a crime warranting 
punishment after the fact.”   (Sofaer, 2010a: 109)  He criticized the UN Charter 
rules on the use of force as inadequate in light of modern realities and non-
state actors because, in Sofaer’s view, these rules “effectively protect 
terrorists, proliferators, and irresponsible states.”  (Sofaer, 2010a: 111)  His 
solution was to propose a set of “guidelines” that, while not strictly lawful 
under UN Charter rules, remain true to the Charter’s purposes of maintaining 
peace and security.  Under Sofaer’s guidelines on the use of preventive force, 
a state could use force against non-state actors in a foreign state without 
permission to prevent a terrorist attack even if there is no UN authorization as 
long as the use of force complies with the overall purposes of the UN Charter.  
His book, The Best Defense? Legitimacy & Preventive Force expanded upon 
these guidelines.  While Sofaer’s analysis was facially persuasive in that it 
was based broadly on UN Charter purposes, the flaw lies in the fundamental 
notion of what state should properly judge the appropriateness of the 
application of preventive force (Nemo iudex in causa sua: no one should be a 
judge in their own cause).  The implicit premise of Sofaer’s guidelines allowed 
the U.S. (not the international community speaking through the UN) to judge 
the appropriateness of its own use of force, a prospect that, if accepted by the 
international community, could shift the use of force regime perilously back to 
pre-UN Charter days. 
 Two books, which had relatively little impact in academic circles, but a 
larger effect on policy-makers, are The Terror Network by Claire Sterling and 
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Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America by 
Laurie Mylroie.  Both books remain controversial and were used by various 
administration officials to articulate the terrorism-as-war paradigm to advocate 
forceful military measures in response to terrorism.  The first book, The Terror 
Network, was written in 1981 by an American expatriate journalist who 
theorized that there was an international terrorist network operating worldwide 
that received extensive aid from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.  The 
CIA had long noted the trend towards greater cooperation among certain 
terrorist organizations including, for example, the Baader-Meinhof Gang and 
Black September.  However, Sterling went further than this in The Terror 
Network, arguing that there was more than cooperation; the Soviet Union was 
using terror to fight the West by proxy.  States such as Libya, Iran, and Syria 
were being aided by the communist world to wield terrorism as an instrument 
of foreign policy.  According to Sterling, “The terrorists’ primary value to the 
Kremlin lay in their resolute efforts to weaken and demoralize, confuse, 
humiliate, frighten, paralyze, and if possible dismantle the West’s democratic 
societies.”  (Sterling, 1981: 277)  For Sterling, Libya’s Qaddafi was the “Daddy 
Warbucks of terrorism.”  (Sterling, 1981: chapter 14)  This complemented the 
Reagan administration’s view that Libya under Qaddafi was one of the most 
dangerous state sponsors of terror.  William Casey, the first CIA director 
during Reagan’s administration, not only admired Sterling’s book but also 
strongly advocated treating international terrorism as warfare. 
 The second book, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished 
War Against America, was published in 2001 by the controversial author 
Laurie Mylroie who once advised President Clinton during his 1992 election 
campaign.  She later joined the conservative American Enterprise Institute as 
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an adjunct fellow and once held faculty positions at Harvard University and the 
U.S. Naval War College.  Mylroie co-wrote Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in 
the Gulf in 1990.  Mylroie’s books were often cited by neoconservatives as 
evidence that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to the U.S. because 
her 2001 book argued that Hussein was behind the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center, in addition to several other failed plots to destroy the 
Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York City.  According to Mylroie, Saddam 
Hussein was the predominant threat because he was engaged in an 
undercover war of terrorism against the U.S.  This was contrary to the views of 
some terrorism experts in the 1990’s who wrote about a “new” kind of terrorist 
threat emanating from Islamic fundamentalists.  These experts discounted the 
possibility of Iraqi state sponsorship of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.  
However, Mylroie theorized that, Abdul Basit, also known as Ramzi Yousef, 
one of the men convicted for the 1993 WTC bombing, was an Iraqi intelligence 
operative, thereby illustrating Saddam Hussein’s continuing desire to sponsor 
terrorism and hurt the U.S. with terrorist strikes.  Her theories were heavily 
criticized, even by some analysts who argued that there were important ties 
between Iraq and radical Islamists. 
 Despite the criticism levelled at Mylroie’s theories, they continued to 
exert influence on policy-makers in the second Bush administration.  In his 
book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke, the counterterrorism coordinator 
for both the Clinton administration and Bush II administration, detailed how 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz relied on Mylroie’s theory of a 
Saddam Hussein-1993 WTC bombing connection to argue that there must be 
Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks.  (Clarke, 2004: 232)  Clarke 
was incredulous that Mylroie’s theories would get a serious hearing by any 
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one in a position to influence national security policy.  Peter Bergen, reviewing 
the events that resulted in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 in The Longest 
War, examined the role of Mylroie’s theories on Iraqi involvement in anti-
American terrorism.  He called Mylroie’s views a “unified-field theory of 
terrorism” that heavily influenced members of the Bush II cabinet including 
Rumsfeld and Cheney.  (Bergen, 2011: 135)    This occurred despite the fact 
that the U.S. State Department concluded in 2000 that Iraq did not attempt 
any “anti-Western attack since its failed attempt to assassinate former 
President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.”  (Bergen, 2011: 136)  In light of these 
facts, Bergen posed the question of whether the neoconservatives in the Bush 
II administration were genuinely convinced by Mylroie, or whether they 
approved of her theory of an Iraqi-terrorism link because the theory fit very 
well with their desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein. (Ibid)  In any event, 
Mylroie’s opinions formed part of the academic foundations for the war in Iraq.   
Literature on al Qaeda 
 The literature examining the origins, goals, and composition of al 
Qaeda and other religiously motivated terrorist movements increased 
dramatically after the September 11 attacks, as scholars and others sought to 
capitalize on the interest in terrorism generated by the tragedy.  Not all the 
literature is of the same quality and my emphasis is on the reactions of various 
administrations to international terrorism, so this section is, by necessity, only 
a small selection of works about al Qaeda that was instrumental to this 
research.  The first piece of literature provided background and context to the 
establishment of al Qaeda as the top national security threat facing the Bush II 
administration.  Steve Coll won a Pulitzer Prize in 2005 for his in-depth review 
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of the history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan; the book is entitled Ghost 
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.  No other piece of recent literature 
examined and documented the covert wars and secret operations in 
Afghanistan as well as this book.  Coll, currently President at the New America 
Foundation, explained how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 sparked American interest in helping the Afghan resistance expel the 
invaders.  American policy-makers in the 1980’s believed it was in the 
interests of the U.S. to fund and train the mujahedin who were fighting the 
better-equipped army of the Soviet Union; the potential of Islamic 
fundamentalism threatening the West was not appreciated until radical 
Islamists in the form of the Taliban were governing Afghanistan.  Coll detailed 
the response of presidents from Carter to George W. Bush to the complex 
history of Afghanistan and the role played by outside forces including the 
USSR and Pakistan.  Coll’s account, although quite thorough, did not attempt 
to offer any alternative models to the U.S. pattern of involvement in 
Afghanistan during the past 35 years.  
 On the other hand, Bruce Riedel offered policy options and preferred 
models for containing the threat posed by al Qaeda in his book, The Search 
for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future.  Now at the Brookings 
Institution, Riedel spent nearly 30 years in the CIA and participated in 
formulating national security policy on the Middle East and South Asia under 
several administrations.  Written in 2008, prior to the start of the Obama 
administration, The Search for Al Qaeda bluntly challenged some of the 
conventional wisdom supported by the Bush II administration regarding the 
threat from al Qaeda and its leadership.  For example, Riedel categorized the 
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war in Iraq as a “quagmire” (not, as President Bush called it, the central front 
in the war on terror) and noted that al Qaeda leaders’ objectives include 
draining the U.S. in “bleeding wars” in the same manner that the mujahedin 
defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  One of Riedel’s reasons for 
explaining al Qaeda and its ideology was his belief that knowledge of the 
enemy is an important first step in defeating it.  In this regard, Riedel wrote, 
“the public’s ignorance and vulnerability are a result of a decision by the 
George W. Bush administration not to clearly explain to the American people 
the nature of the enemy, namely al Qaeda.”  (Riedel, 2008: 2)  Throughout the 
book, Riedel maintained that failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue fed 
into Osama bin Laden’s narrative that the West was determined to subjugate 
Muslims and steal their lands.   
The contrast with the official position of the second Bush administration 
could not be starker: the administration always downplayed the significance of 
the Palestinian issue regarding al Qaeda’s motivations.  Another book 
challenging conventional wisdom about the motivations and operating 
methods of al Qaeda was Holy War, Inc. by Peter Bergen.  Like Riedel, 
Bergen attempted an in-depth examination of Osama bin Laden and his 
organization by accessing and utilizing bin Laden’s own words concerning his 
motivations and objectives.  Both Riedel and Bergen insisted in their books 
that al Qaeda declared war on the U.S. not because of disapproval of 
“American values,” but due to specific American policies in the Middle East. 
 Bergen also examined the organizational structure of al Qaeda and 
theorized that it was similar to a corporation that managed to merge the 
utilization of modern technology with an ideology built upon fundamentalist 
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Islam.  He opposed a simplistic application of the notion of a “clash of 
civilizations” from Samuel Huntington as an explanatory narrative for the rise 
of al Qaeda and argued that “treating ‘Islam’ as a monolith defies common 
sense.”  (Bergen, 2002: 228)  Bergen produced a notable television interview 
with bin Laden in 1997 for CNN in which bin Laden praised jihad against the 
U.S. and warned that civilians were suitable targets in his holy war.  (Bergen, 
2002: 20)  Currently Bergen is co-editor of the AfPak Channel, which is a joint 
publication of Foreign Policy magazine, and the New America Foundation.  
After Holy War, Inc., Bergen continued his analysis of al Qaeda in The Osama 
bin Laden I Know (an Oral History) in 2006 and The Longest War in 2011.  All 
three of these books provided nuanced details and context for this research.  
In addition, Bergen agreed to be interviewed for this thesis. 
Another work that examined the origins and structure of al Qaeda along 
with its ideology was written by Jason Burke, a British journalist with extensive 
experience in the Middle East.  Al Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam
explored the roots of Islamic militancy and described how a “key element” of al 
Qaeda’s successful discourse was the manner in which it “combines so many 
elements of preceding ideologies.”  (Burke, 2004: 40)  Burke noted that using 
the term “al Qaeda” is often a “messy and rough designation” for what has 
become, for many alienated Muslims, a methodology or precept for a way of 
seeing the world.  (Burke, 2004: 290)  The al Qaeda worldview both explains 
the current situation of political, economic, and social decay in some Islamic 
countries and presents a call to action that appeals to some Muslims 
attempting to understand the challenges of modernization and globalization.  
Burke, who wrote the book after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, was critical of the 
approach taken by the U.S. in the “war on terror.”  He cautioned, “every time 
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force is used it provides more evidence of a ‘clash of civilizations’ and a 
‘cosmic struggle’ and thus aids the militants in their effort to radicalize and 
mobilize.  By strengthening the warped vision of the world that is becoming so 
prevalent, every use of force is another small victory for bin Laden and those 
like him.”  (Ibid)  Taken together, the books by Peter Bergen and Jason Burke 
provided background information on al Qaeda, its various adherents, and its 
networks and offered extensive bibliographies and footnotes to facilitate 
further research.    
 In Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, 
edited and introduced by Bruce Lawrence, bin Laden’s actual speeches and 
writings were translated into English.  Lawrence commented in the 
introduction that bin Laden is “not an original thinker,” nor is he “an 
outstanding Qur’anic scholar.”  (Lawrence, 2005: xvi)  However, bin Laden 
does use “the authentic, compelling voice of a visionary, with what can only be 
called a powerful lyricism.”  (Lawrence, 2005: xvii)  Lawrence also argued that 
bin Laden had a “personal reputation for probity, austerity, dignity, and 
courage” that contrasted sharply for many Muslims with the “mismanagement” 
of most Arab regimes.  (Ibid)  The book began with bin Laden’s statement to 
religious leaders in Saudi Arabia about the “betrayal of Palestine” on 
December 29, 1994 and concluded with bin Laden’s December 16, 2004 
message to Muslims to “depose the tyrants” of various Muslim lands.  In his 
message to the people of Iraq on February 11, 2003, bin Laden was eerily 
accurate in his description of tactics that would endanger the American and 
allied troops in Iraq.  For example, bin Laden recommended, “dragging the 
enemy forces into a protracted, exhausting, close combat, making the most of 
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camouflaged defence positions in plains, farms, hills, and cities.”  (Lawrence, 
2005: 183)  According to bin Laden, “What the enemy fears most is urban and 
street warfare, in which heavy and costly human losses can be expected.”  
(Ibid)  He also praised “martyrdom operations” for their ability to inflict harm on 
the U.S. and its allies.  (Ibid)  Messages to the World: The Statements of 
Osama bin Laden conveyed the al Qaeda leader’s worldview and 
perspectives on the issues causing much of the political turmoil in the Middle 
East using bin Laden’s own words.  The book furnished important insights and 
sources for the research on al Qaeda. 
 In The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America, 
two former members of the National Security Council, Daniel Benjamin and 
Steven Simon, discussed the changing nature of international terrorism and 
provided insider details regarding the U.S. government’s efforts to track and 
contain the al Qaeda network.  The idea for their book began in 1999, when 
the threat of a “new” type of terrorism, that of a religiously-inspired and 
loosely-organized network, was not universally accepted by either terrorism 
experts or foreign relations commentators.  As noted above, many in the 
terrorism-as-war school of thought exemplified by Laurie Mylroie argued that 
state involvement was intricately part of any major incident of international 
terrorism directed against the U.S.  The tragedy of September 11 overtook 
their book proposal and the book that was subsequently written examined the 
acts and omissions that led to the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.  
Benjamin and Simon began the book with an intellectual history of al Qaeda 
and then detailed their work within the Clinton administration to contain it.  
Their discussions of the powers of the executive branch regarding 
counterterrorism are particularly relevant to the chapters on the Clinton and 
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Bush II administrations.  When the Bush II administration took over in January 
2001, according to Benjamin and Simon, problems recognizing the challenges 
posed by al Qaeda were acerbated by members of the new administration 
who “did not appreciate new threats such as terrorism that had arisen in the 
1990’s, and they were fixated on a missile defense system” (Benjamin and 
Simon, 2003: 336).    
In addition, characterizations of key agencies tasked with terrorism 
prevention and detection are revealing in The Age of Sacred Terror. For 
example, they wrote, “Of the core agencies in the counterterrorism 
community, the one least troubled by the rise of al-Qaeda was the FBI.”  
(Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 296)  Incidents illustrative of the FBI culture pre-
9/11 are also part of Lawrence Wright’s book, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda 
and the Road to 9/11.  According to Wright, Louis Freeh, the FBI director from 
1993 until June 2001, “was bored by technology.  One of his first actions on 
taking office in 1993 was to jettison the computer on the desk.  The bureau 
was technologically crippled even before Freeh arrived, but by the time he left 
not even church groups would accept the vintage FBI computers as 
donations.”  (Wright, 2006: 237)  Wright’s book traced the lives of some of the 
most important men in the al Qaeda movement including theoreticians such 
as Sayyid Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in addition to an examination of what 
the U.S. government did and failed to do in the decade prior to the 9/11 
attacks.  Taken together The Age of Sacred Terror and The Looming Tower
provide important, detailed information about the causes of 9/11, the al Qaeda 
network, and the counterterrorism strategies pursued by the Clinton and Bush 
II administrations. 
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The ultimate, official source on the 9/11 attacks remains The 9/11 
Commission Report published in 2004 by the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.  A companion book is The 9/11 
Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission, which contains selected 
excerpts from the House-Senate joint inquiry report on 9/11 and testimony 
from key witnesses such as CIA Director George Tenet and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice.  Both books resulted from sustained pressure on 
the Bush II administration applied by the families of victims to investigate the 
9/11 tragedy.  With their extensive notes and appendixes, both books were 
invaluable to the research in this thesis.  The chairpersons of the 9/11 
Commission were Thomas Kean, a Republican, and Lee Hamilton, a 
Democrat, and this is a symptom of a larger problem with the Commission: it 
was intended to be strictly bipartisan to garner maximum support from all 
sides of the political spectrum.  The tendency throughout the report is to 
evenly criticize both the Clinton and Bush II administrations for “system 
failures” which led to the 9/11 attacks.  In essence, the effect of blaming the 
“system” is to blame everyone slightly, while avoiding outright blame on any 
person or administration.  Richard Clarke, former head of counterterrorism at 
the National Security Council, wrote in the New York Times, “because the 
commission had a goal of creating a unanimous report from a bipartisan 
group, it softened the edges and left it to the public to draw many 
conclusions.”  (Clarke, 2004a)  According to Clarke, one of the “obvious 
truths” was that the Bush II administration “did little on terrorism before 9/11.”  
(Ibid) 
  Moreover, other critics charge that The 9/11 Commission Report was 
too deferential to President Bush and Vice President Cheney; they were 
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questioned by the Commission on April 29, 2004, but neither man was under 
oath, they were questioned together in private, and their testimony was not 
recorded.  (Thompson, 2004: 533)  Some observers compared The 9/11
Commission Report to the infamous Warren Commission (which concluded 
that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone when he assassinated President 
Kennedy) and contended that much more involving the 9/11 conspiracy 
remains to be investigated.  (Thompson, 2004: 563-568)  Despite the 
criticisms, The 9/11 Commission Report is widely cited and its 
recommendations regarding the organization of the US national security 
apparatus are the starting point for many discussions on improving it. 
The Use of Force: International and Domestic Legality 
The following section reviews some of the most pertinent literature on 
the use of force and its legality, both on the international level and 
domestically, according to American law.  The issue of using force in 
counterterrorism is multifaceted in that it involves international legal sources, if 
the use of force occurs abroad, and domestic authorizations for the use of 
force.  Therefore, the questions are whether the use of force is authorized (or 
at least not prohibited by), the international regime on the use of force, and 
whether U.S. law permits the President to use force in the particular 
circumstances.  As will be examined in further chapters, usually the inquiry 
resolves itself in this manner: the U.S. claims the use of force was lawful 
according to Article 51 of the UN Charter which permits self-defence under 
international law, and the White House maintains the President was 
authorized to use force against terrorism without consulting with Congress 
because he is given the powers of the Commander-in-Chief in the U.S. 
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Constitution.  In addition, during the Bush II administration, Congress 
specifically authorized the use of force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, which the 
administration interpreted broadly. 
The first source regarding international legality in this inquiry is the UN 
Charter, specifically Articles 2(4) and 51, which formulate the basis for the 
legal use of force in international law.  Both articles are analyzed in depth in 
numerous articles and books; my research began with the following legal 
textbooks: International Law by Carter and Trimble; Principles of Public 
International Law by Brownlie; and International Law and World Order by 
Weston, Falk and D’Amato.  These traced the norms regulating the resort to 
force from “Just War” theories to the signing of the UN Charter in 1945 and 
beyond.  They contained excerpts of cases interpreting the meanings of 
various UN resolutions and Charter articles, but due to their general 
emphasis, did not provide great focus on the issue of using force in response 
to international terrorism.  For that aspect of the research, Baker’s book In the 
Common Defense, Murden’s The Problem of Force, and National Security 
Law by four law professors examined the legal issues regarding the use of 
force in counterterrorist operations. 
Several books specifically explored the use of force under international 
law since the end of the Second World War.  The first, War, Aggression and 
Self-Defence by Yoram Dinstein, is an often-cited book in its fourth edition, 
newly expanded with material on the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Dinstein discussed how the Bush Doctrine “appears to push the envelope by 
claiming a right to preemptive self-defence” but he added that this might have 
no effect practically because this was not the rationale applied in 2003 in Iraq.  
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He argued that this would not comply with Article 51 of the UN Charter, but 
maintained the use of force in Iraq was lawful because it was simply the 
disintegration of the cease-fire that suspended the hostilities of the first Gulf 
conflict. (Dinstein, 2005: 297)  Dinstein’s clear and forceful analysis was useful 
because it required realistic application of Article 51 to real sets of facts. 
International Law and the Use of Force by Christine Gray explored the 
international legal issues involving states using force to fight terrorism post 
9/11.  Gray discussed the intense debates among states regarding self-
defence in the period between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 
and concluded that the only two states to initially contribute forces to the Iraq 
conflict, the UK and Australia, “did not use pre-emptive self-defence as any 
part of their legal case for the invasion.”  Instead, these countries relied on UN 
Security Council authorization, a stance that indicated doubt about the 
doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence.  Her conclusion was that the doctrine 
“remains extremely problematic” and future U.S. administrations may not 
continue to press this highly controversial concept as a legitimate doctrine 
under international law.  
Another book on the subject of the use of force under international law 
is Recourse to Force by Thomas Franck.  Franck, a former president of the 
American Society of International Law, noted that the drafters of the UN 
Charter were more concerned in 1945 about peace than about justice; he then 
explored how the tension between these two values has affected the 
functioning of the Charter.  He also examined how legal systems, both 
domestic and the international one, attempted to “bridge the gap between 
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what is requisite in strict legality and what is generally regarded as just and 
moral,” using NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia in 1999 as an example.   How the 
law adapts to changing circumstances and unforeseen conflicts may explain 
how the norms governing the use of force are evolving in the post 9/11 
climate, according to Franck. 
    A more recent work on the subject is Terrorism and the International 
Legal Order (2002) edited by Peter van Krieken.  This book was written after 
the September 11 attacks and incorporated UN treaties and Security Council 
resolutions on the matter in addition to materials from the European Union.  
Another useful source was the book Legal Instruments in the Fight against 
International Terrorism (edited by Fijnaut, Wouters, and Naert) which resulted 
from an international conference in Belgium in 2002.  Not surprisingly, there is 
a split between American and European writers regarding the legality of the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003; in general, the American commentators were more 
likely to agree with the Bush II administration that the invasion of Iraq was 
lawful.  Several books examined the intelligence and political background to 
the invasion, providing in-depth analysis and details; two of the most useful for 
this thesis were Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: 
British and American Perspectives and The Political Road to War with Iraq.  
Where possible, this thesis attempted to identify U.S, European, and other 
perspectives from around the world on international law and terrorism by 
consulting as many sources as possible.  
  
The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law by Helen 
Duffy, the legal director of a human rights non-profit organization, is an 
56
expanded version of an online article.  This book provided an extremely 
thorough and useful overview of the international legal framework governing 
possible responses to the terror attacks of 9/11.  The subjects covered 
included international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and 
international human rights in armed conflict, refugees and internally displaced 
persons.  Duffy attempted to analyze the law governing how states may react 
to a substantial act of international terrorism without advocating any particular 
position (other than the general advice to apply international law).  She also 
raised many questions regarding how states may respond to terrorism and 
thus, provided an outline of possible avenues for further research on the 
subject.  A similar project entitled The Costs of Counterterrorism: Power, 
Politics, and Liberty by Laura Donohue compared and contrasted 
counterterrorism laws in the UK and U.S.  Donohue examined certain specific 
areas in depth, such as financial counterterrorism, privacy, and surveillance, 
which were beyond the scope of the current research.  However, the analysis 
was instructive and her general argument that counterterrorism laws tend to 
increase the powers of the executive, whether it is American or British, is an 
important component to the chapters on George W. Bush.  Donohue agreed 
to be interviewed as part of this thesis.  
My research also built upon the work of Jackson Maogoto’s book 
Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force and the War on 
Terror. For Maogoto, the September 11 attacks and the U.S. response to the 
attacks represent a new paradigm in the international legal regime governing 
the use of force.  His analysis concluded that 9/11 marked a turning point in 
international law and relations due to the status of the attacks as acts of war, 
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not criminal behaviour.  This book examined both sides of the arguments 
surrounding the legality of the interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq by 
extensive use of many different scholars’ research.  In addition, Maogoto not 
only  presented the Bush II administration’s theory that the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq was lawful due to the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-
defence, but then asked the next question which is: how will anticipatory self-
defence affect the international community if other states use it, as the U.S. 
used it, to justify unilateral military action?  With the possibility of terrorists’ 
obtaining WMD, Maogoto warned that a broad right of anticipatory self-
defence would “introduce dangerous uncertainties relating to the 
determination of potential threats justifying pre-emptive action.”  (Maogoto, 
2005: 137) 
The legality, under international law, of the use of force in Afghanistan 
and Iraq was explored in detail in Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of 
Force by States by Judith Gardam.  Her research complemented the analysis 
in Maogoto and Gray but went further regarding the requirements of 
proportionality and necessity in self-defence.  Gardam examined the use of 
force in Afghanistan after 9/11 and noted that the Taliban’s harbouring of 
members of al Qaeda was regarded by the international community as 
“sufficient to justify a military operation against that state of unprecedented 
magnitude that led to the deposing of the government.”  (Gardam, 2004: 145)  
Both Maogoto and Gardam discussed the possibility of the U.S, by pushing 
the doctrine of self-defence to justify uses of force against terrorists, may 
loosen the restraints on states resorting to force in place since the enactment 
of the UN Charter.  
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In addition to these books, there are numerous articles published on 
the international legal system and the problem of combating terrorism.  For 
example, the July and October 2003 issues of the American Journal of 
International Law contained a forum on the future implications of the Iraq 
conflict; several international legal scholars participated and contributed 
articles that supported the Bush Administration’s actions while other authors 
condemned them as violations of the UN Charter.  Two of the most 
informative articles from the American Journal of International Law July forum, 
representing different ends of the debate on the legality of the Iraq invasion, 
are discussed below.  The first article is by William H. Taft IV and Todd F. 
Buchwald entitled “Preemption, Iraq, and International Law.”  Taft and 
Buchwald, formerly the Legal Adviser and the Assistant Legal Adviser for 
Political-Military Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, put forth a justification 
of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a continuation of collective self-
defence arising from Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Iraq’s breaches of 
Security Council resolutions.  As former members of the Bush II 
administration, the authors were, unsurprisingly, vague, doctrinaire, and 
dogmatic in their analysis.  For example, they simply wrote, “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom was and is lawful” and avoided going into the messy details which 
may have contradicted their conclusion.  However, this article would have 
been better if the authors had attempted a more critical appraisal of the Bush 
administration’s military operation in 2003.  Nevertheless, the article was quite 
useful because it is one of the few early statements published by officials from 
the U.S. government discussing the legality of the war in Iraq and the doctrine 
of preemption. 
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The second article from the American Journal of International Law’s
forum on the Iraq conflict was Miriam Sapiro’s “Iraq: the Shifting Sands of 
Preemptive Self-Defense.”  This article examined the Bush administration’s 
doctrine of pre-emptive war in detail and concluded that it represented a 
significant departure from traditional conceptions of anticipatory self-defence 
under international law since the creation of the UN Charter in 1945.  Although 
the Bush administration called its approach “preemptive,” Sapiro argued it is 
more accurate to describe it as “preventive” because instead of preempting a 
specific, imminent threat, the objective of this approach was to “prevent more 
generalized threats from materializing.”   Sapiro’s article analyzed the Bush 
administration’s military campaign in Iraq in 2003 from an international law 
perspective without discussions about the domestic politics behind President 
Bush’s decision to go to war in 2003 against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq.  Sapiro insightfully pointed out the many risks inherent in allowing any 
state to adopt a doctrine of preventive war and counselled the United States to 
“find opportunities to narrow the scope” of this doctrine in the future, lest other 
countries adopt and use it to justify other military actions. 
In the journal Parameters, Jeffrey Record, a professor at the U.S. War 
College, explored the “Bush Doctrine” and the war in Iraq.  This was a 
controversial piece when it was written because Record bluntly questioned the 
usefulness of the Bush Doctrine in combating international terrorism.  The 
U.S. army was quick to note that the views expressed in the article are 
Record’s and not official U.S. policy.  Record examined the Bush doctrine via 
five observations: 1) “The threat of WMD proliferated among suicidal or 
otherwise undeterrable terrorist groups is new, real, and potentially 
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catastrophic, but the Bush Administration’s primary focus on regime change in 
Iraq may be a focus on the periphery rather than the heart of the threat; 2) The 
Bush Doctrine correctly dismisses the effectiveness of deterrence against 
suicidal terrorist organizations, but it may be mistaken in dismissing its 
effectiveness against rogue states; 3) the Bush Doctrine rightly focuses on the 
principle of regime change as the most effective means of defeating threats 
posed by rogue and terrorist-hosting weak states, but actual regime change 
can entail considerable, even unacceptable, military and political risk, 
depending upon local, regional, and international circumstances; 4) In 
transforming an implicit policy option---striking first---into a declaratory 
doctrine, the Bush Administration has reinforced an image of America, widely 
held among friends and adversaries alike, of a unilateralist, overbearing 
“hyperpower” insensitive to the concerns of others; 5) The Bush Doctrine 
invites abuse and establishes a dangerous precedent for others to follow.”  
(Record, 2003: 11)  This article was extremely helpful in guiding the early 
research because its analysis of the preceding points was clear and Record 
applied the theories of containment and deterrence to terrorist organizations. 
 Other journals which published relevant articles on international law 
after 9/11 are the European Journal of International Law and the International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. An example of a non-American legal journal 
is the Tilburg Foreign Law Review, which published an article by Carsten 
Stahn called “Collective Security and Self-Defence after the September 11 
Attacks.”  This well-organized and thoughtful piece examined the lawfulness of 
the U.S. led military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after 
9/11.  Stahn discussed the ambiguities of the law of self-defence under the 
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UN Charter and the system of collective security originally designed by the UN 
drafters after World War II.  Although it was written before the U.S. led 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the analysis contained in it remains relevant 
because it systematically examined the law of self-defence, which was 
transforming in the wake of U.S. actions to pursue terrorists.  Stahn suggested 
five standards or tests that must be met before state action against terrorist 
groups would be considered lawful under the UN Charter.  These are the 
following: the terrorist act must be of “substantial gravity” to qualify as an 
“armed attack” under article 51 of the UN Charter; the act must be imputable 
to the state against which force is used; self-defence is lawful only after the 
exhaustion of peaceful remedies; acts of self-defence against terrorist 
activities must be carefully targeted; and finally, the use of force must be 
proportional.   
  
 The preceding books and journal articles examine the legal issues 
surrounding the use of force from an international perspective but, as noted in 
the introduction to this section, there is another aspect to the law and this is 
the domestic legality of actions taken by the President.  In this area, the 
analysis begins with the U.S. Constitution, which was written well before 
worries about non-state actors aspiring to WMD acquisition.  In fact, the U.S. 
Constitution was adopted in 1787, a few years before the Reign of Terror in 
France gave the English language the word “terrorism” (its original usage 
referred to state terror).  The last section in the literature review surveys the 
literature describing and analyzing the powers of the modern President 
regarding the use of force.  Although there is a great deal of work done on the 
topic of how decisions are made concerning committing military forces to 
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combat, there is far less on the issue of using force in counterterrorism, and 
even less on what constrains these decisions.  The American system of 
government, according to the Constitution, splits authority to make foreign 
policy between the legislative and executive branches.  The executive is the 
Commander-in-Chief and is responsible for implementing policy, while the 
legislative branch has the power to declare war, regulate commerce with 
foreign countries, and appropriate the funds for the military.   
In theory, the concept of separation of powers and the doctrine of 
checks and balances in this system would ensure the two branches shared 
authority to make foreign policy.  However, since the end of World War II, for a 
variety of reasons including the advent of nuclear weapons and the status of 
the U.S. as the lone superpower, the executive branch has exercised more 
power over the direction of U.S. foreign policy, particularly national security 
policy.  My research, while not directly evaluating the wisdom of this evolution, 
touches upon it because, as the chapters on the four administrations illustrate, 
decisions regarding the use of force in counterterrorism are made in the 
executive branch.  Conventional wisdom on using force for counterterrorism 
dictates that the legislative branch, lacking the information available to the 
executive and unable to maintain secrecy (it is a common cliché that there are 
simply too many Senators and Congressmen to keep a secret) and to make 
decisions quickly, should have a minor role.   Under the Bush II administration, 
there was less Congressional oversight of these decisions.  As described by 
Bruce Fein, an attorney in the Reagan administration, the fear is that future 
administrations will continue this trend with the loss of democratic 
accountability and the legitimacy that accompanies decisions made in 
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accordance with the original constitutional design.  Fein wrote several books 
on this subject, frequently appeared before Congress to give testimony, and 
agreed to be interviewed for this research. 
Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought regarding the 
proper allocation of powers regarding foreign affairs under the U.S. 
Constitution.  The first school, which supports the executive branch asserting 
itself and dominating the foreign policy process, is represented by books and 
articles detailing the executive’s superior knowledge regarding foreign affairs 
and ability to implement policy.  An example is the 1979 book by Thomas 
Franck and Edward Weisband entitled Foreign Policy by Congress, which 
explored the post-Watergate reforms enacted by an “insurgent” Congress 
challenging the executive for control over foreign relations.  Franck and 
Weisband pointed to the War Powers Resolution of 1973 as evidence, among 
other reforms, that Congress was determined to wrestle control over foreign 
policy from the executive branch.  Another oft-cited example is The Unitary 
Executive (2008) by Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo.  The authors of 
this book argued that American history established a “strong, internal, 
executive branch precedent” of the principle of the unitary executive.  
(Calabresi and Yoo, 2008: 9)  Other scholars and advocates of presidential 
power have extrapolated from this principle many things, including a more 
robust version of the unitary executive theory, which was used by lawyers in 
the Reagan administration and later, by the second Bush administration.  
They promoted the doctrine that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended 
to give the president independent authority, unchecked by the other branches 
of government, to determine the meaning and scope of certain laws.  The far-
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reaching implications of this doctrine, applied to foreign policy formulation, are 
detailed in the Reagan chapter and the Bush II chapters.   
The other school of thought, called the “pro-congressional” school, is 
represented by scholars such as David Gray Adler, Larry George, Harold Koh, 
and Louis Fisher.  Their numerous articles, books, and testimony at 
congressional hearings tend to start with the history of the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution, with special emphasis placed on the Framers’ intent to avoid a 
monarchical form of power distribution which allowed the monarch to have 
sole discretion over matters of foreign policy.  Koh’s discussion of a “national 
security constitution” in his book, The National Security Constitution: Sharing 
Power after the Iran-Contra Affair, forms the backbone of the next chapter.  
David Adler and Larry George edited The Constitution and the Conduct of 
American Foreign Policy, which is a collection of essays discussing the nature 
of the separate but shared foreign policy powers held by the legislative and 
executive branches.  Adler and George argued that a “myth” emerged post-
World War II which permits the president to do “whatever he wishes” in foreign 
affairs and this myth is “corruptive of political democracy, and 
counterproductive to the nation’s interests here and abroad.”  (Adler and 
George, 1996: 1)  They faulted both Republican and Democratic presidents 
and the judiciary in the U.S. for allowing this evolution to occur.  Fisher, a 
specialist in separation of powers issues, followed their analysis with his 
observations regarding the causes of presidential dominance in foreign policy-
making, despite the evidence that the Framers intended a system of shared 
powers, not an absolute monarch with royal powers over war and peace. 
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Fisher wrote numerous articles and books analyzing various aspects of 
executive and legislative powers including Presidential War Power, In the 
Name of National Security: Unchecked Power and the Reynolds Case, and 
The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America’s Freedoms.  
According to Fisher, the Framers saw the need for the executive branch to 
“repel sudden attacks,” but since World War II, Presidents have usurped 
powers and claimed the right to send American troops into hostilities 
anywhere in the world.  The results have been unpopular military interventions 
such as Vietnam and unauthorized executive branch covert actions like the 
Iran-Contra scandal, which is discussed further in the Reagan chapter.  In 
Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, Fisher 
assessed the circumstances of the second Bush administration during which 
the Congress took a “backseat” regarding decision-making in foreign affairs, 
leaving President Bush to “fill the vacuum.”  (Fisher, 2007: 284-285)  Fisher, 
formerly at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 
agreed to be interviewed as part of my research and his analysis appears 
throughout the thesis. 
Arthur Schlesinger wrote about the dangers of an unaccountable 
executive in the 20th century in The Imperial Presidency, written shortly after 
the shocks of President Nixon and the Vietnam War.  Schlesinger explored 
the abuses of power and the threats posed by presidential resorts to 
emergency prerogatives and in 2004; he was motivated by the second Bush 
administration to write a new introduction to the latest edition.  Two books 
which built upon Schlesinger’s ideas and applied them more explicitly to the 
presidency of George W. Bush are The Dark Side: the Inside Story of How the 
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War on Terror turned into a War on American Ideals by Jane Mayer and 
Takeover: the Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of 
American Democracy by Charlie Savage.  Savage’s book won the Pulitzer 
Prize in 2007.  Intended more for a general audience, both books were 
extensively footnoted and detailed regarding activities in the Bush II 
administration.  In addition, the books documented how the Bush II 
administration borrowed ideas and practices from previous administrations, 
particularly Reagan’s, to enlarge the powers of the executive branch.  These 
included the practice of adding “signing statements” to laws to evade the 
intent of Congress and other executive branch initiatives designed to increase 
the powers of the President while avoiding oversight by either the courts or 
Congress.   The results, as described in chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, were 
frequently at odds with stated American policies regarding the treatment of 
detainees and long-standing practices regarding surveillance.  Moreover, the 
path taken by the Bush II administration presents a problem concerning the 
possibility of catastrophic terrorism in the future: how would a future 
administration act if a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon caused major 
damage in the U.S? 
 At its core, this research seeks to find and examine the legal 
mechanisms that constrain the U.S. president when formulating use of force 
decisions in counterterrorism.  The practical constraints regarding 
counterterrorism, such as lack of actionable intelligence, the difficulty of 
projecting force outside U.S. borders, obtaining cooperation from foreign 
states, and other constraining factors are discussed in the context of the four 
administrations.  Nevertheless, the focus remains on what legal and political 
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factors control presidential decision-making in this area, given the nature of 
the international legal regime on the use of force and domestic disputes over 
the powers of the executive branch to control all aspects of national security 
policy.  The experience of the past four administrations, especially that of the 
second Bush administration, indicates there are few real constraints on this 
exercise of power.  With the advent of technologies like remotely-operated 
drones, and the possibility of terrorists obtaining WMD, the questions 
surrounding constraints on the U.S. executive are ever more compelling and 
important. 
68
 Chapter 3 
Principles Allocating Foreign Affairs Powers 
The executive branch in the U.S. system of government must confront 
two related questions when considering using force in counterterrorism: does 
international law permit the proposed use of force (essentially, an international
law question)?  In the first chapter, the international legal norms regulating the 
use of force were detailed in the discussion on Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN 
Charter.  This chapter examines the second question: does the president have 
the authority under the U.S. Constitution to use force (the question of 
domestic legality)?  This inquiry focuses on domestic legal constraints on the 
president when decisions to use force are made.  The chapters on the 
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations will then enumerate how 
each administration viewed the analysis required by the international law 
question and the domestic legality question.   
A discussion of the President’s authority to use force should begin with 
the system of checks and balances famously devised by the Framers of the 
U.S. Constitution to keep each branch of government under control.  The 
Framers, wary of royal prerogatives and cognizant of the high costs of 
European wars, intended to create a republic with three co-equal branches, 
the legislature, executive, and judiciary.  The theory for the government they 
created was based on a separation of powers, with one branch of government 
limiting another branch.  At least on paper, Congress’ war-making powers are 
as great as the President’s because, according to Article 1, section 8 of the 
Constitution, Congress has the following war powers: 
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• To declare war, grant letters of marquee and reprisal, and make 
rules concerning capture on land and water 
• To lay and collect taxes. . . to. . . provide for the common 
defence 
• To define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations 
(international law) 
• To raise and support armies 
• To provide and maintain a navy 
• To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
naval forces 
• To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions 
• To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia 
In addition, Congress controls the appropriations process to fund wars and 
may pass laws which are “necessary and proper” to fulfil its duties. 
 In contrast, the President has fewer war-making powers on paper.  As 
one American legal scholar wrote, “If law were math, we might add up the 
clauses and declare Congress the winner.”  (Baker, 2007: 178)  According to 
Article II of the Constitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the army 
and navy and is obligated to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”  
The reality is that war-making powers, like other powers, are separate but 
often shared and the executive branch has more power than a casual reading 
of the text of the Constitution would indicate.  One constitutional law expert 
explained the situation as an “invitation for Congress and the President to 
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struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” (Koh, 1990: 
156)  Presidential power, which is based on unspecific, but significant inherent 
powers in constitutional text, tends to expand “when factors such as national 
crisis, military action, or other matters of expedience call for its exercise.”  
(Marshall, 2008: 510)   
The U.S. has declared “war” pursuant to Congress passing a 
declaration eleven times since its founding; the last time was during World 
War II.  The modern trend is for the President to ask Congress for its “support” 
(but not necessarily permission) through an authorization for the use of force.  
As detailed in subsequent chapters, President George W. Bush claimed 
inherent war powers as part of his role as Commander-in-Chief and 
maintained that congressional authorization, although welcome, was not 
required.  His father, the first President Bush, took a similar position before the 
first Gulf War in 1991.  Therefore, in practice, the text of the Constitution alone 
does not resolve how conflicts regarding decisions to use force are made in 
the 21st century.    
Koh’s National Security Constitution 
 Harold Koh, currently the legal advisor to the Department of State in 
the Obama administration, analyzed the disparity between the few war-making 
powers granted to the President and the many granted to Congress with 
contemporary foreign-policy making practice in a ground-breaking book 
written in 1990.  In The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the 
Iran-Contra Affair, Koh, formerly the Dean of Yale Law School, not only 
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examined the Iran-Contra scandal, but also charted the decline of the 
American system of checks and balances in foreign affairs.  The major 
premise of the book----that fundamental defects exist in the structure of the 
American national security decision-making process----has been debated and 
discussed by political scientists and constitutional law scholars ever since its 
publication.  The National Security Constitution is frequently cited in academic 
works both supporting and opposing unilateral presidential exercises of the 
use of force and this research, based upon its theoretical foundations, 
analyzed the four administrations and their uses of force in counterterrorism 
with these foundations as a guide.  
In essence, Koh argued that a “normative vision of the foreign-policy-
making process,” labelled the “national security constitution” emerges partially 
from the text of the Constitution.  (Koh, 1990: 68)  In addition to the text of the 
Constitution, the other sources for the national security constitution include 
judicial decisions that construe the Constitution, framework statutes enacted 
by Congress, framework executive orders issued by presidents, and historical 
precedents involving foreign relations that Koh termed “quasi-constitutional 
custom.”  According to Koh, these sources formed a hierarchy with the text of 
the Constitution at the top, as the highest source for the national security 
constitution.  Next are the relatively few judicial decisions issued by the U.S. 
Supreme Court which interpret the powers allocated to the three branches of 
government regarding foreign relations; two of the most important cases, 
Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright, are mentioned later in this chapter. 
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 Framework statutes and framework executive orders occupy the 
second level of the hierarchy.  Framework statutes “specify legal authorities 
and constraints for particular institutional acts; they provide procedures to 
evaluate and control particular exercises of delegated powers; and they foster 
institutional expectations as to how those powers will be exercised in the 
future.”  (Koh, 1990: 70)  For the purposes of this thesis, the framework 
statutes most relevant to the use of force in counterterrorism are the National 
Security Act of 1947 and the War Powers Resolution of 1973, discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
 Quasi-constitutional custom stands at the lowest level of Koh’s 
hierarchy for the national security constitution; it is analogous to customary 
international law in that it evolves from actual practice.  Instances of quasi-
constitutional custom are executive branch practices in foreign affairs or, more 
specifically, counterterrorism that Congress approves of, or acquiesces to, 
and formal or informal congressional actions with which the president has 
repeatedly complied.   Like customary international law, which may be 
amended by treaties, quasi-constitutional custom may be altered by a 
subsequent statute passed by Congress and signed into law by the president.  
Although quasi-constitutional custom appears at the lowest level of Koh’s 
hierarchy, making its significance opaque, it is quite germane to the use of 
force in counterterrorism because many of the activities the Bush II 
administration undertook during its “war on terror” were based on previous 
presidential practices.   As detailed in later chapters, the second Bush 
administration frequently justified its assertions of executive power by 
reference to precedents established by other presidents, such as Reagan’s 
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bombing of Libya in 1986 to deter Libyan terrorism.  Moreover, the Bush II 
administration was “in the business of creating executive power precedents,” 
which means that future presidents may build upon those historical 
precedents to expand their powers.  (Savage, 2011) 
 Koh used his analysis of the national security constitution to support 
his contention that the whole area of foreign policy-making, including war 
powers, was based upon the principle of “balanced institutional participation,” 
meaning that all three branches of government had roles in foreign relations.  
(Koh, 1990: 72)  Most foreign relations decisions fall into the sphere of 
concurrent authority, which the president manages, subject to checks 
provided by congressional consultation and judicial review.  The system 
designed by the Framers depends upon balanced participation by all three 
branches of government, but since U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the system 
has been dominated by the executive branch.  Koh used the Iran-Contra affair 
to illustrate his broader point that unless all three branches of government 
participated in the process of foreign policy making, more executive branch 
mistakes like Iran-Contra were inevitable.  For Koh, the Iran-Contra affair was 
a symptom of the failures of the foreign policy process, not an aberration 
stemming from overzealous executive branch officials. 
The Pattern of Foreign Policy Making: Executive Initiative 
An important element of Koh’s theory about the national security 
constitution is the pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, 
and judicial tolerance regarding the contemporary process of foreign policy in 
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the U.S.  This section explains the pattern, how it relates to the topic of this 
thesis, and suggests how the analytical method will be applied to the four 
administrations in the study in subsequent chapters.  Executive initiative refers 
to the tendency of modern American presidents to initiate action in foreign 
relations due to the nature of the office, i.e. the president is elected nationally 
and expected to take the lead regarding foreign affairs.  Unlike Congress, 
which is bicameral and composed of many individual members with various 
constituencies, the president is well-situated to drive the process of foreign 
policy making.  He controls the various intelligence agencies and thus, 
possesses superior knowledge about foreign relations and the Constitution 
makes him Commander-in-Chief of the military.  In addition, the President, 
unlike Congress, may act quickly in response to a crisis and, after the crisis, 
he speaks with one voice in articulating the policy justifications to the general 
public.  As one former executive branch staffer put it, “unilateral executive 
action has advantages in surprise, speed, and secrecy.”  (Baker, 2007: 25) 
 There are several theories that executive branch officials rely upon to 
justify uses of force without explicit congressional authorization.  For instance, 
one way to justify the use of force is to distinguish between offensive and 
defensive resorts to force.  If the President is using force defensively to protect 
the country, instead of offensively, then the President may unilaterally use 
force without prior congressional authorization.  (Baker, 2007: 179)  Of course, 
according to this school of thought, an offensive use of force would still require 
authorization from Congress.  Another theory is that, while only Congress may 
“declare” war according to the Constitution, uses of force short of a “war” may 
be authorized by the President alone; several Presidents utilized this theory to 
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argue that they did not need a formal declaration of war prior to initiating 
hostilities.  According to Louis Fisher, one of the interviewees, a thorough 
review of the history of the drafting of the Constitution reveals that the 
President’s unilateral ability to use force is limited to the narrow circumstances 
of imminent danger to American lives, or an actual attack on the U.S.  For 
Fisher, the Framers of the Constitution “gave Congress the power to initiate 
war” because they feared entrusting the executive branch with such an 
important decision.  (Fisher, 2004: 10)  The Framers’ expectation was that 
requiring Congress to declare war would impede any rush to war advocated 
by the executive branch for its own purposes. 
The War Powers Resolution 
When the President takes the initiative in foreign relations, he “has 
often done so by construing laws designed to constrain his actions as 
authorizations.”  (Koh, 1990: 117)  The best example of this is the War Powers 
Resolution (WPR), which became law in 1973 despite President Richard 
Nixon’s veto.  The WPR grew out of public and congressional discontent with 
the conduct of the executive branch in Vietnam and Cambodia, where 
President Nixon secretly ordered aerial  bombing without disclosing the use of 
force to the public or Congress.  Vietnam was the result of incremental 
increases in the number of troops in Southeast Asia, under the authorization 
of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.  Ely noted that Congress did 
authorize the Vietnam War, but it was done “backhandedly,” enabling 
Congress to avoid “serious consideration of the consequences of its actions.”  
(Ely, 1993: 47)  Although the WPR was intended to constrain the executive 
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branch and re-establish congressional control over war powers decisions, in 
practice it has not worked as intended.  Some critics contend it gives the 
executive branch too much discretion to use military force without meaningful 
input from Congress, while others maintain that it impinges upon the 
President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief.  A brief review of its provisions is 
necessary because, according to U.S law, the President must have legal 
authority to use force.  In theory, the WPR could be a constraint on the 
executive’s use of force against international terrorism, but an evaluation of 
the four administrations reveals it is more of an equivocal constraint. 
The stated purpose of the WPR is “to fulfill the intent of the Framers of 
the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of U.S. 
armed forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”  (WPR resolution, see 
Fisher, p. 290)  The WPR explicitly requires both consultation and reporting; 
section 3 requires that the President “in every possible instance shall consult 
with Congress before” introducing troops into hostilities.  The “consultation” 
with Congress regarding the use of force as counterterrorism has become a 
pro forma notification in which the President informs a limited number of 
members of Congress shortly before the incident.  This was the pattern in 
Libya in 1986 (Reagan administration) and in the 1998 missile strikes in 
Afghanistan and Sudan (Clinton administration).  If the legislature intended the 
consultation requirement to be a real check on executive branch uses of force, 
the experience of the four administrations indicates the consultation is neither 
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a meaningful exchange of views, nor a timely check on executive branch 
action. 
The second condition of the WPR, reporting, requires the President to 
report to Congress within forty-eight hours after introducing U.S troops into 
“hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.”  A report submitted according to section 4 of 
the WPR triggers the “sixty-day clock” which means the “President shall 
terminate any use of U.S. Armed Forces” unless Congress has declared war, 
or enacted specific authorization, or granted the President an extension.  On 
paper, this might appear to constrain the executive branch but, in practice, the 
executive branch does not indicate under what section of the WPR a report is 
filed, and thus avoids the problem of the sixty-day clock.  In fact, only 
President Ford has cited section 4 of the WPR in a report, and that occurred in 
1975 when the U.S. used force to rescue the crew of the U.S. merchant ship 
Mayaquez.  (Fisher, 2004: 156)  In this manner, the executive branch avoids 
potential problems with the sixty-day time limit on troop deployments. 
Since it was enacted in 1973, every “President has taken the position 
that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the President’s 
authority as Commander-in-Chief.”  (Grimmett, 2012: 1-2)  However, the 
executive branch still writes Congress a report “consistent” with, but not 
“pursuant” to, the WPR, indicating the President and his advisors do not feel 
legally obligated by the law to report the introduction of troops into hostilities.  
(Baker, 2007: 184)  According to Baker, a former legal advisor to the National 
Security Council, the majority of WPR reports to the Congress are 
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“inconsequential and ministerial, even pro forma.”  (Ibid)  During the second 
Bush administration, when Special Forces teams were deployed globally to 
hunt members of al Qaeda, the WPR reports for Congress adopted “broad 
generalizations that avoid secrecy concerns” and afforded President Bush 
“maximum flexibility.”  (Baker, 2007: 185)  During the course of his two terms, 
President George W. Bush submitted 39 WPR reports to Congress. 
The Congressional Research Service identified three problems with the 
WPR.  The first is the disputed nature of the word “hostilities” for purposes of 
triggering consultation between the President and Congress.  The second 
concerns the definition of “consultation” and the propensity of the executive 
branch to interpret that as merely informing Congress shortly before the use of 
military force.  The third problem is who represents Congress for the required 
consultation: a few senior members, or should it encompass the entire 
Congress?  (Grimmett, 2012: 22)  It is beyond the scope of this research to 
evaluate whether the WPR would prevent another creeping military 
intervention such as Vietnam.  Clearly, when the WPR was passed in 1973, 
the U.S was not threatened by transnational non-state terrorists and so 
Congress did not contemplate this type of national security threat in the 
statute.  For the purposes of the current topic, the use of force in 
counterterrorism, the evidence of the four administrations reveals the 
requirements of the WPR were not a constraint on executive branch freedom 
of action. 
Applying the concept of executive initiative to the area of 
counterterrorism, the use of drones for discreet military operations illustrates 
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Koh’s point.  Drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, were first used by the Clinton 
administration for intelligence purposes.  Various accounts detail the evolution 
of drones from intelligence-gathering capabilities to lethal weapons.  (Coll, 
2004, O’Connell, 2010, and Gellman, 2002)  Cofer Black at the CIA advocated 
arming them at the end of the Clinton administration to fly missions against al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan, but “State Department lawyers objected, arguing that 
an armed drone might violate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which 
banned the United States from acquiring new long-range cruise missiles.”  
(Coll, 2004: 531)   After the 9/11 attacks, the American public expected the 
executive branch to take strong action against terrorists and the Bush II 
administration began using drones equipped with missiles against suspected 
terrorists in the autumn of 2001.  Congress did not vote on the decision to arm 
drones for military strikes.  Instead, the Bush II administration calculated that 
using them was lawful because the Congress had appropriated the funds for 
drones and passed a broadly worded Authorization for Use of Military Force 
against those involved in the 9/11 attacks.  As explored in the chapter on the 
second Bush administration, the executive branch relied on the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force for many of its more controversial practices during the 
“war on terror.”   
Moreover, using armed drones in brief, discreet military operations 
avoids potential conflict with the WPR because no ground troops are involved 
and the use of force is executed quickly.  Congress and the general public 
typically find out about the drone strike after it is over.  As the author of The 
Costs of Counterterrorism, Laura Donohue, explained during an interview with 
the author, the government avoids WPR questions and possible complications 
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by using drones.  She added that reliance on drones for counterterrorist 
operations is an additional problem for a democracy in that the legal authority 
permitting drones remains secret so it is very difficult to check the government 
in this area.  Due to the fact that “national security” becomes a “trump card” for 
the President, he usually gets what it he wants in terms of authority in 
counterterrorism laws.  (Donohue  Interview)  
The National Security Act 
   
 The second framework statute which is important regarding the 
composition of the National Security Constitution is the National Security Act 
(NSA) of 1947.  President Truman signed the act which merged the 
Department of War with the Department of the Navy; this entity was eventually 
renamed the Department of Defense (DoD).  The NSA also established the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC).  
Both of these organizations will be described briefly as they have roles in the 
executive branch’s use of force in counterterrorism.  The CIA is responsible 
for collecting, evaluating, disseminating, and advising on intelligence about 
foreign governments, corporation, and individuals.  Congress also gave the 
CIA the authority “to perform such other functions and duties related to 
intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time 
direct.”  (National Security Act, 1947)  This language seems to authorize 
covert operations in support of NSC policies.  During the Cold War, the CIA 
spent a great deal of time monitoring the movements of the Soviet Union and 
its satellites.  In 1986, during the Reagan administration, the CIA established a 
Counterterrorist Center in response to the increase in terrorist attacks against 
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Americans and American interests.  During the Clinton administration, in 1996, 
the CIA set up the Bin Laden Unit within the Counterterrorist Center to track 
bin Laden and his associates. 
 The NSA also established the National Security Council, which is 
formally part of the executive branch; its functions include advising and 
assisting the President on matters of national security and foreign policy.  In 
addition, the National Security Council coordinates policy with meetings 
chaired by the President who appoints a National Security Advisor as part of 
his team.  Other members of the National Security Council are the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of 
Defense.  Others may attend meetings, such as the Attorney General, 
depending on the topic under discussion.  The National Security Advisor is not 
subject to confirmation by the Senate, so the President is free to appoint a 
trusted confidant without worrying about Senate confirmation.  Over the years 
and particularly since President Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy, the 
position of National Security Advisor has grown in importance.  The chart 
below lists the National Security Advisors in the four administrations in this 
research; Republican administrations are in red, while the Democrats are in 
blue.  To varying degrees, these National Security Advisors served their 
Presidents by managing “the process of making decisions on major foreign 
and national security issues” and by overseeing the “implementation of the 
decisions the President has made.”  (Daalder & Destler, 2009: 128)  Further 
details on the National Security Advisors are found in the Reagan, Bush I, 
Clinton, and Bush II chapters. 
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President National Security Advisor Time in Office 
Ronald Reagan Richard Allan Jan. 1981- Jan. 1982 
 William Clark Jan. 1982- Oct. 1983 
 Robert McFarlane Oct. 1983- Dec. 1985 
 John Poindexter Dec. 1985- Nov. 1986 
 Frank Carlucci Dec. 1986- Nov. 1987 
 Colin Powell Nov. 1987- Jan. 1989 
George H.W. Bush Brent Scowcroft Jan. 1989- Jan. 1993 
Bill Clinton Anthony Lake Jan. 1993- March 1997 
 Sandy Berger March 1997- Jan. 2001 
George W. Bush Condoleezza Rice Jan. 2001- Jan. 2005 
 Stephen Hadley Jan. 2005- Jan. 2009 
 The NSA is also an important statute regarding the collection of 
intelligence.  As Baker wrote, “intelligence is the fuel of counterterrorism,” 
while the “presidency is the engine of counterterrorism.”  (Baker, 2007: 126)  
Without actionable intelligence, the executive is unable to authorize any use of 
force in counterterrorism.  The NSA requires the executive branch to give the 
intelligence committees in Congress briefings on the intelligence collected by 
the government so that Congress may perform oversight.  However, the 
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“executive branch exploited the statute’s ambiguity to the hilt” by providing 
bare bones briefings to the “gang of eight,” which includes the chairs and 
ranking minority members of both the House and Senate intelligence 
committees, along with the House and Senate majority and minority leaders.  
(Schwarz and Huq, 2007: 140)  Unless Congress performs meaningful 
oversight of the executive branch, abuses of power are inevitable.   
A great deal of academic literature on the NSA attempts to chart its 
influence on U.S. foreign policy making and evaluate whether the NSA needs 
to be modernized, given that it was enacted in 1947, in response to the threat 
from the Soviet Union.  One author, for example, traces how the wartime 
emergency of World War II became the Cold War and how that morphed into 
a “war on terror” after 9/11.  His thesis is that the atomic bomb fostered an era 
of continuing crisis, increased the power of the presidency, and redefined the 
U.S. government as a “national security state.”  (Wills, 2010)  Other authors 
described how the environment of continuing crisis after the 9/11 attacks 
assisted in expanding executive powers in the second Bush administration.  
(Mayer, 2009 and Savage, 2007) The NSA and NSC will be mentioned in the 
following chapters as they pertain to the use of force in counterterrorism 
without addressing broader questions about the compatibility of the 
intelligence gathering capabilities of the CIA and other executive branch 
agencies with notions of democratic accountability.  The next section 




 The second part of Koh’s pattern regarding national security is 
congressional acquiescence, which goes to the heart of the research question 
about the role of Congress in shaping use of force decisions.  After studying 
the history of foreign policy making since Vietnam, Koh noted that the 
President “almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”  (Koh, 1990: 117)  
Despite its powers in the Constitution, Congress usually “acquiesced in what 
the president has done, through legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, 
ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will.”  (Ibid)  Several of the 
interviews with former members of the executive branch explored this 
phenomenon for the thesis.  The consensus from the interviewees was that 
congressional oversight is typically lax when the President’s political party 
controls both houses of Congress.  In theory, the Framers of the Constitution 
expected Congress to check the executive branch as a matter of institutional 
loyalty and pride; the Framers did not account for the growth of political parties 
in the American system.  Moreover, when the same political party controls 
both the Congress and the executive branch, the President is the party leader 
in the legislature.   
  Koh cites the WPR as an example of inadequate drafting; as 
discussed above, the WPR has failed to constrain the executive branch 
regarding the introduction of armed forces into hostilities.  This is partially the 
result of political compromises necessary to first pass the statute and then 
override President Nixon’s veto.  Political compromises among members of 
Congress are essential in the legislative branch.  In fact, the strengths of the 
legislative branch, compromise, democratic debate, and bargaining, are often 
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seen as detriments to swift decision-making in the realm of foreign affairs.  In 
addition, few Congressmen or Senators are elected based on their abilities in 
foreign relations; constituents tend to focus on domestic problems, until there 
is a foreign policy crisis. 
 One of the most important devices Congress possesses for controlling 
the executive branch is the “power of the purse,” the ability of Congress to 
control appropriations for foreign relations and other matters.  According to 
Baker, “it is the exercise of the appropriations power that can guarantee 
meaningful congressional participation in the national security process if it is 
used effectively.”  (Baker, 2007: 102)  Fisher writes that the Framers granted 
the power of the purse to Congress while making the President the 
Commander-in-Chief to “separate the purse and the sword.”  (Fisher, 2004: 11 
and Fisher Interview)  However, much has changed since the Constitution 
was adopted in 1787 including the maintenance of a standing army, the 
emergence of the U.S. as a superpower, and the speed and lethality of 
modern weapons.  The frequently made argument, that Congress could 
control the President’s war making or other uses of force by cutting off the 
funding, underestimates the dilemma facing Congress.  After troops are 
deployed, it is actually quite difficult politically for Congress to cut off funding 
the troops in the battlefield.  Once the President has deployed troops, there is 
typically a “rally round the flag” attitude, which encourages Congress and the 
general public to back the use of force, at least until the troops appear caught 
in a quagmire. 
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 In addition to the “power of the purse,” Congress has the ability to 
investigate executive branch malfeasance by holding oversight hearings.  
Over the years, oversight committees have occasionally curbed abuses and 
produced meaningful reforms; the committees chaired by Senator Frank 
Church and Congressman Otis Pike in the 1970’s led to real reform of the 
intelligence-gathering of the CIA, FBI, and NSA.  (Schwarz and Huq, 2007: 
50)  In theory, congressional oversight might function to curtail executive 
branch initiatives in national security, but an evaluation of the four 
administrations reveals that congressional oversight is often minimal due to 
the lack of political will to hold hearings and question the executive branch.  
Indeed, as a legal commentator noted, “oversight of security agencies by 
Congress itself has been weak to nonexistent, with the exception of moments 
such as the Church Committee and the 9/11 Commission.”  (Huq, 2007: 48)  
Compounding the problem is the number of committees that are tasked with 
overseeing elements of the national security apparatus.  For example, one 
chart documenting congressional oversight in the 110th Congress displays 108 
committees and subcommittees charged with overseeing the Department of 
Homeland Security.  In 2011, two investigative reporters documented the 
enormous growth of government agencies with “top secret” employees at over 
1,300 facilities in all 50 states that constitute part of the government’s 
counterterrorism operation post 9/11.  (Priest and Arkin, 2011)  The sheer 
volume of agencies tasked with national security makes effective oversight an 
oxymoron.  
 Another important dimension to congressional acquiescence is a lack 
of political will to challenge the executive initiative in foreign relations; this is 
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particularly evident when the President and the majority in Congress are in the 
same political party.  The issue of political will surfaced several times in 
interviews when discussing the Bush II administration and the use of force.   
For instance, Bruce Fein, a Justice Department attorney in the Reagan 
administration, was extremely critical of the lack of political will in Congress  
vis-à-vis  the Bush II administration.  Expanding on the notion of Congress as 
an inkblot, he wrote, “By elevating party loyalty above institutional 
prerogatives, Congress has voluntarily reduced itself to an inkblot on the 
political landscape.”  (Fein, 2010: 27 and Fein Interview)  Likewise, Lawrence 
Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin Powell, remarked that there was a lack 
of congressional oversight concerning the “war on terror” due to the “lack of 
moral courage” to challenge the Bush White House and because the 
“complexity of governance” meant members of Congress do not have the 
same level of expertise as those in the executive branch.  (Wilkerson 
Interview)  
 A related element in congressional acquiescence is the extremely 
polarized two-party system that currently prevails in the U.S.  Individual 
members of Congress calculate that their political success depends more on 
how their political party is faring with the electorate than on how well Congress 
performs its collective duty as a check on presidential power.  Members of 
Congress then “have a greater personal interest in the President’s success as 
leader of their party than they have in Congress as an institution.”  (Marshall, 
2008: 518-519)  President George W. Bush benefitted from having a 
Republican controlled Congress for most of his presidency and executive 
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branch excesses in the “war on terror” went unchecked by Congress.  (Green, 
2007: 52) 
Session Years President’s 
Party 
























Hamilton-D Pell -D 
104 Jan. 1995-
1996 
 Gilman-R Helms-R 
105 Jan. 1997-
1998 
 Gilman-R Helms-R 
106 Jan. 1999-
2000 
 Gilman-R Helms-R 
107 Jan. 2001-
June 2001 
 Hyde-R Helms-R 
107 June 
2001-2002
 Hyde-R Biden-D 
108 Jan. 2003-
2004 
 Hyde-R Lugar-R 
109 Jan. 2005-
2006 
 Hyde-R Lugar -R 
110 Jan. 2007-
2008 
Lantos-D Biden -D 
 The chart above illustrates the four administrations in this research, 
detailing when the President and Congress were controlled by the same 
political party.  Of the four administrations in this research, three (Reagan, 
Bush I, and Bush II) were led by Republican Presidents and one (Clinton) was 
Democratic.  Red represents the Republican party, blue is for the Democratic 
party, and the pink areas show when the Congress had divided control, as for 
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example, from January 1981 to December 1986 (Reagan administration) 
when the majority in the House of Representatives was Democratic but the 
Senate was controlled by the Republican party.  The other period of divided 
control in the Congress, in pink, was June 2001 till the end of 2002, during the 
Bush II administration when the House of Representatives was under 
Republican party control and the Senate majority was Democratic.  “Session” 
indicates the congressional session, while “House FRA” stands for the House 
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and “Senate FRC” means 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  
A few observations about the chart and the problem of political will vis-
à-vis the President illustrate the issue of congressional acquiescence.  
President Clinton, the only Democrat in the study, had to contend with a 
Republican Congress for the last six years of his presidency, after the 
Democrats lost control of the legislative branch in the mid-term election of 
1994.  As explored in the Clinton chapter, Clinton ordered missile strikes in 
August 1998 in Afghanistan and Sudan after two U.S. embassies were 
bombed in Tanzania and Kenya.  The leadership of the Republican controlled 
Congress generally applauded his use of force, but because Clinton was 
weakened politically by the Monica Lewinsky scandal and his party no longer 
controlled the Congress, he was subjected to congressional speculation that 
the missile strikes were merely orchestrated to deflect attention away from his 
personal problems.  As the New York Times wrote on August 21, 1998: 
“Across the city, there was an inescapable sense Thursday that the 
timing of the raid might have been dictated by politics rather than 
intelligence information. Among the questions that Defense Secretary 
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William Cohen faced at the official Pentagon briefing on the air strikes 
was whether he had seen "Wag the Dog," the satirical film in which a 
president concocts a war to deflect attention from a sexual encounter 
with a teen-age girl. He did not bother to answer, instead insisting, "The 
only motivation driving this action today was our absolute obligation to 
protect the American people from terrorist activities."  
 Contrast that situation with President George W. Bush’s “war on 
terror” approach, which garnered little opposition in the Republican controlled 
Congress from 9/11 until the Democrats gained control over both the Senate 
and House of Representatives in January 2007.  For the first years of the war 
on terror, the public was shocked by the enormity of the 9/11 tragedy, an 
atmosphere of continuing crisis prevailed, and few in Congress perceived any 
political gain in questioning the specifics of the war’s track, even when 
instances of abuse like Abu Ghraib and extraordinary renditions of the wrong 
person were revealed. 
In fact, according to a study by the Brookings Institution on Congress, 
“there were many more hearings on the alleged abuse by the Clinton White 
House of its Christmas card list than there were during the Bush 
administration on Abu Ghraib.”  (Binder, Mann, Ornstein, and Reynolds, 2009: 
14)  The Brookings study then reports that the 110th Congress (controlled by 
Democrats) held more hearings on abuses of power and challenged the Bush 
II administration to a greater extent than the previous sessions of Congress 
(led by Republicans), but  
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“any weakness in the presidency that emerged in the final two years of 
the Bush White House came primarily from the president’s ever-
weakening standing with the public and from intervention by the federal 
courts, not from Congress imposing its own views in sensitive policy 
areas like surveillance or extracting from the White House testimony 
from top officials or documents that would shed light on alleged abuses 
of power, or successfully beating back the uniquely aggressive Bush 
approach to signing statements”. (Ibid, 14-15) 
    Numerous examples of congressional acquiescence during the Bush 
II administration exist, particularly in the area of counterterrorism.  This may 
be due to the phenomena of terrorism, i.e. by its very nature, an act of 
terrorism is intended to terrorize both direct victims and witnesses who, in 
turn, demand action from the government after a large attack such as the 9/11 
tragedy.  Responding to terrorism presents a conundrum as the public expects 
the government to take action against the terrorists and members of Congress 
sense no political gain from opposing what the President proposes to do, and 
some political risk if they object to the activity.  It is politically more convenient 
to acquiesce to an executive counterterrorist initiative and wait to see if it 
actually works.  As explained by Savage, “when there are pervasive fears 
about grave and imminent threats to national security, both the public and 
Congress historically have tended to be more willing to grant the president 
extra powers in order to protect the country---powers that later the president 
may not be willing to put down again especially if it is still unclear whether the 
crisis is over.”  (Savage, 2007: 311) 
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 Another dynamic at work after a terrorist attack is the general 
acceptance of government secrecy.  Both citizens and members of Congress 
accept that counterterrorist activities may require extreme secrecy to be 
effective, so there tends to be very little complaint or questioning of the 
executive branch when it claims something must not be publicly disclosed to 
avoid “tipping off” the terrorists.  The Bush II administration maintained that 
the specifics of its “enhanced interrogation techniques” could not be divulged 
without alerting the terrorists who would then adapt to the techniques to avoid 
disclosing valuable intelligence.  Sceptics who complained that this emphasis 
on secrecy also conveniently avoided congressional and public oversight of 
the executive branch and its detainee policies were ridiculed for not 
understanding the value of secrecy in counterterrorism.  (Fein Interview) 
The practice of waterboarding, or stimulated drowning, also illustrates 
how terrorist incidents and their aftermath of continuing crisis affect political 
will in Congress.  After the Bush II administration admitted that it had used 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (he was 
waterboarded 183 times) in September 2006, the Democrats in Congress 
could have opposed the use of this technique and opened congressional 
hearings on the legality of the tactic, but they risked looking “weak”  or “soft”  
on terrorists.  Having learned during the Cold War that appearing “weak” on 
national security made them vulnerable in elections, the Democrats largely 
acquiesced in the practice, which was defended by Bush II administration 
officials as being an essential tool for keeping the country safe from al Qaeda. 
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Judicial Tolerance 
The final element in Koh’s pattern is judicial tolerance, meaning the 
tendency of the federal courts in the U.S. to tolerate acts of executive 
initiative, either “by refusing to hear challenges to those acts or by hearing the 
challenges and then affirming presidential authority on the merits.”  (Koh, 
1990: 117)  This section will briefly describe some of the most important U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that interpreted presidential powers in foreign 
affairs, and sets forth how these decisions have been applied in the realm of 
national security and counterterrorism.  The judicial doctrines that prevent the 
courts from deciding cases involving national security will be explored as they 
help explain why the federal courts have repeatedly permitted the executive 
branch to dominate foreign relations.
 The first case, a 1936 decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corporation, stands for unlimited executive discretion in foreign affairs 
and is frequently cited by executive branch attorneys when they are claiming 
expansive powers for the President.  The case evolved from a war between 
Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930’s; in 1934 the U.S. Congress passed a joint 
resolution authorizing President Franklin Roosevelt to embargo arms 
shipments to the area, which the President did by issuing a proclamation.  The 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation was subsequently prosecuted for selling fifteen 
machine guns to Bolivia, but the real impact of the case lies in the opinion by 
Justice George Sutherland, which is frequently quoted and stands for 
unchecked executive branch discretion in foreign affairs.  Specifically, 
Sutherland wrote that the President is “the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations,” and this language has been 
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used countless times to justify executive branch action in foreign affairs.  
(Baker, 2007: 39)  Koh, a critic of the opinion and its later usage, argued that 
the Curtiss-Wright case incorrectly implies the entire field of foreign affairs falls 
under the President’s inherent authority.  (Koh, 1990: 95)  He also noted, 
“over time the Curtiss-Wright vision would mysteriously come to embrace 
another notion previously suggested, but never broadly adopted, by the 
Supreme Court---that once courts have determined that foreign affairs are at 
stake, they should dismiss challenges to the executive acts as political, not 
legal, questions.” (Ibid)  The reluctance of courts to hear cases involving 
foreign affairs forms a significant part of the third element of the pattern 
identified by Koh, i.e. judicial tolerance of executive initiatives. 
 The other influential case in this area, Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, is also known as the “Steel Seizure Case” because it involved 
President Harry Truman’s attempt to seize steel mills to prevent labour unrest 
from disrupting the provision of steel during the Korean War in 1952.  The 
Supreme Court ruled against Truman, writing that the Commander-in-Chief 
power did not include the power to “take possession of private property in 
order to keep labour disputes from stopping production.”  (Youngstown, 1952: 
587)  This case is often cited as one that limits presidential powers.  In 
addition, the three levels of analysis of presidential actions by Justice Jackson 
in a concurring opinion remain an important foundation for legal arguments 
and opinions.  According to Jackson, 
  
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
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includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, 
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have 
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.   (Youngstown, 1952: 635-637) 
Although it may appear as an old and esoteric case, Youngstown continues to 
define the contours of the scope of the President’s powers in foreign affairs.  
For instance, instead of endorsing broad concepts of unfettered presidential 
powers, as the Bush II administration urged in cases brought during the “war 
on terror,” the Supreme Court referred to Youngstown and reiterated that 
Jackson’s analysis was still valid law more than 50 years after it was decided.  
 Later chapters on the Bush II administration explore how President 
George W. Bush and his advisors endorsed a new paradigm for the “war on 
terror,” which expanded executive branch authority.  The theory supporting 
Bush’s new legal paradigm included the proposition that the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, may disregard legal boundaries if national security 
requires it.  Cases involving the rights of detainees in the “war on terror,” such 
as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, supplement the analysis because 
the Supreme Court rejected President Bush’s claims that his power as 
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Commander-in-Chief gave him the authority to disregard acts of Congress.  A 
related case is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in which the Supreme Court used the 
three tiers from Youngstown to reject the Bush II administration’s extreme 
theory of executive power.  However, many challenges to Bush II 
administration legal theories were never adjudicated because federal courts 
are reluctant to decide cases that involve foreign affairs.  By refusing to hear 
challenges, the courts tolerate acts of executive initiative that violate the goal 
of balanced institutional participation in foreign relations, the third part of Koh’s 
pattern. 
 Several American legal doctrines permit federal courts to decline to 
hear cases; they are the following: standing, ripeness, mootness, the state 
secrets doctrine, and the political question doctrine.  In brief, they prevent the 
judiciary from reviewing, and possibly forbidding or curtailing, executive 
branch action in foreign affairs.  For example, the doctrine of standing means 
a plaintiff cannot bring a case against the President unless he has standing to 
sue and, even if the court finds he has standing, according to the concept of 
ripeness, they can still decline to hear the case because the issue is not ready 
or “ripe” for adjudication.  Furthermore, courts may also refuse to hear a case 
because the challenged event has already occurred, making the issue moot.  
During the Bush II administration, the state secrets privilege was frequently 
invoked by administration lawyers to avoid a ruling on the merits that might 
have been detrimental to the legal underpinnings of the “war on terror.”   
The state secrets privilege applies when the subject matter of the suit is 
itself a state secret; when the plaintiffs cannot make their case without 
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disclosure of the secret; or when the defendants cannot defend themselves 
fairly without disclosing the secret.  (Baker, 2007: 49)  The “moral integrity” of 
the executive branch lawyer relying on the state secrets doctrine is important 
in this area, as “the lawyer has an additional duty to test that the information is 
in fact secret and properly designated so.”  (Ibid)  Countless legal 
commentators debated whether the Bush II administration was properly using 
the state secrets doctrine, particularly in cases challenging the legality of 
extraordinary rendition and eavesdropping by the National Security Agency.  
Fisher, for instance, examined the Bush II administration’s justifications for the 
warrantless surveillance program exposed by the New York Times in a series 
of articles in December 2005.  He described how the administration began 
using the title “Terrorist Surveillance Program” as soon as it became public 
and how the administration argued it was legal due to the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force of September 2001, and the President’s “inherent 
constitutional authority” under Article II of the Constitution.  (Fisher, 2008: 292-
294)  Of course, when a lawsuit is precluded due to the state secrets privilege, 
there is no way to assess whether the privilege was correctly applied, or 
whether the government was simply claiming the privilege to hide 
malfeasance or incompetence. 
 The final method courts rely on to avoid deciding a case on the merits 
is known as the political question doctrine.  According to this doctrine, courts 
should refuse to hear a case in three circumstances: 
• “where the question presented hinges on a grant of authority that is 
textually assigned to one or both political branches; for example, 
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whether the United States should resort to war, which power is 
committed to the political branches. 
• where the matter raised is incapable of discoverable or manageable 
standards of judicial review.  This might be the case, for example, 
where the president’s use of force is challenged on the ground that the 
force was not ‘vital to national security.’ 
• where the matter is really one of policy disagreement and not law; for 
example, whether the president was correct to conclude that the 
intelligence predicate warranted the use of force.”  (Baker, 2007: 49-50) 
The Bush II administration routinely urged federal courts not to hear cases 
challenging its actions in the “war on terror” based on the political question 
doctrine.  Like the state secrets doctrine, legal commentators debated whether 
the political question doctrine was properly invoked to avoid adjudication of 
elements of the “war on terror.”  The merits of the debate are beyond the 
scope of this research, but the chapter on the legacy of the Bush II 
administration returns to the theme of precedents set in the “war on terror” and 
how they might be used by subsequent administrations for more extreme 
claims of executive branch power.  As noted by one scholar, “every 
extraordinary use of power by one President expands the availability of 
executive branch power for use by future Presidents.” (Marshall, 2008: 511) 
 The final point about judicial tolerance of executive branch initiatives 
concerns the role of executive branch lawyers, in particular, the lawyers in the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).  Due to 
the fact that many challenges to presidential power are not adjudicated by 
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federal courts, lawyers in the DOJ and OLC who advise the President on the 
permissibility of an action are the final legal authorities on these issues.  In 
effect, “the executive branch is the final judge of its own authority,” and this 
results in “broad interpretations of executive power.”  (Marshall, 2008: 512)  
The personal political outlook of an attorney in the OLC may become relevant 
in the equation as, for example, when John Yoo, a proponent of the unitary 
executive theory, wrote legal memos outlining the extent of the President’s 
authority to conduct military operations against terrorists in 2001.  According 
to a former legal advisor to the NSC, lawyers working in the field of national 
security for the executive branch “may be fueled with the moral integrity to 
interpret the Constitution in good faith, or they may be fueled by political 
expedience or a view that the law is whatever we might need or want it to be 




 Applied to the four administrations in the context of the use of force in 
counterterrorism, Koh’s pattern is an excellent explanatory lens in which to 
analyze and assess political behaviour.  The executive branch, under 
pressure from the general public after a large terror attack to do something 
about terrorism, takes the initiative and uses force to prevent or deter future 
terrorists.  Frequently, the initiative is a brief, sharp application of force like the 
bombing of Libya in 1986 or missile strikes in 1998, authorized without any 
input from Congress.  The President claims the use of force was lawful under 
international law as part of the law of self-defence, or even the concept of 
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anticipatory self-defence.  Moreover, the President construes statutes such as 
the War Powers Resolution as authorizing the action, or he claims inherent 
war powers to protect the national security of the U.S., thus bestowing the 
mantle of legality on the use of force.  Congress typically fails to check the 
exercise of power claimed by the President, either because it is controlled by 
the same political party as the President, or because individual members 
calculate there is more to lose than gain in challenging presidential actions 
taken in the name of national security.  The judicial branch also fails to check 
the President usually because judicial avoidance doctrines acerbate the 
tendency of courts to defer to the executive branch in areas of national 
security. 
 As explored further in the Bush II administration chapters, Koh’s 
pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial 
tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another 
attack to create a “perfect storm” of sorts.  This perfect storm was the ideal 
environment for executive initiatives in the treatment of detainees, surveillance 
of the public, and, most cogent for this research, the use of force.  
Furthermore, this perfect storm is not just important for its historical value but 
also because Koh’s premise posits that it may happen again, even if the 
personalities controlling the executive branch are different, in the absence of 
balanced institutional decision-making in foreign affairs.  Just as Koh’s 
admonition that the Iran-Contra affair remains a symptom of the failures of the 
foreign policy process, this research indicates the “war on terror” was not 
simply an aberration stemming from overzealous executive branch officials. 
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In itself, the growth of executive power in the U.S. might only be of 
concern to American specialists in separation of powers issues and 
constitutional history.  What this thesis is concerned with, however, is the 
possibility that combined with the unique characteristics of international 
terrorism and the ability of the U.S. to project force all over the globe, the 
expansion of executive power in the U.S. has been accompanied by less 
effective constraints on the use of force.  A worst case scenario includes fears 
about terrorists obtaining WMD’s in an attack with catastrophic casualties in 
the U.S. resulting in executive branch uses of force, more extreme than earlier 
precedents, with very negative consequences for the world community. 
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Chapter 4 
The Administration of Ronald Reagan 
This chapter examines President Ronald Reagan’s “War on Terror” 
from historical, political, and legal perspectives.  Upon winning the presidential 
election in 1980, Ronald Reagan came to office determined to combat 
international terrorism more forcefully than his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, 
whose term in office was marred by the hostage crisis in Iran.  Indeed, as 
discussed below, the Iranian hostage crisis contributed to Reagan’s electoral 
win.  After a series of well-publicized terrorist incidents in the mid-1980’s, 
Reagan launched the United States’ first “War on Terror.”  After the 
September 11 attacks, the second Bush administration borrowed from, and 
expanded upon, concepts and doctrines from the Reagan administration to 
implement George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” as discussed in chapters 7 and 
8. 
 Like the Bush “War on Terror,” President Reagan’s campaign to end 
international terrorism relied upon his Commander-in-Chief powers and 
involved the use of military force to punish and deter further attacks.  
Throughout this chapter, the “War on Terror” (WOT) refers to Ronald 
Reagan’s campaign, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  Ronald Reagan was 
in office for two terms, from 1980 to 1988 when several infamous terrorist 
attacks occurred including the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut and 
marine barracks in Beirut, the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the hijacking of the 
cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.
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During the Reagan administration, the concept of state-sponsored 
terrorism came into prominence and directly influenced policy-makers; it is 
defined as “the active and often clandestine support, encouragement and 
assistance provided by a foreign government to a terrorist group” (Hoffman, 
1998: 23).  While members of the Reagan administration may have 
anticipated contending with Communist terrorist groups and plots 
“orchestrated by the Kremlin and implemented by its Warsaw Pact client 
states,” by 1985, they were focusing on state-sponsored terrorism as a “type 
of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, 
more powerful rivals” (Hoffman, 1998: 27). 
Historical Context 
Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter (a Democrat) in 1980 
partially due to the American public’s concern about the weak economy.  
Carter was also portrayed by Reagan as a foreign policy failure due to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Iranian hostage 
crisis.  The hostage crisis, which began on November 4, 1979 when Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Revolutionary Guards seized control of the U.S. embassy in 
Teheran, dominated the media.  The Iranian students seized 66 American 
personnel, including those with diplomatic status, and 52 of the hostages were 
held for 444 days in an ordeal that was televised to the American public and 
discussed constantly.  After repeated efforts to end the standoff peacefully 
failed to work, President Carter authorized a rescue attempt to free the 
hostages.  On April 24, 1980, the rescue mission was forced to abort after 
encountering difficulties in the Iranian desert; eight U.S. servicemen were 
killed and four injured in the attempt.  For many Americans, the failed rescue 
104
added to a sense of American impotence regarding terrorism and 
incompetence on the part of the Carter administration in dealing with it. (Martin 
and Walcott, 1988: 42)  One year after the students took over the U.S. 
embassy, on November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President.  The 
day Reagan took the oath of office, January 20, 1981, the remaining 52 
hostages were released and left Iran.  One week later the new President set 
the tone of his administration’s rhetoric regarding terrorism by stating, “Let 
terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our 
policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.” (Wills, 2003: 1) 
 Many conservatives who came to Washington with the Reagan 
administration in 1981 arrived with the same strong worldview about the 
Soviet Union as Ronald Reagan; it was an “evil empire” with an insatiable 
desire to dominate and control countries around the globe.  In addition, it was 
the mission of the United States, as leader of the free world, to resist this 
domination wherever possible.  This worldview acerbated the tendency to 
analyze international tensions and policy challenges through the prism of the 
East-West ideological divide and to view things in a “black or white” 
dichotomy.  The problem of terrorism was no exception to this tendency; an 
example of this is a book by Claire Sterling called The Terror Network that 
explored terrorism as a “calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a 
vast global conspiracy.” (Hoffman, 1998: 27)  The perception that international 
terrorism was part of a Soviet effort to dominate the world may have 
persuaded many in the Reagan administration to believe it was more 
analogous to warfare than to criminal activity, a perception with important 
policy implications. 
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The goal of the “Reagan doctrine,” a term used to describe Reagan’s 
foreign policy, was stopping the perceived expansion of Soviet power and 
communist ideology.  Instead of containing communism, the conservatives 
under Reagan wanted to roll communist countries back by increasing the 
Defense Department budget, developing new weapons, and helping anti-
communist forces in states such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. (Evans and 
Newham, 1998: 464).  A related concept was the “Shultz doctrine” named for 
the Secretary of State who advocated using military force “not only against 
terrorists, but also against states that support, train or harbor terrorists.” 
(Paust, 1986: 711)  The Reagan administration did not use the Reagan 
doctrine as a legal justification for the use of force; rather it was a political 
statement about policy and goals. 
 Some of the most important players in the Reagan administration 
regarding terrorism include the following: Secretary of State George Shultz, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) William Casey.  George Shultz was Secretary of 
State from 1982 to 1989 and equated terrorism with warfare.  (Shultz, 1993: 
645)  In his book, Turmoil and Triumph, Shultz explained that the U.S had to 
become more aggressive regarding terrorism by responding with force so that 
terrorists would learn acts of terrorism do not work.  (Shultz, 1993)  In October 
1984, Shultz gave a speech at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City 
and declared, “The United States must be ready to use military force to fight 
terrorism and retaliate for terrorist attacks even before all the facts are known.” 
(Maogoto, 2005: 90)  
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 Many of Shultz’s views of terrorism from the 1980’s became standard 
rhetoric in the second Bush administration.  In 1984 he affirmed, “We must 
reach a consensus in this country that our responses [to terrorism] should go 
beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, 
and retaliation.”  (Henninger, 2006)  A Wall Street Journal editor named him 
the “father of the Bush Doctrine” for his advocacy of preempting threats well 
before the 9/11 attacks.  (Ibid)   After 9/11, Shultz, a former marine, approved 
of Bush’s war on terror approach, stating, “The law-enforcement mentality is 
not going to do the job for us.  You have to have a war mentality.  You have to 
have an offense and defense; you have to be active about it.”  (Ibid)  However, 
in the 1980’s, these views of terrorism did not find the same level of 
acceptance that they received after the 9/11 tragedy. 
Shultz’s readiness to use military force contrasted with the Secretary of 
Defense, Caspar Weinberger, who held that office from 1981 until 1987 (when 
he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Affair).  Weinberger viewed terrorism as 
criminal activity but not warfare and frequently clashed with Shultz over the 
most appropriate means for the U.S. to respond to terrorists. (Wills, 2003: 30)  
For Weinberger, six criteria needed to be evaluated prior to committing U.S. 
combat troops abroad: 
• The mission had to be in the vital interests of the U.S. 
• Overwhelming force should be used for a decisive victory. 
• There should be clearly defined military and political objectives. 
• The situation should be continually reassessed. 
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• There must be reasonable assurance---before committing 
combat forces abroad---that both the mission and troops have 
the support of the American people and Congress. 
• The commitment of troops should be the last resort.   
(Weinberger, 2001: 309-313) 
  
 Shultz, who advocated using military force against terrorists, 
concluded that Weinberger’s criteria applied to a “major, conventional war” but 
amounted to “a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis” in the face of 
terrorists. (Shultz, 1993: 650)  The inability of Weinberger and Shultz and their 
closest aides to agree on the nature of terrorism (was it war or crime?) 
frequently led them to disagree on the fundamental question of how to 
respond appropriately to acts of terrorism.  
 Another notable personality influencing Reagan’s WOT was the 
director of the CIA from 1981 until his death in 1987, William Casey, a man 
described as a conservative who was “fixated on the Soviet Union” and firmly 
committed to halting the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology. (Coll, 2004: 92)  
When Casey took over at the CIA, he applied the “message endorsing action, 
entrepreneurship and simplicity” from the book In Search of Excellence: 
Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies to improve the CIA.  
(Woodward, 1987: 314)  He also viewed terrorism as warfare, not criminal 
activity, and supported Shultz in advocating the use of military force to fight 
terrorists. (Wills, 2003: 33)   After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 
December 1979, the Carter administration sent approximately $75 million 
dollars to the mujahedin soldiers who were fighting the Soviet army.  (Persico, 
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1990: 225)  Although most members of the Reagan administration disdained 
Carter’s foreign policy initiatives, aid to the mujahedin was viewed as a way to 
counter the forcible spread of communism without sending American troops, 
so Casey continued it.  (Ibid)  The possibility of the mujahedin later opposing 
the U.S. and forming a non-state terrorist network, al Qaeda, never seems to 
have occurred to Casey and those who funded the anti-Soviet campaign. 
Colin Powell, who held various posts in all four administrations in this 
study, worked in the Reagan administration as National Security Adviser from 
1987 to 1989.  He then became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 
first Bush administration and the Clinton administration (1989-1993).  During 
the second Bush administration, Powell, by then the Secretary of State, 
presented the American case for invading Iraq to the UN in February 2003.  In 
his book, My American Journey, Powell remarked upon the continuing tension 
between Weinberger and Shultz while cautiously avoiding agreement with 
either man’s views on terrorism.  (Powell, 1995)  In addition, Powell endorsed 
Weinberger’s rules on committing U.S. forces to combat, writing that they 
operated as a “practical guide” by Powell when he advised Presidents on the 
desirability of committing troops abroad.  (Powell, 1995: 303)  
   
Other influential people in the Reagan administration were Robert 
McFarlane, National Security Advisor from 1983 to 1985, and John 
Poindexter, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1981 
to 1986.  Both McFarlane and Poindexter were involved in the Iran-Contra 
scandal; McFarlane plead guilty to four counts of withholding information from 
Congress and was pardoned by the first George Bush in 1992 and Poindexter 
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was convicted of multiple felonies in 1990 but the convictions were reversed a 
year later.  Finally, Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor at the State Department 
during the latter half of Reagan’s term, provided explicit legal backing for the 
administration’s use of force against terrorists.  His published works on 
terrorism and the law were assessed in the literature review chapter.  As some 
of the most important participants in Reagan’s foreign policy team, these men 
were responsible for shaping and implementing counterterrorism policy. 
Counterterrorism Policy under Ronald Reagan 
 Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 determined to change many Carter 
administration policies including counterterrorism.  While the Carter 
administration championed human rights, the new Reagan administration 
“announced international terrorism would replace human rights as the number 
–one issue for the U.S.”  (Weiner, 2007: 388) Terrorist incidents increased 
throughout the 1980’s with half of the incidents “aimed at only 10 countries; 
one-third of the total were targeted directly at the US.” (Task Force Report, 
1987: 8)  From the start of his administration, Reagan pledged a policy of 
“swift and effective retribution” against terrorists; the second pillar of his policy 
was “making concessions to terrorists was not an option.” (Wills, 2003: 4)  
State sponsorship of terrorism dominated the foreign policy agenda of the 
administration and the two main sponsors of terrorism, the Soviet Union and 
Libya, received most of the administration’s attention.  In fact, during a hearing 
by the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in 1986, Ambassador 
Robert Oakley, Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency 
Planning at the State Department, called Libya “far and away the most active 
supporter of terrorism, especially against Americans and Europeans.”   Libya 
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was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1979 under the Export 
Administration Act, during the Carter administration, and this meant it was 
subject to export restrictions.  Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of 
terrorism was not rescinded until June 2006 during the second Bush 
administration. 
 The Vice President’s task force on combating terrorism, chaired by 
Vice President George H. W. Bush, concluded in 1987 that U.S. policy was 
“no concessions to terrorists.” (Task Force Report, 1987: 12)  In addition, the 
task force noted that the U.S. government was prepared to act “unilaterally 
when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.” However, the Reagan 
administration’s strong rhetorical stance did not always result in the use of 
force or other counterterrorist activity.  In many cases in the 1980’s, the 
empirical evidence reveals the strong rhetoric did not match reality in that 
there was no response by the Reagan administration to terrorist acts.  
Specifically, one study identified 636 terrorist incidents from January 1981 to 
January 1989 (the Reagan years) and “in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
the administration did not respond at all.” (Wills, 2003: 6)  Sometimes the 
terrorist incident was minor and other times the lack of clear evidence as to 
culpability or the whereabouts of the perpetrators made responding too 
difficult.  In other cases, the government response was not swift and effective 
retribution, but rather, defensive measures such as improving security at 
potential targets and increasing intelligence gathering capabilities.  (Ibid)  In 
addition, despite all the talk in the 1980’s about combating terrorism, the 
President and Congress were slow to enact laws to protect American citizens.  
It was not until 1984, for instance, that taking an American hostage overseas 
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became a crime under U.S. law and only in 1986 did assaulting, maiming, or 
murdering a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world became a crime. (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 367)    
 Much of Reagan’s counterterrorism rhetoric “reflected the scene, 
characters, and themes of Cold War discourse,” with the Soviet Union 
occupying the position of evildoer.  (Winkler, 2006: 80)  The Reagan 
administration tended to focus on one region of the world, Central America, 
and on Lebanon, where they believed democracy was fragile and under 
attack.  Throughout his two terms, Reagan portrayed the Soviet Union as the 
“evil empire” bent on destructive expansionism, with assistance from its 
satellite states and often working through the tactic of terrorism.  Winkler 
detailed how Reagan transformed the political debate on counterterrorism so 
that “terrorism became less about individuals committing crimes and more 
about the Soviet Union and its client states permitting and encouraging 
terrorism as the means of furthering their ideological perspective.”  (Winkler, 
2006: 82)  As the public became more accustomed to viewing international 
terrorism this way, responding with the use of force, as opposed to law 
enforcement methods, became more of an acceptable option. 
  The following sections examine the major terrorist incidents of the 
Reagan administration by describing the events and detailing the response, if 
any, of the administration.  In addition, in the cases where the administration 
responded with force, the administration’s legal justification for the use of force 
and the international community’s reaction are analyzed.  The pattern of 
executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance, 
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expounded by Koh and explained in chapter three, is the lens applied to 
assess how the Reagan administration responded to international terrorism in 
the 1980’s. 
Marine Barracks Bombing 
 In June of 1982, Israeli troops under the direction of Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin and Defence Secretary Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to 
move Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces north.  Some critics 
accused the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, of tacitly agreeing to the 
Israeli invasion, but Haig denied it.  Although the PLO was eventually expelled 
from Lebanon and the Syrian troops fighting the Israeli army suffered more 
casualties, it is often cited as an Israeli political failure despite their military 
victory.  Graphic images of civilian deaths in the media helped turn world 
public opinion against the Israeli invasion.  American policy toward Lebanon 
soon became “the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, a sovereign, 
independent Lebanon, and security for Israel’s northern border.” (Wills, 2003: 
50)   
In August of 1982, eight hundred U.S. marines were sent to Lebanon to 
facilitate the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut.  Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger resisted the deployment of the marines from the beginning 
because he feared the assignment was too vague.  On September 10, 1982, 
the marines left Lebanon and returned to U.S. ships in the Mediterranean.  
However, two events quickly brought them back into Beirut: President-elect 
Bashir Gemeyel was assassinated on September 14, and Israeli Defence 
Minister Sharon allowed Phalange militiamen to kill over 700 Palestinian 
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civilians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. (Wills, 2003: 53)  Disturbing 
images of dead Palestinians put pressure on the Reagan administration to 
prevent more violence.    
 The second deployment of marines, part of a multinational force with 
French and Italian troops, entered Lebanon to stabilize the political situation 
and allow the Lebanese government to reestablish control over its territory.  
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed 
to the second marine deployment due to the “intractable political and military 
problems on the ground,” but their caution was overruled.  (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 97)  Intelligence reports that indicated possible terrorist attacks 
against American installations were ignored and on April 18, 1983, a truck 
bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, 17 of 
them Americans.  A group called Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the 
attack, which indicated Hezbollah and Iranian involvement.  In a sharp 
departure from the rule of law, one CIA officer, Keith Hall, extracted 
confessions from four suspects arrested by the Lebanese with “overly harsh” 
techniques that led to Hall’s discharge from the CIA. (Martin and Walcott, 
1988: 105) 
 Despite the vulnerability of their position, the marines remained near 
the Beirut airport and on October 23, 1983 suffered their largest single-day 
losses since the Vietnam War when a truck bomb destroyed the marine 
barracks, killing 241 Americans.  Shortly thereafter, another bomb exploded at 
the French headquarters, killing 59.  After the bombing of the marine barracks, 
President Reagan stoutly declared that he was committed to keeping 
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American forces in Lebanon to complete the “peacekeeping” mission.  Two 
days later, on October 25, U.S. forces invaded the tiny island of Grenada and 
a storm of controversy engulfed the Reagan administration as questions were 
asked about the legality of invading Grenada.  In addition, the Reagan 
administration was forced to deflect questions about whether the timing of the 
Grenada invasion was intended to turn attention away from the sight of dead 
and wounded marines in the rubble in Lebanon.  Although unrelated events, 
the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut 
both threatened to derail Reagan’s hopes for re-election. 
 In the aftermath of the marine bombing many in the Reagan 
administration called for strong action against the terrorists who had carried 
out the attack.  The first problem was gathering intelligence to determine who 
to retaliate against and how.  After its investigation, the CIA concluded that the 
“bombings on October 23 of the U.S. and French MNF headquarters were 
carried out by Shia radicals armed, trained and directed by Syria and Iran.” 
(Wills, 2003: 70)  The U.S. military drew up plans for retaliatory air strikes but 
never carried them out; the exact reason why remains obscure.  In his 
memoirs, Reagan claimed he cancelled the air strikes out of concern that the 
targets were not appropriate but Weinberger later said he did not recall the 
president “even coming close to ordering an attack.” (Wills, 2003: 75)  In stark 
contrast to the American non-response, the French bombed the Sheik Abullah 
Barracks in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley on November 17, 1983. (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: xvii) 
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 As explained by the chart in chapter 3 on party affiliations of 
presidents and congress, President Reagan dealt with a divided congress (the 
Senate was controlled by the Republican party while the House of 
Representatives was in the hands of the Democrats) from January 1981 until 
January 1987 when the Democrats took control over both houses.  Unlike 
President George W. Bush, whose two terms in office were spent mainly 
interacting with a Republican controlled congress until January 2007, Reagan 
was forced by political reality to reach some accommodation with the 
Democrats as they controlled the levers of spending and congressional 
oversight.  In addition, the Reagan era was not marred by the extreme party 
polarization that marked the Clinton and Bush II administrations, when political 
party affiliation increasingly became more important for predicting how 
individual members of congress might vote on a particular issue. 
 The War Powers Resolution (WPR) did not significantly constrain 
President Reagan’s deployment of U.S. forces in counterterrorism activities, 
notwithstanding the intentions of the WPR drafters in 1973.  When Reagan 
first ordered the marines into Lebanon, he did not consult with members of 
Congress, but instead based the deployment on his “constitutional authority 
with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief.”  
(Fisher, 2004: 160)  Reagan did send a war powers letter to congress, but did 
not report the deployment of U.S. troops under section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, to 
avoid triggering the sixty day “clock” that would have required the troops be 
brought home, or an extension.  In response, on October 12, 1983, Congress 
passed legislation stating that the “clock” stipulations of section 4(a)(1) 
became operative on August 29, 1983.  However, in a major weakening of an 
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already weak constrain on presidential deployments of force, Congress 
permitted the military action in Lebanon for 18 months.  (Fisher, 2004: 160)  
President Reagan responded to this mild assertion of congressional will with 
the announcement that he “felt no constitutional obligation to seek 
congressional authorization after the expiration of the 18-month period if, in 
his view, further use of military action was necessary.” (Fisher, 2004: 161)  
Tragic events overtook politics with the explosion of a bomb in front of the 
marine barracks on October 23, 1983, detailed above. 
 Reagan’s political advisors feared that the Democrats would use the 
bombings and continued deployment of the marines in Lebanon to defeat 
Reagan in his 1984 re-election campaign.  They did not want Reagan’s 
policies to become enmeshed in Lebanon as the Carter administration had 
become bogged down by the hostage crisis in Iran while public and 
congressional support for the mission in Lebanon was collapsing.  (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 148)  Despite his earlier assertions that the troops were on a 
humanitarian mission that would be completed despite the violence, Reagan 
began withdrawing troops from Lebanon until the last marine was withdrawn 
on February 26, 1984, well before the 18-month period granted by Congress 
ended.  The Reagan administration always denied that there was a cause and 
effect relationship between the barracks bombing and the marines’ departure, 
but this may have been the interpretation of future terrorists who believed the 
U.S. lacked the political will to sustain a military engagement with heavy 
casualties. 
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 Although it failed to strike militarily after the marine barracks bombing, 
the Department of Defense did establish a commission to study what went 
wrong and how to prevent it from happening again.  The Long Commission 
issued its report in December of 1983, concluding that the marines in Beirut 
were “not trained, organized, staffed, or supported to deal effectively with the 
terrorist threat in Lebanon.  (Long Commission, 1983: 121)  In addition, the 
commission recommended that the U.S. have “an active policy” to combat 
terrorism because “a reactive policy only forfeits the initiative to the terrorists.” 
(Ibid)  Based on the recommendations of the Long Commission, National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 was drafted and then signed by 
Reagan on April 3, 1984.  (Winkler, 2006: 93)  This important executive 
branch directive remains partially classified, although some of its main points 
are described in various accounts about the Reagan administration.  For 
instance, one important finding was that terrorism is a form of aggression and 
therefore the U.S. is justified in acting in self-defence under international law.  
It also authorized “active defense measures” including preemptive military 
strikes against terrorist groups located in states unable or unwilling to take 
effective action.  NSDD 138 has been described as “a seminal shift in the 
administration’s officially sanctioned approach to terrorism” which authorized 
the use of preemptive and retaliatory strikes, deception, and expanded the 
ability of the intelligence community to gather information on terrorists.  (Wills, 
2003: 83-84)  
 The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate and it became 
increasingly dangerous for Americans and other Westerners to remain there; 
several were kidnapped in Beirut and held hostage for years.  Reagan’s 
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Secretary of Defense and his Secretary of State, Weinberger and Shultz, 
continued to disagree on the proper role of U.S. military forces in 
counterterrorism operations.  Ultimately, the inability of Western governments 
to negotiate the hostages’ release led to a small group of staffers in the 
National Security Council (NSC) to take matters into their own hands to initiate 
an unconventional method of hostage release.  The resulting Iran-Contra affair 
in which executive branch officials attempted to sell arms to Iran in exchange 
for the release of the hostages in Lebanon is discussed below. 
Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
The next real test for the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism 
policy was the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985.  On June 14, 1985, two 
Shia Lebanese gunmen hijacked TWA Flight 847 as it was flying from Athens 
to Rome.  There were 153 passengers on board, including 135 Americans.  
The hijackers demanded that more than 700 Lebanese Shiites be released 
from an Israeli prison, in addition to the release of more Shiites from prisons in 
Kuwait, Spain, and Cyprus.  (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 169)  On the second 
day of the hijacking, while on the ground in Beirut, the hijackers shot and killed 
a U.S. Navy diver.  The hijackers then threw the body of Robert Stetham out 
of the plane, onto the tarmac.  As the hijacked plane flew from Algeria to 
Lebanon and then back again, the hijacking became a media event with 
American television showing interviews with the hostages and the hostages’ 
families; the families spoke about their frustration with the Reagan 
administration’s response to the hijacking.  On June 19 in Beirut an American 
news crew was allowed to interview the crew of the hijacked plane; this gave 
Americans watching at home visual confirmation of the crew’s plight and it 
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gave the hijackers another way to publicize their demands.  This added to the 
pressure put on the administration to end the hijacking without further 
bloodshed.  Behind the scenes, the Reagan administration was trying to get 
the Israeli government to speed the release of the Shiites taken in Lebanon, 
but the Israelis did not want to appear to be giving in to terrorists. 
 The Reagan administration also sent an elite military force called 
Delta to Cyprus to attempt a rescue similar to the Entebbe raid in which Israeli 
forces had rescued Israeli and Jewish passengers from an Air France plane in 
Entebbe, Uganda in 1976.  However, the Delta force never got close enough 
to the hijacked TWA plane to attempt a rescue because the hijackers realized 
that an American military force might be sent and so they ordered the pilot to 
keep flying.  Ultimately, the plane ended up in Beirut where the pilot told the 
hijackers that it could not take off again without a new engine. (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 184)  Some of the passengers had been released by the 
hijackers earlier in Algiers; the rest were taken off the plane, still in captivity, to 
be held hostage in different spots in Beirut.  Negotiations continued for days, 
until June 30 when the remaining hostages were driven to Syria, delivered to 
the American ambassador to Syria, and then flown to Germany by the U.S. Air 
Force. 
 The results of the hijacking were varied; the liberation of the hostages 
was followed by the liberation of 735 Shiite prisoners held in Israel, although 
the Israeli government maintained that there was no connection because the 
release of the Shiites had been planned before the start of the hijacking.  The 
Reagan administration was relieved that the death toll had not been higher 
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and became convinced that the key to releasing hostages in Lebanon was 
held by Iran (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 202).  The ability of a spectacular 
terrorist event to consume TV and newspaper headlines was demonstrated 
once again, along with the ability of a few armed terrorists to put pressure on 
the U.S. government to act, or at least to be seen acting.  Furthermore, the 
administration ordered a review of counterterrorism policy and this became 
the Vice Presidential Task Force on Combating Terrorism, which issued its 
report in 1987.  Secretary of State Shultz and the NSC staff argued that the 
U.S. should retaliate with force for the hijacking, but this option was not 
followed, probably due to the seven Americans still held hostage in Beirut. 
(Wills, 2003: 134)    
 The hijackers of TWA 847 largely remain free; in October 2001, 
President George W. Bush announced the formation of an FBI Most Wanted 
Terrorists list and it included the names of three of the hijackers, Imad 
Mugniyah, Ali Atwa, and Hassan Izz-Al-Din.  Hezbollah subsequently claimed 
Mugniyah was killed by a car bomb in Syria in 2008, but this is unconfirmed.  
Finally, another hijacker, Mohammed Ali Hammadi, was arrested in 1987 in 
Germany, tried, and convicted for the murder of American Robert Stethem.  
However, instead of serving the life sentence he received during his trial, he 
was released in 2005 and returned to Lebanon; the U.S. requested his 
extradition in 2006 to be tried for murder and hijacking, but this has not 
occurred as of 2012. 
  
Achille Lauro Affair 
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 On October 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked 
by four armed men as it sailed from Alexandria to Port Said.  The men, 
members of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), demanded the release of 
50 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.  At the time of the hijacking, there were 
approximately 400 people on board and one of the first things the hijackers did 
after taking control of the ship was to single out the American and British 
citizens and put them on deck surrounded by open cans of petrol.  (Wills, 
2003: 140)  The Reagan administration quickly learned of the hijacking and 
made plans for a rescue operation, believing that a rescue at sea would be 
possible because, as long as the ship stayed at sea, it was isolated and 
vulnerable.  A Special Operations Command (JSOC) force left the next day for 
the NATO air base at Sigonella, Sicily to plan a rescue mission.  (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 238)  In addition, not only would a rescue operation be easier if 
the ship stayed in open seas, there would be no media circus with TV 
interviews of the hostages and hijackers.  The Reagan administration was 
increasingly concerned about the impact publicity-seeking terrorists had on 
the press and public. 
 On the second day of the hijacking, as the ship waited outside the port 
of Tartus, Syria, the hijackers grew angry waiting and shot and killed an 
American tourist, Leon Klinghoffer, who was wheelchair-bound.   On the third 
day of the hijacking, in Egyptian waters, negotiations with the hijackers 
accelerated and the Egyptian government worked out a deal which it 
presented to the U.S. and Italy: the hijackers would surrender to Egyptian 
authorities.  (Wills, 2003: 148)  The next day, President Mubarak of Egypt told 
the news media that the hijacking was over and that the hijackers had left the 
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country.  However, the hijackers had not left Egypt, and Israeli intelligence 
tracked their whereabouts and passed along this information to the Reagan 
administration.  When the U.S. confirmed that an American citizen, 
Klinghoffer, had been killed, the Reagan administration became adamant that 
the hijackers be captured and brought to justice.  Several members of the 
NSC staff, including Oliver North, worked on a plan using Israeli intelligence to 
intercept the plane carrying the hijackers as they fled Egypt.  (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 245) 
 Secretary of Defense Weinberger did not approve of the plan, which 
involved using U.S. military aircraft to intercept an Egyptian civilian airliner, but 
“Reagan was determined to proceed.” (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 249)  On 
October 9, U.S. Navy jets forced the EgyptAir plane carrying the hijackers to 
land in Sicily and Delta force troops quickly surrounded the plane; then the 
Delta troops were quickly surrounded by Italian troops.  Italian Prime Minister 
Craxi insisted that the Italians had jurisdiction because the hijackers were on 
Italian soil and the hijacked ship had been Italian.  A diplomatic standoff 
ensued for four hours, with Italian troops surrounding the American forces until 
negotiations between the U.S. and Italy resolved the situation.  
In the end, the Italians brought charges against three of the four 
hijackers, who received long sentences.  One of the hijackers, Abu Abbas, 
was released by the Italians but captured later by U.S. Special Forces; he was 
found on the outskirts of Baghdad in 2003 after the U.S. invaded Iraq.  The 
Italian government collapsed on October 17, 1985, partially due to the standoff 
with the Americans and subsequent handling of the hijackers.  Not 
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surprisingly, relations between the U.S. and Egyptian governments were 
strained after the interception of EgyptAir. (Wills, 2003: 161)  In addition, the 
legality of the U.S. interception of the Egyptian aircraft was hotly debated, with 
some analysts calling it an illegal use of force.  For the Reagan administration, 
particularly the NSC staff, it was a triumph, which confirmed for many the 
utility of using military force in counterterrorism operations.  The attraction of 
“going on offense” against terrorists and initiating executive branch 
counterterrorist plans without significant congressional input remained with the 
Reagan administration from the interception of EgyptAir.  
Terrorist Attacks at the Rome and Vienna Airports 
 In two nearly simultaneous attacks, Abu Nidal terrorists killed 18 
passengers waiting in the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985 
with guns and hand grenades.  The dead and injured included American 
tourists; when Reagan was told, he was filled with “revulsion” and “anger” and 
the option of swift and effective retribution immediately came up as a methods 
of preventing more terrorist attacks. (Wills, 2003: 176)  However, it was 
necessary to first gather intelligence to determine who aided the terrorists and 
how to retaliate.  One terrorist was captured alive and subsequent 
investigations indicated that two countries helped carry out the attacks: Libya 
by providing Tunisian passports confiscated or stolen from Tunisian citizens 
working in Libya, and Syria by providing training at camps in the Bekaa Valley 
in Lebanon by Syrian agents. (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 268)  Qaddafi 
augmented his reputation as a head of state who supported terrorism by 
hailing the attacks as “heroic actions.”  During the Carter administration in 
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1979, the U.S. officially designated Libya as a country that supported acts of 
terrorism and subsequent bellicose rhetoric from the Libyan head of state 
reinforced this designation. 
 Secretary of State Shultz once again argued that the U.S. should 
carry out a military strike against Libya and members of the NSC staff agreed 
that force was justified in this instance.  In addition, Abraham Sofaer, legal 
counsel at the State Department, advised that terrorism was a form of armed 
aggression, which allowed the victim state to use military force in defence. 
(Wills, 2003: 181)  In an article examining Article 51 of the UN Charter, which 
grants states the right to self defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
state, Sofaer wrote that “a sound construction of Article 51 would allow any 
state, once a terrorist attack occurs or is about to occur, to use force against 
those responsible for the attack in order to prevent the attack or to deter 
further attacks.” (Sofaer, 1989: 95)    For Shultz, this was a policy of “active 
defense” and it enabled the U.S. to proactively strike terrorists or the states, 
like Libya, that sponsored them. 
 However, Secretary of Defense Weinberger opposed military action 
against Libya, partially due to the possibility that Qaddafi might take 
Americans working in Libya at the oilfields hostage.  He also felt other 
alternatives should be considered and implemented before a military strike. 
(Martin and Walcott, 1988: 181)   In the end, Reagan decided not to use the 
military, but rather to implement more diplomatic and economic sanctions 
against Libya to curtail its support of the Abu Nidal organization.  For example, 
Reagan signed Executive Order 12543 on January 7, 1986 which imposed 
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new economic sanctions on Libya and NSDD 205 the next day, which banned 
all direct imports and exports with Libya, prohibited travel to Libya, and barred 
Libyan-flagged ships from entering U.S. ports. (Wills, 2003: 184-5)  As is 
frequently the case with economic sanctions, the problem was enforcement 
and uniformity of application.  Only Canada fully supported the U.S. position.   
 The political situation between the American administration and 
Qaddafi continued to deteriorate with increasingly bellicose rhetoric on both 
sides as tensions mounted.  For instance, Qaddafi created what he called the 
“Line of Death” across the Gulf of Sidra, claiming all the waters within the gulf 
were Libyan territory and then he forbid all other countries from passing 
through this line.  The U.S. Navy engaged in naval exercises in the Gulf of 
Sidra to demonstrate that, outside of the usual 12-mile territorial sea, the rest 
of the gulf was high seas and open for navigation.  On March 24 and 25, 
1986, Libyan ships attacked the U.S. Navy during such an exercise and two 
Libyan patrol boats were sunk. (McCredie, 1987: 215)  Some scholars have 
questioned the purpose of sending the U.S. Navy into the Gulf of Sidra, 
theorizing that it was “to provoke a Libyan armed attack which would serve as 
a justification for the use of armed force in response.”  (Murphy, 1986: 88) 
Bombing of the La Belle Disco in Berlin 
 On April 2, 1986, a bomb exploded on a TWA flight from Rome to 
Athens, killing four American citizens, including an infant.  The “Arab 
Revolutionary Cells,” another name Abu Nidal used, claimed responsibility, 
saying the bombing was “in retaliation for America’s actions in the Gulf of 
Sidra.”  (Wills, 2003: 195)  On April 5, a bomb exploded in the La Belle Disco 
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in West Berlin, killing two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman; more than 200 
people, including many other U.S. soldiers, were injured.   
After the La Belle Disco bombing, the Reagan administration claimed it 
had solid evidence of Libyan involvement.  The evidence was twofold: the 
British General Communications Headquarters had intercepted a message 
from the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin to Tripoli describing a “joyous 
event” that was going to happen soon, and after the bomb exploded, the 
British intercepted another message which reported the operation had been 
successful and could not be traced to the People’s Bureau. (Martin and 
Walcott, 1988: 286)   The bombing of the disco seemed to provide the Reagan 
administration with a “smoking gun” and a clear-cut terrorist attack that called 
for the implementation of Reagan’s policy of swift and effective retribution.  
Shultz and the other advocates of proactive measures against terrorism urged 
Reagan to order military strikes against Libya to illustrate American resolve. 
Bombing of Libya: Swift and Effective Retribution? 
Early on April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval aircraft bombed 
targets in Libya; the air strike hit the Tripoli Military Air Field, Aziziyah 
Barracks, Sidi Balal Training Camp, Benina Military Air Field, and Benghazi 
Military Barracks.  (Intoccia, 1987: 179)  The death toll was 37 people killed, 
including Qaddafi’s adopted daughter, and 93 injured; two U.S. airmen were 
also killed when their plane crashed.  In addition, the Pentagon admitted that 
U.S. planes “inadvertently hit civilian areas.”  (Intoccia, 1987: 180)  The air 
strikes brought a storm of criticism of the Reagan administration’s WOT and 
its use of military force against Libya.  For example, Greece and Italy 
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denounced the air strikes as “set[ting] dynamite to peace” and thousands of 
demonstrators protested the American action in West Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, and Great Britain. (Intoccia, 1987: 187-188)  A resolution in the UN 
Security Council condemning the strikes was vetoed by France, the U.S, and 
UK, but many other countries in the Security Council disapproved of the 
American action.  (Maogoto, 2005: 93)  In contrast to the Security Council, the 
UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the American air 
strikes by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 abstentions.  
Prior to sending U.S. planes to Libya, the Reagan administration 
sought the support of key European allies such as France and Great Britain.  
President Mitterrand of France refused to give the U.S. permission to fly over 
French territory, so the American planes had to fly the long way around the 
continent to reach Libya.  (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 293)  In Britain, Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s decision to allow the American planes to launch from 
British bases was deeply resented by members of the opposition party and 
public.  Before granting her permission, Mrs. Thatcher, who was “on record as 
saying that ‘retaliatory strikes’ against Libya would be ‘against international 
law,’” wanted assurances from the State Department that the air strikes were 
“fully consistent” with the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
(Martin and Walcott, 1988: 290)  According to Reagan’s diaries, Mrs. Thatcher 
sent Reagan a long message of support a few days before the strikes, but 
expressed concern about civilian casualties.  (Reagan, 2007: 403)  Reagan 
noted, “That’s our concern also.”  (Ibid)  Reagan does not mention soliciting 
any input from Congress. 
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As noted in chapter 1, the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is subject to certain conditions such as necessity, imminence, and 
proportionality.  Acts taken in legitimate self-defence must be strictly 
necessary to protect against an “armed attack” and the amount of force used 
in response must be proportional to the amount of force used in the initial 
attack.  Legal scholars who support a narrow right of self-defence believe it 
“arises only if an armed attack occurs” as this right is an exception to the 
general Charter prohibition on the threat or use of force found in article 2(4). 
(Gray, 2004: 98)  On the other side are writers who argue that the right of self-
defence is broader because the UN Charter preserves the “wide customary 
international law right of self-defence, allowing the protection of nationals and 
anticipatory self-defence.” (Gray, 2004: 98)  Clearly, the Reagan 
administration based its actions on a broad interpretation of self-defence.   
The Reagan administration was careful in its official pronouncements 
regarding the air strikes in Libya; Reagan cited self-defence under Article 51 
as the legal basis for the bombing and avoided calling them reprisals.  He also 
referred to the strikes as “preemptive action” against Qaddafi’s terrorist 
installations.  For many analysts, the air strikes fit uneasily into Article 51 as 
measures taken in self-defence for several reasons.  Article 51 provides a 
right of self-defence in the event of an armed attack, so the question was 
whether Libyan actions such as the La Belle Disco bombing, support for the 
Abu Nidal organization, Gulf of Sidra provocations, and possible involvement 
in the Rome and Vienna airport killings constituted an “armed attack” under 
international law, triggering the right to respond in self-defence.  The Reagan 
administration claimed that the cumulative effect of Libyan activities 
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amounted to an “armed attack,” a position not shared by all scholars of 
international law.  For instance, O’Connell argued terrorist acts, typically 
sporadic events, are generally treated as criminal acts because “they have 
all the hallmarks of crimes, not armed attacks that can give rise to the right of 
self-defense.”  (O’Connell, 2010: 14)   
In addition, the issue of imminence was debated because normally the 
act of self-defence should occur very close in time to the armed attack.  
However, the U.S. air strikes in Libya came 10 days after the last incident, the 
bombing at the La Belle Disco (April 5, 1986).  The U.S. offered no concrete 
evidence that Libya was preparing another “imminent” attack.  Finally, the right 
of self-defence is subject to the requirement of proportionality, which left many 
commentators wondering whether it was proportional for the U.S. military to 
strike targets within Libya for its support of terrorism.  At least one writer 
viewed the U.S. bombing of Libya as “part of crystallizing U.S. policy” that 
employed preemptive strikes against terrorism, although the opportunity to 
use this policy did not present itself until the end of the Cold War.  (Maogoto, 
2005: 93) 
The domestic aspect of legality, i.e. did the President have the 
constitutional authority to use force against Libya, requires an evaluation of all 
the circumstances and the WPR.  The application of force against Libya was a 
brief use of force that did not entail Congress declaring war on Libya, or the 
deployment of troops.  In addition, the use of force was not strictly done under 
“emergency” conditions or for the purpose of rescuing American citizens held 
hostage.  In his address to the country explaining the raid on Libya, Reagan 
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stated his actions were based on his “constitutional authority,” including his 
powers as Commander-in-Chief.  The WPR requires consultation with 
Congress about the deployment of troops and reporting, if the use of military 
force falls under section 4.  Understandably, the Reagan administration 
avoided the reporting requirements of section 4 by claiming the use of force 
did not fall under section 4.  Several members of Congress, mostly 
Democrats, were displeased that the “consultation” was in name only, 
because “Congressional leaders were called to the White House only as U.S. 
bombers were approaching Libya.”  (Fisher, 2004: 164)  Instead of 
“consulting” with members of Congress, President Reagan was merely 
informing them of his decision to bomb Libya.  If Congress disapproved of 
bombing Libya, it was far too late to stop it by the time the members were 
informed. 
At the time of the bombing of Libya, the Democrats controlled the 
House of Representatives, which may partially explain why hearings were 
held on the issues involving war powers, Libya, and state-sponsored terrorism 
at the end of April 1986.  The chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Congressman Dante B. Fascell (Democrat from Florida), also wrote a 
letter to President Reagan, requesting compliance with the WPR.  At the 
beginning of the hearings, Chairman Fascell stated, “there was no 
consultation, no report, and because of a dislike for the War Powers 
Resolution, which is still the law, we find Presidents, and not just this one, 
waltzing around in an attempt to avoid the requirements of the resolution.”  
(Hearings, 1986: 2)  He went on to ask, “Can the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, take the country to war wherever an act of state-sponsored terrorism 
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has taken place, and do it all under the rubric of saying this is self-defense?”  
(Hearings, 1986: 4)  However, despite the hearing and complaints from 
members, Congress did nothing more to compel the Reagan administration to 
comply with the WPR regarding the use of force in Libya.  Thus, the bombing 
of Libya clearly conforms to the first two parts of the pattern identified by Koh 
of executive initiative and congressional acquiescence.    
The Iran-Contra Affair 
 The Iran-Contra Affair was the Reagan administration’s largest 
political scandal and tied two distinct issues, i.e. the release of hostages held 
in Lebanon, and the transfer of funds to the Contra militants in Nicaragua.  It is 
connected to the Reagan administration’s war on terrorism because some of 
the same executive branch officials who coordinated Reagan’s WOT became 
involved in selling arms to Iran to facilitate the release of hostages held in 
Lebanon.  One of the major players was Oliver North, a military aide to the 
NSC and advocate of using force to combat terrorism.  In the mid-1980’s, the 
Reagan administration was faced with the problem of how to free several 
hostages held by various groups in Lebanon in various locations.  Frustration 
grew, as the U.S. was unable to negotiate for their release or mount a 
successful rescue mission because the intelligence on their location was too 
spotty.  At the same time, President Reagan and many in his administration 
favoured giving aid to the Contras in Nicaragua as they fought the Sandinista 
government because Reagan did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to gain 
a “toehold” in Central America.  However, Congress did not agree with 
Reagan’s position on Central America and cut off all funding for the Contras’ 
military operations in a statutory provision known as the “Boland Amendment.”  
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Despite the Boland Amendment, members of the executive branch sought 
funds from private sources and third countries to continue giving aid to the 
Contras.  Moreover, the NSC staff agreed to an Israeli proposal that missiles 
be sold to Iran in return for the release of seven American hostages held in 
Lebanon.   
 President Reagan authorized Israel to proceed with the sale of arms 
to Iran in the summer of 1985, but did not notify Congress about this covert 
operation, despite section 501 of the National Security Act, which requires 
“significant anticipated intelligence activity” to be reported.  The scandal broke 
in November 1986 when a Lebanese magazine reported the arms-for-
hostages arrangement.  Soon after, Oliver North and his secretary deliberately 
shredded pertinent documents; she achieved some fame when she told 
Congress later, “sometimes you have to go above the written law” during the 
hearings.  Ronald Reagan admitted to the sale of weapons to Iran, but 
claimed it was not in exchange for hostages because the U.S. government 
“has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands.”  The attempt to sell 
weapons in exchange for the release of the hostages was not particularly 
successful as only three of 30 hostages were released.  Under political 
pressure, Reagan established a commission, called the Tower Commission, 
to investigate; that commission subsequently found that the President should 
have had better control of the NSC staff, including North, Poindexter, and 
others.  In addition, the Tower Commission stated that the Reagan 
administration showed “disdain for the law” but Reagan survived the scandal 
and, ultimately, his approval ratings recovered. 
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 The Congress, controlled by the Democrats by 1987, established a 
joint House-Senate committee to investigate covert arms transactions with 
Iran and issued its report in November of that year.  The majority report found 
that “the Iran-Contra Affair resulted from the failure of individuals to observe 
the law, not from deficiencies in existing law or in our system of governance.”  
(Majority Report, 1987: 229)  The minority report written by some 
Republicans, on the other hand, stated that the Reagan administration 
proceeded “legally in pursuing both its Contra policy and the Iran arms 
initiative.”  (Minority Report, 1987: 442)  The perspective of the minority report 
was that the Congress should not have attempted to tie the President’s hands 
in foreign relations by passing the Boland Amendment.  According to the 
minority report, “much of what President Reagan did in his actions toward 
Nicaragua and Iran were constitutionally protected exercises of inherent
Presidential powers.”  (Minority Report, 1987: 457)
The minority report of the Iran-Contra hearings might have been 
forgotten in time but one of its main proponents, Congressman Richard 
Cheney from Wyoming, became Vice President in the second Bush 
administration.  As discussed in the Bush II chapters, Cheney and his aides 
borrowed from concepts devised in the Reagan administration and built upon 
theories of inherent presidential powers to erect a “New Paradigm” for the war 
on terror.  These legal theories were then used to justify questionable 
presidential initiatives such as military commissions, “enhanced interrogation 
techniques,” and warrantless surveillance.  Savage recounted that when the 
New York Times reported the Bush II administration had violated the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 by authorizing the NSA to spy on 
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Americans’ calls and emails without warrants, “Cheney told reporters that he 
believed the president had all the authority he needed to bypass the law 
based on his inherent powers as Commander-in-Chief.”  (Savage, 2007: 57)  
Cheney then told the reporters to read the minority report from the Iran-Contra 
hearings if they wanted to understand the principles he was operating under.  
(Ibid)  Cheney did not address the problems of democratic accountability or 
bypassing the system of checks and balances when he announced his 
operating principles, nor was he ever forced to explain how the minority report 
from a previous scandal could yield guidelines for the Bush II administration.  
In his book, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the 
Iran-Contra Affair, Koh argued that Iran-Contra should not be viewed as an 
“aberration, an error on the part of certain individuals within a particular 
administration, but as a fundamental failure of the legal structure that 
regulates the relations among the president, Congress, and the courts in 
foreign affairs.”  (Koh, 1990: 3)  His point was that unless new framework 
statutes were in place to ensure balanced institutional participation from all 
three branches of government in foreign policy making, scandals such as Iran-
Contra would erupt again.  In addition, Koh identified the pattern of executive 
initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance, which usually 
results in the executive branch “winning” any dispute with Congress over 
foreign relations.  (Koh, 1990: 116)  Building upon that foundation, this thesis 
attempts to illustrate how the combined circumstances of terrorist attacks and 
threats, provoking government responses, and counterterrorism with its need 
for secrecy and efficiency, exacerbate this tendency.  
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While researching this thesis, I was able to contact and interview two 
men with substantial ties to the Iran-Contra investigation.  The first, Louis 
Fisher, was the research director for the majority staff on the House of 
Representatives Select Committee to investigate covert arms transactions 
with Iran; he later became the Senior Specialist at the Congressional 
Research Service.  The other man, Bruce Fein, was the minority research 
director on the same committee and was also a Justice Department attorney 
in the Reagan administration.  Fisher viewed the Iran-Contra affair as part of 
the pattern of executive branch intrusion on foreign affairs powers shared with 
Congress.  (Fisher Interview)  For Fein, the Iran-Contra affair was dissimilar to 
the Bush II administration’s war on terror because, as he explained, the 
Reagan administration did not intend to alter the legal architecture with its 
counterterrorism policies.  (Fein Interview)  Another man on the minority staff, 
David Addington, later gained notoriety during the Bush II administration for 
his part in drafting the New Paradigm for the war on terror as Dick Cheney’s 
lawyer.  The perspectives and opinions of all three men appear in the Bush II 
administration chapters. 
Lockerbie Bombing 
The last major terrorist attack during the Reagan administration was the 
explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988.  All 259 
people on board were killed, along with 11 people on the ground.  Ronald 
Reagan’s Vice President, George H. W. Bush, had already been elected 
President in the November elections and Reagan left office less than one 
month later on January 20, 1989.  Reagan did not take “swift and effective 
retribution” against the terrorists who were responsible for Lockerbie, and it is 
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unclear exactly why.  Some historians believe Reagan expected George H. W. 
Bush, the next President, to respond appropriately to the Lockerbie attack.  
Others note that, immediately after Lockerbie, a group called the “Guardians 
of the Islamic Revolution” claimed responsibility for the bombing because of 
their anger at the U.S. for giving refuge to the shah, and for the July 1988 
downing of an Iranian civilian aircraft by the USS Vincennes.  (Winkler, 2006: 
68)  Thus, it was not certain which group or state was behind the Lockerbie 
bombing prior to Reagan’s departure.  As discussed in the chapter on George 
H. W. Bush, the U.S. and U.K. eventually decided, “to treat the bombing of 
Pan Am 103 as a crime under their domestic legal processes and for which 
Libya bore state responsibility under international law.”  (Schwartz, 2007: 556) 
Conclusion 
An assessment of Reagan’s war against terrorism and the later “war on 
terrorism” launched by President George W. Bush after 9/11 will be part of 
later chapters.  In brief, there are striking similarities in style and language.  
For example, both administrations referred to terrorists and those who helped 
them as “evil” and the personal contempt Reagan showed for Qaddafi was 
similar to Bush’s evident personal contempt for Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein. Even the concept of conducting a “war” on terror or against 
terrorism with the resulting military language, rhetoric, and analogies is similar. 
Indeed, one scholar noted, “the discourse on the ‘War on Terror’ follows long-
established interpretive tendencies; the tendency to militarise foreign policy 
responses, a fear of internal subversion, a sense of endangerment towards 
‘the other’ and the demonising of opponents.” (Jackson, 2005: 156)  Winkler 
analyzed Reagan’s use of the “terrorist label” and explained how this meant 
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individual terrorists “were no longer just the responsibility of law enforcement; 
heads of all states now had an obligation to respond and prevent such acts 
within their spheres of influence.  American presidents could use the full range 
of state powers, including preemptive military strikes and violations of 
historically recognized boundaries of state sovereignty, in their pursuit of 
terrorists.”  (Winkler, 2006: 95) 
Both the Reagan administration and second Bush administration 
emphasized the use of military force to combat terrorism, with both 
administrations offering legal justifications for using force in circumstances 
which other states questioned.  Both administrations espoused broad views of 
the right of self-defence under Article 51, arguing that it permitted the U.S. to 
defend itself after “armed attacks” by terrorists.  Self-defence included 
intercepting the plane with the Achille Lauro hijackers, launching air strikes on 
Libya, and, in the Bush II administration, invading Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Furthermore, Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush claimed inherent 
presidential powers to conduct foreign relations, including counterterrorist 
activities without significant input from Congress.  Both administrations 
contained officials who believed terrorism is more like warfare than criminal 
activity and therefore, the methods of fighting it need to be more aggressive 
and proactive than the usual law enforcement regulations.  According to this 
view of terrorism, law enforcement looks backward to punish behaviour 
whereas a war paradigm is more proactive in deterring future acts of terrorism. 
Ironically, despite its rhetoric about swift and effective retribution for 
acts of terrorism, the Reagan administration only reacted twice in a manner 
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that matched this rhetoric: when the Achille Lauro hijackers were captured, 
and when the U.S. bombed Libya in response to Qaddafi’s support of 
terrorism.  The reasons for the wide discrepancy between Reagan’s professed 
policy of swift and effective retribution and its non-implementation in most 
cases was attributed to Reagan’s management style which allowed 
subordinates to take action (or block action) on their own, and different 
factions within the administration who could not agree on the desirability of 
using military force for counterterrorism operations. (Wills, 2003: 214)  
External factors such as the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and 
Reagan administration officials’ propensity to view geopolitical problems 
through an East-West prism may have also constrained the Reagan 
administration in its uses of force for counterterrorism.  However, the Reagan 
administration was not constrained by the international law norms of self-
defence under Article 51, or by the WPR requirements about consulting and 
reporting to Congress.  Later chapters on the second Bush administration will 
further develop how theories and concepts from previous administrations, 
particularly from the Reagan administration, were adapted for use in the post 
9/11 war on terror. 
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Chapter 5 
The Administration of George H.W. Bush  
The first George Bush to become President was born in 1924 and was 
a naval aviator during World War II.  Of the four Presidents in this thesis, 
George H.W. Bush is the only combat veteran, and the only one term 
president.  He also held several political posts prior to his election as 
President, including Vice President under Ronald Reagan.  In 1988 George 
Bush defeated the Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis, with 53.4% of the 
popular vote and became the first sitting Vice President to be elected 
President since 1836.  Reagan’s popularity as President no doubt contributed 
to George H. W. Bush’s election, despite the Iran-Contra scandal. The first 
Bush Administration (or “Bush I”) was frequently described as pursuing a 
“pragmatic” and “prudent” foreign policy in contrast to the ostensibly more 
ideological Reagan administration, which emphasized a more strident 
approach to the Soviet Union. (McCormick, 2005: 157) 
Bush came into office uniquely suited to the tasks of conducting 
American foreign policy and combating terrorism in the sense that his previous 
experience was often directly relevant.  For example, Bush had served as 
Director of the CIA so he was intimately acquainted with covert operations and 
the problems they incurred; he was the only U.S. President who had been a 
member of the intelligence community.  Bush had also been the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN so he realized the value of multilateralism and the 
need to accommodate international opinion.  As Vice President under 
Reagan, he chaired the Task Force on combating terrorism that Reagan 
established in 1985; this task force evaluated American policy and programs 
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regarding terrorism after the spike in terrorist attacks in the 1980’s.  His 
predecessor, Reagan, and his successor, Bill Clinton, were former state 
governors who came to the White House without Bush’s level of international, 
diplomatic, and pragmatic terrorism expertise. 
Key Bush I players were the two Secretaries of State, James Baker 
(1989-1992) and Lawrence Eagleburger (1992-1993), Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney, and the NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who served 
previously in this capacity in President Gerald Ford’s administration (1975-
1977).  The first Director of the CIA in the Bush I administration was William 
Webster (1987-1991) and the second was Robert Gates who served from 
1991 until 1993.  Another notable foreign policy participant was the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell.  As explained later, many of these 
men went on to serve in the administration of George W. Bush. 
As depicted on the chart in chapter 3 on party affiliations, Bush, a 
Republican, dealt with a Congress that was controlled by the Democrats for all 
of his four years in office.  The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, a Democrat from Florida, Dante Fascell, was a cosponsor of the 
War Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973.  In the Senate, the Chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee was Democrat Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island.  
This type of “divided government” where one party controls the White House 
and the other party controls one or both houses of Congress normally forces 
the political parties to forgo extreme ideological positions in the interests of 
getting legislation passed.    Conventional wisdom also indicates that the 
political realities of divided government tend to result in pragmatic comprises 
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between the legislature and President.  One theory is that by putting one party 
in the White House and the other party in control of Congress, the American 
voters are adding “political checks and balances to the structural checks and 
balances” contained in the U.S. Constitution.  (Schlesinger, 1998: 464) 
Foreign Policy 
The Bush I administration dealt with a number of unexpected foreign 
policy challenges including the end of the Cold War, the break up of 
Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.  Furthermore, the Soviet army left 
Afghanistan after ten years of fighting in February 1989, one month after Bush 
took the oath of office as President.  The old East-West tensions that 
characterized and dominated foreign relations between the U.S. and the rest 
of the world faded with the end of the Cold War, and President George H. W. 
Bush proclaimed a “new world order” where the norms of the UN Charter 
would be respected and enforced through multilateral action.  However, this 
hopeful vision of international politics was tested by events such as the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait.   
The first Gulf War was not a counterterrorist use of force or labelled a 
“war on terror” by the American government.  Instead, the first Bush 
administration argued that Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 could not “stand” because it was a direct challenge to the international 
community and the norms of international law.  The terminology and rhetoric 
of terrorism eventually appeared in some of President George H. W. Bush’s 
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speeches on the Iraqi invasion, however, and gradually the administration 
began referring to Saddam Hussein as an “international terrorist” because the 
Iraqi military held several American and Western hostages in Iraq and Kuwait.  
Throughout the autumn of 1990, the first Bush administration increased its 
rhetorical campaign against Saddam Hussein by emphasizing the hostages 
and the “acts of terror” perpetrated on the people of Kuwait by the Iraqi 
military.  Eventually, the Bush I administration’s framing of the invasion of 
Kuwait, “transformed the crisis in the Persian Gulf from a conventional war 
scenario between two foreign nation-states into an international battle against 
the scourge of terrorism.”  (Winkler, 2006: 104)  In addition, the first Bush 
administration skilfully ascribed “many of the negative characteristics ascribed 
to the Communists in the Cold War narrative” to Iraq, thus making it 
imperative to resist Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.  (Winkler, 2006: 107) 
The relatively brief ground war in the first Gulf War, which resulted in 
the Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait, coupled with the low number of American 
casualties, appeared at first to be a triumph for President George H. W. Bush.  
The victory was hailed as vindication of the new world order where multilateral 
institutions would enforce international legal norms.  Bush and his National 
Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, explained later that the U.S. military did not 
enter Iraq in 1991 to pursue Saddam Hussein because it would have 
exceeded the UN mandate, destroyed the coalition, and forced the U.S. to 
occupy Baghdad and rule Iraq.  (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 489)  In addition, 
they wrote, “we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling 
aggression in the post---Cold War world.  Going in and occupying Iraq, thus 
unilaterally exceeding the United Nations’ mandate, would have destroyed the 
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precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish.”  
(Ibid)  Ironically, the second Bush administration also self-consciously tried to 
set a pattern for handling terrorist aggression, but as detailed in later chapters, 
it was a pattern of preemptive military action instead of the “international 
response” advocated by the first Bush administration. 
Counterterrorism Policy in the Bush I Administration 
When George H. W. Bush became President in January 1989, the U.S. 
government began applying a “more low-keyed approach to terrorism” 
because the “practical results of the aggressive, proactive approach to 
counterterrorism. . . tempered enthusiasm for it.”  (Tucker, 1997: 47)  In other 
words, the Reagan administration’s war against terrorism was not viewed as a 
resounding success. In addition, Bush “inherited a counterterrorism program 
whose policies, organization, and methods were much as his task force 
recommended they be.” (Tucker, 1997: 46)  As noted in the Reagan chapter, 
Vice President Bush was chairman of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism 
created by Reagan in 1985. This gave Bush unusual expertise and experience 
regarding the American government’s counterterrorism procedures and 
policies.  In addition, it also gave him the opportunity to influence 
counterterrorism methods prior to becoming President.  No other President in 
this study had comparable experience. 
The official report of the Vice President’s Task Force was a result of 
political pressure on the Reagan administration to do something after several 
spectacular terrorist attacks in 1985.  Specifically, the most serious attacks 
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involving Americans that year were the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June, 
the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in October, and the December 
shootings at the Rome and Vienna airports.  According to the report, in 1985 
there were 23 Americans killed and 160 wounded as a result of international 
terrorism.  Reagan wanted the task force to “review the nation’s program to 
combat terrorism” and “to reassess U.S. priorities and policies, to ensure that 
current programs make the best use of available assets, and to determine if 
our national program is properly coordinated to achieve the most effective 
results.”  In addition to the chairman, George H. W. Bush, other participants 
included retired admiral James Holloway as the executive director and 
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, 
Justice and the Treasury along with staff from the CIA, FBI, and NSC. 
The conclusions and recommendations of the task force were released 
in February 1986.  The recommendations were divided into the following five 
categories:  
• National policy and program recommendations  
• International cooperation recommendations  
• Intelligence recommendations  
• Legislative recommendations 
• Communications recommendations   
From the perspective of using force to combat terrorism, one of the 
most interesting findings was the recommendation to prepare and submit to 
the NSC “policy criteria for deciding when, if, and how to use force to preempt, 
react and retaliate.” (Task Force, 1987: 28)  Criteria for developing response 
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options included the potential for injury to innocent victims; status of forces for 
preemption, reaction or retaliation; ability to identify the target; and host 
country and international cooperation or opposition.  Two months after the 
public release of the task force report, the Reagan administration used force 
against terrorism when it bombed Libya in April 1986.  There is no evidence 
that George H. W. Bush opposed bombing Libya or that he questioned the 
efficacy of using force to prevent international terrorism. 
 Another noteworthy finding from the Task Force report for the 
purposes of this study was a legislative recommendation to “study the 
relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal 
system.” (Task Force, 1987: 34)  The recommendation elaborated on this 
theme, explaining, “There were ambiguities concerning the circumstances 
under which military force is appropriate in dealing with terrorism.”  This “lack 
of clarity” could “limit the power of governments to act quickly and forcefully.”  
The task force then suggested “private and academic study to determine how 
international law might be used to hasten, rather than hamper, efforts to 
respond to an act of terrorism.”  This recommendation is similar to sentiments 
expressed by Reagan’s legal advisor at the State Department, Abraham D. 
Sofaer, about how international law blundered in addressing the problems of 
international terrorism.  
In the late 1980’s, Sofaer wrote and lectured about the failure of 
international law to effectively repress international terrorism.  In fact, Sofaer 
wrote that, “international law is too often used to serve terrorists and their 
objectives.” (Sofaer, 1989: 90)  He was critical of legal concepts that could 
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impose “limits on strategic flexibility” such as the doctrine of self-defence as 
discussed by the International Court of Justice in the case brought by 
Nicaragua against the U.S. in 1986.  In that case, the ICJ found that the U.S. 
had violated the UN Charter by mining the harbours of Nicaragua and by 
providing arms and training to the Contras.  The ICJ stated that self-defence 
under article 51 did not apply to American activities in Nicaragua because 
Nicaragua’s incursions into El Salvador and its assistance to insurgents in that 
country did not constitute an “armed attack” as used in the UN Charter.  Not 
surprisingly, many members of the Reagan administration were critical of this 
decision, believing that it was unduly restrictive regarding a state’s right to 
self-defence.  Sofaer summed up their strategic thinking on terrorism when he 
wrote, “to deal effectively with state-sponsored terrorism requires treating its 
proponents not merely as criminals, but as a threat to our national security.”  
(Ibid)  According to Sofaer, this was the policy of the U.S. during the Reagan 
administration and it was supported by the Vice President’s task force. 
Sofaer’s analysis illustrates the tendency of members of the Reagan 
and Bush I administrations to categorize international terrorism as not “merely” 
criminal, but as a national security threat.  According to this line of thinking, if 
international terrorism is truly a national security threat, then deployment of 
military force to protect the nation is warranted and completely lawful.  On the 
other hand, if an administration views the problem as criminal activity, then 
that administration is more likely to pursue law enforcement methods to 
capture and convict the terrorists. 
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As explained in the literature review chapter, divergent schools of 
thought regarding the utility of using force against terrorism existed before the 
second Bush administration used military force after the 9/11 attacks.  The 
crime versus war dichotomy was part of all four administrations and its 
ramifications gradually increased in influence.  Abraham Sofaer and like-
minded individuals such as George Shultz (Secretary of State from 1982 to 
1989) advocated proactive measures against state sponsors of terrorism and 
terrorists involving the preemptive use of military force.  (Sofaer, 1986 and 
Sofaer, 1989)  On the other hand, many other academics like Paul Wilkinson 
warned liberal democracies should avoid a “total militarization of Western 
response” to terrorism because it would “encourage the very anarchy in which 
terrorism flourishes.” (Wilkinson, 1986: 299).  The evidence suggests that the 
first Bush administration included many adherents to the view that acts of 
international terrorism were similar to acts of war, yet that administration did 
not use force against international terrorism, a paradox that is examined in 
following sections of this chapter.   
Lockerbie Bombing 
The most infamous terrorist incident of the Bush I administration 
involving Americans occurred shortly before George H. W. Bush took office. 
On December 21, 1988 after Bush defeated Dukakis but before he took the 
oath of office, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.  All 259 
people on board the plane were killed along with 11 people on the ground 
when the airplane crashed.   American citizens accounted for 189 of those 
killed.  The burning wreckage of the plane and the resulting devastation on the 
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ground in Scotland were broadcast immediately to the American public and all 
around the world.  The Reagan administration, which had promised “swift and 
effective retribution” against terrorism, did not respond to the Lockerbie 
bombing, leaving that to the incoming administration of George H. W. Bush.  
Two days after the explosion, President Reagan expressed his sorrow about 
Pan Am 103 but did not mention terrorism.  He took no retaliatory action, 
partially due to the controversy over who was responsible for bombing Pan 
Am 103.  
Initially, investigators looking into the Lockerbie tragedy suspected that 
Iran was involved due to the accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian 
aircraft a few months earlier on July 3, 1988.  A US Navy ship, the Vincennes, 
fired two missiles at Iran Air Flight 655 after erroneously identifying the plane 
as a military fighter.  All 290 passengers on board were killed and the U.S. 
government later paid 131.8 million dollars to Iran in a settlement.  But shortly 
after the tragedy, the Iranian government offered a reward of 10 million to any 
one who avenged the destruction of the airplane and it appeared that a radical 
Palestinian group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command might have taken up the offer.  However, in November 
1991 both the UK and U.S. issued parallel indictments against two Libyans
(Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah) who were 
allegedly Libyan intelligence agents involved in the Lockerbie bombing. 
Libya refused to extradite the two men accused of placing an IED 
(improvised explosive device) on Pan Am 103, but after several years of UN 
sanctions, the Libyan government relented and the Lockerbie suspects were 
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flown to the Netherlands.  Colonel Gaddafi agreed to a trial governed by Scots 
law in the Netherlands; this began on May 3, 2000, more than 10 years after 
the explosion.  On January 31, 2001, al-Megrahi was found guilty while his co-
accused, Fhimah, was found not guilty and permitted to return to Libya.  The 
Libyan government always claimed al-Megrahi was innocent, although Libya 
paid 2.7 billion dollars in compensation to the victims’ families.  Al-Megrahi 
appealed his conviction but this was unsuccessful in 2002; subsequently, al-
Megrahi lodged another appeal against his conviction with the Scottish 
Criminal Cases Review Commission.  Before that was adjudicated, al-Megrahi 
was released by the Scottish Government on compassionate grounds due to a 
diagnosis of prostate cancer.  In August 2009, he flew to Libya after having 
served eight and a half years of his life sentence.  Although al-Megrahi was 
given only a few months to live according to his doctors, he survived until May 
20, 2012, living in Tripoli.  The U.S. government and some victims’ families 
were outraged by this result.  In the end, the Lockerbie trial did not settle 
unanswered questions surrounding the explosion, such as whether Libya was 
really responsible or a convenient suspect, and whether the evidence of al-
Megrahi’s guilt was contaminated by American or British authorities.  
Furthermore, even if al-Megrahi was correctly convicted, he must have had 
assistance in bombing Pan Am 103 but the source of this assistance remains 
unknown. 
The Aftermath of Lockerbie 
For the purposes of this study, the Lockerbie aftermath is instructive 
because of what did not occur; specifically, neither Reagan nor Bush used 
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military force against Libya for the Lockerbie bombing.  Instead, the response 
was a criminal investigation, followed eventually by UN sanctions against 
Libya and indictments of the accused and a trial.  According to Tucker, this 
was a “forensic and judicial rather than political and military” response to a 
major terrorist attack.  (Tucker, 1997: 46)  In addition, Tucker cites interviews 
with NSC and FBI officials in 1993 as proof that the Lockerbie investigation 
revealed a “judicial response to terrorism” was “effective and useful.”  (Ibid)  
Schwartz noted that the U.S. and UK could have treated the Lockerbie 
bombing as an “act of war” but instead decided to treat it as a crime under 
their domestic legal processes.  (Schwartz, 2007: 556)  Together these two 
countries investigated the crime scene in Scotland and eventually issued 
parallel indictments against the two Libyan suspects. 
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why the first Bush administration did not 
use force in response to the Lockerbie tragedy.  Close examination of 
contemporary accounts and analysis of the Lockerbie investigation indicate 
that there are several possible explanations.  Firstly, the initial gathering of 
evidence and recreation of the bombing took more than three years, and 
many other international crises erupted in this time, forcing the first Bush 
administration to concentrate on other foreign policy problems.  In addition, 
the 1986 air strikes in Libya ordered by Reagan prompted a harsh 
international reaction and did not appear to have the desired effect of 
deterring further Libyan acts of terrorism.  Indeed, Colonel Qaddafi may have 
responded to the 1986 air strikes with plans for bombing an American civilian 
aircraft.  Furthermore, the Bush I administration had to cooperate with the 
British government regarding the Lockerbie investigation due to the location of 
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the attack, and this may have limited their options concerning response.  
Finally, it is possible that George H. W. Bush’s rhetoric about a new world 
order of multilateral cooperation was based on his sincerely held beliefs that 
the post-Cold War world could be governed more by international law norms 
and less by brute force.  
The eventual trial of the Lockerbie accused took more than a decade 
and the conviction of one of them occurred after George H. W. Bush left office.  
Indeed, by the time al-Megrahi was convicted, the second George Bush was 
in the White House.  During the Bush I administration, when Iran appeared as 
the main suspect in the bombing, many of the victims’ families formed support 
groups and pressured President Bush to find answers.  As a result, Bush 
issued an executive order on August 4, 1989 establishing a commission.  The 
President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism consisted of 
seven members, four of whom were appointed from Congress: Senator Frank 
Lautenberg (Democrat from New Jersey), Senator Alfonse D’Amato 
(Republican from New York), Representative James Oberstar (Democrat from 
Minnesota), and Representative John Hammerschmidt (Republican from 
Arkansas).  In May 1990, the Commission released a 182-page report that 
included recommendations designed to improve aviation security and the 
ability of the government to respond to terrorist acts like Pan Am 103. 
The commission found that the destruction of Pan Am 103 might have 
been prevented and criticized Pan Am’s security lapses and the failure of the 
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) to enforce its own regulations.  It also 
discussed contentious issues like public notification of aviation threats and the 
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ability of the U.S. State Department to assist victims’ families after a major 
terrorist attack overseas.  Most relevant for this study is chapter 8 of the 
commission’s report entitled “National Will.” 
According to newspaper accounts at the time, many of the 
commission’s findings were expected, but some sections of chapter 8 came 
as a surprise due to the characterizations and findings on terrorism.  In this 
chapter, the commission articulates “several facts about terrorism” which 
include the following: 
• “Unchecked terrorism creates a shift in the balance of power 
toward those nations that sanction terrorism and use it as an 
instrument of foreign policy.” 
• “Terrorism is a form of surrogate warfare.” 
• “Acts of state-sponsored terrorism against a nation’s citizens are 
acts of aggression against that nation.  In today’s world, the 
principal targets are the values and interests of democratic 
nations.” (President’s Commission, 1990: 113) 
The commission went on in chapter 8 to recommend “zero tolerance” 
towards terrorist attacks and then wrote, “Pursuing terrorists and responding 
swiftly and proportionately to their acts” must be U.S. policy “in deed as well 
as in word.”  (President’s Commission, 1990: 115)  In addition, the 
commission advocated “planning, training and equipping for direct preemptive 
or retaliatory military actions against known terrorist hideouts in countries that 
sanction them.” (Ibid)  This strong language would become frequent in rhetoric 
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after the 9/11 attacks, but it was not commonplace during the first Bush 
administration. 
Chapter 8 on “National Will” also urged the U.S. to exercise its “national 
will” and take “more aggressive action against both terrorists and their state 
sponsors.” (President’s Commission, 1990: 113)  The benefits of taking a law 
enforcement approach to the problem of terrorism were acknowledged, but 
the commission nevertheless continued to assert that this approach was not 
always appropriate.  The “reactive” and “time-consuming process” of the law 
enforcement approach required the U.S. government to develop “active 
measures--preemptive or retaliatory, direct or covert” in the effort to deter and 
prevent terrorism. (President’s Commission, 1990: 117)  If George H. W. Bush 
had ordered a military strike in retaliation for the bombing of Pan Am 103, he 
surely would have cited the language in chapter 8 of the commission’s report 
as justification. 
However, according to Gerson and Adler, a military strike against Libya 
“never came under serious consideration” and this was the result of “a 
personal decision made by George Bush.” (Gerson and Adler, 2001: 98)  Two 
powerful bureaucracies agreed with this decision: the Justice Department 
because it wanted to prosecute the two indicted Libyans, and the Pentagon 
because the top military leaders believed that using force should be limited to 
situations that complied with the “Powell Doctrine,” which established strict 
conditions for the deployment of American military force.  According to Gerson 
and Adler, the U.S. military in the early 1990’s did not include abstractions 
such as “justice” or “teaching terrorists a lesson” as part of America’s vital 
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national interests warranting the deployment of military force.  (Gerson and 
Adler, 2001: 99)  A decade later, under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. 
military reoriented its position to embark on the “war on terror” after 9/11.  
Another consequence of the Lockerbie bombing was that Congress 
passed legislation in the autumn of 1990 after lobbying by the victims’ families.  
Senator Lautenberg, a member of the President’s Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism, introduced bills that were based on the Commission’s 
recommendations.  The Aviation Security Act had wide bipartisan support but 
still had trouble passing through Congress because a Republican from a 
Western state put a secret “hold” on the legislation to get a piece of unrelated 
legislation included.  It took strenuous lobbying by the victims’ families and the 
joint support of Senator Dole (a Republican) and Senator Mitchell (a 
Democrat) to get the legislation passed.  (Gerson and Adler, 2001: 96) 
UTA Flight 772 
In a tragedy very similar to Lockerbie, a French airplane exploded over 
the Sahara Desert on September 19, 1989 killing all 170 aboard, including 
seven Americans.  UTA Flight 772 has been called the “forgotten flight” 
because, despite the parallels to Lockerbie, much less was written about it.  
This is true even though one of the victims, Bonnie Pugh, was the wife of the 
U.S. ambassador to Chad.  Subsequent investigations revealed that an IED 
was placed in the forward cargo hold inside luggage loaded at Brazzaville 
airport in the Republic of Congo.  Islamic jihadists claimed credit for the 
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bombing, in retaliation for Israel’s kidnapping of Hezbollah leader Sheikh 
Abdel Karim Obeid.   
Ten years later, in 1999, six Libyans were tried in absentia in Paris and 
convicted of the bombing.  In 2003, Libya “accepted responsibility for the 
actions of its officials” and arranged for compensation payments of $170 
million for the victims.  The American victims’ families refused these 
compensation awards and instead filed a lawsuit against the Libyan 
government in federal court in Washington.  The second Bush administration 
took Libya off the “state sponsor of terrorism list” in 2006 and began 
diplomatic talks with the Libyan government, an unimaginable move a few 
years earlier.  In 2007, the federal judge found Libya directly responsible for 
the bombing of UTA 772 and in 2008, the American families won $6 billion in 
damages, which Libya appealed.  The aftermath of the bombing of UTA 772, 
like the aftermath of Lockerbie, resulted in a judicial response despite the 
existence of strong rhetoric about taking “proactive measures” found in 
chapter 8 of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism 
report. As discussed above, the language in chapter 8 justified aggressive 
action against state sponsors of terrorism.  The absence of resorting to the 
use of force may indicate that the Bush I administration had learned, like the 
Reagan administration before it, that it was easier to issue strong rhetoric 
about terrorism than follow through with effective, aggressive measures using 
force. 
 Unanswered policy questions regarding terrorism remain regarding 
the Lockerbie and UTA 772 explosions.  For example, what policy, if any, 
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deters a state sponsor of terrorism?  Should a superpower such as the U.S. 
be satisfied with the convictions of Libyan citizens for their participation in acts 
of international terrorism, or is some show of force required to discourage 
other states from sponsoring these activities?  From the perspective of 
preventing further acts of aviation terrorism, is it more effective to treat the 
bombing of civilian aircraft as a crime, or as an “act of war” which threatens 
national security? 
Conclusion 
Characterizing the first Bush administration‘s operative policy on 
counterterrorism is elusive for several reasons including the simple fact that 
the first President Bush was in office for a mere four years and these years 
were dominated by two major foreign policy challenges: the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and the end of the Cold War.  George H. W. Bush has been 
praised for his leadership and skill in handling both of these difficult issues.  
Specifically, his ability to maintain an international coalition, work with the UN, 
expel Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait, and navigate the end of the Cold 
War are cited as his most important foreign policy successes. As Carter’s 
national security advisor noted, the first George Bush left office with 
“unprecedented global respect.”  (Brzezinski, 2007: 82) 
During the first Bush administration, fewer acts of highly visible 
international terrorism combined with the administration’s concentration on the 
invasion of Kuwait and the enormous changes happening in Europe meant 
that the prevention of terrorism naturally became less urgent.  In 1990, a year 
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after the Lockerbie and UTA 772 bombings, the National Security Strategy 
briefly mentions terrorism under the heading “Low Intensity Conflict.”  It notes 
that Special Operations Forces have “particular utility in this environment,” but 
does not detail the guidelines for using force against terrorism.  (National 
Security Strategy, 1990: 28)   
The nature of international terrorism was slowly changing during the 
1990’s, although this was not obvious to most casual observers.  Under 
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, counterterrorist officials often wrote about 
the dangers of state-sponsored terrorism that was difficult to deter.  What was 
emerging in the 1990’s was another form of terrorism: loose, independent, ad 
hoc groups such as al Qaeda, motivated by religious fundamentalism.  Until 
the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, these transnational groups did 
not appear to have the ability to commit terrorist acts on American soil.  The 
Reagan administration tended to view international terrorism through the 
prism of the Cold War and to focus on state-sponsored terrorism, a trend that 
continued in the Bush I administration.  However, the end of the Cold War and 
the dulling of tensions between the U.S. and Russia did not mean the end of 
terrorist attacks. 
President George H. W. Bush, familiar with intelligence reports from his 
days as CIA director, seems to have underestimated the ability of Islamic 
fundamentalists to inflict serious harm on the U.S.  For example, after the 
Soviet army left Afghanistan in 1989, the Bush administration, preoccupied 
with German reunification, the disintegration of the USSR, and the first Gulf 
War, disengaged from the struggles going on in Afghanistan for control of the 
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government.  (Coll, 2004: 217)  The power vacuum left bin Laden and the 
jihadists free to help the Taliban establish a fundamentalist regime in Kabul.  
The jihadists would eventually establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan 
where both practical skills and al Qaeda’s ideology were taught.  President 
Bush was so consumed by other priorities in the early 1990’s that, referring to 
fighting in Afghanistan, he once asked, “Is that thing still going on?”  (Coll, 
2004: 228)    
After his defeat to Bill Clinton in November 1992, President Bush gave 
a speech at West Point in which he articulated his general principles for the 
use of force.  These included resorting to military force “when force can be 
effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its 
application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits 
justify the potential costs and sacrifice.”  (Bush, 1993)  He continued with this 
analysis, “Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally. In 
some circumstances, it may be essential, in others counterproductive. I know 
that many people would like to find some formula, some easy formula to 
apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force. Anyone 
looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment.”  (Ibid)  Bush did not 
mention the circumstances justifying using force against terrorism in this 
address. 
An assessment of the Bush I administration’s guidelines for using force 
against terrorism is complicated by the fact that they were never plainly 
articulated and must therefore be gleaned from various sources.  These 
include the Task Force Report on Terrorism written when Bush was Reagan’s 
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vice president, the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism convened after Lockerbie, and miscellaneous sources.  A review of 
these materials suggests a paradox in that while the first President Bush 
supported a proactive, aggressive stance against international terrorism, when 
presented with opportunities to use force against terrorism (for example, after 
the bombings of Pan Am 103 or UTA 772), he did not.  
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  Chapter 6 
The Administration of Bill Clinton 
William Clinton, or simply “Bill Clinton,” is the only Democrat in this 
research project, presenting the possibility that his uses of force against 
terrorism deviate from the pattern of the previous two Republican presidents 
due to political party affiliation.  He narrowly defeated George H. W. Bush in 
1992 with just 43% of the popular vote; the election was largely a result of 
public disillusionment with the first Bush administration’s handling of the 
economy.  Clinton was elected for two terms in office (8 years), something no 
Democrat had done since Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930’s.  The Democrats 
controlled both houses of Congress when Clinton was first elected, but this 
abruptly changed with the mid-term elections of 1994.  As illustrated by the 
party affiliation chart in chapter 3, both houses of Congress were led by 
Republicans beginning in January 1995.  After that, Clinton had to deal with 
an assertive Republican Congress led by the Speaker of the House, Newt 
Gingrich, and the Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole.  In theory, a Congress 
controlled by the Republicans might be expected to inhibit a Democratic 
president’s use of force, but this did not appear to happen in practice, as the 
following illustrates. 
In addition, Bill Clinton became the only president impeached in the 
20th century; the only other president impeached was Andrew Johnson in 
1868.  While one might expect Clinton to be an exception to Koh’s pattern of 
executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance, the 
evidence regarding his use of force against terrorism indicates that he 
followed the same pattern.  As the only Democrat in this thesis, Clinton’s 
161
foreign policy could have been a radical change from his Republican 
predecessor, George H. W. Bush, but this was not the case.  In general, the 
Clinton administration began with a commitment to a “foreign policy rooted in 
a clear set of principles,” instead of the “ad hoc” foreign policy of the preceding 
Bush administration.  (McCormick, 2005: 178)  
President Clinton’s first Secretary of State was Warren Christopher 
(1993-1997), often described as a low-key advisor.  The second, more visible 
Secretary of State was the first woman in this position, Madeleine Albright 
(1997-2001).  There were three Secretaries of Defense during the Clinton 
administration: Les Aspin (1993-1994), William Perry (1994-1997), and 
William Cohen (1997-2001).  Anthony Lake was Clinton’s first National 
Security Advisor (1993-1997) and Sandy Berger was the second (1997-2001).  
Clinton’s CIA directors were R. James Woolsey (1993-1995), John Deutch 
(1995-1996) and George Tenet (1997-2004).  The FBI director during the 
Clinton administration was Louis Freeh, a man chosen and appointed by 
Clinton in 1993, but ultimately at odds with many members of the Clinton 
administration.  Freeh served as FBI director until June 2001, leaving shortly 
before the 9/11 tragedy and two years before the end of his statutory term.  In 
his book, My FBI: Bringing down the MAFIA, investigating Bill Clinton, and 
Fighting the War on Terror, Freeh asserted that under his leadership, the FBI 
did all that it could to stop al Qaeda, an assertion disputed by many.  (Freeh, 
2005) 
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Clinton’s Foreign Policy 
Unlike his predecessor George H. W. Bush, Clinton, a governor from 
the state of Arkansas, was not deeply steeped in foreign policy expertise when 
he was elected.  In fact, Clinton was mainly focused on his domestic agenda 
and the American economy when he arrived at the White House in 1993, as 
the campaign slogan “it’s the economy, stupid” bluntly reflected the public’s 
concerns.  Eventually foreign policy challenges forced his administration to 
devote more time and energy to the international community.  The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, for example, required the 
administration to develop a strategy, along with the Europeans, for dealing 
with the associated problems and violence in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.  
When Clinton took the oath of office, the Cold War was over and the “new 
world order” which the former president (George H. W. Bush) envisaged, 
seemed possible; the rivalry between the world’s superpowers no longer 
influenced every regional problem.  Clinton advocated promoting democracy 
as an alternative to the containment strategy, which prevailed during the Cold 
War.  In 1994, his national security paper entitled A Strategy for Engagement 
and Enlargement listed three pillars of US strategy: American retention of 
global military predominance, the search for continued economic prosperity 
and expanded free markets abroad, and the promotion of democracy around 
the globe. 
During his eight years of office, Bill Clinton submitted 60 war powers 
letters and reports to the Congress in compliance with the War Powers 
Resolution (“WPR”).  Many of these letters involve the deployment of U.S. 
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military forces to Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Haiti; the relevant letters for 
the purposes of this study are the ones regarding Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, 
and Sudan.  The War Powers Resolution was enacted in 1973 despite the 
veto of President Nixon, as a reaction to the Vietnam War.  As discussed in 
chapter 3, it was intended to restore the balance between the legislative and 
executive branches of government regarding the decision to send U.S. military 
forces into hostilities by limiting the president’s “authority to use armed forces 
abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities without a declaration of war or other 
congressional authorization.” (Grimmett, 2007:1)  Its operation has always 
been controversial; every president since its passage has questioned its 
constitutionality and many scholars argue that it should be repealed either 
because it usurps executive power or because it is ineffective in restoring 
Congress’ role in determining when military force should be introduced into 
hostilities.   
The WPR does not specifically mention the constitutional 
responsibilities of either the Congress or the president when responding to 
terrorist acts.  However, the president is granted the power to use force when 
there is a declaration of war made by Congress, specific statutory 
authorization, or a “national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”  (War Powers 
Resolution, 1973: section 2).  A large terrorist attack upon the U.S. would 
permit the President to respond with an immediate military response but the 
President is still required to “consult” with Congress in every possible 
instance.  (Hendrickson, 2002: 99)  Much controversy has resulted from the 
many definitions of “consultation”; proponents of the executive branch initiative 
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argue that simply telling Congress the facts about a military response is 
sufficient while members of Congress claim that “consultation” was intended 
to encompass more than “merely being informed.”  (Grimmett, 2007: 2)  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has never been asked to decide upon the precise 
definition of “consultation” under the WPR. 
Counterterrorism Policy during the Clinton Administration 
In general, the Clinton administration viewed the containment of 
international terrorism as a law enforcement matter, in contrast to the “war 
against terrorism” approach of the Reagan administration.  According to 
Feste, Clinton pursued a conflict avoidance strategy when responding to 
international terrorism, with the result being mostly “unilateral, defensive 
actions, apart from the retaliatory, brief attacks against al Qaeda targets in 
Afghanistan and Sudan” (Feste, 2011: 181).  Moreover, the Clinton 
administration did not employ the war-like rhetoric of previous administrations 
to illustrate its concern about international terrorism; rather, it increased 
funding for counterterrorism programs.  According to a former director and 
senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council during the 
1990’s, by 1996 Clinton was steadily allocating more of the federal budget to 
terrorism.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 247)  Funding for counterterrorism, 
which is difficult to quantify as the amount allocated to the CIA is classified, 
increased steadily from 1996 to the end of Clinton’s term in 2001.   
 The State Department under Clinton articulated four ways in which the 
US dealt with terrorists: by providing “no concessions” to terrorists; by using 
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the legal system to try and convict those who engaged in or supporting 
terrorist activities; by trying to “isolate” and “change the behavior” of terrorists; 
and by coordinating counterterrorist efforts with other countries.  
(Hendrickson, 2002: 101)   
 According to Madeleine Albright, Clinton used the “bully pulpit” of the 
White House to “heighten awareness of the terrorist threat and rouse global 
support for defeating it” (Albright, 2003: 371).  Despite the fact that Clinton 
frequently warned about the possibility of terrorists obtaining WMD during his 
second term, except for nervousness surrounding the millennium at the end of 
1999, most of the general public viewed the threat of foreign terrorists on 
American soil as remote.  When warning Americans about terrorists, Clinton 
did not use the rhetoric of war or label terrorist incidents as “acts of war” to 
mobilize public support for his counterterrorism efforts.  Instead, Winkler 
characterized his efforts as portraying “the conflict with terrorists as a battle 
between good and evil.”  (Winkler, 2006: 145)  Congress had the opportunity 
to assist him in this battle by passing legislation favoured by the 
administration, or according to Clinton’s perspective, they could be “pawns” of 
the terrorists who targeted Americans and their allies.  (Ibid)    
 In June 1995, Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (“PDD”) 
#39 on U.S. policy on counterterrorism; Benjamin and Simon cite it as one of 
the first policy documents to address the threat of asymmetric warfare.  
(Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 230)  According to the parts of the PDD which 
are now unclassified, the Clinton administration sought to “deter terrorism 
through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist 
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acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors.  
Our actions will reduce the capabilities and support available to terrorists.”  
(PDD 39, 1995: 3)  In effect, this was similar to the “no concessions” policy 
articulated by the Reagan administration but subsequently violated when the 
Reagan administration attempted to trade arms for hostages during the Iran-
Contra scandal.  In addition, PDD 39 set forth the responsibilities of different 
agencies involved in counterterrorism including the Attorney General, FBI 
director, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others.  It also helped 
centralize control over counterterrorism policy by placing it in the White 
House.  Finally, PDD 39 states, “the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction by a terrorist group, through theft of manufacture, is unacceptable.  
There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or 
removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.”  
(PDD 39, 1995:10)   
One of the prime movers behind this initiative was a career civil servant 
named Richard Clarke who was in the State Department during the Reagan 
and Bush I administrations but moved to the executive branch when Brent 
Scowcroft gave him a job at the White House.  Clarke went on to serve in the 
Clinton and Bush II administrations in various posts related to national security 
and terrorism.  In several accounts of the Clinton and Bush II administrations, 
Clarke emerges as one of the important, behind-the-scenes bureaucrats who 
recognized the threat posed by al-Qaeda and drafted policy options for 
dealing with it.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 232-233)  After he left the Bush II 
administration, Clarke became a  controversial figure when he expressed his 
opinion that terrorism inspired by al Qaeda was not one of George W. Bush’s 
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highest priorities upon taking office in 2001 (instead, missile defense and 
removing Saddam Hussein were higher priorities).  The politically-charged 
debate over whether Clinton did enough to deter al Qaeda and whether 
George W. Bush fully appreciated the threat posed by bin Laden emerges 
often in the memoirs and books written after 9/11 by former officials such as 
Clarke. 
  
  One particularly counterproductive aspect of the Clinton 
administration’s counterterrorism policies and procedures related to the 
troubled relationship between Clinton and his FBI director, Louis Freeh.  
Numerous administration insiders have chronicled the strained relationship 
between the two men and how difficult it was to get Freeh to share information 
or cooperate in administration initiatives related to counterterrorism.  
(Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 302-304)  Members of the National Security 
Council, an executive branch agency, received reports on terrorism from the 
CIA, the State Department, and the National Security Agency, but not from 
the FBI.  Moreover, Freeh “showed little interest in the growing phenomenon 
of Sunni terrorism and played no notable role in U.S. strategizing against al-
Qaeda.”  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 304)  The FBI director serves for 10 
years; therefore, Clinton’s only remedy regarding Freeh was to fire him, a 
“political impossibility” because Freeh was head of the agency investigating 
Clinton for various reasons including the suicide of Vince Foster (deputy White 
House counsel during the first few months of Clinton’s term).  Clarke wrote 
that Freeh had “back channels to Republicans in the Congress and to 
supporters in the media” (Clarke, 2004: 117).   
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 Another source of discord between Freeh and the White House was 
the handling of the Khobar Towers bombing.  Truck bomb explosions outside 
of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 killed 19 U.S. servicemen 
and one Saudi; Freeh took a “passionate interest” in the case and was 
displeased when the Saudis refused to allow the FBI access to suspects.  
(Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 300)  In the aftermath of the bombing, the 
identities of the perpetrators were unclear with the Saudis placing the blame 
on Hezbollah.  Others attributed the attack to al Qaeda.  Freeh became 
convinced that the Clinton White House was not pursuing the investigation 
aggressively enough, a notion disputed by those in the executive branch at 
the time.  According to Benjamin and Simon, the Clinton administration 
“viewed bringing those responsible to justice as a high priority.”  (Benjamin 
and Simon, 2003: 301) 
In the end, the Clinton administration soldiered on with Freeh as FBI 
director despite the friction and discord this caused.  Freeh continued at the 
FBI in the Bush II administration, until June 2001, as threat reporting regarding 
al Qaeda increased the summer before 9/11.  Freeh later faulted the Clinton 
administration for failing to appreciate the “war” al Qaeda had launched 
against America and wrote in his book, “We had been feeding the terrorists’ 
embedded belief that the United States lacked the fortitude to fight a real war 
against them.”  (Freeh, 2005: 303)  Whether better leadership at the FBI or 
closer cooperation with the Clinton White House would have prevented 9/11 
are issues occasionally discussed in the copious literature on the attacks.   
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After Freeh left the FBI in June 2001, the FBI received at least two 
significant reports concerning al Qaeda in the U.S. but the next FBI director 
was not appointed until one week before 9/11.  The first was the July 10, 2001 
memo, known as the “Phoenix Memo,” from FBI agent Ken Williams warning 
that men with suspicious backgrounds were attending flight schools in 
Phoenix.  (Thompson, 2004: 102)  The second report concerned the August 
15, 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, the presumed 20th hijacker in the 9/11 
plot.    When Moussaoui was arrested, Minnesota FBI agent Coleen Rowley 
repeatedly tried to get FBI headquarters to grant permission to search his 
home and computer, but this was not allowed until after 9/11.  (Thompson, 
2004: 213-214)  Freeh denied that leaving the FBI in the summer prior to 9/11 
resulted in a leadership vacuum, just as officials in the Bush II administration 
claimed that preventing the attacks was impossible.
   
First World Trade Center Bombing 
Shortly after Bill Clinton was sworn in as President in January of 1993, 
a bomb hidden in a rented van exploded in the parking garage underneath the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York.  The February 26, 1993 
truck bomb exploded at 12:18 p.m. and killed six people.  The explosion also 
injured around one thousand people in the WTC, and traumatized the entire 
country.  According to Benjamin and Simon, the blast ripped a 150-square-
foot crater in the concrete floor and blew through the concourse level of the 
Vista Hotel.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 11)  It was conceived as a mass 
casualty event, one that would not just damage the towers, but would result in 
the collapse of one tower into the other tower.   
170
Followers of Egyptian spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman 
planned the attack in “response for the American political, economical, and 
military support to Israel, the state of terrorism, and to the rest of the dictator 
countries in the region.”  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 13).  In March of 1994, 
four men (Nidal Ayyad, Ahmad Ajaj, Mohammad Salameh, and Mahmud 
Abouhalima) were convicted on all counts for their roles in the bombing and 
are serving life sentences in U.S. prisons.  In addition, the ringleader, a 
Pakistani born in Kuwait named Ramzi Yousef, was captured in Pakistan in 
1995 and eventually tried and convicted for the bombing.  Yousef, the nephew 
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is currently serving a life sentence in an 
American federal prison.  Although the first World Trade Center bombing 
shocked the public, there were few calls for a “war against terrorism” and the 
law enforcement paradigm seemed to serve the public interest as most of the 
conspirators were captured and sentenced to life terms.   
More shocking terrorist incidents occurred as the Clinton administration 
wore on and the threat of terrorist attacks began to alarm the general public.  
Mass casualty events like the January 30, 1995 car bombing in Algiers that 
killed 42 people and injured 300 more and the January 31, 1996 central bank 
bombing in Sri Lanka that killed 53 and injured more than 1,400 indicated the 
willingness of terrorist groups to plan and execute operations with large 
numbers of casualties.  A turning point of sorts occurred in 1995 when a 
religious cult called Aum Shinrikyo released poison gas in the Tokyo subway 
and killed 12 while injuring thousands on March 20.  Experts within the U.S. 
counterterrorism community began to notice the rise of religiously motivated 
terrorists who were less likely to be affiliated with a state.  These “ad hoc or 
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autonomous” groups with “little or no hierarchical structure” appeared to be 
less inhibited about using weapons of mass destruction (Tucker, 1997: 49).   
In addition to mass casualty terrorism abroad, domestic terrorist 
incidents shocked American citizens in the 1990’s.  For instance, 168 people 
were killed when a federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed on April 19, 
1995.  The next year, at the 1996 Olympic Summer games in Atlanta, a pipe 
bomb exploded in Centennial Olympic Park in July, killing two.  Subsequent 
investigations revealed that the Oklahoma City and Atlanta bombs were acts 
of domestic terrorism as the perpetrators were American men disgruntled with 
the U.S. government and the crimes occurred within the United States.  The 
USA Patriot Act confines acts of domestic terrorism to those which occur 
“primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”  The Oklahoma 
City bombers, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were caught and 
imprisoned immediately; the Centennial Olympic Park bomber, Eric Rudolph, 
was caught in 2003 and jailed for life.  The Clinton administration’s response 
to these attacks, like the first World Trade Center bombing, was largely the 
law enforcement approach which involved investigating the perpetrators, 
arresting them, and processing them through the normal U.S. judicial system.   
Attempted Assassination of George H.W. Bush 
The first significant use of force by the Clinton Administration in 
response to international terrorism occurred after an assassination attempt 
against former President George H.W. Bush in 1993.  The attempted 
assassination of George H. W. Bush occurred when Bush was in Kuwait in 
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April 1993.  The plan was to detonate a bomb in an SUV in Kuwait City as the 
former President drove by; the Kuwaiti police discovered the bomb and 
arrested 16 men, two of whom were Iraqi citizens.  (Clarke, 2004: 81)  Later 
the CIA and FBI learned that Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service was 
involved in the plot.  In June, members of the Clinton executive branch began 
planning “a retaliation mission against Iraq.”  Clarke described how a “target 
list” was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA to “minimize 
casualties.” (Clarke, 2004: 81) 
On June 26, 1993, President Clinton ordered the U.S. Navy to launch 
23 cruise missiles against targets in Iraq, including the headquarters of the 
Iraqi intelligence service (Maogoto, 2005: 113).  The attack was done on a 
Saturday night to minimize casualties but, despite this precaution, some 
bombs fell short and killed a female artist and seven other civilians across the 
street from the Iraqi intelligence building.  In a letter to Congress written 
pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, President Clinton noted, “the 
Government of Iraq’s violence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq poses a 
continuing threat to United States nationals. . .”   He also cited his 
“constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as 
Commander in Chief” and justified the use of force under the right of self-
defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter.    
Some scholars commented that the timing of this use of force during 
Clinton’s first year in office bolstered his status as a President who was not 
timid about protecting American interests and citizens.  Contemporary news 
analysis also suggested that the “White House appreciated that the use of 
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force would help rebuild Clinton’s image into that of a strong and decisive 
leader.”  (Fisher, 2004: 176)  Unlike George H. W. Bush, who served as a 
fighter pilot in World War II, Bill Clinton never served in the military and had, in 
fact, avoided service in America’s contentious war in Vietnam.  Acting tough 
against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was an easy way to appear strong without 
incurring substantial political risks. 
According to Clarke, the use of force against Iraq in 1993 was 
successful in that it deterred Saddam Hussein from engaging in more acts of 
international terrorism directed against the United States during Clinton’s 
administration.  (Clarke, 2004: 84)  This is noteworthy for two reasons: if it is 
true, then it supports the proposition that state-sponsored terrorism may be 
deterred while non-state terrorism, on the other hand, remains more difficult to 
deter.  Secondly, the Bush II administration used the fear of weapons of mass 
destruction and Iraqi terrorism to advocate invading Iraq after 9/11 but 
Clarke’s analysis suggests that Iraq was successfully deterred in 1993 from 
engaging in terrorist attacks against the U.S. until the U..S invaded in March of 
2003.   
Several questions remain regarding Clinton’s use of force in this 
instance including whether the Congress was adequately involved in the 
process and whether the administration complied with the international legal 
norms regarding self-defence under article 51.  Although Clinton stated he 
was providing Congress with a report “consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution,” the letter appeared after the missile strike was over and thus, 
seems more like the President was informing Congress rather than consulting
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with Congress, as the War Powers Resolution requires.  One Congressman, 
Ron Dellums, a Democrat from California, noted that the “unilateral U.S. 
military action was initiated by the executive alone, and is further evidence of 
the absolute imperative to reestablish the proper balance between the 
Executive and Congress.”  (Hendrickson, 2002: 144)  However, most in 
Congress said very little about the attack, no hearings were held, and no one 
protested the President’s action because most of the country supported 
Clinton’s use of force in this case.  In fact, Clinton’s approval ratings went up 
after the missile strike, which conforms to the usual pattern of public approval 
for short, decisive, low risk executive uses of force. 
In addition, Hendrickson sees a parallel between Clinton’s use of force 
against Saddam Hussein and “perceived communist threats of the cold war” in 
that the American public saw a “clearly defined enemy.”  (Hendrickson, 2002: 
144)  Members of Congress had little to gain and potentially lots to lose 
politically if they decided to question the targeting of such an enemy.  
Therefore, the political incentives favoured deferring to the President and 
refraining from questioning how the decision to use force was made.  This fits 
neatly with Koh’s pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, 
and judicial tolerance except no member of Congress even bothered to take 
the issue to court (so judicial tolerance is assumed). 
 Another debatable aspect of Clinton’s missile strike in 1993 concerns 
his reliance on the norms of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter to 
justify the attack.  The assassination attempt on George H. W. Bush was 
made in April of 1993 and was unsuccessful so it is difficult to argue that the 
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U.S. was acting in strict self-defence when it launched missiles in June.  As 
two constitutional law scholars wrote, “Calling the U.S. bombing of Iraq an act 
of self-defense for an assassination plot that had been averted two months 
previously is quite a stretch.” (Ratner and Lobel, 1993: 24)  Nevertheless, 
reaction from the world community was muted; the “Arab world expressed 
regret regarding the attack,” but most countries either supported the U.S. or 
failed to criticize it.  (Maogoto, 2005: 113) 
Moreover, Clinton defined U.S. national security interests broadly to 
include responding militarily to a planned attack on a former president in a 
foreign country.  Therefore, according to Hendrickson, Clinton’s missile strike 
in 1993 resembled the actions of “an imperial presidency, in which the chief 
executive unilaterally defined the United States’ national security interests and 
justified his actions through a broad definition of presidential powers and 
international legal appeals.”  (Hendrickson, 2002: 146)  Very few constraints, 
either from Congress or the international legal regime, inhibited Clinton in this 
instance.   
Embassy Bombings in 1998 
The second significant use of force in a counterterrorist operation 
during the Clinton administration occurred as a result of the simultaneous 
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania on August 7, 1998.  Approximately 252 people died in the bombings, 
with the vast majority of the victims being Africans (the American death toll 
was 12).  About 4,000 were injured in Nairobi and 85 in Dar es Salaam.  In his 
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Rose Garden statement shortly after the bombings, President Clinton said, 
“These acts of terrorist violence are abhorrent; they are inhuman.  We will use 
all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter 
what or how long it takes.”  (Feste, 2011: 173)  Two Clinton administration 
staffers noted “something qualitatively different from anything that had gone 
before” in that “no previous terrorist operation had shown the kind of skill that 
was evident” in the embassy bombings.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 257)  
Clinton’s response was “Operation Infinite Reach” which involved 
sending 79 cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on 
August 20, 1998.  The specific targets were four militant training camps in 
Afghanistan near Khost and Jalalabad and the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant 
in Sudan.  The last target was the most controversial as the Sudanese 
government denied that it was manufacturing or harbouring chemical 
weapons.  Two Clinton administration staffers wrote that the camp near Khost 
and the date of August 20 were chosen because intelligence reports indicated 
that Bin Laden would be there on that day.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 260)  
In his televised address to the nation after ordering the missile strikes, Clinton 
noted that “law enforcement and diplomatic tools” had been used previously in 
the fight against international terrorism, but he added that there are “times 
when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when our 
very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary 
steps to protect the safety of our citizens.”  These comments, invoking the 
threat to American national security, sound similar to statements made by 
Reagan regarding Libya and later by George W. Bush after 9/11. 
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In addition to the controversy over the suspect chemical weapons 
facility in Sudan, Clinton’s timing was suspected domestically as a ruse to turn 
the American public’s attention away from the sensational Monica Lewinsky 
scandal.  Only three days before ordering the missile attacks, Clinton had 
appeared on TV and admitted to an “inappropriate relationship” with the White 
House intern.  Very few members of the general public understood the 
potential of the little-known terrorist network called “al Qaeda” which was 
subsequently blamed for the African embassy bombings.  The two Clinton 
administration staffers described the months after the missile strikes as a 
“nightmare” because the “press picked apart the administration’s case for 
striking al-Shifa.”  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 261)  The Clinton 
administration struggled to explain the threat posed by al Qaeda and the 
adequacy of its response to the terror network. 
Some scholars critical of using military force to combat terrorism point 
out that Clinton, like Reagan, used self-defence under Article 51 as a 
justification and this broad interpretation of the right of self defence is not 
accepted by all members of the world community.  The same analysis 
regarding the legality of Reagan’s strike against Libya in 1986 can be applied 
regarding Clinton’s use of missiles in 1998.  Specifically, these strikes violated 
international law and looked more like “retaliation rather than legitimate self-
defence.”  (Maogoto, 2005: 114).  As detailed in chapter one, self-defence 
under Article 51 must meet the requirements of imminence, necessity, and 
proportionality.  The embassies were bombed on August 7 while the missile 
strikes occurred 13 days later, on August 20, thereby straining the concept of 
taking immediate steps to defend the country.  Others argue that the strikes 
178
against training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan 
were neither strictly necessary nor proportionate.  (Maogoto, 2005: 114-115)  
Despite the controversy, world reaction to Clinton’s use of force was mixed 
with most EU countries voicing support for the U.S. action. 
  In his letter to Congress reporting on military action against terrorist 
sites in Afghanistan and Sudan dated August 21, 1998, Clinton claimed that 
the “strikes were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly 
identified terrorist threat.”  Other members of Clinton’s cabinet stressed that 
bin Laden was planning another attack on U.S. citizens so the President was 
justified in acting in self-defence.  Some viewed this strike as a new policy 
direction, moving the executive branch into pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorists, indicating that the U.S. would be taking a more aggressive stance 
against non-state terrorist networks.  The practical problem of how to deter a 
stateless terrorist group was never solved. 
The problem of structuring a military strategy against a terrorist network 
aided by an Islamic fundamentalist regime like the Taliban continued in the 
last years of the Clinton administration.  From August 20 until the end of his 
term in office, Clinton had his staffers on the National Security Council work 
with the Pentagon to identify more targets in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden moved 
frequently inside Afghanistan so it was difficult to trace him and Sandy Berger, 
Clinton’s National Security Advisor, feared that a major bombing campaign 
aimed at bin Laden might fail and make the al Qaeda leader look “invincible.”  
(Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 284).  In fact, the ability of bin Laden to escape 
American efforts to capture or kill him until May 2011 did serve to enhance his 
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mythological stature with followers or admirers of al Qaeda’s ideology.  
(Bergen Interview) 
From the standpoint of the WPR, Clinton’s actions in 1998 require a 
more complicated analysis because this is one instance in which the President 
appeared to do real consultation with Congressional leaders instead of the 
usual notification.  For example, before the strikes occurred, Clinton spoke 
with the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich (Republican of Georgia).  In 
addition, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger spoke with Newt Gingrich, 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (Republican of Mississippi), the staff of 
House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (Democrat of Missouri), and Senate 
Minority Leader Tom Daschle (Democrat of South Dakota).  (Hendrickson, 
2002: 106)  After the missile strikes took place, a public opinion poll revealed 
that 40 percent of the American public thought Clinton’s military strikes were 
“influenced by his domestic problems with Ms. Lewinsky” but members of 
Congress “raised no constitutional objections and no concerns regarding 
violations or exploitation of the WPR.”  (Hendrickson, 2002: 107)  Thus, it 
appears that consulting with Congressional leaders prior to using force helped 
Clinton in the aftermath of the missile strikes when the general public was 
largely sceptical of striking at terrorist operations in Sudan and Afghanistan. 
Several factors may explain Clinton’s willingness to comply more 
completely with the WPR by consulting with Congressional leaders prior to 
using force.  By 1998, Clinton was dealing with a Republican House of 
Representatives and Senate; he was also vulnerable politically due to the 
Lewinsky scandal with decreased credibility ratings among the general public.   
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The August missile strikes occurred a few months before the mid-term 
elections of 1998 and Clinton would have been aware of the tendency of the 
President’s party to lose seats in mid-term elections.  These may have 
combined to provide political incentives for Clinton to share the intelligence on 
bin Laden and consult with Congressional leaders to ensure their support prior 
to launching the missiles.  
Another factor which militated against congressional investigation or 
complaints about the 1998 missile strikes was the nature of the target, i.e. 
Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network.  As noted above, these types of 
targets are similar to well-defined and identified enemies of the U.S. such as 
the communists during the Cold War and Saddam Hussein after his invasion 
of Kuwait.  The 1998 missile strikes did not involve a sustained military 
commitment and no American military forces were hurt or killed.  Under these 
circumstances, members of Congress had many incentives to acquiesce in 
Clinton’s use of force against bin Laden.   
In July 1999, Clinton signed an executive order that formally designated 
al Qaeda as a foreign terrorist organization, which meant that it was subject to 
the sanctions imposed on state sponsors of terrorism.  (National Commission, 
2004: 125)  The issue of how to treat Afghanistan and its Taliban government 
remained an ongoing problem for the Clinton administration; the U.S. did not 
recognize the Taliban but some in the administration hoped that their leader, 
Mullah Omar, could be persuaded to extradite or expel bin Laden to either the 
U.S. or Saudi Arabia.  In December 2000, the U.S. convinced the United 
Nations to adopt Security Council Resolution 1333, which imposed an arms 
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embargo on the Taliban.  (Ibid)  Efforts by the Clinton administration to use 
Pakistan to pressure the Taliban, like earlier efforts to influence the reclusive 
regime with sanctions and UN resolutions, were fruitless.  After 9/11, 
advocates of forceful military action tended to portray the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to influence the Taliban and prosecute bin Laden as 
misguided and pointless moves by an administration that did not comprehend 
al Qaeda and the U.S. were at “war.”   
Rendition 
Rendition is the “return of a fugitive from one state to the state where 
the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime,” according to Black’s Law 
Dictionary; it is similar to extradition in that suspects are removed from one 
state to another but extradition usually requires a treaty.  In 1986, Ronald 
Reagan authorized transferring the suspects responsible for the 1983 Marine 
barracks bombing in Lebanon so that the suspects could stand trial.  In 1995 
Bill Clinton signed PDD 39 which states, “return of suspects by force may be 
effected without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the 
procedures outlined in NSD-77 (Reagan’s PDD), which shall remain in effect.” 
(Fisher, 2008: 330)  In other words, under certain limited circumstances, the 
abduction of suspected terrorists outside of the U.S. was authorized in order 
to subject them to trial or legal process.
The practice of extraordinary or irregular rendition, discussed in 
greater detail in the chapters about the Bush II administration, became more 
common after the 9/11 attacks.  According to the former CIA chief in charge of 
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the bin Laden unit, the original goals of extraordinary rendition were to detain 
al Qaeda suspects and seize documents in their possession.  The detainees 
were then sent to other countries for judicial process, meaning that no 
abduction was authorized if charges had not been filed against the suspect.  
(Fisher, 2008: 331)  The Bush II administration expanded on this procedure in 
the “war on terror,” and sent people merely suspected of terrorism to states 
known for conducting interrogations with tactics generally considered torture.  
Nevertheless, as Baker noted, “a rendition must comply with U.S. law,” 
meaning the operation must be “properly authorized.”  (Baker, 2007: 167).  In 
this manner, Bush II administration officials designed their rendition 
procedures on precedents from the Reagan and Clinton administrations, and 
maintained it was lawful. 
    
Bombing of the USS Cole
The last al Qaeda attack against Americans in the Clinton 
administration took place when a Navy ship, the USS Cole, was struck by a 
suicide bombing on October 12, 2000 while harboured in the Yemeni port of 
Aden.  The death toll was 17 American sailors and the 2 suicide attackers.  
Some terrorism experts do not consider this an act of terrorism because, like 
the Khobar Towers bombing, the target was military, a U.S. Navy ship in this 
instance, and not random civilians.  Leaving that controversy aside, the 
relevant point for this research is that the Cole bombing was used, after the 
9/11 attacks, as a tool to criticize the Clinton administration because it did not 
respond militarily to the attack.  In the months after the 9/11 attacks, some 
commentators maintained that Clinton did not do enough during his term of 
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office to deter bin Laden and prevent more acts of terrorism.  Defenders of the 
Clinton administration have pointed out that the USS Cole bombing occurred 
during a closely contested presidential election (Bush v. Gore) and 
responsibility for the attack was not established definitely until after the 
November 2000 elections.  Thus, the argument goes, responding to the Cole
bombing was the prerogative of the new President, George W. Bush.  
Whether or not a response would have deterred Osama bin Laden and the al 
Qaeda network remains an open question.  At the time, no one in Congress 
called on Clinton to respond to the Cole bombing with force.  
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis reveals several items about the use of force by 
Bill Clinton during his eight years in office.  Despite the fact that Clinton was a 
Democrat and opposed many of the domestic policies of his immediate 
predecessors, George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, the general pattern 
on executive branch initiatives regarding the use of force against international 
terrorism remained the same.  In other words, Clinton, like Reagan, rarely 
invoked the WPR and his “consultation” with Congress was usually the 
minimal form of notification.  The exception, discussed above, was the use of 
cruise missiles in 1998. Clinton also justified the use of force in Iraq in 1993 
and the missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 as permitted by the 
international legal standards on self-defence under article 51 of the Charter.   
In this manner, Clinton, a Democrat, was not radically different from 
Reagan regarding the use of force in counterterrorism.  Both Reagan and 
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Clinton justified using force after a terrorist incident as legitimate self-defence.  
However, the Reagan administration included many officials like George 
Shultz and Abraham Sofaer who forcefully advocated a war paradigm 
approach to the problem of terrorism while the Clinton administration 
approach embodied a law enforcement paradigm with emphasis on the 
apprehension, conviction, and imprisonment of terrorists.  Clinton’s preference 
for a law enforcement paradigm regarding terrorism resulted in considerable 
criticism after the 9/11 attacks; critics claimed Clinton’s failure to respond 
more often with American military force against al Qaeda emboldened the 
terrorist network.  It remains an open question whether using more force more 
frequently against al Qaeda in the late 1990’s could have prevented 9/11. 
Furthermore, the Clinton administration did not significantly depart from 
the Reagan administration’s practice of rendition, in that under limited 
circumstances, terrorism suspects were removed from one state to another 
state to stand trial.  According to George Tenet, the Clinton administration 
rendered more than 70 suspects during its eight years in office.  These two 
elements, advocacy of a broad interpretation of self defence in international 
law and the practice of rendering suspects for counterterrorism, laid the 
foundations for the “war on terror” unleashed by George W. Bush after 9/11.  
As discussed in subsequent chapters, the second Bush administration would 
build upon precedents culled from both the Reagan and Clinton 
administrations in its approach to counterterrorism.  
The phenomenon of international terrorism changed slowly during the 
1990’s from attacks carried out by state-sponsored groups to more 
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autonomous religiously inspired non-state terrorist networks.  According to 
Pillar and Preble, one of the most salient trends in the past twenty-five years 
“has been the trend away from terrorism by regimes towards terrorism by 
groups.”  (Pillar and Preble, 2010: 66)  The authors then explain that the 
biggest difference between a state and a transnational network is the “return 
address” that the state possesses, which facilitates the use of force against 
the state (Ibid).  The Clinton administration appeared to grapple with ways to 
contain terrorist networks but it did not deviate from the previous pattern of 
executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance as far 
as the use of force was concerned.  
As the Clinton administration came to an end, one of the biggest 
complaints constitutional law scholars articulated was Clinton’s failure to 
secure congressional authorization for the military intervention, in cooperation 
with NATO, in Kosovo in 1999.  Indeed, one author termed it “one of the most 
flagrant acts of usurpation of the war power in the history of the Republic” 
(Adler, 2002: 19).  However, as this thesis will illustrate in subsequent 
chapters on George W. Bush, Clinton’s use or possible misuse of force was 
dwarfed by activities conducted under the guise of the Bush “war on terror” 
after 9/11.  In fact, the Bush II administration borrowed rationales from 
previous administrations, expanded executive power, and built upon earlier 
precedents to use force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, all in the name of 
preventing international terrorism. 
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Chapter 7 
The Administration of George W. Bush 
This chapter examines the Bush II administration’s use of force by 
analyzing the case studies of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as 
smaller uses of force entitled “discreet military operations” or DMO’s such as 
the use of drones in Yemen and Pakistan.  The first section, Intellectual  
Architecture, assesses the pivotal personalities in the administration, foreign 
and military policies, the “New Paradigm” for the war on terror, and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  While some aspects of the “New Paradigm” for the war 
on terror, such as signing statements, did not directly involve the use of force, 
they are included in the discussion because they formed an integral part of the 
Bush II administration’s overall system for implementing a war on terror. 
The second section of the chapter, entitled Discreet Military 
Operations, scrutinizes the use of drones in the war on terror, along with 
other DMO’s.  An emphasis on drones is warranted due to the fact that they 
were increasingly used as the weapon of choice in the war on terror, 
particularly as the insurgency in Iraq consumed other resources in the military.  
After George W. Bush left office, his successor, President Obama, increased 
the use of drones as a counterterrorism measure. The continuing questions 
and controversies surrounding drone use are addressed at the end of the 
chapter.   
Several themes emerge from this examination, including the continuity 
of American counterterrorism tools from the administration of Ronald Reagan 
to George W. Bush, despite pervasive rhetoric used by the latter 
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administration proclaiming more aggressive and innovative approaches to 
fighting international terrorism.  In addition, from the Reagan administration to 
the Bush II administration, reaction to acts of international terrorism resulted in 
the expansion of executive power, even though the nature of international 
terrorism was changing and despite different men from different political 
parties occupying the White House.  Arguably, the policies of the Bush II 
administration regarding detainees, interrogations, wire-tapping, and other 
activities tend to indicate a serious lack of constraints on the modern 
American president and an executive branch that is increasingly 
unaccountable.  
Finally, Koh’s pattern of executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and 
pervasive fears of another attack created a “perfect storm” of sorts during the 
Bush II administration.  This perfect storm was the ideal environment for 
executive initiatives in the treatment of detainees, surveillance of the public, 
and the use of force.  Furthermore, powerful personalities in the administration 
worked in a mutually reinforcing environment that resulted in counterterrorist 
operations that, at times, worked against long-term American interests.  The 
evidence from the interviews supports the theory that although the second 
Bush administration “pushed the envelope” in many areas, the system in place 
allowed it to occur and the possibility that another, similar administration could 
proceed in the same manner cannot be discounted.
I. Intellectual Architecture 
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In retrospect, it appears natural that one of the most controversial 
presidents of the post-World War II era, George W. Bush, would begin his 
presidency with controversy.  The election of November 7, 2000 did not 
revolve around foreign affairs or international terrorism; the main issues in the 
contest between Al Gore, Bill Clinton’s vice president, and George W. Bush, 
governor of Texas were domestic problems such as how to spend the budget 
surplus and moral character.  Mr. Bush argued that he would bring “integrity” 
back into the Oval Office by avoiding the moral failings of the Clinton 
administration.  The election results were closer than most observers 
expected and the outcome hinged on the results in the state of Florida.  After 
a lengthy dispute about methods of vote counting, the issue was heard by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which decided by a 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore to stop 
the vote recount on December 9, 2000, effectively giving the presidency to 
George W. Bush.  Although he lost the popular vote count by more than half a 
million votes, Mr. Bush took the oath of office on January 20, 2001. 
The second Bush administration began its first term with many people 
who had served with the elder George Bush, including Richard (“Dick”) 
Cheney as Vice President.  Cheney had more experience in government than 
George W. Bush, having previously served as White House Chief of Staff 
(during the Ford administration), congressman from Wyoming in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (from 1979 to 1989), and Secretary of Defense (first 
Bush administration).  This background meant he knew how policy was 
formulated in both the White House and on Capitol Hill.  Cheney’s large and 
pivotal role in shaping the second Bush administration’s use of force policies 
is examined in greater detail in later sections of this chapter because he was 
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one of the most powerful administration officials.  Cheney was concerned 
about expanding executive power vis-à-vis encroachments by the U.S. 
Congress from his days in the Ford administration, a theme which runs 
throughout his tenure as vice president. 
Another important member of the second Bush administration was 
Donald Rumsfeld who was Secretary of Defense from 2001 until 2006, when 
he was replaced by Robert Gates.  Rumsfeld was a seasoned Washington 
insider, having previously served in the Nixon administration, Ford 
administration, and the Reagan administration.  He became Secretary of 
Defense at age 43 in the Ford administration and later became the oldest 
Secretary at age 68 when he joined the second Bush administration.  In the 
1960’s he was a Congressman from Illinois in the House of Representatives.  
Like Cheney, his many transitions from private business to public service over 
the years neatly illustrate the concept of a shadow elite that operates in 
Washington, DC by moving in and out of government, all the while maintaining 
important contacts and networks with other powerful individuals.  One of the 
most curious episodes in Rumsfeld’s career was his work as Reagan’s 
Special Envoy to the Middle East in 1983; he met with Saddam Hussein and 
restored US relations with Iraq, seen at the time as a bulwark against Iranian 
influence.  Years later, in 1998, Rumsfeld joined other neoconservatives at the 
Project for a New American Century in calling on then- President Clinton to 
force regime change on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  Cheney and Rumsfeld were 
partners and philosophical soul-mates in the Bush II administration and 
according to Bush’s recent memoir, Decision Points, Cheney did not want 
Bush to drop Rumsfeld after the November 2006 midterm elections.  However, 
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the decisive victory of the Democrats (who won both houses of Congress) 
compelled Bush to make the change.  (Bush, 2010) 
Other pivotal members of the Bush II administration were Colin Powell, 
the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the first Secretary of State 
and Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor.  In 2005, Powell resigned 
and Condoleezza Rice became Secretary of State and Stephen Hadley 
became the National Security Advisor.  Clinton’s CIA director, George Tenet, 
stayed on during Bush’s first term and was replaced after he retired in 2004 by 
Porter Goss.  Goss lasted only 2 years as CIA director; Michael Hayden 
replaced him in 2006.  Finally, Louis Freeh was the FBI director when Bush 
took the oath of office in 2001 but he resigned early and left the FBI in June 
2001.  He was replaced by Robert Mueller, who took over the FBI one week 
before the 9/11 attacks.   
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
biggest government reorganization in U.S. history, took place as a result of the 
9/11 attacks; the department began as a non-Cabinet level office of Homeland 
Security, headed by Tom Ridge in October 2001.  In November 2002, this 
entity became a Cabinet level department with 22 government agencies such 
as the Coast Guard, immigration, and customs.  DHS was intended to protect 
the US from terrorist attack and respond to natural disasters like hurricanes.  
After Ridge resigned in 2005, Michael Chertoff became the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. 
Karl Rove, often given credit as the man who helped elect Bush 
governor of Texas and then President, served as political advisor to Bush until 
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August 2007 when he resigned.  His tenure at the White House was marred 
by scandal but his role in making policy regarding the use of force was 
marginal, so although his name is frequently mentioned in Bush administration 
histories, he is less important for the purposes of this study. Any examination 
of the Bush II administration’s use of force and counterterrorism actions 
should begin with the unique and pivotal role of the Vice President, Dick 
Cheney, and his staff. 
.  
The Influence of Dick Cheney 
As an indispensable proponent of the Bush II administration’s approach 
to international terrorism, Dick Cheney warrants in depth examination because 
much of what occurred during this administration can be traced back to 
Cheney and the office of the vice president.  No other vice president in this 
study wielded so much power and exerted so much influence over policy as 
Cheney.  While the caricature of Cheney as the puppet master and Bush as 
the puppet is too simplistic, close examination of the Bush II administration 
illustrates that many of the specifics of the “New Paradigm” of the War on 
Terror are attributable to Cheney.  
Article II of the US Constitution establishes the office of the vice 
president but few powers are given to the office holder; throughout most of 
U.S. history, the vice president has been tasked with ceremonial duties 
associated with the President’s role as head of state.  In 1949, Congress 
made the vice president a member of the National Security Council and 
President Jimmy Carter’s vice president, Walter Mondale, established the 
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precedent of vice presidents attending cabinet meetings.  After World War II, 
the office of vice president was viewed as a stepping stone to the presidency.  
Al Gore was Bill Clinton’s trusted advisor on many issues including the 
environment and his selection as the Democratic nominee for President in 
2000 was a natural evolution from the office of vice president.  Despite the 
growing influence of vice presidents from Mondale to Gore, few political 
observers anticipated the unprecedented power Dick Cheney wielded as vice 
president throughout the Bush II administration.   
Cheney’s influence began as the man George W. Bush tapped to help 
find a running mate in the 2000 elections; Bush asked Cheney to head his 
vice presidential search committee.  According to an in depth account of 
Cheney, as head of the vice presidential search committee, he solicited 
personal and lengthy information from potential candidates but when Cheney 
selected himself as a vice presidential candidate, no one vetted him. 
(Gellman, 2008: 23)   Cheney is famous for his penchant for secrecy, 
preference for working in the background away from the spotlight, and ability 
to retain large amounts of detailed information for later use.  Whereas George 
W. Bush was the outsider from Texas, Cheney was the man who knew how 
Washington, DC worked and how to get around the inevitable bureaucratic 
inertia and hurdles that can derail policy initiatives.  Bush, the CEO president, 
delegated duties to his subordinates and planned on focusing on the “big 
picture” while the chief operating officer dealt with the details.  Cheney gladly 
accepted working on the details in subject areas he cared most about, 
including the Bush energy plan and then national security when that became 
the top priority after 9/11. 
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As chief of staff in the Ford administration, Cheney viewed the post-
Watergate reforms enacted by Congress to reign in the “imperial president” as 
too constricting and detrimental to the executive branch.  Schlesinger’s 
persuasive theory about an imperial presidency, defined as one where “the 
constitutional balance is upset in favor of presidential power and at the 
expense of presidential accountability,” was applied to Richard Nixon.  The 
post-Watergate reforms Cheney deplored included the War Powers 
Resolution, enacted in 1973 to avoid open-ended military campaigns like the 
one in Vietnam without Congressional approval.  Another reform was the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), enacted in 1978, to provide the 
executive branch with the “exclusive” means by which the government can 
wiretap.  This law was a reaction to abuses by the CIA explored by the Church 
Committee during the Nixon administration.  Cheney repeatedly said that the 
President had become “imperiled” instead of imperial by a series of assertive 
legislative reforms that sought to reign in the President, but in reality according 
to Cheney, impinged on the President’s constitutionally proscribed powers in 
matters concerning defence and foreign policy.  
Cheney had several sources of power during his tenure as vice 
president; one was his intimate knowledge of who controls the levers of power 
and how policy is enacted in Washington, even in the face of determined 
opposition.  (Wilkerson Interview)  As head of Bush’s transition team during 
the recount in 2000, Cheney helped appoint many like-minded bureaucrats 
and followers in important positions in Washington.  He had great access to 
Bush who valued Cheney’s loyalty and trusted him as a former member of 
George H.W. Bush’s administration (Secretary of Defense).  His lack of 
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presidential ambition (Cheney consistently let it be known that he did not 
intend to run for the presidency when his term expired) gave him a measure of 
freedom in that he did not have to worry about the verdict of potential voters in 
the future.  Many scholars have noted his preference for secrecy, lack of 
transparency, and the ability to limit the spread of information, even to people 
in the administration as highly placed as Condi Rice (National Security 
Advisor) and Colin Powell (Secretary of State).  (Gellman, 2008) 
Another source of power for Cheney was the lack of vice presidential 
accountability that prevailed throughout the Bush II administration.  Several 
factors explain this phenomenon, including George Bush’s failure to supervise 
his vice president adequately and the absence of a regular policy-making 
process within the executive branch, which would have exposed Cheney’s 
policy preferences to competing ideas and agendas.  After 9/11, Cheney used 
the need for secrecy and speed in national security policies to deny relevant 
information to officials normally included “in the loop.”  He also excluded 
important policy-makers from the negotiations which led to the military 
commission order.  (Mayer, 2009: 123-125)  Cheney (and the entire Bush II 
administration for much of the first 6 years) avoided congressional oversight, a 
topic examined later.  Finally, two other features of Cheney’s tenure are 
notable: Cheney avoided the media in general, except on his own terms, and 
failed to comply with the usual record keeping regulations.  (Goldstein, 2009) 
The last feature occasionally led to satiric results in that the office of the vice 
president claimed in a dispute with the Information Security Oversight Office of 
the National Archive in 2007 that the vice president was not part of the 
executive branch despite having argued in the energy task force controversy 
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in 2001 that the vice president, as part of the executive branch, should enjoy 
the same prerogatives as the President. (Ibid) 
No discussion of Cheney’s influence is complete without noting I. 
“Scooter” Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff from 2001 to 2005.  In addition to 
being chief of staff, Libby was also given two other positions within the White 
House hierarchy, which solidified his power; these positions were national 
security adviser, and assistant to the president.  (Gellman, 2008: 44)  In a 
notorious episode from 2003, Cheney and Libby retaliated against a critic of 
the Iraq invasion, Joe Wilson who wrote an op-ed in the New York Times
questioning Bush’s evidence for war, by revealing that Wilson’s wife (Valerie 
Plame) was a CIA operative.  Libby was convicted of perjury, obstruction of 
justice, and making false statements to federal investigators in 2007 in the 
Valerie Plame affair.  George Bush, under heavy pressure from conservatives 
to pardon Libby, ultimately spared him jail time by commuting his sentence.  
Lost in the long media controversy between two narratives of Libby, one as 
the loyal executive branch official trying to keep America safe and the other as 
Cheney’s attack dog who would do anything to discredit a critic of the White 
House, was the fact that a long-time covert CIA officer working on weapons 
proliferation (Plame) had been exposed, potentially decreasing America’s 
security.  The Scooter Libby episode is relevant to the administration’s 
approach to using force in that it illustrates how the administration 
aggressively went after its critics regarding the war in Iraq, rather than engage 
in a discourse on the merits of the original decision to invade Iraq.  
Throughout the eight years of the Bush II administration, there was a pattern 
of transforming policy determinations (for example, should the USA invade 
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Iraq?  Was the evidence of WMD substantial enough?) from decisions on the 
merits to a politically charged dialogue attacking critics’ motives.  Scooter 
Libby and the Plame affair follow this pattern quite neatly. 
Another important Cheney aide was David Addington, a conservative 
attorney who was in the CIA under William Casey and shared Casey’s view 
that congressional oversight of the intelligence community was an 
“impediment to be circumvented.” (Mayer, 2006)  In 1989 when Cheney 
became Secretary of Defense, Addington went with him to the Pentagon and 
when Cheney became vice president in 2001, Addington followed him.  Unlike 
previous administrations where many of the top positions were filed by 
lawyers, neither George W. Bush nor Dick Cheney were lawyers and both 
relied on trusted advisors for their legal advice.  (Mayer, 2009: 54)  Cheney 
consistently turned to Addington who combined a background in national 
security law with a forceful personality; Addington’s style impeded free-flowing 
deliberation.  In several instances involving controversial or sensitive subjects 
such as the interrogation of detainees, Cheney relied on advice from 
Addington and shut others who might have different legal opinions out of the 
policy-making process.  From various accounts of decision-making in the 
administration, both Cheney and Addington preferred a small, closed, group of 
policy-makers and eschewed the normal constraints inherent in a democracy 
such as legislative oversight and enquiries from the media.  In the words of 
one lawyer who served in the Reagan administration, “reducing Congress to a 
cipher” was a large “part of Cheney and Addington’s political agenda.” (Fein 
Interview and Mayer, 2009: 54)   
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The Bush II administration’s reliance on Cheney and Addington’s views 
regarding international law, national security law, and the laws of war 
occasionally embroiled the administration in years of litigation with some 
cases (notably on detainee treatment) ultimately being decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  When the White House was discussing how to handle newly 
detained prisoners from Afghanistan in 2002, an influential Congresswoman 
on the House Intelligence Committee, Jane Harman, came to Addington with 
proposals on how to treat the new detainees in the WOT.  Harman believed 
Congress should approve legislation for dealing with detainees under Article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution (Congress has the power to “make rules 
concerning captures on land and water”).  Addington dismissively replied that 
the section only applied to “pirates,” a contention that is not universally 
accepted by legal scholars.  (Gellman, 2008: 172)  Harman acquiesced in 
Addington’s proposal.  As discussed in the section on “New Paradigm” for the 
war on terror, the rules Cheney, Addington, and a few others designed for this 
new type of war often conflicted with areas of American and international law 
long considered settled.    
Foreign Policy 
While campaigning for the presidency in 2000, George W. Bush 
famously stated his preference for a “humble” foreign policy, indicating his 
unwillingness to involve the U.S. in activities like “nation building.”  He did not 
run on his foreign policy credentials which were slim because he did not have 
to; the U.S. was at peace and with the demise of the Soviet Union, few other 
countries appeared capable of rivalling U.S. military superiority.  Unlike his 
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father, Bush did not have extensive experience abroad or in government.  He 
was the governor from Texas whose appeal to the electorate came largely 
from his folksy manner, apparent everyman likeability, and ability to 
distinguish himself from the other presidential contender, the stiff policy wonk 
Al Gore (jokingly called “Al Bore” by some commentators).  George W. Bush 
also wisely never tried to pretend he was an international affairs expert; rather, 
he pledged to be a CEO President, delegating judiciously and surrounding 
himself with knowledgeable advisors.  Terrorism was rarely mentioned on the 
campaign trail, or in Bush’s speeches despite the fact that terrorists 
associated with al Qaeda had blown a hole in the USS Cole in October 2000.  
International terrorism did not register with the American public as a pressing 
problem during the fall campaign.  Much later, after 9/11, questions arose 
regarding the lack of response to the Cole attack but, during the 2000 
elections, the voters did not press George W. Bush on how he would handle 
terrorism. 
Although his background in international affairs was slight, George W. 
Bush unleashed a “revolution” in foreign policy in that he shed the constraints 
of multilateralism and acted on his belief that “American unbound should use 
its strength to change the status quo in the world.” (Daalder and Lindsay, 
2005: 13)  Bush and his advisors viewed the Clinton administration’s 
preference for multilateral action in the international arena as a weakness that 
unduly constricted America’s actions and complicated its strategy because it 
required the U.S. to consult and compromise with allies.  Prior to 9/11, the 
second Bush administration focused on large nation states such as China and 
Russia because the principals in the administration assumed these states 
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posed the major threats and challenges to America.  Indeed, Condoleezza 
Rice, a close friend and foreign policy advisor to candidate Bush, wrote an 
article in Foreign Affairs, which concentrated on powerful nations like China 
and Russia and only briefly mentioned state-sponsored terrorism.  (Rice, 
2000)  After 9/11, the focus shifted dramatically to non-state terrorist groups 
and “rogue” states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea who might be willing to 
materially assist terrorist groups.  However, the underlying core principle, the 
preference for unilateralism, remained the same.  (Daalder and Lindsay, 2005) 
In the first months of his administration, George W. Bush emphasized 
his willingness to use unilateral action and the “hard power” approach instead 
of the “soft power” approach of the previous administration.  Hard power 
involves the use of military force and coercive measures to influence other 
states’ behaviour, while soft power “relies on the appeal of American culture 
and values to enable the United States to influence the behaviour of other 
states.” (McCormick, 2004: 195)  In keeping with his belief in unilateralism, 
George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol, opposed the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and the International Criminal Court, and withdrew from the 
Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.  In addition, the second Bush 
administration promoted military preparedness and promised to develop and 
deploy a missile defence system that would protect Americans from missiles 
launched by rogue states.  From the very start of his administration, George 
W. Bush was determined to break with the foreign policy of the Clinton 
administration which was criticized for being too multilateral, too 
accommodating of other nations’ perspectives and, in general, subordinated to 
domestic policy. 
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Various scholars have debated the issue of whether foreign policy 
making during the Bush II administration was the product of George W. Bush 
or the result of the overwhelming influence of the neoconservatives in his 
administration.  Much has been written on this topic; most analysis falls into 
one of the two categories, those who believe Bush was uninterested in foreign 
affairs and thus was easily influenced by those around him with more 
experience and firm neoconservative principals such as Cheney, and those 
who claim Bush made the choice to unleash a revolution in foreign affairs due 
to his own inclinations and personality.  For example, Daalder and Lindsay 
write that commentators who described Bush as controlled by 
neoconservatives misunderstood George W. Bush because he was not a 
“figurehead.” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2005: 15)  In his memoir, Decision Points, 
Bush strives to portray himself as the decider, not a puppet controlled by 
others.  An analysis of the details of policy making in his White House 
indicates that Bush left the details to others, preferring the short executive 
summary; this arrangement gave his vice president and the vice president’s 
office the ability to impact policy in the manner that Cheney wanted.  
According to Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s chief of staff, Cheney and 
the members of his staff understood the “bureaucratic game” very well and 
knew how to “play it” to get their preferred outcome.  (Wilkerson Interview)  He 
also called them “the most effective team in government.”  (Gellman, 2008: 
364) 
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the Bush II foreign policy was oriented 
towards the traditional states which might threaten American interests, 
primarily Russia and China.  This was natural due to the backgrounds of the 
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foreign policy heavyweights in the administration, i.e. Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, 
and other neoconservatives such as Wolfowitz.  In its reliance on the military, 
the Bush II administration was following the basic outlines of previous 
American administrations.  Since World War II, American foreign policy 
makers have succumbed to “military metaphysics,” the tendency to see 
international issues as military problems and to discount the likelihood of 
finding a solution except through military means.  (Bacevich, 2005: 2)  Despite 
the demise of the Soviet Union, successive American presidents have 
maintained or increased high levels of spending on the military and subscribed 
to Cheney’s theory that force “makes your diplomacy more effective going 
forward, dealing with other problems.”  (Keen, 2004: 1) 
After 9/11, the national security apparatus of the U.S. government 
switched gears to focus on al Qaeda and the Taliban as the newest threats to 
American security.  Despite this orientation, Cheney and other 
neoconservatives within the administration were already planning on 
eliminating the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, part of the Project for a 
New American Century’s agenda since 1998.  Less than six months after the 
attacks, Bush spoke of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address on 
January 29, 2002; he was referring to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.  Although 
the three countries did not coordinate policy (and, in fact, Iraq and Iran had 
fought a bitter war in the 1980’s), Bush put them together in his rhetoric to 
evoke the “Axis powers” in World War II, i.e. Germany, Italy, and Japan.  
(Sanger, 2009: 42)  Powell, who claimed not to have seen the State of the 
Union text in advance, disliked the rhetoric even though the neoconservatives 
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approved of the phrase; it reminded them of Reagan’s characterization of the 
Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” (Sanger, 2009: 43) 
George Bush’s views on the post-war concepts of deterrence and 
containment were outlined in a speech he gave at West Point on June 1, 
2002, when he stated, “For much of the last century, America's defense relied 
on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, 
those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. 
Deterrence -- the promise of massive retaliation against nations -- means 
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to 
defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons 
of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide 
them to terrorist allies.”  Bush went on to declare, “If we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long,” signalling that the U.S. was 
embracing an assertive preemption in its foreign policy. (Bush Remarks at 
West Point, 2002) 
A few months later in September 2002 the National Security Strategy 
was issued.  It is often cited as the first clear articulation of what came to be 
called the “Bush Doctrine.”  In one passage discussing emerging threats, the 
National Security Strategy states, 
The security environment confronting the United States today is 
radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of 
the United States Government remains what it always has been: to 
protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring 
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American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate 
and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the 
threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the 
risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as 
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater 
threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. 
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent 
right of self-defense. (National Security Strategy, 2002) 
Bush himself described four parts to the Bush Doctrine in Decision Points:  
• “Make no distinction between the terrorists and the nations that harbor 
them---and hold both to account”  
• “Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again”  
• “Confront threats before they fully materialize”  
• “Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of 
repression and fear.”  (Bush, 2010: 396-397)  
Many different scholars and commentators subsequently criticized the 
Bush Doctrine; one of the most relevant criticisms was its “considerable 
conceptual confusion, most importantly by conflating the notion of prevention
with that of preemption.  (Korb and Wadhams, 2006)  The difference between 
preventive war and preemptive strikes seemed murky and, at times, Bush II 
administration officials were unable to articulate the distinction.  (Heisbourg, 
2003)  While some saw the Bush Doctrine in action with the invasion of Iraq (a 
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preemptive strike against a country with WMD), Rice later claimed that 
invading Iraq was not preemption, but rather the enforcement of UN 
resolutions long ignored by Hussein.  In her book, No Higher Honor, Rice 
explained that the “final piece” of the Bush Doctrine was the administration’s 
“choice of promoting freedom in the Middle East and elsewhere,” rather than 
settling for more stability.  (Rice, 2011: 325)   
In addition, some political scientists criticized the administration’s 
proclaimed “freedom agenda,” the promotion of democracy as a way to 
forestall terrorism, due to the lack of empirical evidence showing liberal 
democracy “reduces or prevents terrorism.”  (Gause, 2005)  In fact, truly 
democratic elections in certain Middle Eastern countries could result in 
Islamist parties and governments that were more hostile to the foreign policies 
of the U.S. than the previous undemocratic regimes.
Military: Growth from Cold War to the War on Terror
There are both similarities and differences between George W. Bush’s 
foreign policy and those of his immediate predecessors.  One of the most 
important similarities was the administration’s reliance on American military 
force instead of diplomacy to advance U.S. interests in the world and prevent 
international terrorism.  The trend toward the militarization of U.S. foreign 
policy can be traced as far back to the end of World War II when the United 
States emerged as a superpower with the Soviet Union as the only real rival in 
terms of military strength.  During the Cold War, American politicians 
frequently justified spending large amounts on military equipment, weapons, 
and the Pentagon in general as necessary to counter the Soviet threat.  
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Although attempts were made to control the arms race between the 
superpowers, they were never entirely successful and the American public 
became used to large expenditures on the military. 
Quantifying the Pentagon budget is notoriously difficult due to several 
variables including the classified nature of certain intelligence budgets and the 
fact that not all defence spending is part of the Department of Defense (DOD) 
budget.  In addition, there is a “Black Budget” which includes the costs of 
doing intelligence work and covert operations.  According to the New York 
Times, the black budget “nearly doubled in the Bush years” to close to 32 
billion dollars per year by 2008.  The Congressional Budget Office calculates 
that in 2001 the DOD budget was 291.1 billion; by 2010 it had grown to 708 
billion dollars.  This represents an increase of 9% annually on average from 
fiscal year 2000 to 2009.   
Equally important, the funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
during the Bush II administration was not always included in the regular 
Pentagon budget, which is subject to congressional oversight by various 
committees including the appropriations committee.  One of the major 
methods of reining in executive power has traditionally been the “power of the 
purse,” the ability of Congress to prevent the president from pursuing some 
foreign policy initiative by not appropriating the money for it.  However, this 
requires an active Congress with the desire to rein in the executive; this was 
absent during most of the Bush II administration.  Instead, the executive 
branch requested and Congress agreed to fund the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq through a device known as supplemental budget legislation or an 
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“emergency supplemental” appropriation.  For instance, from September 11, 
2001 to 2006, Congress appropriated $331 billion from military operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere as part of the WOT; $301 billion or 91% was 
provided in supplemental or additional emergency funding.  After the initial use 
of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was no longer credible to argue that 
spending in these wars was “emergency” or unexpected.  The extended use 
of supplemental funding legislation to fund these operations was criticized by 
many Republicans and Democrats in Congress as a distortion of the normal 
budgeting process.  Moreover, in December 2006 the bipartisan Iraq Study 
Group recommended that the “normal budget process should not be 
circumvented.”   
In addition, funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in this manner 
allowed the Bush administration to avoid the limits on total discretionary 
federal spending and meant they were not subject to the full congressional 
appropriations review process.  (Daggett, 2006)  The Bush II administration 
justified funding the wars in this manner by historical precedent; it pointed to 
previous administrations during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and conflicts in 
the 1990’s when additional supplemental funding augmented the normal 
Pentagon budgeting process.  However, the clever use of past history 
obscured the fact that close analysis of previous administrations’ use of 
supplemental war funding reveals it was generally brief and ended as soon as 
funding the conflict in the normal manner was possible. (Ibid)  Moreover, as 
Wilkerson pointed out in an interview, funding wars in this manner is a 
“disaster” because it ensures that “nobody knows how much we are spending” 
and there is “no high level accountability for waste.”  (Wilkerson Interview) 
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Currently the United States spends almost as much on defence as the 
rest of the world combined, which means the U.S. is outspending its two 
biggest military rivals, Russia and China, although figures for China are 
estimates.  (Maddow, 2012: 187, SIPRI Database)  Spending on the DOD 
accounts for one half of all discretionary spending in the U.S. and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, suggested in 2008 
that the U.S. should continue to devote 4% of GDP to the military per year.  
Given the current economic conditions, it is not certain that this spending is 
sustainable. 
The New Paradigm for the War on Terror 
The following discussion of the “New Paradigm” erected to fight the war 
on terror highlights its influence on the use of force during the Bush II 
administration.  As noted previously, when the Reagan administration used 
force against international terrorism by bombing Libya in 1986, it justified its 
actions by reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter which allows states to use 
force in self defence in the event of an armed attack.  This was also the 
rationale for the Clinton administration when it bombed Iraq in 1993 and sent 
cruise missiles to Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.  The Bush II administration 
claimed several sources of authority for its WOT.  Like the Reagan and 
Clinton administrations, it asserted the U.S. was entitled to acts in self-
defence under Article 51 after 9/11.  For domestic legal purposes, it relied 
upon two authorizations: the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 
September 18, 2001, known as the AUMF to justify the campaign against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan; and the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq 
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passed by Congress in 2002.  However, the Bush II administration erected a 
more sophisticated legal framework than the Reagan or Clinton 
administrations in that it established a “New Paradigm” for the WOT that 
enlarged the powers of the President to fight terrorists.  
The New Paradigm for the WOT was broadly based on the President’s 
Article II powers as Commander-in-chief and, in some cases, built on previous 
concepts used by earlier administrations. When asked to compare and 
analyze the differences between the Reagan administration’s use of force 
against terrorism and the Bush II administration’s, an attorney in the Reagan 
administration, Bruce Fein, pointed to the fact that Reagan used force only 
once, against Libya in 1986.  (Fein Interview)  He went on to add that 
Reagan’s use of force was a limited, “one shot deal” that did not change the 
legal architecture of the country.  (Ibid)  According to several accounts, the 
lawyers working on the WOT intended to “transform the fight against terrorism 
from a criminal justice matter to a full-fledged military war, thereby allowing the 
CIA and Pentagon to kill or capture and question terrorist suspects as swiftly 
as possible, with as much latitude as possible.”  (Mayer, 2009: 52) 
  
Many of Cheney’s objectives for the executive branch, culled from his 
speeches and the minority report of the Iran-Contra Affair, became 
foundational elements of the New Paradigm.  For example, Cheney wanted to 
“restore” or expand presidential power, “enlarge the zone of secrecy around 
the executive branch, to reduce the power of Congress to restrict presidential 
action, to undermine limits imposed by international treaties, and to nominate 
judges who favoured a stronger presidency.” (Savage, 2007: 8)  In an 
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exhaustive study of the UK and US legal regimes, Donohue found that in both 
systems, counterterrorist law “increases executive power, both in absolute and 
relative terms, and, in so doing, alters the relationships among the branches of 
government.”  (Donohue, 2008: 3)  This increase in executive power was 
exactly what Cheney and his aides intended, long before the attacks of 9/11 
gave them the opportunity to enact their agenda. 
The philosophical foundations of the New Paradigm have extensive 
legal roots; many of the men who wrote the legal memos supporting the Bush 
II administration’s legal theories for the use of force, detention, and other 
aspects of the WOT have impressive legal educations.   The primary authors 
of the New Paradigm in the WOT were Addington, his protégée, Timothy 
Flanigan, associate White House counsel (2001 to 2002), Jay Bybee, head of 
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department (2001 to 2003), 
and John Yoo, author of many once-secret legal memos, a young 
conservative lawyer in the OLC (2001 to 2003).  Jim Haynes, General 
Counsel at the Department of Defense during the Bush II administration, was 
also part of the small circle of lawyers who constructed the New Paradigm.  
Alberto Gonzales, White House counsel from 2001 to 2005 and then Attorney 
General from 2005 to 2007, was present for many important legal decisions 
and memos but acquiesced to the details, instead of authoring them.  These 
men tended to refer to themselves as “the War Council” and wrote the memos 
for the WOT “with virtually no experience in law enforcement, military service, 
counterterrorism, or the Muslim world.”  (Mayer, 2009: 66)   
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The New Paradigm was partially built on the foundations of the unitary 
executive theory. A brief examination of the legal background of the unitary 
executive theory illustrates how the Bush II administration borrowed from, and 
expanded upon, ideas developed in the Reagan administration.  The unitary 
executive theory is a doctrine of American constitutional law that has two 
manifestations; one posits that the President has control over the executive 
branch, including the supposedly independent regulatory agencies such as 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  The second, more controversial version of the unitary 
executive theory is the one propounded by Bush II lawyers and the 
conservative Federalist Society.  Several lawyers in the Reagan Justice 
Department, including Samuel Alito (who became a Supreme Court Justice in 
2006), promoted the view that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution proposed 
that the President have “independent authority, unchecked by the other 
branches of government, to decide what the law means.”  (Drew, 2006: 12)  
During the Reagan administration, this was just another conservative legal 
theory advocated by the Federalist Society. 
When George W. Bush came to office in 2001, the broader version of 
the unitary executive theory was resurrected out of law journals.  Many of the 
powerful lawyers in Cheney’s office, including Addington, supported a robust 
application of the theory.  At the Justice Department, John Yoo, in the OLC, 
based many of his legal memos on the notion that the U.S. Constitution 
envisages a strong executive with powers similar to the British monarch in the 
18th century.  This included the power to make war.  However, many critics, 
including Fisher and Adler, contend that the Framers of the Constitution were 
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extremely suspicious of monarchical power and would not have granted the 
American President such discretion in foreign policy matters.  Yoo and other 
unitary executive adherents counter that the intent of the Framers was to 
establish an energetic President who would protect the country, and, 
additionally, the Framers empowered Congress with the means to check 
executive branch foreign adventures by cutting off appropriations.  
Many of the administration’s legal memos outlining the President’s 
powers remained secret until something leaked to the press; then the usual 
pattern was controversy leading to a repudiation, partial reversal, or 
amendment of the memo.  In fact, the memos might change “on the surface,” 
but they continued to follow the path advocated by Cheney and others in 
expanding executive authority to permit practices that the U.S. had previously 
condemned when done by other states.  (Cole, 2009: 11)  According to Cole, 
a law professor, “despite repeated assurances that the U.S. ‘does not torture,’ 
official U.S. policy, as reflected in the secret memos, continued to authorize 
the CIA to strip suspects naked, deprive them of sleep for seven to eleven 
days straight, slam them into walls, slap them, douse them with cold water, 
force them into painful stress positions and cramped boxes for hours, and 
waterboard them repeatedly.”  (Ibid)   
Signing Statements 
One device that the Bush II lawyers seized upon to expand presidential 
powers is known as a presidential “signing statement,” an official 
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announcement issued by the President contemporaneously with the signing of 
a bill into law.  (Garvey, 2012)  Although they have been used by Presidents 
since the early 19th century, it is the modern usage of signing statements, 
starting with Reagan, that caused controversy.  Reagan initiated the practice 
of issuing signing statements “to assert constitutional and legal objections to 
congressional enactments.”  (Ibid)  In fact, Samuel Alito at Reagan’s Justice 
Department wrote a memo advocating their use as a means to increase the 
power of the executive branch to shape the law.  (Fisher, 2007: 192)  
However, it was President George W. Bush who “used this instrument as part 
of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen and expand executive authority 
generally.”  (Garvey, 2012: 26) 
The best example detailing how a signing statement could modify the 
terms of the WOT occurred at the end of December 2005, when President 
Bush signed a defence authorization bill into law.  The bill contained a ban on 
torture that was the result of a long battle between the executive branch, led 
by Cheney lobbying Congress, and Senator McCain, who adamantly insisted 
on adding a provision banning torture.  It appeared that McCain won after the 
White House stated it would accept the torture ban.  (Savage, 2007: 223)  
However, the Bush II administration quietly inserted a signing statement into 
the bill, which asserted that President Bush had the power to “construe” the 
torture ban as “giving him an unwritten waiver for special national security 
circumstances.”  (Savage, 2007: 226)  While passage of the torture ban was 
big news, the insertion of the signing statement, which altered the executive 
branch’s obligations under the ban, into the Federal Register (a compendium 
of U.S. law) was done shortly before New Year’s Eve to attract little public 
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attention.  By the end of his administration, George W. Bush had issued more 
than 1,000 challenges to distinct provisions of law.  (Garvey, 2012: 8)  The 
long-term effects of these presidential signing statements are unclear, but 
Fisher urged close scrutiny of the practice to guard against executive abuse 
and arrogance.  (Fisher, 2007: 210) 
Press secretaries in the Bush II administration frequently defended 
aspects of the New Paradigm by referencing practices under previous 
administrations, as if to say, this is not new; it has all been done before.  Close 
examination of the practices reveals that while previous administrations may 
have used them on occasion, their use was sporadic and not intended as an 
expansion of executive branch prerogatives.  In addition to signing 
statements, another prime example is extraordinary rendition, discussed 
below.  Moreover, previous administrations did not claim so much executive 
branch discretion to fight international terrorism, nor consciously attempt to 
leave executive branch precedents for other Presidents to follow.  The 
following sections consider other WOT policies of the Bush II administration 
briefly. 
Rendition 
As explained in the Clinton chapter, rendition or the practice of 
removing a suspect accused or convicted of a crime from one state to another 
state in the absence of an extradition treaty did not begin with the war on 
terror.  During testimony at the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2000, CIA 
Director Tenet testified that the CIA had rendered more than 70 suspects 
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during the Clinton administration and described bringing “more than two dozen 
terrorists to justice”  (Fisher, 2008: 330).  It is unclear whether this means they 
were brought to trial in the U.S, or turned over to another country for judicial 
process.  One report by the New America Foundation documented 117 cases 
before September 11, 2001.  (Mayer, 2009: 108-9)  In his book, Grey listed 23 
renditions from 1987 until September 11, 2001.  (Grey, 2006: 269-271)   
However, the Bush II administration implemented an “extraordinary 
rendition” program after the 9/11 attacks, which remains somewhat shrouded 
in secrecy.  Many documents related to the second Bush administration’s 
program are currently unavailable as they continue to be classified as top 
secret.  According to one in-depth examination, the difference between 
Clinton’s renditions and the ones conducted by the Bush II administration is 
“before September 11, the program was aimed at rendering criminal suspects 
to justice, but afterward it was used to render suspects outside the reach of 
the law.”  (Mayer, 2009: 108)  According to Baker, a former legal advisor to 
the National Security Council, the U.S. renders people to other states “to 
facilitate intelligence gathering, disrupt terrorism planning, as well as to 
facilitate the prosecution of terrorist suspects.”  (Baker, 2007: 166)  He 
acknowledged that the post-9/11 practice of rendition raised “legal and policy 
concerns” because “persons rendered to certain third countries may indeed be 
subjected to treatment considered abhorrent or unlawful in the United States 
or by the international community on whose assistance the United States 
depends.”  (Baker, 2007: 167) 
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In addition, a troubling aspect of rendition is the exact number of people 
subjected to it during the Bush II administration remains unknown.  Estimates 
indicate hundreds may have been rendered.  (Baker, 2007, Grey, 2006)  One 
report on renditions undertaken by NYU Law School and the New York City 
Bar Association found that “at least 150 people were renditioned between 
2001 and 2005.”  (Mayer, 2009: 108-9)  Furthermore, another unknown is the 
fate of some of those rendered to countries where torture or inhuman 
treatment occurs; some detainees are simply unaccounted for, years after 
they were detained.  Although Congress could have demanded answers from 
the executive branch on this practice, there was no political incentive to 
investigate the Bush II administration. 
  In this manner, the Bush II administration built on the precedent of 
capturing terrorist suspects wanted for trial and subject to procedural 
safeguards and, after 9/11, turned it into a  clandestine method of abducting 
people merely suspected of terrorist activity or ties.  This transformation 
resembled independent and arbitrary executive law.  (Fisher Interview)   
Fisher noted how “extraordinary rendition” involved transferring people to a 
third country (usually Egypt, Syria, Morocco, or Jordan) where inhumane 
treatment or torture was known to happen.  Although Bush II administration 
officials continued to deny any one was subjected to torture, the evidence 
indicates that these practices occurred under circumstances American officials 
should have known might involve torture.   
For instance, one detainee who was a Lebanese-German, Khaded al-
Masri, was taken off a bus in Macedonia in 2003 and sent to Afghanistan.  
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After several months of interrogations and abusive practices, he was not 
charged with any crime and then released.  (Fisher, 2008: 352-4)  The 
WikiLeaks exposures of U.S. State Department documents in November 2010 
revealed that U.S. diplomats in Berlin pressured the German government to 
drop any investigations of CIA agents involved in al-Masri’s rendition.  His 
attempt to get redress from the U.S. government was unsuccessful when the 
Supreme Court dismissed his lawsuit in 2007 due to the “state secrets” 
doctrine. 
In another case, an Egyptian living in Italy named Abu Omar was 
kidnapped in Milan on February 17, 2003 because the CIA suspected he was 
involved in terrorist recruiting.  Abu Omar was flown to Egypt, interrogated, 
and abused until his release in 2007.  After an investigation by Italian 
magistrates, an Italian judge convicted 22 CIA agents in absentia for the 
abduction in 2009.  This is one of the rare instances when any one involved in 
an extraordinary rendition has been held accountable, although the CIA 
agents were not in Italy for the trial and, presumably, will not travel to Italy to 
avoid arrest. 
Numerous investigations by newspapers and independent 
organizations detail abductions and abuses carried out clandestinely to further 
the war on terror.  In November 2010, Amnesty International released a 57-
page report entitled Open Secret: Mounting Evidence of Europe’s Complicity 
in Rendition and Secret Detention that examined how European governments 
cooperated or tolerated covert activity by the CIA. The report detailed how 
European countries allowed secret CIA flights to cross their air space and the 
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existence of secret detention centres in Poland and Romania.  The lack of 
accountability by the U.S. and members of the Bush II administration are 
explored further in the next chapter on George Bush’s legacy. 
Ghost Detainees 
In Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program, Grey 
traced the extraordinary renditions of al Qaeda suspects who become ghost 
detainees at one of the CIA’s black sites, or in another secret prison.  By 
investigating the flight plans of CIA flights and tracking down suspects who 
have been subjected to this treatment, Grey documented the existence of the 
program and its effects on detainees.  One Canadian born in Syria, Maher 
Arar, was detained in New York in September 2002, deported to Syria, and 
beaten after he denied involvement with al Qaeda.  (Grey, 2006: 62-78)  
Under the norms of human rights law, specifically article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture, the U.S. is not permitted to send some one to a country 
where it is likely that they will be tortured. However, the U.S. sent Arar to Syria 
despite the law.  Eventually, the Canadian government apologized to Arar and 
awarded him a settlement.  (Toope, 2005).  However, the U.S. government 
continues to deny any wrongdoing and classifies his treatment as a 
deportation, not rendition.  Arar’s lawsuit against American officials in the 
Bush II administration was subsequently dismissed on national security 
grounds. 
Beginning late in 2004, newspaper accounts described a shadowy 
practice of CIA abductions involving flying people to undisclosed locations or 
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“black spots” where they remained both beyond the normal reach of the U.S. 
court system and not accounted for as normal prisoners of war to the Red 
Cross. (Priest, 2004: 1)  Eventually the Red Cross gained access to 14 of 
these “ghost detainees” in CIA custody and wrote a confidential report on their 
findings.  When parts of the report began to leak into the press, the details 
described clearly indicated that the U.S. government was involved in practices 
that were considered either torture or inhuman and degrading treatment under 
commonly accepted international legal norms (Mayer, 2009: 244-245).  No 
previous administration had authorized the drastic step of establishing “black 
sites” where high value detainees were held and interrogated.  In fact, from 
Reagan to Clinton, the working presumption was that terrorism suspects 
should be tried in a criminal law procedure under a number of federal statutes 
in a U.S. federal court.  The other working presumption was that no one 
should be held “off the books” as a detainee by the U.S. government. 
The New Paradigm for the WOT aided the establishment of these 
“black sites” with a two-step legal reasoning process that began by positing 
the President as Commander-in-chief with the constitutional duty to protect the 
nation.  The second step in the process was to greatly expand the executive’s 
areas of discretion and competence without input from the other branches of 
government due to exigencies of the war on terror.  For example, as a 
“wartime president,” as George W. Bush frequently called himself, the 
President had the authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions and the Bush 
II administration was careful to point out that the battlefield extended all over 
the world.  This is the position taken in a memo dated January 9, 2002 written 
by John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, both at the OLC in the Justice 
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Department, to Jim Haynes at the Department of Defense.  (Greenberg & 
Dratel, 2005: 38-79)  As a policy matter, the President could still apply the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees 
(and, indeed, George Bush, declared during a press conference in 2002 that 
the U.S. would) but he was not required by law to apply the conventions.   
This was the first time any U.S. President had denied the applicability 
of the treaties since they were enacted in 1949 and some in the administration 
felt it was not in the long-term interests of the U.S. to take this position.  Colin 
Powell, former soldier and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that it 
was counterproductive and might result in other countries’ disregarding the 
treaty regime and could adversely affect military discipline.  In a memo, Powell 
wrote that applying the Geneva Convention on the treatment of Prisoners War 
(GWP) to the war on terror in Afghanistan would present a “positive 
international posture” and preserve American “credibility and moral authority.”  
(Greenberg & Dratel, 2005:123) 
However, Powell was in the minority in the Bush II administration on 
this issue; Gonzales (then White House counsel) summarized different 
positions regarding whether the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 
applied to the Taliban and al Qaeda in his January 25, 2002 memo to 
President Bush. (Fisher, 2008: 216).  Rumsfeld and the lawyers in the OLC 
agreed with Gonzales that contemporary terrorism was a “new type of 
warfare” that required executive branch “flexibility.”  According to Fisher, the 
effect of this approach was to “exclude Congress” with an executive branch 
fiat.  It also substituted binding treaty law with a “unilateral administration 
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policy that could be altered, modified, or rescinded” whenever the executive 
branch felt it was necessary or desirable.  (Fisher, 2008: 216)  Many legal 
scholars like Cole and Fisher chart the administration’s subsequent descent 
into practices normally considered torture to its decision to suspend the 
Geneva Conventions early in 2002.  The White House decision on the Geneva 
Conventions also conforms to Koh’s pattern of executive initiative, followed by 
congressional acquiescence.  
Detainees and their Rights 
Only a brief outline of the Bush II administration’s guidelines for holding 
and treating detainees is possible; several books explore the entire detention 
regime.  (Sands, 2008, Greenberg, 2006)  In his 2011 book, In My Time, 
Cheney lamented that critics advocate closing detention camps like 
Guantanamo in part because it harms America’s image as a liberal 
democracy.  According to Cheney, “it’s not Guantanamo that does the harm, it 
is the critics of the facility who peddle falsehoods about it.”  (Cheney, 2011: 
356)  Many members of the second Bush administration maintain the narrative 
that its practices regarding detainees in the WOT were always legal and 
above reproach, despite evidence to the contrary. 
Shortly after September 11, Dick Cheney warned ominously that the 
U.S. would have to work “on the dark side” to eradicate terrorists; at the time, 
no one quite knew what that entailed.  (Gellman, 2008: 160)  Gradually the 
parameters of the New Paradigm for the war on terror began to emerge as 
program details were leaked and, as the panic of the original attack on 9/11 
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receded, Americans realized the Bush II administration was not afraid to 
reorder long-held legal positions.  For example, shortly after U.S. forces 
arrived in Afghanistan in October 2001 to remove the Taliban from power, the 
problem of where and how to detain prisoners emerged.  At the end of 
December, Rumsfeld announced that those captured in Afghanistan would be 
taken to Cuba where the U.S. had a military base. Guantanamo or GITMO 
soon became infamous as the camp where hundreds of detainees were held.   
The overwhelming evidence shows that the Bush II administration 
choose to establish a detention at GITMO because a small group of 
administration lawyers believed it was outside the jurisdiction of U.S. federal 
courts.  In a memo from Patrick Philbin and John Yoo to Jim Haynes dated 
December 28, 2001, the two OLC lawyers wrote, “federal courts lack 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by alien detainees held outside the 
sovereign territory of the United States.” (Greenberg & Dratel, 2005: 29) This 
was not a minor legal point for the Bush legal team; it meant that detainees 
would not be able to challenge their detentions with a habeas corpus petition.  
For many legal commentators, including Bruce Fein, lawyer in the Reagan 
administration, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus marks the 
emergence of executive power that is not bounded by law and unchecked by 
the legislature or judiciary.  (Fein Interview)  Fein was very adamant about the 
dangers of this happening in a democracy, and insistent that this is not 
compatible with the tenets of democracy. (Ibid) 
The Bush II administration’s establishment of the GITMO detention 
camp followed Koh’s pattern of executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance (although the judiciary eventually began 
222
to rule against the Bush II administration after lawyers for the detainees 
pressed cases).  The Bush White House claimed unilateral authority to detain 
men indefinitely due to increased executive powers during wartime.  In 
addition, it also used the Authorization for Use of Military Force to ague that 
Congress had given the President the power to detain combatants.  With both 
houses of Congress under Republican control from the midterm elections of 
2002 until the midterm elections of 2006, it is not surprising that Congress 
went along with the Republican executive’s agenda.  As explained in chapter 
3, individual members of Congress usually perceive nothing to gain, and much 
to lose, in objecting to the President’s agenda when that President is also their 
party’s leader.  As Savage noted, there is a “bipartisan history in which 
lawmakers from presidents’ own parties have tended not to object to 
invocations of executive power.”  (Savage, 2012)   
The judiciary, however, gradually began to disagree with some of the 
Bush II administration’s legal positions in the war on terror, but only when 
specific cases actually made it into a court for adjudication.  This took years.  
For example, in June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two rulings on the 
same day that began to curtail some aspects of the Bush II administration’s 
legal strategies.  In Rasul v. Bush (542 U.S. 466), the court ruled that U.S. 
courts did have the authority to hear habeas petitions from non-American 
detainees held in Guantanamo, despite the government’s claim that the 
detention of captured combatants fell “squarely within the President’s authority 
as Commander-in Chief” and thus fell outside of the court’s jurisdiction. 
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In the second case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507), the Supreme 
Court ruled that even though the government had the power to detain 
unlawful combatants, detainees who were U.S. citizens had to be given the 
ability to challenge their detention before an impartial judge.  Eight out of the 
nine judges agreed that the executive branch did not have the power to hold a 
U.S. citizen indefinitely without basic due process rights enforceable through 
judicial review. The Bush II administration struggled to enact military 
commissions that would assess the detainee’s imprisonment in a manner that 
was consistent with the U.S. Constitution and existing laws. The problem was 
the unwillingness of some in the administration to give full due process rights 
to detainees outside the U.S.  Advocates of the New Paradigm espoused a 
legal philosophy that, in essence, allowed the executive a great deal of leeway 
in fashioning detainee policy without any checks or balances from the other 
branches of government.  (Fein Interview) 
Two years later, in 2008, the Supreme Court issued another ruling that 
ran counter to the administration’s preferred legal reasoning; in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (548 U.S. 557) the court said the military commissions established 
by the administration to try detainees at Guantanamo violated both the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.  Once again, a 
majority of justices on the Supreme Court disagreed with the Bush II 
administration’s legal reasoning and ruled in favour of the Guantanamo 
detainees.  Predictably, the dissenting judges were Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
Roberts, and Alito, the last two having been appointed by George W. Bush.  
Over 21 amicus briefs were filed in support of the detainees’ rights while just 
four briefs supported the administration’s position.  This represents the 
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gradual evolution in the legal community about the administration’s rationale 
for holding detainees in Guantanamo; over time, more and more people came 
to question its legality and the failure to try captives in a fair and timely manner 
eroded the public’s trust in the Bush administration’s system.  The Obama 
administration’s handling of Guantanamo will be discussed in the chapter on 
the legacy of George W. Bush. 
This brief review of the Bush II administration’s New Paradigm on 
extraordinary rendition, ghost detainees, and the rights of other detainees 
reveals several important points about how this administration was different 
than previous administrations.  First, no previous administration had a vice 
president like Cheney who was intent on expanding executive power even 
before 9/11 and no previous vice president’s office employed so many like-
minded adherents to Cheney’s agenda.  Cheney and a small group allied with 
him consistently worked to implement the New Paradigm for the WOT.  
Although the Reagan administration declared a war against terrorism in the 
1980’s, it did not claim the President had authority as the Commander-in-Chief 
to take many of the “wartime” actions George W. Bush took, such as 
suspending the Geneva Conventions.  Moreover, international terrorism and 
the threat from al Qaeda were presented by the second Bush administration 
as a continuing crisis, directly threatening the national security of the U.S., as 
the Soviet Union once did.  The threats transformed into political instruments 
wielded by the Republican Party to question the Democrats’ commitment to 
U.S. national security.  This politicization of national security effectively 
silenced much dissent, so it was not surprising that the Republican controlled 
Congress did not conduct oversight of many of the activities of the executive 
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branch from 2002 to 2006, and the Democrats in Congress went along with 
the Bush II agenda.  Finally, the second Bush administration built on a 
foundation erected by the previous four administrations but close analysis of 
the details reveals it went further and set new precedents regarding the use of 
force. 
In his book, In My Time, Cheney discussed the need for “enhanced 
interrogation methods” on detainees who would not disclose vital intelligence.  
According to Cheney, “Since the beginning of the enhanced interrogation 
program, the CIA had briefed key members of Congress on the interrogations 
and on what they were learning.  I do not recall in any of the briefings I 
attended a single member objecting to the program or urging that we stop 
using these authorized, legal methods.”  (Cheney, 2011: 360)  Former officials 
in the second Bush administration sustain the narrative that the practices of 
the administration, although controversial, were legal but Congress has never 
fully investigated and publicly revealed all that transpired during the WOT.  It 
will be left to future historians who have access to all the currently classified 
information to assess the veracity of Cheney’s claims that the New Paradigm 
was entirely lawful. 
Afghanistan 
After the shock of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration quickly 
decided that a muscular, military response was necessary.  In his short 
address to the nation the evening of 9/11, George Bush did not mention 
Osama Bin Laden by name but he did give this as a reason for the attacks, 
“America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for 
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freedom and opportunity in the world.”  During the memorial service at the 
National Cathedral on September 14, Bush stated that America’s 
“responsibility” after the attacks was “to rid the world of evil,” a phrase that 
evokes images of Wilson’s call to make the world safe for democracy.  The 
President and his advisors soon began using the discourse of war to indicate 
how the U.S. would respond to the largest terrorist attack on American soil.  
According to one administration insider, the choice to proceed with the “war” 
paradigm instead of criminal law was self-evident because “if only the military 
has the capability to do what must be done, such as destroying enemy camps 
in Afghanistan, and it is sent to do it, then it is war.”  (Yoo, 2006: 10)  The 
Reagan administration talked of a “war” against terrorism (although it actually 
resorted to the use of force infrequently), but the Bush II administration was 
determined from the start to pursue a real war against al Qaeda and all other 
groups the administration deemed might threaten the security of the U.S.  The 
actual wisdom of this approach was not debated in Congress at the time 
although Congress is tasked with the responsibility of declaring war. 
As outlined in chapter 3, Congress has the power to declare war and to 
raise and fund the armed forces according to the U.S. Constitution.  Most 
scholars accept that the President has the power to repel sudden attacks 
against the U.S. and its armed forces, but agreement ends there.  What the 
Bush II administration did after 9/11 was enact an extreme agenda for the use 
of force that entailed little role for the Congress or the courts; this followed the 
pattern articulated by Koh of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, 
and judicial tolerance.   
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The U.S. intelligence community quickly identified bin Laden and the al 
Qaeda network as the perpetrators and within a week, Bush was meeting with 
his National Security Council at Camp David to plan the invasion of 
Afghanistan; it was September 15, 2001.  According to Rumsfeld’s memoir, 
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz “helped conceptualize the global war on terrorism 
as being broader than just Afghanistan.”  (Rumsfeld, 2011: 359)  The option of 
attacking Iraq was raised at the same meeting.  (Ibid)  It was evident that the 
President wanted to start with Afghanistan but was already contemplating 
military action against Iraq.  By September 17, President Bush was directing 
the Pentagon to begin planning for an invasion of Iraq and Wolfowitz was 
publicly discussing the odds that Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 9/11 
attacks, even though none of the counterterrorism experts in the 
administration could find a link between Hussein and 9/11.  (Bergen, 2011: 56)  
Much of the Bush II administration’s belief in Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 
attacks stemmed from Mylroie’s book entitled Study of Revenge: Saddam 
Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America that placed Hussein at the centre 
of most important sources of terrorism against the U.S.  The 
neoconservatives’ long quest to get rid of Saddam Hussein is discussed 
further in the section on Iraq. 
Less than one week after the attacks, the Bush II administration quickly 
worked out legislation with the leaders of Congress granting the administration 
authority to use military force against “those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
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the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”  (AUMF, 2001)  
Several things are notable about the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF 2001) including the speed with which it was passed in Congress; there 
were no committee hearings and only one representative voted against the 
legislation in the House.  The vote in the House was 420–1 and the vote in the 
Senate was 98-0.  The AUMF was the first time Congress authorized the 
President to use force against organizations or persons, and not only nations.  
Although the White House press office statement on the AUMF said the 
president was “gratified that Congress has united so powerfully by taking this 
action,” the administration’s legal team actually believed it was unnecessary 
because the “commander in chief already had the power on his own to decide 
whether to take the country to war over the attacks.” (Savage, 2007: 120)   
In addition, the AUMF was later cited by the Bush II administration for 
some questionable legal theories and practices; for example, the 
administration used the AUMF as justification for military commissions at 
GITMO, a claim rejected by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  In 
2006, the Court held in Hamdan that the military commissions established by 
the Bush II administration violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  The Bush II 
administration also claimed, after news reports of domestic wiretaps without 
warrants appeared in 2005, that the AUMF gave the National Security Agency 
the power to engage in domestic surveillance in violation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  As Cheney articulated it, the president 
“was granted authority by the Congress to use all means necessary to take on 
the terrorists, and that’s what we’ve done.”  Tom Daschle, Senate majority 
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leader when the AUMF was passed, wrote later that Congress never intended 
to grant the executive branch all the broad powers it later exercised, including 
the power to wiretap Americans without warrants, despite subsequent claims 
by the Bush II administration. (Daschle, 2005)  Although the domestic 
surveillance claim generated controversy, it has never been adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court.   
According to Donohue, the dynamic at work after a major terrorist 
attack in a democracy such as the U.S. or UK can best be described as a 
“spiral” (not a pendulum), meaning that public sentiment after an attack 
favours strong measures against terrorism and the executive branch, which is 
responsible for national security, seeks the broadest powers possible.  
(Donohue, 2008: 335 and Donohue Interview)   Congress, instead of acting as 
a check on executive power, enables the executive by passing strong 
counterterrorism measures and those who oppose the measures are labelled 
as “weak” on terrorists.  Later, those who advocate repealing strong 
counterterrorism measures bear the burden of proving that no political 
violence will follow repeal, or that some violence of this nature is acceptable.  
The legislature is the “crucial player” in this spiral for it has the ability to 
demand that the executive use all powers granted to it appropriately. (Ibid)  In 
addition, counterterrorist measures intended to apply only to political violence 
may be applied to other aspects of criminal law, thereby enlarging the reach of 
counterterrorism laws.  The passage of the AUMF in September 2001 (and 
the subsequent passage of the Patriot Act in October 2001) conforms to the 
“spiral” described by Donohue and illustrates the dangers of quick passage of 
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counterterrorism measures proposed by an executive eager to expand its 
authority. 
 In his speech to Congress on September 20, Bush once again 
emphasized that an act of war rather than an enormous act of terrorism had 
been committed, stating, “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom 
committed an act of war against our country.”  He also referenced the 
notorious ideologies of the 20th century, communism, fascism, and Nazism, 
and the role the U.S. played in helping to defeat them, thereby insinuating that 
al Qaeda was as great a threat to national security as these had been once.  
This would not be the only time that the administration conflated the threat 
from a transnational terrorist group with the threats once posed by Nazi 
Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union.  One Bush II administration 
lawyer noted that right after September 11, the administration decided 
without debate that the criminal justice system was not sufficient to handle 
the terrorist threat.  According to this insider, “There was a consensus that we 
had to move from retribution and punishment to preemption and prevention.  
Only a warfare model allows that approach.”  (Mayer, 2009: 64)  Thus, from 
the very beginning the Bush II administration clearly and consistently 
portrayed the 9/11 tragedy as warfare which eased public acceptance of its 
response, i.e. the use of military force and the announcement of a “war on 
terror.” 
Despite this announcement of a war on terror, at least two former 
members of the administration acknowledge that the word “war” was neither 
particularly accurate nor effective.  In interviews, both Paul Pillar and 
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Lawrence Wilkerson discussed a more nuanced view of the war versus crime 
dichotomy.  For instance, Pillar stated, “there is no benefit to the rhetoric of a 
war on terror.”  It creates “semantic confusion” and it “overemphasizes the 
military.”  (Pillar Interview)  For Pillar, former deputy chief of the 
counterterrorist center at the CIA, the “war versus crime talk is a lot of 
propaganda” because terrorism is both a crime and warlike. (Ibid)   
In another interview, Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Powell, 
explained that counterterrorism actions involving the military are not really a 
war, nor are they a “classic covert operation.”  Instead, they are something “in 
between,” a type of hybrid operation.  (Wilkerson Interview)  He added, “in 
essence, I’m saying that the military can be useful against terrorism, but it 
needs to be the last resort.”  (Ibid)  Both men indicated that using the military 
in counterterrorism had practical constraints such as the difficulty of finding 
appropriate targets and the possibility of collateral damage.  Nevertheless, the 
lawyers in Cheney’s office and at the OLC proceeded with an agenda for the 
WOT that stressed the laws of war, the methods of warfare, and maximized 
the administration’s options in pursuit of its war based on the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers.  
The Bush II administration took legal steps in September 2001 to lay 
the groundwork for a “war on terror” that would be fought without too much 
congressional oversight or public inquiry.  For example, John Yoo, a 
proponent of the unitary executive theory, wrote a secret memo dated 
September 25, 2001 on the president’s constitutional authority to conduct 
military operations against terrorists and nations supporting them.  Yoo cited 
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Reagan’s 1986 bombing of Libya and Clinton’s 1993 bombing of Iraqi 
Intelligence Headquarters and 1998 cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan and 
Sudan as support for the proposition that the president has broad unilateral 
authority to use force against terrorists. 
According to Yoo’s memo, “Military actions need not be limited to those 
individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution vests the President with the 
power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably 
linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar 
threat to the security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether 
at home or abroad.”  (Greenberg and Dratel, 2005: 3-24)  In a footnote, Yoo 
added that “in the exercise of his plenary power to use military force,” the 
president’s decisions were unreviewable, i.e. not subject to either 
congressional or judicial oversight.  (Ibid)  Yoo’s September 25, 2001 memo 
was kept secret until December 2004, after George W. Bush had been re-
elected to a second term.  Thus, the Bush II administration expanded 
presidential powers by secret memos that enabled the executive branch to 
determine on its own to use the American armed forces against any terrorist 
organization that posed a threat to the security of the U.S. without supervision 
or check by the other branches of the government.  
Another important legal document enacted in the autumn after 9/11 but 
not secret was the USA Patriot Act signed into law by President Bush on 
October 26, 2001.  In an effort to show bipartisan resolve in the face of 
international terrorism, Congress quickly passed the huge Patriot Act six 
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weeks after 9/11 with wide majorities, i.e. the Senate approved it by a vote of 
98 to 1, and the House approved it by 357 to 66 votes.  Like other 
counterterrorism laws enacted in democracies hit by a major terrorist attack, 
many of the sections of the Patriot Act contained sunset provisions.  In the 
case of the Patriot Act, the provisions were set to expire on December 31, 
2005.  In her study of U.S. and UK counterterrorism laws, Donohue evaluated 
the effectiveness of sunset provisions and noted that they foster an “illusion of 
control” over what the executive is doing, but they should be the option of last 
resort.  (Donohue, 2008: 338)  Instead, obligatory reporting requirements are 
better at safeguarding civil liberties and ensuring the executive is held 
accountable for the implementation and operation of its counterterrorism laws. 
(Ibid) 
The Patriot Act soon generated criticism from many different groups 
and came to symbolize lost civil liberties in the WOT.  The Bush II 
administration discovered that its reauthorization was more difficult than 
original passage but the White House finally succeeded in getting the 
Congress to reauthorize it on March 9, 2006.  The USA Patriot Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act contained sections requiring the Justice Department 
to make “regular and comprehensive reports to congressional oversight 
committees about how it was using its expanded powers.”  (Savage, 2007: 
229)  The irony was that after President Bush signed the bill, he issued a 
signing statement that substantially altered these reporting requirements.  
According to the signing statement, the president would construe the 
provisions of the bill that “call for furnishing information to entities outside the 
executive branch. . . . in a manner consistent with the President’s 
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constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to 
withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, 
national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.”  (President’s Statement, 
2006)  In other words, the President was not bound to obey the reporting 
requirements of the reauthorization bill.  Although several members of 
congress protested when this signing statement surfaced, nothing substantial 
was done to limit that power of the executive branch.   
Application of Force 
Al Qaeda, formed in 1988, announced its “war” against the U.S. on 
August 23, 1996 when bin Laden issued a public statement after he was 
expelled from Sudan.  It was entitled, “Declaration of war against the 
Americans occupying the land of the two holy places,” and in it bin Laden 
expressed his anger at the US for being expelled from Sudan. (Bergen, 2011: 
22)  Bin Laden and his followers were angered by the presence of U.S. troops 
in Saudi Arabia and found support among a population of young people in the 
Middle East who felt marginalized.  Very few Americans realized it in 1996, but 
al Qaeda considered itself at war with the world’s superpower and the 
reciprocal declaration of war by the Bush II administration after 9/11 must 
have been satisfying for bin Laden; at last the “far enemy” (the U.S.) he had 
been plotting against understood al Qaeda’s potential for inflicting damage 
and was treating the terrorist group as combatants.  Over the years, analysts 
have pondered whether according such treatment to al Qaeda was in the best 
interests of the U.S., as it elevated the group and bestowed on its members 
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the status of warriors, instead of mass murderers.  Moreover, as one security 
expert noted, al Qaeda “positively seeks increased confrontation as a means 
of greatly increasing support” for its goals.  (Rogers, 2004: 196) 
The use of force in Afghanistan was justified by article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which permits individual and collective self-defence; on September 
12, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 condemning the attacks 
as a threat to international peace and security.  On September 28, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which called on states to suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts and accelerate the exchange of information on 
the “threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by 
terrorist groups.”  After the attacks of 9/11, the international consensus 
permitted a strong American response and given the pre-existing foreign 
policy orientation of the Bush II administration, no one was surprised when the 
U.S. resorted to force against the Taliban regime.  The original war plan relied 
on a CIA strategy of mobilizing local militias comprised of many Uzbek and 
Tajik fighters who opposed the ultra-religious Taliban.  The plan called for a 
light U.S. footprint in the first insertion of American troops in the war on terror.   
The Bush II administration began its campaign against the Taliban 
government at the end of September 2001 when a small team of CIA officers 
arrived in the country; shortly thereafter, on October 7, the U.S. began 
bombing.  The plan for eliminating the Taliban entailed the use of American 
Special Forces to locate targets, strategic bombers to destroy Taliban 
facilities, and an alliance with local anti-Taliban militias known as the Northern 
Alliance.  (Rogers, 2008: 163)  There was a rapid advance on Afghan cities 
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and the Taliban left Kabul on December 7.  Taliban fighters melted into the 
landscape rather than risk making a stand and being destroyed by the 
conventional American forces.  As a result of this tactic, the U.S. was unable 
to capture many Taliban leaders because they escaped through the porous 
border into Pakistan.  For instance, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the reclusive 
Afghan Taliban leader, has never been captured despite a large and intensive 
manhunt.  The U.S. was successful, however, in killing al Qaeda’s military 
commander, Mohammed Atef, in the first weeks of November 2001 by 
sending an armed drone to destroy the safe house where Atef was hiding.  As 
the war on terrorism progressed and al Qaeda and Taliban members melted 
into the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. began to use 
more armed drones to kill those suspected of terrorist activity. 
In December 2001, Osama bin Laden escaped at the Battle of Tora 
Bora; according to Bergen, this was “the last, best chance to capture bin 
Laden and his top deputies.”  (Bergen, 2011: 79)  The battle, from December 
12 to 17, illustrated the less effective elements of the American strategy of 
maintaining a small presence in Afghanistan.  The Pentagon was reluctant to 
send more ground troops into the battle in the mountains of Tora Bora 
because of several factors: fear of repeating the mistakes of the Soviet army 
when it occupied Afghanistan in the 1980’s, an unwillingness to incur more 
American casualties, and the difficulty of fighting in the mountainous terrain in 
the winter.  The U.S. was relying on the local Afghan warlords and their 
militias, along with the Pakistani army on the other side of the border, to seal 
the Afghan-Pakistan border.  The failure to send in more US ground troops 
meant that bin Laden and other influential members of al Qaeda and the 
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Taliban fled into Pakistan and were able to begin rebuilding the network.  
Many of those captured and taken into U.S. custody at GITMO were low-level 
fighters, not the leadership.  (Rogers, 2004: 101)  The Bush II administration 
appeared almost as reluctant to risk American lives in combat as the Clinton 
administration had been in humanitarian missions.  
Despite the failure to capture bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the U.S. 
strategy in Afghanistan appeared in early 2002 as a huge success, particularly 
when compared with the long Soviet experience in the same country.  The 
Taliban were routed by “little more than 100 CIA agents and 300 special 
forces troops.”  (Murden, 2009: 87)  The number of Afghan civilians killed is 
unknown but estimated at over 1,000 with only two U.S. forces killed by 
January 2002.  The model used by the Pentagon and CIA in Afghanistan 
seemed to ensure swift success with minimal losses and it acerbated the 
trend in the Bush II administration to move on to other issues and states in the 
WOT, i.e. regime change in Iraq.  Close examination of the historical record 
reveals the administration moved human resources and material into the war 
in Iraq without ensuring that stability and development projects in Afghanistan 
were completed.  
A familiar pattern began to emerge in the first months of the U.S. 
occupation of Afghanistan, a pattern described by Bush himself during a 
speech in April 2002.  Bush spoke of the “history of military conflict in 
Afghanistan.  It’s been one of initial success, followed by long years of 
floundering and ultimate failure.  We’re not going to repeat that mistake.”  
Bush realized that the Afghans had been neglected in previous 
administrations, including his father’s, after the Soviets left in 1989 and 
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American attention turned to more compelling problems.  (Coll, 2004)  
Although the younger Bush depreciated the value of “nation building” during 
the election campaign against Gore, he now promised to do just that after the 
US ousted the Taliban.  Despite his pledge to enact a new “Marshall Plan” for 
Afghanistan, the U.S. did not commit significant resources to the country; by 
2007, the U.S. spent an “average of $3.4 billion a year reconstructing 
Afghanistan, less than half of what it spent in Iraq.”  In addition, in 2002 the 
U.S. did not want other states to send security forces so the 4,000 men in the 
international peacekeeping force (ISAF) stayed in Kabul while the U.S. force 
of 8,000 was intended to hunt Taliban and al Qaeda, not engage in 
peacekeeping or reconstruction.  Thus, the original U.S. counterterrorist plan 
for Afghanistan, in spite of rhetoric calling for a new “Marshall Plan,” centred 
on killing or capturing the remaining al Qaeda and Taliban forces. 
Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader, was chosen as the interim head of 
Afghanistan on December 22, 2001 in Bonn at an international conference 
organized to establish a political framework for the country.  In June 2002, a 
tribal loya jirgah selected Karzai as interim president and two years later, in 
January 2004, another loya jirgah approved a new constitution and parliament 
for Afghanistan.  (Murden, 2009: 90) When Karzai won the elections for 
president in September 2004 with 55.4 percent of the vote, it appeared that 
the transition to democratic and liberal political institutions was well underway.  
However, the reality was less certain as the appearance of democratic 
institutions disguised the “continuance of older and deeper governance 
structures.” (Murden, 2009: 91)  One recurring problem for Afghanistan was 
warlordism, which thrived in the countryside due to a weak government in 
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Kabul and with a security vacuum outside the main capital, warlords, drug 
smugglers, and remnants of the Taliban were slowly able to re-emerge.  The 
Afghan National Army and police were gradually trained to enhance security 
but without adequate supervision, some of these forces engaged in corruption 
and opium smuggling. 
By March of 2003, the Bush II administration turned American attention 
to the invasion of Iraq. The situation in Afghanistan continued to drift 
backwards towards warlordism, while foreign aid trickled in, and foreign aid 
workers struggled with reconstruction and development.  According to several 
accounts, more resources and trained personnel were earmarked for use in 
Iraq than Afghanistan after “Operation Iraqi Freedom” began.  (Bergen, 2011)  
American aid to Afghanistan dropped to $3.1 billion in 2006 at the same time 
that violence against aid workers increased.  In July of 2006, responsibility for 
security was given to NATO although the U.S. and NATO disagreed over 
strategy; the Americans wanted more emphasis on confronting the remaining 
Taliban while NATO countries faulted the U.S. for its insufficient reconstruction 
efforts.  The uncertainty regarding the chain of command in Afghanistan 
hindered effective action and was not resolved until the summer of 2008 when 
General David McKiernan became commander of all U.S. and NATO forces.   
(Bergen, 2011: 190) 
In addition to the lack of adequate resources for reconstruction and 
development, there were other factors behind Afghanistan’s slide towards 
lawlessness and warlordism.  One of the most significant was Pakistan’s role 
as regional power broker and its long relationship with the Taliban.  The 
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complicated relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is marked by mutual 
distrust and concern over nuclear proliferation; since Pakistan first tested a 
nuclear weapon in May 1998, the U.S. and India have watched warily as 
Pakistan increased its nuclear stockpile.  When General Pervez Musharraf led 
a coup in October 1999 that deposed the civilian government, the Clinton 
administration advocated a return to civilian rule and distanced itself from the 
Musharraf regime.  Pakistan was one of the few supporters of the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 but the attacks radically altered the 
security equation for Pakistan and the U.S.  George W. Bush and his advisors 
were adamant that support for the Taliban would not be tolerated by the U.S, 
so Musharraf became an American ally in the WOT.  Thereafter, Bush spoke 
of Musharraf and his regime as “friends” and Pakistan was rewarded with a 
huge increase in American aid.  However, it is an enduring irony of the Bush II 
administration’s war on terror that the U.S. has been using force in the form of 
armed drones to target insurgents inside the territory of its avowed ally, 
Pakistan.  (The drone war is described more fully in the section on drones.) 
Despite the official designation of Pakistan as an ally in the WOT, many 
American analysts question whether the Pakistan military and the ISI (the 
Pakistani Intelligence Service) in particular, have done as much as possible to 
track down Taliban and al Qaeda militants hiding in the Federally 
Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.  Bergen depicts a U.S. military 
official as using the term “schizophrenic” to describe Pakistani cooperation in 
the WOT in that sometimes the Pakistani military gave the U.S. invaluable 
information to track down al Qaeda leaders.  At other times, there is 
substantial evidence that some Pakistani officials “tolerate and/or maintain 
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links with certain Taliban leaders.”  (Bergen, 2011: 186)  In examining the 
Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld noted in his book, ‘The central 
problem was the sanctuary Pakistan provided for the insurgents.”  (Rumsfeld, 
2011: 688)  The mainly Pashtun Taliban went to religious schools in 
Afghanistan and have substantial ties to the Pakistani military.  The border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan has never been completely sealed and 
Islamabad has never completely controlled the FATA, enabling both al Qaeda 
and Taliban militants to move across with weapons and other aid.  By using 
the tribal areas in Pakistan as a place to hide and regroup, the Taliban were 
able to filter back into Afghanistan to mount campaigns against the U.S. and 
NATO forces.  
As the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, some analysts 
began to speak of an “insurgency” in the countryside and to advocate 
adapting tactics more appropriate to asymmetrical warfare; counterinsurgency 
or COIN tactics became popular.  The Taliban and al Qaeda, cognizant that 
striking the American and NATO forces in a direct, conventional manner was 
unlikely to succeed, applied the time-honoured tactics of insurgents.  The 
“American way of war” against them was counterproductive when it involved 
an aggressive, offensive style in combat, a focus on firepower, and an 
emphasis on technology.  Specifically, the American military’s heavy reliance 
on firepower tended to cause civilian deaths and increased resentment 
against the U.S. and its allies, while the emphasis on technology meant 
American troops were not in close contact with the local populations and were 
thus unable to distinguish between friend and foe.  Initially grateful for the 
overthrow of the ultra-strict Taliban, many civilians in Afghanistan gradually 
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started to resent the occupation of the country by foreign troops who appeared 
to use excessive force indiscriminately.   
In an effort to adapt to the realities of insurgents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Pentagon evaluated the work of an Australian army officer, 
Dr. David Kilcullen.  Kilcullen, Chief Strategist in the US Department of State 
in the office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 2005-2006, wrote 
extensively on the notion of a global insurgency that required new tactics.  
One of his influential papers, Countering Global Insurgency, argued that a 
new strategic approach to the WOT was necessary.  In addition, he 
conceptualized the WOT “as a global insurgency, initiated by a diffuse 
grouping of Islamist movements that seek to re-make Islam’s role in the world 
order.  They use terrorism as their primary, but not their sole tactic.”  
(Kilcullen, 2005)  The best method of defeating this global jihad was therefore 
“counterinsurgency rather than traditional counterterrorism.” (Ibid.)  Kilcullen’s 
counterinsurgency concepts made increasing sense to some members of the 
Bush II administration who witnessed the initial conventional military victories 
in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorate into small-scale warfare.  At the end of 
2006, Kilcullen was seconded to work on specialized aspects of the 
counterinsurgency program with General David Petraeus’ staff.  Petraeus had 
been the commanding officer in Mosel, Iraq in 2003 and his success at COIN, 
by focusing on protecting the civilian population, starting public works projects, 
using minimal force, and enhancing security, made him stand out among the 
occupation troops in Iraq.  By 2006 most of the U.S. army was trying to apply 
Petraeus’ approach to the rest of Iraq in an effort to suppress the insurgency 
there.  The U.S. experience with counterinsurgencies in Vietnam remains a 
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particularly bitter one so there was resistance to using counterinsurgency 
strategies in the WOT.  However, events on the ground in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq required the Pentagon to rethink its initial analysis and adapt. 
According to the field guide on counterinsurgency written by General 
David Petraeus, “a counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, 
defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of 
operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar 
combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The 
balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance 
is not easy.”  Kilcullen wrote one of the chapters in the field manual that 
discussed concrete steps for the U.S. military; he noted, “counterinsurgency is 
a competition to mobilize popular support,” so it was incumbent upon the U.S. 
to know the opinion makers in the countryside and to solicit their support.  In 
addition, Kilcullen wrote that COIN operations “can be characterized as armed 
social work” and they include “attempts to redress basic social and political 
problems while being shot at.”   This was clearly a long way from the “shock 
and awe” tactics that captivated American TV viewers as the Iraq invasion 
began in 2003. 
As George W. Bush left office in January 2009, the conflict in 
Afghanistan continued; during his tenure, more than 630 American military 
forces died and more than 1,049 coalition troops died while the number of 
Afghan civilian killed is estimated in the thousands.  The number of 
combatants in Afghanistan increased from a small contingent of special 
operation and CIA forces in the autumn of 2001 into much larger force of 
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36,000 American and 32,000 coalition troops by the start of 2009.  President 
Obama has augmented the forces so that by 2011, there were 100,000 U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan.  More fundamentally, the mission of the forces 
transformed from a kinetic, targeted effort to apprehend al Qaeda and remove 
the Taliban to an occupation force attempting to apply the counterinsurgency 
doctrines articulated by Petraeus and Kilcullen.  The goal of a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign was complicated by various reports of accidental 
civilian deaths and troop misconduct.  An egregious example occurred in 2010 
when five U.S. soldiers from an Army Stryker brigade were charged with 
deliberately killing Afghan civilians for sport.  The leader of the so-called “kill 
team,” Staff Sergeant Gibbs, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in 
prison. Other examples of unlawful civilian deaths complicated the 
counterinsurgency campaign and bolstered the Taliban’s narrative. 
Whether the cost to the U.S. and its coalition partners in terms of blood 
and treasure was worthwhile, particularly in light of the current economic 
recession, is controversial.  Despite George Bush’s pledge, Afghanistan 
remains a very impoverished country with ingrained problems of governance, 
stability, and security.  Neglecting the Afghans does not appear to be an 
attractive option for the U.S. due to the possibility of Taliban resurgence and 
the dilemma posed by nuclear Pakistan.  Although officially an ally of the U.S., 
Pakistan remains the source of much insurgent activity in the FATA and 
therefore, the American government believes it has the right, under article 51 
of the UN Charter, to use force in Pakistan as a measure of self-defence.  An 
overall assessment of the efficacy of the use of force to prevent terrorism in 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan follows in chapter 8.  The next section examines 
how the Bush II administration extended its war on terror to Iraq. 
Build-up to the War in Iraq 
In sharp contrast to the use of force in Afghanistan, which was 
precipitated by the 9/11 terror attacks, the use of force in Iraq was the 
culmination of a series of policy choices and a public relations campaign 
designed to convince the public that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat.  
As discussed below, prominent neo-conservatives were the ideological force 
behind the campaign, which began long before George W. Bush became 
president.  By the time he gave a speech on national security to the graduates 
at West Point in June 2002, the war in Afghanistan looked like a mopping up 
operation and the neoconservatives in the Bush II administration were ready 
to eradicate other threats to American security.  Years before Bush took office, 
they had decided that Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was an unacceptable 
threat to U.S. and Middle East security and the “war on terror” discourse that 
engulfed Washington policy-makers after 9/11 gave them the opportunity to 
enact their agenda.  This section will examine the neo-conservative worldview 
and how it influenced the decision-making process in the build-up to the war in 
Iraq.  It is clear from a close examination of the facts that without the 
significant input of the neo-conservatives and their allies within the Bush II 
administration, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have been unlikely. 
Contemporary neo-conservatism contains strong elements of 
“Wilsonian ambition to spread democracy,” coupled with an “emphasis on 
military power, exporting democracy and unilateralism.”  (Ritchie and Rogers, 
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2007: 143)  Proponents of the neo-conservative worldview focused their 
attention on the Middle East which they theorized was best-suited to the 
spread of democracy; Iraq was viewed as the ideal place where democratic 
institutions and a free market economy could flourish as soon as the 
repressive, autocratic regime of Saddam Hussein was replaced.  In addition, 
many neo-conservatives vigorously supported Israel as the best functioning 
democracy in the Middle East.  Two related tenets of neo-conservative 
thought are important regarding the invasion of Iraq: the belief in American 
exceptionalism, and the notion that, unlike other counties in the past, the U.S. 
lacks imperial ambitions so a “benevolent imperium” based on American 
values would actually benefit the world community.  (Ritchie and Rogers, 
2007: 144)  As a result of the neo-conservative influence in the Bush II 
administration, participation in multilateral institutions such as the UN was 
downplayed while the U.S. military was perceived as the most important tool 
of foreign policy.     
During the Clinton administration, the neo-conservatives largely 
retreated to academia and the conservative think tanks of Washington, DC 
(for example, the American enterprise Institute and Project for a New 
American Century) where they continued to write and publicize their 
worldviews and preferred policies.  They were critical of Clinton’s preference 
for multilateral solutions and willingness to seek global consensus, which was 
viewed as indecisiveness or weakness.  Clinton’s policies of continued 
sanctions along with containment of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq were 
criticized as ineffective and throughout the 1990’s the neo-conservatives 
advocated regime change as the best course of action to secure American 
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interests.  Regime change in Iraq became official policy of the U.S. after 
Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act by wide margins in 1998.  The 
Senate approved it by unanimous consent and the vote in the House was 360 
to 38.  (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007: 41)  When Clinton signed the bill into law at 
the end of October 1998, it signalled that his Democratic administration and 
the Republican Congress agreed on the policy goal of regime change in Iraq.  
The next question was how regime change should happen.  For neo-
conservatives, the way forward was simple: provide military support to the 
Iraqi opposition; Paul Wolfowitz, for instance, told the House of 
Representatives that if the Clinton administration could “muster the necessary 
strength of purpose,” Saddam Hussein would be defeated.  (Ritchie and 
Rogers, 2007: 48)  For Clinton and his foreign policy advisors, including 
Madeleine Albright, the situation was more complex and required more 
nuanced policies than merely arming the Iraqi opposition to achieve regime 
change in Baghdad.  
In an interview, Lawrence Wilkerson discussed how the Middle East 
has presented the U.S. with security dilemmas since at least 1979 when the 
Shah of Iran was deposed.  He noted how the Iraq Liberation Act became law 
due to the combined efforts of the Republican controlled Congress and the 
Democratic administration of Clinton in 1998.  According to Wilkerson, it took 
years of careful work and consistent campaigning by the neo-conservatives to 
ensure the Iraqi regime was perceived as a continuing and serious threat to 
the U.S. after the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War in 1991.  Reflecting on the 
contemporary situation with Iran, Wilkerson maintained that there were some 
in Congress working on an “Iran Liberation Act” that would make regime 
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change in Iran the goal of the U.S.  (Wilkerson Interview)  He cautioned 
against underestimating the neo-conservatives because of the following three 
characteristics: they have a “strategy,” they are “ruthless in pursuing the 
strategy,” and they are “experts at bureaucratic politics.”  (Ibid)     
In January of 1998, the Project for New American Century (PNAC), a 
neo-conservative think-tank, sent a letter to Clinton urging the president to 
remove Saddam Hussein because “current American policy toward Iraq is not 
succeeding.”  The signatories noted that Iraq threatened American security 
and the security of American allies with WMD and they advocated, “a 
willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing.”  By 
March of 2003, eleven of the signatories of the letter held positions in the 
Bush II administration, including John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul 
Wolfowitz.  In December 1998, Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox against 
the Hussein regime; the cruise missiles were intended to force Iraqi 
compliance with the UN weapons inspection regime.  The UN weapons 
inspectors withdrew from Iraq shortly before the bombing began and did not 
return until November 2002, after Security Council Resolution 1441 was 
adopted.  The neo-conservatives were never satisfied that the Clinton 
administration was implementing an effective, tough policy against Iraq, one 
that would result in regime change.  When George W. Bush became president 
in January 2001, many of the same neo-conservatives who had criticized 
Clinton’s perceived weaknesses joined the new Bush administration in 
positions at the State Department or Department of Defense, ready to enact a 
tougher line against Saddam Hussein. 
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As detailed in the section on Afghanistan, immediately after the terror 
attacks of 9/11, some in the Bush II administration and their allies suggested 
links between the attacks and Iraq.  Laurie Mylroie, the author of Study of 
Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America, wrote an op-
ed for the Wall Street Journal just two days after 9/11 in which she cast doubt 
on whether al Qaeda had acted without state support.  According to Mylroie, 
“It does not make a great deal of sense to attribute to one man--Osama bin 
Laden--all the acts of terrorism which are regularly ascribed to him, including 
Tuesday's assault. It is time to take a new look at the major terrorists acts of 
terrorism directed against the U.S. in recent years. Are they, perhaps, more 
complicated than they seem? Indeed, are they acts of war, with all the 
complexity that wartime activities regularly involve?”  (Mylroie, 2001)  Thus, 
within days of 9/11, the discourse on terrorism as war instead of criminal 
behaviour, and the linkages between Saddam Hussein and support for 
international terrorism appeared in American newspapers and in the Bush II 
administration agendas.  Moreover, the president’s need to be perceived by 
the American electorate as responding strongly to terrorism coincided with the 
“neo-conservatives’ long-desired goal of regime change in Baghdad.” (Halper 
and Clarke, 2004: 205) 
 Within the Bush administration, a more muscular response to 
international threats was evolving as Bush’s national security team, Rice, 
Powell, Rumsfeld, and Cheney, in particular, moved away from a security 
paradigm that placed major states such as China and Russia as the 
preeminent threats.  In a Foreign Affairs article in 2000, Dr. Rice barely 
mentioned terrorism and to the extent she addressed it, it was in the context of 
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state sponsors of terror.  (Rice, 2000)  The possibility of a non-state terrorist 
network threatening the world’s superpower with a large-scale attack like the 
9/11 tragedy does not appear in her written work.  Her performance as Bush’s 
first national security advisor has been criticized by several analysts including 
one who wrote, “Rice has never really had the authority within the 
administration that a national security adviser should.  Before September 11, 
she allowed Rumsfeld and other hawkish officials to make missile defense 
and the dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty priorities.”  (Kurlantzick, 
2004: 19)  Her inability to mediate among competing views and then enforce 
the President’s decision on a foreign policy issue resulted in strong 
personalities like Rumsfeld pursuing their own preferred policies. 
Cheney organized his own national security advisors, many of whom 
were neo-conservatives and had served previously in government so they 
knew how to get their preferred policy enacted.  Cheney’s influence and 
powerful staff were discussed in a preceding section.  In addition, Cheney and 
Rumsfeld had a long history of working together, beginning in the Ford 
administration, and they shared the same type of assertive nationalist 
worldview.  At the CIA, Tenet was a holdover from the Clinton administration, 
but he depended upon George W. Bush’s continued confidence to stay at his 
position, and, after the surprise attack of 9/11, sought to redeem himself and 
his agency.  
At the State Department, Powell was neither a neo-conservative nor 
convinced that a stronger sanctions regime applied more consistently against 
Iraq would not work.  According to Powell’s chief of staff, Wilkerson, Powell 
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was hesitant to use force against Saddam Hussein again (recalling the 
difficulties in achieving political objectives after the first Gulf War) and 
presented a strategy for the war on terror that incorporated diplomacy and law 
enforcement, along with the military.  (Wilkerson Interview)  The goal was to 
decrease terrorism to manageable levels and build resilience in case of 
another attack.  (Ibid)  In Wilkerson’s opinion, President Bush did not use 
Powell’s ideas “because of Rumsfeld.” (Ibid)  Rumsfeld was opportunistic and 
the “politics of fear” played into his hands to ensure his preferred policy 
options, including the use of force in Iraq, became the President’s preferred 
policy outcomes. 
According to Paul Pillar, the decision by the Bush II administration to 
remove Saddam Hussein was driven not by the intelligence on WMD in Iraq, 
but by “other factors,” such as “the desire to shake up the sclerotic power 
structures of the Middle East and hasten the spread of more liberal politics 
and economics in the region.”  (Pillar, 2006: 11)  In an article in Foreign 
Affairs, Pillar argued that the administration “used intelligence not to inform 
decision-making, but to justify a decision already made.”  (Ibid)  He notes that 
in October 2002, Congress, not the executive branch, requested a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons programs but “no more than six 
senators and only a handful of House members got beyond the five-page 
executive summary” of the classified document.  (Ibid)  According to President 
Bush’s press secretary, the President himself selectively declassified the NIE 
so that the Vice President and Scooter Libby could leak information on Iraq’s 
WMD program to the press.  Parts of the 2002 NIE discuss “key judgments” 
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about WMD in Iraq and the level of confidence that the intelligence agencies 
have in their assessment.  Listed under “low confidence” are the following: 
• When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
• Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against 
the US Homeland. 
• Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or 
biological weapons with al-Qa’ida. 
Pillar detailed how the Bush II administration used its preferred policy 
option of removing Saddam Hussein to drive the intelligence on WMD, and to 
aggressively “win public support for its decision to go to war.”  In Pillar’s 
analysis, the greatest discrepancy between the administration’s public 
statements and the intelligence community’s assessments regarded “the 
relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda,” which was exaggerated to draw 
upon the public’s fears of more terrorist attacks. 
  
Pillar’s explanations regarding pre-war intelligence on Iraq strike at the 
nerve in the centre of a controversy that has boiled since the failure to find 
WMD led people to examine the causes of the war.  Members and supporters 
of the Bush II administration blame the pre-war intelligence estimates, and 
point out that much of the intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein and WMD 
was wrong.  Opponents claim a close examination of the facts reveals that the 
administration manipulated the intelligence to hype the threat from Iraq, 
exaggerate contacts between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and frighten 
the American public into supporting the invasion in 2003.  After examining the 
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intelligence preceding the Iraq war, Phythian concluded, “there were two 
mutually reinforcing sets of failure with regard to Iraq’s WMD.  One was a 
policy failure, the other an intelligence failure.”  (Phythian, 2006: 420)   
Several reports after the war such as the President’s Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Robb-Silberman commission) and the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence report entitled U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq are critical of the U.S. intelligence 
community for overstating the evidence of Iraqi WMD.  (Ritchie and Rogers, 
2007: 131)  Yet another report, this one done by the Minority Staff of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative 
Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-al-Qaida Relationship, claims the pre-war 
intelligence was exaggerated by Douglas Feith at the Pentagon in an effort to 
bolster support for the administration’s policy. (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007: 132)  
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine which report is most 
accurate.  The proliferation of post-war reports analyzing the pre-war 
intelligence indicates that there is consensus that something went terribly 
wrong with the intelligence on Iraq. 
2002 Speeches advocating the Use of Force 
The articulation of a neo-conservative agenda to secure domestic, if not 
international, support for the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime 
can be chartered by examining key speeches made by President Bush and 
Vice President Cheney throughout 2002.  The first key speech was Bush’s 
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January 29, 2002 State of the Union address to both houses of Congress in 
which he used the expression “axis of evil” to describe Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea.  Arguing that these regimes were arming themselves with WMD, Bush 
noted that time was not on America’s side.  He then continued, “I will not wait 
on events, while dangers gather.  I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and 
closer.  The United States of America will not permit the world’s most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”  
(Bush, 2002a))  In the same speech, Bush praised the leadership of President 
Musharraf in Pakistan for “cracking down on terror.” (Ibid)  The disconnect 
between praise of Musharraf’s undemocratic rule in nuclear-armed Pakistan 
and the dire warnings about hostile regimes with WMD did not disturb Bush’s 
speechwriter.  Throughout Bush’s first term, he continued to praise Musharraf 
for help in the WOT while ignoring many of the undemocratic aspects of 
Musharraf’s regime.  The “axis of evil” speech marked the beginning of the 
promotion of the Bush doctrine of preemption.  
 On June 1, 2002, President Bush gave a speech to the graduating 
cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point; this was another 
opportunity to refine the Bush doctrine and put forth the arguments for 
preemptive action in the war on terror.  Bush contrasted the situation 
prevailing during the Cold War, when the nuclear-armed superpowers 
struggled for dominance and the concepts of containment and deterrence kept 
the conflict manageable, with contemporary international threats.  Bush noted 
“shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend” were not 
amenable to containment and deterrence.  (Bush, 2002)  Giving the rationale 
for preemption, Bush continued, “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we 
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will have waited too long.”  (Ibid)  He called on the cadets and all Americans to 
be ready for “preemptive action” and described the conflict as one “between 
good and evil.” (Ibid)  This speech incorporated the administration’s security 
strategies with its doctrine of preemption.  It also emphasized the 
administration’s stark notions about good and evil, with the underlying 
implication that compromise, even negotiation, with evil was impossible.  
Finally, it was clear that the administration categorized Iraq as the next target 
in the WOT. 
During the same period that President Bush was articulating the 
contours of the Bush doctrine, Vice President Cheney was warning Americans 
about the dangers of WMD in the hands of dictators, specifically, Saddam 
Hussein.  At the end of August in 2002, Cheney appeared at the Nashville 
convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and began hammering 
home the message that regime change in Iraq was not merely beneficial to the 
U.S, it was essential to its security.  In Cheney’s words, “Deliverable weapons 
of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, 
or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined.  
The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.”  (Cheney, 2002)  
He went on to dispute the critics’ appraisals that regime change in Iraq could 
unleash anarchy or more tension in the Middle East.  According to Cheney, 
“Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region.  
When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the 
region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace.”  
(Ibid)  The Bush II administration consistently tied two elements together that 
autumn in the discourse on Iraq: spokespeople always insinuated an 
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operational link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and WMD; and they 
always extolled the benefits to the greater Middle East of regime change in 
Iraq. 
National Security Strategy 2002 
In September 2002, the Bush II administration released its National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the shift from deterrence to preemption was 
formalized in this document.  According to Halper and Clarke, the NSS of 
2002 was the first time that any U.S. President “set out a formal national 
strategy doctrine that included preemption.”  (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 142)  
The NSS bore some resemblance to an earlier document called the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG) which was written in 1992 for then Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney by some well-known neo-conservatives such as Paul 
Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad (who joined the Bush II National Security 
Council), and I. Scooter Libby (who became Cheney’s chief of staff).  When 
the draft DPG was leaked to the New York Times and Washington Post, it 
created a controversy as it incorporated many neo-conservative concepts for 
retaining U.S. power, including preventing the emergence of any new rival 
powers, establishing a new order dominated by the U.S, and maintaining this 
new order with ad hoc coalitions.  (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007: 147)  Early in 
1992, the notion of the U.S. as a “benevolent global hegemon” as depicted in 
the DPG was badly received by the American public and members of 
congress and the first Bush administration subsequently “issued a revised, 
less provocative version.”  (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 145)  The importance of 
the draft DPG is that it illustrates the tenacity of the neo-conservatives who 
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used their time outside of government after Clinton’s election to refine their 
strategies for U.S. dominance and, ten years after the DPG, capitalized on the 
opportunity presented by George W. Bush to formalize the doctrine of 
preemption in the NSS of 2002. 
The NSS of 2002 drew various criticisms on several levels, including its 
use of the concept of “preemption” which was broadened in the document to 
encompass prevention.  Prevention, the use of force against adversaries 
without specific evidence of an imminent attack, was a bold assertion of power 
by the Bush II administration, and drew on the influence of neo-conservative 
ideology.  Clinton’s preference for multilateralism in resolving international 
problems was absent from the NSS of 2002.   Preempting attacks by terrorist 
networks and rogue states was put forth in the NSS as part of a necessary 
element of U.S. security, but critics noted that conflating terrorists and rogue 
states was counterproductive as certain tools of statecraft (economic 
sanctions and diplomacy, for example) might work on the latter but not the 
former.  Furthermore, the articulation of a right to preemption might work 
against U.S. interests if other states claimed the same right in their security 
strategies.  (O’Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg, 2002: 1)  Overall, the NSS 
embraced the strategic thinking advocated by the neo-conservatives and 
promised a more robust assertion of U.S. power in order to spread American 
values all over the world.  In short, the NSS was “an unabashed manifestation 
of well-documented neo-conservative thought.”  (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 
146) 
258
The Role of Congress 
The importance of the context of the vote in Congress regarding the 
decision to invade Iraq needs to be highlighted to appreciate the role of timing.  
In the autumn of 2002, several key events occurred, including the release of 
the NSS in September and mid-term elections in November.  The mid-term 
elections were the first congressional elections after the 9/11 attacks and the 
impact of a large-scale terrorist act on the electorate was unknown.  In 
addition, traditionally, the president’s party tends to lose seats in Congress 
after the mid-term elections, probably due to the electorate’s disenchantment 
with the administration.  President Bush and the Republican Party 
campaigned strenuously during the autumn of 2002, reminding voters of the 
need for a strong national security posture and implying that the Republicans 
were best able to provide that while keeping the focus on foreign, not 
domestic, issues.  Moreover, the last Gallup poll before the election revealed 
that 63% of the American electorate approved of President Bush’s 
performance as President.  The November 5 elections resulted in Republican 
gains in the House of Representatives by eight seats.  In the Senate, the 
balance of 50 Democrats (including one Democratic-leaning Independent) and 
50 Republicans ended with the election of two Republicans, which gave the 
Republicans control of the Senate.  Thus, after the mid-term elections of 2002, 
the Republican Party controlled both the executive branch and the legislative 
branch and the likelihood of more oversight of the war on terror diminished. 
Less than one month prior to the elections, the House and Senate 
debated the Bush II administration’s proposal for authorization to use military 
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force against Iraq.  This debate contrasted sharply with the situation prevailing 
during the first Gulf War, when the first President Bush did not push Congress 
to vote on authorizing force against Iraq after Iraq invaded Kuwait.  In fact, the 
first President Bush maintained that he did not need authorization from 
Congress to commit U.S. troops to war against Iraq but asked Congress 
anyway, as a curtsey to the institution.  That vote took place well after the 
November elections, on January 14, 1991.  In 2002, the younger President 
Bush and his administration exhorted members of Congress to vote before the 
mid-term elections as the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was depicted as 
imminent and growing.  The proximity of the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 mid-
term elections infuenced the debate in Congress on whether the U.S. should 
use military force against Iraq and forms the background to the following 
discussion on the congressional debate.  Another important step in the 
process of moving towards war with Iraq was President Bush’s address to the 
UN on September 12, 2002, discussed below. 
The House of Representatives began serious consideration of the Bush 
II administration’s proposal for an Iraq war authorization on October 2, 2002.   
The administration argued that the President had a greater chance of securing 
“a tough UN resolution against Iraq” if there was bi-partisan support from 
Congress for the use of military force against the Hussein regime.  (Ritchie 
and Rogers, 2007: 118) The next day, October 3, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), pursuant to an order from the House Committee on International 
Relations, issued a cost estimate for the proposal.  In their cost estimate, the 
CBO estimated that “prosecuting a war would cost between $6 billion and $9 
billion a month----although we cannot estimate how long such a war may last.”  
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The estimates for removing Saddam Hussein from power varied widely; 
former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey gave an estimate of 
$100 to $200 billion, but this was strongly disputed by Bush II administration 
officials.  Rumsfeld, for example, called this estimate “baloney” and many 
fellow neo-conservatives pointed out that Iraq was an oil-rich country that 
could pay for its own reconstruction.  In the end, the projected costs of 
prosecuting a war against Iraq did not prevent members of Congress from 
voting for the Iraq war resolution, possibly due to the disputed nature of the 
estimates and strong denunciations of any high-end estimates by the 
administration.  By March 2008, two noted economists, Stiglitz and Bilmes, put 
the total economic impact of the war to the U.S. at $4 trillion.  (Herszenhorn, 
2008). 
In the House, Iraq war resolution was jointly sponsored by the Speaker, 
Republican Dennis Hastert, and the Democratic Minority Leader, Richard 
Gephardt from Missouri.  Gephardt’s support for the administration’s proposal 
was crucial, as Gephardt was an influential member of the Democratic 
caucus.  Moreover, Gephardt was planning on running for the Democratic 
nomination for the presidency in 2004.  In his speech to the House, Gephardt 
maintained, “September 11 has made all the difference” regarding his analysis 
of the security situation in Iraq.  He echoed the administration’s viewpoint that 
deterrence was not likely to work on Saddam Hussein and the compelling 
urgency of WMD in Iraq made action imperative.  Most importantly, despite 
being the Democratic Minority Leader, Gephardt articulated the same themes 
and fears about terrorism, Saddam Hussein, and the nexus with WMD prior to 
the vote in the House on the Iraq war resolution.  The most notable point of 
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dissention for Gephardt was his failure to endorse President Bush’s policy of 
preemption. With many senior Democrats in agreement with the 
administration’s assessment of the need to remove Hussein, those opposing 
the Iraq war resolution were weakened and unable to stop the measure from 
passing.  On October 10, 2002, the House voted 296 to 133 to pass the 
resolution. 
In the Senate, a similar dynamic took place as senior Democratic 
senators agreed with the administration that the combination of terrorism, 
rogue regimes like Saddam Hussein’s, and WMD presented a security 
dilemma to the U.S. that made using force a viable and desirable option.  In a 
letter to Senator Bob Graham, CIA Director Tenet repeated the 
administration’s argument that the links between Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda posed a dangerous threat, noting that “We have solid reporting of 
senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade.”  
(Tenet, 2002)  Potential Democratic nominees for the presidential run in 2004 
like Senators John Edwards and John Kerry did not dispute the 
administration’s version of the security dilemma.  Instead, they implicitly 
acknowledged that fighting Iraq was central to the war on terror.  This resulted 
in giving the initiative to the administration because once it was conceded that 
Iraq had (or would soon possess) WMD and that Iraq posed an imminent 
threat, it was impossible to argue effectively against the administration’s 
proposal.   
Senator Robert Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, was one important 
dissenter from the administration’s viewpoint and he spoke forcefully against 
the proposal on October 4.  He explained he was “pained” to see the 
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Congress rush to pass the resolution immediately, to “get it behind us before 
the election.”  (Byrd, 2002)  He then warned that the Bush II administration 
wanted the Congress to “put its stamp of approval on that Bush doctrine of 
preemptive strikes.”  (Ibid)  Nevertheless, his ardent opposition to the proposal 
failed to move many senators and the Senate passed the resolution by a vote 
of 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.  President Bush signed it into law on October 
16, 2002, making the invasion of Iraq appear inevitable, in the absence of 
serious UN or Iraqi efforts to advert the U.S. use of force. 
The Authorization for use of Military Force against Iraq resolution of 
2002 states in the preamble that Iraq “poses a continuing threat to the national 
security of the United States and international peace and security in the 
Persian Gulf region.”  It also specifically included the Bush II administration’s 
claim that al Qaeda members “were known to be in Iraq.”  Two other 
statements concerning Iraq and terrorism are part of the preamble: “Iraq 
continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, 
including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States 
citizens;” and the 9/11 attacks “underscored the gravity of the threat posed by 
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist 
organizations.”  Thus, the use of force against Iraq was skilfully tied to the 
9/11 attacks and the threat of more terrorist attacks.  The resolution then 
authorized the President to use the armed forces of the U.S. “as he 
determines to be necessary and appropriate” and states that it is specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution.  The 
neo-conservatives had succeeded in making regime change in Iraq part of the 
national security strategy of the Bush II administration and the Bush II 
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administration had succeeded in convincing the Congress to pass an 
authorization for use of military force against Iraq in the absence of Iraqi 
complicity with the 9/11 attacks.  Rather than act as a check on executive 
branch movement towards war, the Congress had facilitated it.  
Bush Address to the UN 
On September 12, 2002, one year and a day after the 9/11 attacks, 
President Bush went to the United Nations General Assembly in New York 
and described the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s government.  
He also detailed the many UN Security Council resolutions, including ones on 
weapons inspections, which the Hussein regime had violated in the years 
since the cease-fire of 1991.  Bush repeated the link between the Hussein 
regime and terrorist networks, saying, “In violation of Security Council 
Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations 
that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments.” (Bush, 
2002b)  He characterized Saddam Hussein’s regime as “a grave and 
gathering danger.”  In addition, President Bush claimed that if Iraq acquired 
“fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.” 
(Ibid)  In closing, President Bush challenged the UN to live up to its stated 
purposes and hold Iraq accountable by asking the UN, “Are Security Council 
resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence?  
Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be 
irrelevant?”  (Ibid)  Clearly, the themes the Bush II administration emphasized 
for the domestic audience, i.e. the links between Hussein and terrorists and 
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Iraq as an undeterrable security threat, were repackaged for the international 
audience at the UN.  
In retrospect, it may appear odd that the Bush II administration 
articulated a widening of the war on terror to encompass Iraq when Osama bin 
Laden and other al Qaeda leaders were still at large and the war in 
Afghanistan continued, but the Bush II administration’s push for an invasion of 
Iraq can best be comprehended as part of a neo-conservative agenda to 
remake the Middle East by spreading democracy.  The administration was 
able to make Iraq part of an urgent agenda by emphasizing the danger of 
rogue states giving WMD to terrorists.  After the 9/11 attacks, the American 
public, operating in an environment of continuing crisis, no longer doubted the 
ability of committed terrorists to kill thousands and the Bush II administration 
used this fear to connect the regime in Iraq with international terrorism.  
President Bush’s speech to the UN  was intended to rally support for the Bush 
II administration’s position on Iraq, challenge the UN to take action, and make 
it clear to the world that the administration would take action alone if the world 
did nothing more to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening the security of 
the U.S.  The underlying assumption was that the U.S. had the right 
unilaterally to use force against Iraq on behalf of the international community.  
The Bush II administration continued to build a case for invading Iraq to 
remove Saddam Hussein based upon the combined threats of WMD, 
terrorists, and rogue states---states that were beyond the ability of the U.S. to 
contain or deter.  The threat from Iraq was always presented by notable Bush 
II administration officials such as Cheney and Rumsfeld as an urgent one.  
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Although the U.S. Congress was convinced that the use of force against Iraq 
was justified, much of the rest of the world was sceptical, but the initiative for 
action was with the Bush II administration.  As some critics pointed out, 
allowing the UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq was not the preferred 
option of the neo-conservatives, but the Bush II administration went along with 
this, partially to retain crucial support from the British government.  On 
November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, which 
established an enhanced weapons inspections regime for Iraq, but did not 
authorize the use of force to compel compliance.  Resolution 1441 also 
specifically mentioned previous UN resolutions such as 687 that required Iraqi 
compliance.  Regarding terrorism, resolution 1441 deplored the failure of the 
government of Iraq to comply with its commitments with regard to terrorism, 
but did not detail Iraqi non-compliance in this area.   
As a result of resolution 1441, UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq 
on November 25, 2002 and began the search for weapons.  They found a 
“crate of warheads designed for chemical weapons” but no “smoking gun” to 
prove Saddam Hussein possessed banned weapons or the means to deliver 
them.  (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007: 108)  Nevertheless, the lack of hard 
evidence of Iraqi noncompliance did not halt the Bush II administration’s 
campaign to achieve regime change in Iraq; instead, administration officials 
noted that the Iraqi regime was skilled in deception and evasion.   
The rhetoric counselling the use of force to remove the regime and 
neutralize the imminent threat from Iraq continued unabated.  For instance, in 
his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President Bush explained 
that, “We've got the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on the run. One 
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by one the terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.”  (Bush, 
2003)  He then went on to detail Iraqi deceptions about WMD and carefully 
linked the possibility of more terrorist attacks against Americans to Saddam 
Hussein.  According to President Bush, “Evidence from intelligence sources, 
secret communications and statements by people now in custody reveal that 
Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. 
Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons 
to terrorists, or help them develop their own. Before September the 11th, 
many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But 
chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily 
contained.” (Ibid)  The President then continued to link Saddam Hussein with 
terrorism and asked, “Some have said we must not act until the threat is 
imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, 
politely putting us on notice before they strike?” (Ibid)  The public discourse on 
Iraq, far from advocating patience with the UN weapons inspection system, 
was clearly combining the threats of rogue regimes, WMD, and terrorism. 
The other notable statement from the State of the Union in 2003 was, 
“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”  (Ibid)  This assertion, later 
proven false, formed the core of the Valerie Plame scandal, discussed in the 
section above on the New Paradigm for the WOT.  Its inclusion in Bush’s 
State of the Union address reflected an administration ready to present any 
claim, however unproven, to bolster its case that the threat posed by Iraq was 
imminent, growing, and not subject to containment or deterrence. 
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Powell Presentation to the UN 
On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell went to the UN 
Security Council and laid out the case against Saddam Hussein’s regime with 
many sources of U.S. intelligence.  Many assertions cited by Powell as 
positive proof of Iraqi noncompliance with UN norms later proved to be false 
and Powell himself regretted the “flaws” in the speech.  Lawrence Wilkerson, 
his chief of staff, later called the speech “the lowest point in my life” because 
so many of the American  assertions, presented as fact, were false.  
(Wilkerson Interview)  Wilkerson described spending four days and nights in a 
CIA conference room with Powell and Tenet and other administration officials, 
trying to ensure the accuracy of Powell’s presentation.  (Ibid)  However, some 
of the assertions were based on faulty intelligence including, for example, 
Powell’s argument that Iraq possessed mobile bioweapons laboratories 
mounted on trucks.  Subsequently, it was revealed that this information came 
from an informant, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi known as “Curveball,” who 
had been flagged by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a fabricator.  
Another false evidentiary element mentioned by Powell was a “fine paper that 
the United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail 
Iraqi deception activities.”  (Powell, 2003)  This turned out to be a British 
dossier on Iraq that contained intelligence “taken from published academic 
articles, some of them several years old.”  (Lashmar and Whitaker, 2003: 480)  
Despite the fact that much of the “evidence” provided by Powell at the UN 
later turned out to be false, at the time of his presentation, it was a dramatic 
rhetoric challenge to the world to viscerally see and hear “proof” of Iraqi WMD 
and then be asked to do something about it. 
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Powell used slides, tapes, and charts during his speech at the UN to 
augment his argument that Saddam Hussein was a growing, unique, and 
uncontainable threat to the US and the world.   Saddam Hussein’s disregard 
of UN resolutions and attempts to acquire WMD in contradiction to the 
sanctions regime formed the first part of Powell’s speech.  When Powell 
began discussing the nexus of international terrorism and Saddam Hussein, 
he claimed, “Iraq and terrorism go back decades.”  (Powell, 2003)  He then 
described the nexus between Iraq and al Qaeda member Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi, who had fought the Soviets in the Afghan war and established an 
explosive training camp in north-eastern Iraq.  Powell described the training 
camp and the terrorist organization, Ansar al-Islam, that operated there and 
admitted the area was “in northern Kurdish areas outside of Saddam 
Hussein’s controlled Iraq.”  (Ibid)  Nevertheless, Powell maintained Saddam 
Hussein aided and abetted al-Zarqawi and he offered a slide entitled, 
“Terrorist Poison and Explosives Factory, Khurmal” to illustrate the size of the 
facility.  He also pointed out the deadly effects of poisons like ricin and how 
dangerous such a poison would be in the hands of suicidal terrorists.  In 
retrospect, it is clear the Bush II administration exaggerated the ties between 
Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda terrorists to bolster its claim for regime 
change, but the training camp Powell described did, in fact, exist in northern 
Iraq and was the subject of a chapter in Zenko’s book on discreet military 
operations (DMO’s). 
Zenko detailed how Ansar al-Islam ran a training camp near Khurmal, 
Iraq and how the U.S. government contemplated a brief military strike against 
it in the summer of 2002.  According to Zenko, the U.S. military, including 
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General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed a 
military strike against Khurmal was feasible, but the U.S. never took any 
action against the training camp until the Iraq war started in March 2003.  
Analyzing why the Bush II administration failed to strike against a known 
training camp in Iraq, Zenko examined several possible explanations and then 
concluded, “President Bush did not want to undertake any actions that could 
have derailed the option of regime change in Iraq” as the most plausible 
reason Khurmal was not attacked.  (Zenko, 2010: 92)  The failure to strike 
militarily at a known terrorist training camp in the summer of 2002 highlights 
the nature of the Bush II administration’s agenda at that time; administration 
officials were focused on promoting the neo-conservative goal of regime 
change in Iraq and were wary of becoming side-tracked.  This focus on 
promoting regime change paid off in the sense that the U.S. eventually 
invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003.    
The Bush II administration’s efforts to portray the security dilemma in 
the Middle East as centred on the regime of Saddam Hussein and not 
amenable to the strategies of containment or deterrence in 2002 and early 
2003 had an effect on the American public.  On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, 
more Americans supported the case for going to war against Iraq, presumably 
as a result of the January State of the Union address and Powell’s 
presentation at the UN.  Invading Iraq was viewed as the next step, or the 
“central front” in the war on terror.  In addition, a majority of Americans 
believed, erroneously, that Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks and Iraqi 
citizens had been on the planes in the 9/11 hijackings.  Yet a majority of 
Americans wanted the UN to authorize the use of force against Iraq and 
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sizable protests against an invasion took place in major cities across the U.S. 
prior to the war.  There were also large anti-war protests across the world, 
including massive rallies in Rome and London, prior to the invasion.  In the 
end, dissent to the neo-conservative agenda for regime change in Iraq did not 
stop the war, which began with the bombing of Baghdad on March 19, 2003. 
“Shock and Awe” Campaign 
  
The Iraq war, also called Operation Iraqi Freedom, began with a 
conventional use of military force, utilizing American, British, Polish, and 
Australia military forces.  The campaign was termed one of “shock and awe” 
as the coalition forces were applying massive amounts of force to the Iraqi 
forces to induce surrender.  Saddam Hussein’s conventional military was 
quickly defeated and Baghdad was occupied on April 9, 2003.  At first, it 
appeared the neo-conservatives claim that defeating the Iraqi regime would 
be quick and easy was correct.  President Bush appeared on the USS 
Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003 and famously declared that combat 
operations in Iraq ended under a banner proclaiming “mission accomplished.”  
The Bush II administration later had to explain away the theatrical 
presentation of mission accomplished when the Iraq war turned into an 
insurgency with mounting American and coalition casualties.  The failure to 
adequately plan for post-war Iraq and anticipate the sectarian divisions that 
fomented violence have been extensively documented elsewhere.  (Ricks, 
2006, Chandrasekaran, 2006) 
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This research examined the war in Iraq as ostensibly part of the Bush II 
administration’s campaign against international terrorism because invading 
Iraq was always cited by administration officials as part of its “war on terror.”  
However, none of the people interviewed as part of the research considered 
the use of force in the Iraq war as a counterterrorism operation.  In fact, very 
few scholars analyze the Iraq war as a counterterrorism operation, partially 
because the purported ties between Saddam Hussein and members of al 
Qaeda were illusory, but this fact does not prevent some former Bush II 
officials from characterizing the war as the central front on the war on terror.  
The analysis in this section assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Bush 
II officials were correct in their characterization of the Iraq war as part of the 
U.S. effort to eradicate international terrorism. 
II. Discreet Military Operations 
The last sections of the chapter scrutinize the Bush II administration’s 
smaller scale uses of force such as the use of predator and reaper drones in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries.  First, the use of drones 
and how the Bush II administration altered the circumstances regarding their 
utilization will be examined because drones emerged as a weapon of choice 
in the war on terror.  Then other types of discreet military operations like the 
use of Navy Seals or Special Operations Forces on the ground in Pakistan 
and Syria will be explored.  The use of drones is potentially more significant in 
the long term in that their utilization is less costly than a full-scale invasion 
(like Iraq in 2003) or an operation with ground troops where U.S. casualties 
may be high.  Thus, there are indications they may become a preferred 
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method of American policy makers.  In fact, the Obama administration 
apparently favours the flexibility offered by drones and has increased their use 
in its counterterrorist operations. 
Drones are remotely piloted, unmanned small aerial vehicles (also 
called UVA’s) which are armed with missiles to find and kill Taliban and Al 
Qaeda militants in difficult or remote regions.  During the Clinton 
administration, a small number of drones were used for intelligence and 
surveillance in areas where the CIA had few human sources on the ground.  
Although the Clinton administration experimented with putting bombs on 
drones and, according to some accounts, blew up a mock bin Laden house in 
the Nevada desert, it did not use armed drones.  (Coll, 2004)  After 9/11, the 
Bush II administration began arming them (usually with Hellfire missiles) and 
escalated their use as the invasion in Afghanistan proceeded without the 
capture of either Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar.  (O’Connell, 2010, and 
Gellman, 2002)   
Drones, a type of discreet military operation, are often seen by 
executive branch policy makers as a less risky alternative than an operation 
involving ground forces that could result in military casualties.  Discreet 
Military Operations or DMO’s are defined as “a single or serial physical use of 
kinetic military force to achieve a defined military and political goal by inflicting 
casualties or causing destruction, without seeking to conquer an opposing 
army or to capture or control territory.”  (Zenko, 2010: 2)  The primary political 
uses of force in DMO’s may be categorized as compellence (a subset of 
coercive diplomacy); deterrence (trying to persuade a state to refrain from 
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taking a certain action); and punishment (inflicting physical destruction of a 
target through the direct and kinetic application of force).  (Zenko, 2010: 18-
21)  During the Bush II administration, there were more than 30 DMO’s, most 
of them drone strikes; the exact number is difficult to discern as the U.S. 
government does not officially acknowledge drone strikes.   
The creation of an all-volunteer professional military in the U.S. in 
response to the Vietnam War resulted in large disparities between civilian 
policy makers and senior military officials as far as attitudes towards the use 
of force are concerned.  In a study of DMO’s from 1991 to 2009, Zenko 
discovered that “US civilian decision-makers are more willing both to rely on 
military force to achieve their foreign policy goals and to place constraints on 
the manner in which force is used than are their military counterparts.”  
(Zenko, 2010: 25)  In fact, the bifurcation between the military and civilian 
officials is so great that two distinct schools are discernable; the surgical strike 
school, composed of mostly senior civilian officials who believe limited force 
has low domestic political costs if it fails and limited force can achieve limited 
political objectives.  The other school consisting of senior military officials in 
the functional force school, echoes the Powell Doctrine in advocating that if 
force is to be used, it should be overwhelming and only used as a last resort in 
the bargaining process.  Members of the functional force school are more 
likely to view limited force as rarely as precise and low cost as policy makers 
intend.  (Zenko, 2010: 24)  When combined with the phenomenon known as 
“military metaphysics” (the tendency to see international problems as military 
problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through 
military means, discussed in the section on the military), the result is a 
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preference for using force even in circumstances where the efficacy of force is 
unproven.  As illustrated below, the use of drones to eradicate the leadership 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban often resulted in high civilian casualties with 
uncertain political results. 
Building on the Clinton administration’s drone program, the Bush II 
administration began arming drones and then dramatically increased their 
use.  There are two drone programs: one run by the regular U.S military in war 
zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq; the other program is operated by the 
CIA.  (Bergen Interview, Phythian, 2011)  The latter program is more 
controversial for several reasons including its potential to operate anywhere in 
the world due to the Bush II administration’s logic that the entire world 
constituted a battlefield in the WOT and the lack of transparency at the CIA.  
The first armed drone, a predator, was used in combat in Afghanistan in 
October 2001 by the military.  Subsequently, in November 2001, the 
Department of Defense reported that a drone strike killed al Qaeda’s military 
commander, Mohammed Atef outside the Afghan city of Jalalabad.  
(O’Connell, 2010: 3)  
The CIA’s drone program remains highly classified so the following 
information relies in part on a drones database maintained by Peter Bergen 
and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation; their information is 
culled from news reports from the BBC, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, Wall 
Street Journal, New York Times, and other sources with reporters in South 
Asia.  According to this database, the civilian fatality rate as a result of drones 
was 28% in the years 2004 to 2009, although this number is disputed.  The 
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exact number of civilians killed as a result of drone strikes is exceedingly 
difficult to pinpoint as the dead are immediately buried, the locations of strikes 
tend to be remote regions, and militants frequently isolate the area around a 
drone strike so that villagers and the media are unable to see it.  Bergen and 
Tiedemann estimated that the civilian death rate after 2010 is “more likely 8%” 
due to increased accuracy and intelligence.  The following tables illustrate the 
number of deaths: 
Estimated Total Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2010 
*Through November 28, 2010 
   Deaths (low)  Deaths (high) 
2010* 521 857 
2009 413 709 
2008 263 296 
2004-2007 86 109 
Total 1,283 1,971 
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Estimated Militant Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004 - 
2010 
*Through November 28, 2010







*Through November 28, 2010. Included in estimated militants and estimated 
totals, above. 
In an interview with Bergen, he reiterated his position that drone attacks 
were the “least bad option” the U.S. government has for reducing the threat 
   Deaths (low)  Deaths (high) 
2010* 495 797 
2009 293 405 
2008 106 134 
2004-2007 78 100 
Total 972 1,436 
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from Pakistan’s militants, both pro-Taliban and al Qaeda forces.  He added, 
“There are caveats, however.  The use of drones is a technical solution to the 
problem (which calls for a political solution ultimately).  It is impossible to 
simply go into the tribal areas of Pakistan (the FATA, or Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas) and arrest people.”  (Bergen Interview)  The lack of 
public discussion or debate and the failure of congress to investigate the 
drone attacks’ legality or efficacy are striking given the history of targeted
killings. 
A brief overview of the history of targeted killings in the U.S. reveals 
that in 1976 President Gerald Ford signed an executive order banning political 
assassinations as a reaction to criticisms of covert CIA assassination 
programs in the Cold War.  This became Executive Order 12333 in 1981, 
signed by President Reagan.  Although Reagan’s Executive Order remains in 
effect today, the context in which it operates has radically changed.  After the 
1998 embassy bombings in Africa, President Clinton issued a presidential 
finding (similar to an executive order) “authorizing the use of lethal force in 
self-defense against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.”  (Blum and Heymann, 2010: 
150)  In effect, the CIA was authorized to kill Bin Laden and several of his top 
deputies only if deadly force became necessary during an attempt to capture 
them.  Official U.S. policy remained opposed to targeted killings; in July 2001, 
after Israel used targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists, Martin Indyk, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, said, “The United States government is very 
clearly on record as against targeted assassinations.” (Mayer, 2009a)   
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However, after 9/11, the Bush II administration embraced a war 
paradigm for its use of force and made a crucial distinction between 
assassinations that are still not permitted and lethal attacks on terrorists that 
are “lawful battlefield operations against enemy combatants.” (Blum and 
Heymann, 2010: 150)  Also, “specific individuals who pose a direct threat to 
U.S. citizens or national security in peacetime” may be subject to targeted 
killing. (Blum and Heymann, 2010: 155)  President Bush signed a 
Memorandum of Notification in September 2001 authorizing the CIA to kill al 
Qaeda terrorists on an undisclosed “high-value target list.”  This was an 
executive branch initiative taken without congressional input or oversight or 
public debate, based on an expansive reading of article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which allows countries to exercise the inherent right of self-defence.  By 
categorizing its counterterrorism operations as a “war,” the Bush II 
administration avoided the requirements of due process that would normally 
be accorded to suspects in a criminal procedure.  
The first overt use of drones for a targeted killing outside the Afghan 
battlefield occurred on November 3, 2002 in Yemen when a predator drone 
bombed the vehicle carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, suspected of planning the 2000 
bombing of the USS Cole, and five others, including a naturalized U.S. citizen, 
Ahmed Hijazi.  Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, consented to the 
American operation because the Yemeni security forces were unable to 
capture al-Harithi and it was seen as a way of demonstrating to the Bush II 
administration that Yemen was “with” the U.S. in its WOT.  However, this was 
a covert operation and the Yemeni government wanted its cooperation with 
the Bush II administration kept secret.  Some one leaked the details and Paul 
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Wolfowitz soon appeared on CNN and confirmed in an interview that the U.S. 
was responsible for getting “rid of somebody dangerous.”  (Zenko, 2010: 87)  
Subsequent drone operations by the CIA have not been confirmed by the U.S. 
government, to avoid embarrassing any foreign government that may have 
consented to such an operation and to maintain secrecy.  
The political objectives for the drone attack on al-Harithi were two-fold; 
first, “to deter Al Qaeda members from committing future terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. and its allies.” (Zenko, 2010: 88)  The second objective was 
to “compel more consistent counterterrorism cooperation from Yemen” but 
neither objective was achieved despite that fact that the military objective of 
killing al-Harithi was accomplished. (Ibid)  Al Qaeda members continue to plan 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its allies while the questions of whether a 
non-state terrorist network can successfully be deterred and how best to 
compel other countries to cooperate in counterterrorism are continuing 
challenges for the U.S.  How to effectively deal with al Qaeda terrorists 
operating out of Yemen also remains an issue for the Obama administration.  
In brief, the November 2002 Yemeni drone attack revealed that a DMO may 
have complete success in its military objective but fail to accomplish its 
political goals. 
As noted above, subsequent drone attacks have not been officially 
confirmed by the U.S. government, so the numbers cited regarding drone 
attacks are culled from various unofficial sources including the New America 
database.  The next drone attack after the one in Yemen in 2002 occurred in 
South Waziristan, Pakistan in June 2004 when four Taliban were killed, 
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including Nek Muhammad.  In 2005, there were three drone strikes, all in 
Pakistan targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders; the first, on May 8, had the 
military objective of killing Haitaham al-Yemein who was killed.  The second 
attack on November 5 did not succeed in its military objective of killing Abu 
Hamza Rabia, a senior Al Qaeda leader, but his wife, daughter, and six others 
were killed. (Zenko, 2010: 143)  The last known drone strike of 2005 occurred 
on December 1 and this time the military objective of killing Rabia was 
achieved.  The political goals of all three 2005 strikes in Pakistan were similar, 
i.e. “to punish and to deter Al Qaeda from using Pakistan to plan and stage 
operations.” (Zenko, 2010: 145)  Although some Al Qaeda leaders were killed 
by drones, the political goals of the drone strikes were not entirely successful 
as Al Qaeda continues to use parts of Pakistan, particularly the FATA, as a 
planning area. 
The two drone strikes of 2006 happened in January and the military 
objectives of both were to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban, including Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, who was at that time, al Qaeda’s second in command, after Bin 
Laden.  During the second drone strike, in mid-January, as many as eighteen 
civilians were killed and these casualties led to mass protests in Pakistan.  
Pervez Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, then condemned the attack 
and told the U.S. government that it “must not be repeated.” (Witte and Khan, 
2006: 1)  However, one year later, in January 2007, another drone strike in 
Pakistan was launched to kill al Qaeda and Taliban militants and prevent other 
militants from using the territory as a planning area for future terrorism.  This 
attack was followed by two or three more drone attacks in April, June, and 
presumably, November of 2007 with the intention of killing al Qaeda and 
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Taliban militants.  Approximately 70 people were killed but no known militants 
were killed during these drone strikes.  Pakistan experienced a great deal of 
turmoil in 2007 as Musharraf began losing his hold on political power and 
eventually gave up his military rank in November of 2007, while former prime 
minister Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in October to campaign but was 
assassinated on December 27, 2007. 
From the start of the WOT, President Bush relied on Musharraf as a 
partner in U.S. counterterrorism and the Bush II administration ramped up aid 
to Pakistan in return for cooperation in finding and capturing Afghan Taliban 
and al Qaeda.  However, Pakistan’s cooperation was always problematic in 
that the Pakistan security forces or ISI facilitated the rise of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in the 1990’s as a wedge against Pakistan’s prime enemy, India, 
and questions about the ISI’s loyalties to American security interests are 
plentiful.  (Coll, 2004)  Moreover, some Americans theorized that members of 
the Pakistani military or ISI gave advance warnings to Taliban and Al Qaeda 
agents in the FATA before the U.S. launched drone strikes, suspicions that 
are impossible to confirm.  Until the beginning of 2008, the U.S. operated 
drones in the remote regions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border “only 
under the most restrictive conditions.” (Sanger, 2009: 236)   
However, that arrangement began to change.  On January 9, 2008, the 
Director of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, and the Director of National 
Intelligence, Mike McConnell, met with Musharraf to obtain “greater latitude in 
conducting U.S. combat operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban.”  
(Zenko, 2010: 148)  Musharraf agreed to enhanced sharing of intelligence and 
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more drone strikes but did not allow U.S. ground troops in Pakistan.  A few 
weeks later, on January 29, 2008, a drone attack killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a 
senior al Qaeda leader from Libya who planned the suicide attack at Bagram 
during Cheney’s visit in 2007, along with 12 or 13 other people, presumed 
militants.  This drone strike occurred without advance permission from 
Musharraf.  (Wright and Warrick, 2008: 1)  In fact, later in 2008, the Bush II 
administration began using what Sanger claimed was called the “reasonable 
man standard” for drone strikes, i.e. “if it seemed reasonable, you could hit it” 
and “all notions of advance consultations with Pakistani authorities were 
scrapped.”  (Sanger, 2009: 250)  The number of drone strikes increased 
dramatically in 2008; by the year’s end, there had been roughly 34 drone 
strikes, most of them in South and North Waziristan, with approximately 11 
militants killed. George W. Bush turned the presidency over to Barack Obama 
on January 20, 2009, but before he left the White House, there were two more 
drone strikes in South Waziristan in early January, bringing the total number of 
drone strikes during his eight years in office to about 45.  The majority of the 
drone strikes occurred in Pakistan, ironically labelled a U.S. ally in the WOT 
by the Bush II administration. 
Questions Surrounding Continued Drone Use 
Even if some Taliban or al Qaeda militants (including senior leaders 
such as al-Libi) were killed in these drone strikes, the question remains 
whether broader American foreign policy goals are advanced by using 
discreet military operations like drones in the territory of an ally such as 
Pakistan.  As noted by Zenko, even when the military objective of killing a 
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certain Taliban or al Qaeda operative was achieved, the political goal of 
deterring al Qaeda and Taliban from using the border region between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a base for planning operations usually met, at 
best, with “mixed success” as these militants continue their operations in this 
area today.  In addition, the rise in the number of drone strikes in 2008 was 
accompanied by an increase in the number of civilian deaths, which acerbated 
Pakistani mistrust of the U.S. and facilitated al Qaeda’s recruitment of foot 
soldiers.  One paradox of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was confirmed by the 
disclosure of State Department documents by WikiLeaks; the cables confirm 
that Pakistani officials condone the drone “attacks in private while opposing 
them in public.”  
Criticism of the drone strikes in the U.S. has been restricted to 
scholars, human rights groups, and a few political observers; notably, the first 
congressional hearing on the topic of drones occurred in the House of 
Representatives in 2010, after George W. Bush left office.  The Senate has 
not held any hearings on this, despite its duty to oversee the CIA.  This 
conforms to Koh’s pattern of executive initiatives (the second Bush 
administration’s policy of using armed drones) followed, predictably, by 
congressional acquiescence.  Moreover, criticism of the drones falls into 
several categories including political, moral, and legal; the legal complications 
of the drone strikes will be examined first.  The Bush II administration carefully 
built its legal justifications for the use of drones on the concept of anticipatory 
self-defence and relied on analysis from Abraham Sofaer, State Department 
Legal Advisor in the Reagan administration.  The drone strikes are lawful, 
according to Sofaer’s analysis that states have the right “to strike terrorists 
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within the territory of another State where terrorists are using that territory as a 
location from which to launch terrorist attacks and where the State involved 
has failed to respond effectively to a demand that the attacks be stopped.” 
Kenneth Anderson, echoing Sofaer, has written several articles 
expounding his view that drones are legal under both international law and 
domestic U.S. law.  According to Anderson: 
• “Targeted killings of terrorists, including by Predators and even 
when the targets are American citizens, are a lawful practice; 
• Use of force is justified against terrorists anywhere they set up 
safe havens, including in states that cannot or will not prevent 
them; 
• These operations may be covert—and they are as justifiable 
when the CIA is tasked to carry them out secretly as when the 
military does so in open armed conflict. 
• All of the above fall within the American legal view of ‘self-
defense’ in international law, and ‘vital national security interests’ 
in U.S. domestic law.”  (Anderson, 2010: 27) 
Not all legal experts agree with Sofaer and Anderson.  For example, 
Professor O’Connell discussed the requirements for lawful self-defence under 
international law and cited the ICJ verdict from the Nicaragua case in 1986.  In 
that case, the court held, “acts triggering the right to use armed force in self-
defense must themselves amount to armed attacks.”  (O’Connell, 2010: 13)  In 
addition, terrorist acts are usually sporadic events and generally treated as 
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criminal acts because “they have all the hallmarks of crimes, not armed 
attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense.”  (O’Connell, 2010: 14)  
While the legal debate continues, so do the drone strikes. 
Philip Alston, formerly the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, repeatedly asked the Bush II administration 
for the CIA’s legal justifications for targeted killings but received no response.  
In May 2010, the UN released a report on targeted killings, written by Alston in 
which he wrote that the CIA would not disclose its legal basis for targeted 
killings.  (Alston, 2010: 22)  In addition, Alston noted, “Outside of armed 
conflict, killings by the CIA would constitute extrajudicial executions assuming 
that they do not comply with human rights law.” (Ibid)  Alston then discussed 
CIA killings, assuming “without accepting” that they are conducted “in the 
context of armed conflict,” the position of the Bush II administration’s New 
Paradigm.  Alston also concluded that states should identify the legal 
framework they use to justify targeted killings, and other states (such as 
Pakistan) should publicly indicate whether they consented to the targeted 
killings.  He recommended that all states “make public the number of civilians 
collaterally killed.” (Alston, 2010: 27)   
The current UN Special Rapporteur, Christof Heyns, reiterated Alston’s 
concerns and questioned the American government’s use of drones regarding 
ongoing issues of accountability and transparency in 2012.  He wrote that the 
U.S. has not clarified the rules that it considers to cover targeted killings, even 
under the Obama administration.  (Heyns, 2012: 22)  Moreover, Heyns wrote, 
“the practice of targeted killing could set a dangerous precedent, in that any 
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Government could, under the cover of counterterrorism imperatives, decide to 
target and kill an individual on the territory of any State if it considers that said 
individual constitutes a threat.”  (Heyns, 2012: 23) 
Gary Solis, an American military law expert, along with other legal 
scholars, noted that the military operates drones under a legal code that 
specifies judicial mechanisms for mistakes, but the code the CIA operates 
under is unknown.  Solis argued that the CIA operators of drones are 
“unlawful combatants” because they are “fighters without uniforms or insignia, 
directly participating in hostilities, employing armed force contrary to the laws 
and customs of war” as the CIA pilots are “civilians violating the requirement 
of distinction.”  (Solis, 2010)  Others question the use of military contractors to 
arm the drones with bombs.  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) published a guidance on direct participation in hostilities in 2009 and 
according to this, “CIA personnel and their civilian contractors in the armed 
drone program may be targeted” whether they are in Virginia (at CIA 
headquarters) or on an air force base in the U.S. or Pakistan. (Horton, 2010)  
One of the most inexplicable aspects of the limited legal debate on drones is 
the absence of congressional oversight and guidance.   
The Obama administration, pushed to explain its expanded use of 
drones in 2009, finally had its State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, 
discuss the legal framework in a speech in 2010.  Koh argued that the drone 
program was lawful due to the principle of self-defence in article 51 of the UN 
Charter and repeated the Bush II administration’s analysis that the U.S. was in 
an “armed conflict” with al Qaeda.  (Koh, 2010)  In addition, the U.S. was 
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careful to follow the principle of distinction (which requires attacks to be limited 
to military objectives, not civilians), and the principle of proportionality (which 
prohibits attacks that are excessive in relation to concrete and direct military 
objectives).  (Koh, 2010)  Finally, Koh denied that the U.S. engaged in 
extrajudicial killings, reasoning that the U.S. is not required to provide targets 
with any legal process before using lethal force because the U.S. remains 
engaged in an “armed conflict” and is exercising legitimate self-defence.  
(Koh, 2010)  The next chapter on the legacy of the Bush II administration 
returns to the implications involved in drone use, and the similarity between 
the legal reasoning of both the Bush II and the Obama administrations 
regarding their drone programs. 
Other critics of the drone program analyze it more on political and 
ethical grounds, asking, for example, if the number of civilians killed 
accidentally by the drones makes the costs outweigh the benefits of the 
programs.  In an op-ed from May 2009, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 
argued that the costs of drone strikes outweighed the benefits for three 
reasons: the strikes caused a “siege mentality among Pakistani civilians,” in 
addition to the “public outrage” while the use of drones is “a piece of 
technology substituting for a strategy.” (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009)  Others 
questioned whether the U.S. is setting a dangerous precedent for other 
nations to follow, given the likelihood that drone technology will eventually fall 
into the hands of those opposed to U.S. foreign policy.  The disclosure of 
documents by WikiLeaks revealed that many countries are requesting drones 
from the U.S., including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.  As Peter 
Bergen stated during the interview, “Drone technology is not that complicated 
288
so other countries are getting it and it’s always possible that others will use it, 
too, like the Russians in Chechnya.” (Bergen Interview) 
In a chapter exploring the tension between ethics and intelligence, 
Phythian explored the time frame in which decisions on collection, targeting, 
and response are made regarding the drone programs.  (Phythian, 2011)  He 
noted that traditionally there was a bifurcation of sorts between decisions on 
the collection and analysis of intelligence, on one hand, and decisions 
regarding what actions to take in response to the intelligence.  However, CIA 
intelligence officers remotely piloting drones are working in a compressed time 
frame in which “analysis is undertaken immediately by the same people 
involved in collection, and the response follows immediately from the analysis 
(i.e. to launch a Hellfire missile with the intention to kill/not to launch a 
missile).”  (Phythian, 2011: 130)  In the absence of congressional guidance, 
the ethical choices and dilemmas underlying drone use are likely to remain in 
academic circles. 
Finally, there is a broader point about targeted killings in general.  Do 
they actually reduce terrorism?  An analysis by the Brookings Institute in 2009 
noted that targeted killings are “a poor second to arrests” because dead men 
cannot be interrogated; it called the killings “a flawed short-term expedient.” 
(Byman, 2009: 2)  Paul Pillar, former CIA counterterrorism expert, cautioned 
that the benefits of targeted killings may not outweigh the costs.  Writing in 
2001 before the 9/11 attacks, he noted examples where assassinations 
resulted in the death of the wrong person because accurate intelligence is 
difficult.  He then listed the costs of targeted killings as weakening an 
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international norm against assassinations of foreign leaders (one norm that is 
in the interest of the U.S. to keep); “stooping” to a tactic used by the terrorists 
themselves; and “resurrecting old suspicions about what the CIA and other 
U.S. intelligence and security services were doing.”  (Pillar, 2001: 122)  In an 
interview in 2010, Pillar asserted that his analysis in his book Terrorism and 
U.S. Foreign Policy remained valid in the post-9/11 world.  (Pillar Interview) 
Pillar maintained in the interview that drones needed to be “kept in the 
toolkit.  We have been using them since Clinton; the pace of their use was 
cranked up under Obama.  There is a cost/benefit analysis and we need to be 
mindful of the downsides to using drones, namely civilian casualties and the 
resentment this causes.  The use of drones may be feeding resentment 
among the civilian population in which case, more potential terrorists are 
recruited after their use.”  (Pillar Interview)  When asked about who should be 
making the decisions on drone use, Pillar replied, “That is a good question.  
Congress cannot make the individual decisions but it should do more 
oversight.  Congress needs to be involved by setting forth the standards and 
rules on when to use a drone against a target.”  (Pillar Interview)  Finally, Pillar 
was circumspect in commenting on the Obama administration’s 
announcement that Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American in Yemen allegedly helping 
Al Qaeda, could be killed by a drone; note that Pillar was interviewed prior to 
al-Aulaqi’s death.  According to Pillar, “I am not sure he should be a target for 
drones; his U.S. citizenship is an issue.  It is problematic.  I think the first 
choice is capture or rendition.”  (Pillar Interview) 
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On December 7, 2010, a federal court hearing a case brought by al-
Aulaqi’s father decided that it could not decide the issue of whether the U.S. 
government could target him for death overseas because he was not in court.  
Al-Aulaqi remained a target for U.S. drones and was killed on September 30, 
2011, by a drone in northern Yemen, along with another American citizen, 
Samir Khan, who was the co-editor of an al Qaeda magazine.  According to 
press reports, the killings were justified by the Obama administration under a 
secret Department of Justice memo that characterized al-Aulaqi as an 
operational figure within al Qaeda who posed an “imminent threat” to the U.S.  
In June 2012, the memo remains classified.  
Despite the controversies involved in the deployment of drones, their 
use accelerated in the Obama administration.  According to a recent New 
York Times article, the Obama administration “solved” the problem of civilian 
casualties from drone strikes by counting all military-age males in a strike 
zone as combatants “unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving 
them innocent.”  (Becker and Shane, 2012: 6)  If this is accurate, it points to 
the lack of transparency and oversight that has characterized the drone 
program since the start of the war on terror. 
Other Discreet Military Operations in the Bush II Administration 
Although drones became a frequent type of DMO during the last part of 
the Bush II administration, there were other uses of military force as part of the 
WOT.  The two discussed below merit further examination because they were 
single uses of force, unlike the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they 
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illustrate the dilemma of achieving mixed or partial military success without 
achieving corresponding political success.  The first DMO involved Navy Seals 
conducting a ground raid into South Waziristan without the approval of the 
Pakistan government on September 3, 2008.  President Bush authorized the 
raid in an effort to deter Al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a base for 
operations; no high value targets were captured or killed, but some militants 
were killed.  (Zenko, 2010: 152)  After a shoot out, the Seals were evacuated 
by U.S. helicopters dispatched from near-by Afghanistan and “suddenly the 
Pakistani newspapers were filled with tales of the raid, with disputes about 
how many people were killed.”  (Sanger, 2009: 256)  Reflecting on the raid, 
one Bush official asked, “Is it worth it, if you Talibanize 166 million people, and 
you don’t come up with one dead Al Qaeda guy you can name?” (Sanger, 
2009: 257) 
The next month, shortly before the 2008 elections on October 27, US 
Special Forces troops landed in the village of Sukkariyah, Syria, near the 
Syria-Iraq border.  The military objective of killing an Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
operative named Abu Ghadiyah was achieved according to reports, but 
several civilians were killed, too.  (Schmitt and Shanker, 2008: 1)  The political 
goal of deterring Syria from permitting its territory to be used to assist 
insurgents in Iraq was not completely successful as reports in 2009 indicate 
that Syria was not stopping the flow of fighters and arms migrating to Iraq.  
The efficacy of using force in this situation remains unclear but it is certain that 
at times political leaders want to be seen to be “doing something” in response 
to a foreign policy problem, and they will expect senior military officials to be 
able to develop military options.  In both of these DMO’s, congress was not 
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involved, nor told of the plans until the operations began.  This lack of 
congressional involvement prevented meaningful oversight and reduced the 
likelihood of objective assessment of DMO’s effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
A central question of the research is whether the Bush II 
administration’s use of force to combat international terrorism was different 
from the previous three administrations.  George W. Bush was not the first 
American president to use military force after a terrorist attack; Ronald 
Reagan and Bill Clinton both did.  However, their uses of force were more like 
discreet military operations, short, targeted strikes that did not involve ground 
troops or occupying territory.  Their goals for the uses of force were more 
modest, i.e. punishing terrorists or the states that supported them and 
deterring future acts of terrorism.  The Bush II administration, on the other 
hand, established the goal of eradicating terrorism in its war on terror. 
Moreover, only the administration of George W. Bush fused the use of 
force against terrorism to the neo-conservative agenda to remake the Middle 
East by spreading American values and deposing anti-American regimes like 
Saddam Hussein’s.  By combining the administration’s counterterrorism 
program with the perceived needs of the security paradigm in the Middle East, 
President Bush and his advisors had a grand vision for American foreign 
policy.  Their ability to articulate this vision and make it palatable to a majority 
of the American public is probably due in large part to the shock of the 9/11 
attacks and the careful cultivation of the politics of fear.  Despite their success 
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in articulating the agenda and carrying it out in Iraq, the remainder of the neo-
conservative program to remake the Middle East was stymied due to the 
insurgency and costs of the Iraq war.  George W. Bush’s conservative 
domestic agenda also suffered as a result of the costs of the Iraq war and the 
subsequent loss of public support.  In contrast, neither Reagan nor Clinton 
experienced a drop in support for their domestic agendas due to their discreet 
military operations against international terrorists. 
The links between the Reagan presidency and second Bush 
administration cannot be overstated as much of what occurred during the 
second Bush administration can be traced to roots in the Reagan years.  For 
example, the section on the New Paradigm for the WOT noted the use of 
signing statements to bypass congressional intent.  Although signing 
statements existed prior to the Reagan presidency, Reagan’s Justice 
Department championed their use and foreshadowed their even more 
extensive use in the Bush II administration.  President George W. Bush built 
on precedents from the Reagan years in other ways; by establishing a “war” 
on terror after 9/11, Bush was following in Reagan’s footsteps.  The dichotomy 
of terrorism as war versus crime with its policy implications is apparent in all 
four administrations, but it was during the Reagan years and the second Bush 
administration that officials embraced the war paradigm in more ways than the 
merely rhetorical. 
The descent into tactics of questionable legality during the Bush II 
administration is partially due to the mentality of many officials who were told 
to “take the gloves off” and fight a “war” against terrorists.  The focus of this 
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research has not been on analyzing these tactics and practices, although they 
form the background to the Bush II administration’s war on terror and were 
therefore previously discussed when relevant.  Abusive practices towards 
detainees may have hampered the search for members of al Qaeda, as allies 
of the U.S. were concerned about cooperating too much with the 
administration, fearing being implicated in illegal or prohibited practices.  In 
addition, the abuses in detention centres from Iraq and Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo alienated Muslims worldwide at a time when winning the 
ideological campaign was important in suppressing terrorism.  Finally, photos 
of detainee abuse and documented cases of prisoner mistreatment validated 
Osama bin Laden’s narrative that the West was at war with Islam.  The next 
chapter explores the legacy of the Bush II administration. 
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 Chapter 8 
The Legacy of the Bush II Administration 
 President George W. Bush left office on January 20, 2009, and a new 
President, Barack Obama, took the oath of office promising to bring “change” 
to the U.S.  However, despite pledges to close GITMO and chart a new 
direction in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration is 
plagued by the long shadows cast by the previous administration’s 
counterterrorism policies.  This section will examine the legacy of the Bush II 
administration beginning with the implications of Osama bin Laden’s death on 
May 2, 2011.  Other aspects of the Bush II administration will be explored in 
the context of future implications, which include: the embrace of a war 
paradigm to fight a “war on terror,” the impact on civil liberties, the expansion 
of executive power, and the modification of UN norms on the use of force.  
 The results presented here attempt to address the research questions 
outlined in the introductory chapter.  Due to the legal and political emphasis in 
the questions, both international and domestic legal constraints on the use of 
force were examined.  Indeed, the overriding focus of the inquiry has been the 
presence or absence of constraints on the President to use force against 
international terrorism.  Broadly speaking, these constraints are divided into 
internal constraints and external constraints, which may affect the decision to 
use force as a counterterrorism tool.  The main internal constraints may be 
categorized as domestic legal norms and political institutions within the U.S. 
such as congress and the judiciary; powerful political actors such as the 
Secretary of State and Defense; and the administration’s theoretical 
construction of terrorism as either war or crime.  The major external 
296
constraints which may affect use of force decisions include international legal 
norms and the geopolitical circumstances and international environment 
prevailing at the time of the decision.  The research and interviews attempt to 
interweave the two dynamics, internal and external, and to discern patterns 
among the four administrations in so far as they responded with force to 
international terrorism. 
 One advantage of using force to prevent or respond to terrorism in the 
manner advocated by the Bush II administration is that the muscular use of 
American military forces may serve as a deterrent to other terrorist attacks.  In 
theory, this might explain why there have been no major attacks on U.S. soil 
since the 9/11 tragedy.  However, there may be other reasons for the absence 
of a large-scale attack on the territory of the U.S.  For example, better 
intelligence and coordination among law enforcement agencies in the U.S. 
and abroad may explain it.  Deterring terrorists is a difficult concept to 
empirically verify with many analysts distinguishing between state-sponsored 
terrorism and terrorism by non-state actors.  State-sponsored terrorism is 
believed to be more deterrable because the state supporting the terrorists 
knows that if the attack is traced back to its territory, the U.S. will retaliate with 
massive force, while non-state actors are less likely to have an address and 
more willing to use extreme types of terrorism such as sarin gas (The Tokyo 
subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, for example).  Furthermore, as Pillar 
and Preble note, “the biggest advantage of the military instrument over other 
counterterrorist tools is that the potential effect on terrorist capabilities is 
immediate and unqualified.”  (Pillar and Preble, 2010: 69)  By using force to 
combat international terrorism, the U.S. military has detained thousands of 
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suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, thereby disrupting 
planning for operations against the U.S. and its allies.  Another related 
advantage to using force is many suspected terrorists have been killed, 
including the inspiration and leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. 
Death of Osama bin Laden 
 Most Americans expected that Osama bin Laden would be captured 
or killed when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and evicted the Taliban 
leadership in Kabul late in 2001.  When bin Laden escaped at the battle of 
Tora Bora, President Bush declared he was wanted “dead or alive” and with 
the full weight of the U.S. intelligence services searching for al Qaeda, it was 
assumed that bin Laden would be cornered quickly.  The evidence indicates 
that the Bush II administration reassigned resources devoted to tracking bin 
Laden and al Qaeda to the Iraq theatre once the invasion of Iraq began in 
March 2003.  The trail of bin Laden and the top al Qaeda leadership went cold 
for years and Bush then began to downplay the importance of capturing him, 
particularly as the 2004 election campaigns neared.  Bergen noted that bin 
Laden’s ability to evade capture increased his status as a “folk hero” or 
spiritual guide for al Qaeda followers.  (Bergen Interview)   
More than two years after Bush left the White House, President Obama 
made a dramatic late night announcement in May 2011 that Navy SEALS 
under the command of the Joint Special Operations Command had killed bin 
Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  During the raid, three other men and one 
woman were killed, and one woman was injured; the children living in the 
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compound were not physically injured.  The SEAL team took bin Laden’s body 
and buried him in the Arabian Sea within 24 hours of his death according to 
Islamic precepts after the U.S. made a positive DNA match.  President Obama 
stated that the reasons for his burial at sea were the difficulty of finding a 
country to accept his body and to avoid establishing a grave that could 
become a shrine.  In addition, the Obama administration declined to release 
photos taken of bin Laden’s dead body to avoid inflaming Muslims worldwide.  
The Pakistani government protested the incursion by the U.S. military as a 
violation of their sovereignty, but there was also an undercurrent of 
embarrassment that Osama bin Laden had been living in Pakistan for years. 
 In the U.S., the response to the raid was jubilation that bin Laden was 
finally dead, followed by an increase in the war of words over the Bush II 
administration’s “enhanced interrogation” methods, which will be discussed 
below in the section on civil liberties.  Details about the raid were closely 
guarded by the Obama administration.  In addition, the legality of killing bin 
Laden in this type of raid was largely assumed by the Americans; Attorney 
General Eric Holder told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the acts were 
"lawful, legitimate and appropriate in every way.”  Other legal analysts noted 
that the targeting and killing of an adversary in war was lawful.  For instance, 
Kenneth Anderson, a fellow in national security and law at the conservative 
Hoover Institution stated, “the fact that the United States has announced it is 
in an armed conflict with al Qaeda makes the operation legal under 
international law.  It's lawful for the United States to be going after bin Laden if 
for no other reason than he launched an attack against the U.S."  The Obama 
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administration appeared to embrace the war paradigm to justify the legality of 
killing bin Laden, and avoided analysis of extrajudicial or targeted killings.  
Other legal commentators were not as certain about the legality and 
cautioned that all the facts needed to be evaluated.  (Bowcott, 2011)  British 
legal expert Philippe Sands QC, author of Lawless World and Torture Team, 
noted that a definitive legal judgment was not possible until all the facts were 
known.  Moreover, a prosecutor from the Nuremburg Trials, American lawyer 
Benjamin Ferencz, told the Guardian UK that it would have been better to 
capture bin Laden and put him on trial, as the allies tried Nazi officials after 
World War II.  The exact circumstances of bin Laden’s killing may never be 
fully revealed as the U.S. government clearly does not want a prolonged 
discussion of how the unarmed bin Laden resisted capture. 
Tools for Combating Terrorism 
Throughout this research, the various tools for combating terrorism 
were mentioned, although the research questions revolved around the use of 
force, thereby emphasizing this method.  According to the 9/11 Commission 
Report, long-term success in the struggle against al Qaeda and related groups 
“demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, 
covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, 
and homeland defense.”  (National Commission, 2004: 363-364)    The 
purpose of this research was to compare and contrast the four 
administrations’ use of force and evaluate any apparent trends.  One of the 
conclusions of the research is that the second Bush administration continued 
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many of the same counterterrorism policies of its predecessors, despite the 
administration’s rhetoric that it was “going on the offense” and “launching a 
war on terror.”  It is appropriate in this context to briefly analyze the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism tools and indicate what might happen in 
future administration.  This section begins with a summary of the interviewees’ 
statements on the use of force for counterterrorism. 
When discussing the use of force for counterterrorism during the 
interviews, all those questioned stated their belief that force would 
occasionally be necessary, particularly in light of contemporary terrorist 
trends, such as the willingness of some religiously inspired terrorists to commit 
suicide during large-scale attacks.  The interviewees did emphasize that over-
reliance on using force as a counterterrorist tool would be counterproductive 
and inimical to American national security.  Peter Bergen, for example, noted 
that the effectiveness of force was “strongly dependent on the circumstances 
of its use” and went on to describe how Clinton’s 1998 cruise missile strikes 
against bin Laden were not especially effective as they augmented bin 
Laden’s status as a folk hero when he escaped.  (Bergen Interview)  Bergen 
addressed the option of doing nothing in response to an attack, citing George 
H.W. Bush’s lack of response to the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 and argued 
that some response, including a use of force, would have been better than no 
response.  (Ibid)  Bergen distinguished the effectiveness of using force against 
a state sponsor of terrorism and against a transnational terror group by 
explaining that force is probably more effective against a state sponsor with a 
“return address.” (Ibid) 
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In his interview, Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin 
Powell, elaborated on how central decision making in the White House has 
been the norm since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.  
(Wilkerson Interview)  He drew attention to the fact that the U.S. military, 
rather than the State Department, is increasingly called upon to solve more 
international and security problems.  According to Wilkerson, the President 
sees every international problem as a “nail and the military is the manner, so 
of course, he is going to use the tool he has on the nail.”  (Ibid)  This 
observation from a Bush II administration official conforms to the theory 
articulated by scholar Andrew Bacevich who charted the rise of American 
militarism and “military metaphysics,” the tendency to see international 
problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a 
solution except through military means.  (Bacevich, 2005) 
Paul Pillar, who spent 28 years in the U.S. intelligence community, 
serving during several administrations, expressed his view that there was a 
great deal of continuity among the four administrations on the basic tenets of 
counterterrorism.  (Pillar Interview)  Both he and Wilkerson, both former Bush 
II administration officials, stressed that the war in Iraq was “not about 
counterterrorism.”  (Pillar Interview and Wilkerson Interview)  In fact, the lack 
of scholarly support for the proposition that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was 
motivated by counterterrorist operations and methods is striking.  In Pillar’s 
words, terrorism provided the “rhetorical drumbeat that tied 9/11 and Iraq 
together.”  (Pillar Interview)  Both Wilkerson and Pillar explained that the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was part of a neoconservative agenda to remake the 
Middle East.  For Pillar, the attacks of 9/11 persuaded people that the “old 
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bargain of the Middle East,” i.e. cooperation with undemocratic regimes to 
sustain oil production in exchange for U.S. security guarantees, would not 
continue to work.  (Pillar Interview)   
Another interviewee who spent 21 years working at the CIA as an 
analyst stated that the “war on terror” was a poorly chosen phrase because it 
had the effect of inadvertently radicalizing Muslims by implying the U.S. was at 
war with Islam.  (Interviewee A)  The interviewee explained the “ziggurat of 
zealotry,” a model designed by CIA analysts to gauge levels of radicalization; 
at the bottom of the pyramid are peaceful, pious Muslims while the top level 
includes only those individuals who plan on extending violence globally as 
adherents to the al Qaeda ideology.  (Ibid)  The invasion of Iraq in 2003 
“pushed many Muslims into radicalism because they were alienated from what 
the U.S. was doing in Iraq.”  (Ibid)  Whether or not the Iraq war was the 
“central front in the war on terror,” as President George W. Bush claimed, it 
had the effect of bolstering al Qaeda’s message that the West wanted to 
subjugate Muslims and control Islamic territories.  It also aided the recruitment 
of jihadists, as al Qaeda and related groups used the gap between the 
professed ideals of the U.S. and its own practices towards detainees as a 
propaganda tool.  Incidents where civilians were killed by American troops fed 
into bin Laden’s narrative and increased recruitment, too.  (Ibid) 
Interviewee A, who worked at the CIA during both the Clinton and Bush 
II administrations, was asked whether there were substantial differences 
between these administrations.  She stated, “There was a big distinction 
between the Clinton and Bush administrations.  The Clinton administration, 
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from Tony Lake onwards, was professional about terrorism and convinced that 
transnational terrorist networks were a big problem for the U.S.  On the other 
hand, Bush officials were not convinced that international terrorism was that 
sort of problem.  Many of them were what we called ‘Cold Warriors’ from the 
Cold War.  There was no real Arabist among the national security team at the 
Bush White House.  There was no real non-Cold War expert.  Dr. Rice, for 
example, focused on the strategic missile defense initiative before 9/11.”  
(Interviewee A)  She added, “There were lots of warnings before 9/11 but no 
real response to them.”  (Ibid)  The implication that the second Bush 
administration was not sufficiently focused on international terrorism in the 
months preceding 9/11 has always been adamantly denied by top officials.  
(Bush, 2010; Cheney, 2011; Rice, 2011) 
Fighting the war of ideas, although subordinate to the Bush II 
administration’s goal of disrupting terrorist networks with the use of force, was 
part of the administration’s stated aims in the WOT.  According to Wilkinson, 
the British expert on terrorism, “democracies must also learn to defeat the 
terrorists’ sustained propaganda war,” suggesting that narratives and ideas 
matter in preventing terrorism and responding to terrorist cells.  (Wilkinson, 
1986: 300)  The concept of public diplomacy, the government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics to enhance understanding of American 
institutions, culture, and law, was discussed extensively by Bush 
administration officials after 9/11.  President Bush himself often indicated that 
the “war of ideas” was very important in curtailing terrorist activity.  However, 
the director of the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy changed 
several times during the Bush years, resulting in leadership problems.  More 
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relevant to this research is the problem of funding; compared to the vast 
amounts allocated to the military and using force in the WOT, public 
diplomacy received a pittance.  In fiscal year 2008, for example, only 
$890,889 was allocated to the U.S. State Department for public diplomacy.  
(Nakamura and Weed, 2009)  If funding accurately corresponds to 
administration priorities, then Bush II administration policy makers felt funding 
the use of force was many times more worthwhile than public diplomacy 
programs aimed at winning the war of ideas.   
Writing after the invasion of Iraq, Burke advised that winning the battle 
against al Qaeda involved a battle for “hearts and minds.”  (Burke, 2004: 291)  
He observed, “Military power must be only one tool among many, and a tool 
that is only rarely, and reluctantly, used.  Currently, military power is the 
default, the weapon of choice.”  (Ibid)  By phrasing the campaign against al 
Qaeda as a full-fledged war, the Bush II administration clearly signalled its 
intent to use force and rely on the military as much as possible. 
In addition, several scholars and policy analysts argued that the term 
“war” should be eliminated from the Bush administration’s counterterrorism 
vocabulary as it indicated a battlefield solution to the problem and legitimized 
al Qaeda fighters as holy warriors instead of criminals.  No one interviewed in 
the course of this research expressed any confidence in the term “war on 
terror” or advocated its sustained use.  In fact, Paul Pillar discussed the 
counterproductive effects of using the term “war on terror” in detail.  These 
include implying that the military is the main counterterrorist instrument and 
that the “war” will have a definitive end one day, like the world wars. (Pillar 
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Interview)  In addition, using the phrase “war on terror” contributes to 
“conflating many different entities into a supposedly monolithic threat.”  (Ibid)  
In Terrorizing Ourselves, Pillar and Preble wrote, “We do not advance our 
broader objectives of diminishing [Osama bin Laden’s and Ayman al 
Zawahri’s] appeal to their target audience and otherwise rendering them to the 
margins of history---where they belong---by portraying them as being on par 
with” Stalin and Hitler, leaders of major nation-states with large conventional 
armies.  (Pillar and Preble, 2010: 78)  However, the Bush administration 
resisted such advice and continued using the war terminology until the end of 
its time in office, suggesting that part of the reason for continuing the 
terminology was political. 
The Bush administration championed the use of force against terrorism, 
yet rarely explained why the use of force was the best possible tool for 
countering terrorism, beyond issuing platitudes about “taking the fight to the 
enemy” and remaining “on the offense” against terrorism.  In reality, 
counterterrorism experts such as those at RAND, downplay how effective the 
use of force by the military can be in a counterterrorism program.  For 
instance, in an extensive study published in 2008, two RAND analysts 
documented how terrorists groups end by analyzing 648 terrorist groups from 
1968 to 2006.  According to this study, 40% of the groups ended due to law 
enforcement methods, 43% ended with a transition to a nonviolent political 
process, and 10% ended with the groups’ victory.  Despite the Bush 
administration emphasis on the use of force, “The military is usually too blunt 
an instrument and most soldiers are not trained to understand, penetrate, and 
destroy terrorist organizations; thus, 7 percent of terrorist groups have 
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ended as a result of military action.”  (Jones and Libicki, 2008: 126, 
emphasis added)  The study also recommended that the notion of a war on 
terrorism should be ended and replaced with concepts such as 
counterterrorism.  (Jones and Libicki, 2008: xvi) 
Impact on Civil Liberties 
 A British terrorism expert, writing about liberal democracies and the 
threat posed by terrorism, noted, “Extralegal actions will only tend to 
undermine democratic legitimacy and destroy public confidence.  Any breach 
of legality will be exploited by terrorist propagandists to show the hypocrisy of 
government and security forces’ claims that they are acting in the name of the 
law. . .” (Wilkerson, 1986: 295-6)  The evidence from the war on terror 
indicates that, despite promises to “respect American values,” many times 
members of the Bush II administration engaged in extralegal actions in the 
pursuit of al Qaeda. 
How President George W. Bush dealt with the tension between security 
and liberty is surely a large part of his administration’s legacy.  This research 
has primarily focused on the use of force and not on the domestic or 
international consequences of counterterrorism policies that curtail civil 
liberties.  Despite this focus, no discussion of the Bush II administration is 
complete without mentioning the erosion of civil liberties that occurred, both in 
the U.S. and abroad.  In particular, the use of techniques previously 
considered torture or inhumane and degrading treatment as part of the “war 
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on terror” marks a significant departure from the practices of the Reagan, 
Clinton, and first Bush administrations. 
As the initial euphoria of killing the most wanted terrorist wore off, 
several former members of the Bush II administration appeared on various 
American media outlets to emphasize the utility of the “enhanced 
interrogation” methods that were used in 2003 and 2004.  For example, both 
Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld gave interviews on the death of bin Laden 
in which they definitively tied the use of harsh techniques to the intelligence 
that ultimately yielded the safe house in Abbottabad.  Furthermore, in a Wall 
Street Journal opinion piece, John Yoo wrote that finding bin Laden 
“vindicates the Bush administration, whose intelligence architecture marked 
the path to bin Laden’s door.” (Yoo, 2011)  The contention that the 
waterboarding of Khalid Sheik Mohammad (KSM) led to the eventual 
discovery of one of bin Laden’s trusted couriers which, in turn, led to bin 
Laden, compelled Senator John McCain (R-AZ) to condemn the use of torture 
on the Senate floor.  McCain, a victim of torture when he was captured by the 
North Vietnamese, strongly disputed the suggestion that bin Laden’s 
discovery was made possible due to torture.  Then, former Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey, appointed by Bush after Gonzales resigned, came forward 
to argue that his “sources” assured him KSM “broke like a dam under the 
pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding.  He 
loosed a torrent of information---including eventually the nickname of a trusted 
courier of bin Laden.”   (Mukasey, 2011)  Besides the impossibility of proving a 
link between waterboarding KSM and finding bin Laden’s compound with the 
information currently available, the discourse on the usefulness of techniques 
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formerly considered torture in the U.S. point to a troubling legacy of the Bush 
II administration. 
 Human rights advocates argue that it is difficult to believe Americans 
who were once active in governing a liberal democracy are actually 
advocating the use of methods that were formerly condemned by previous 
U.S. governments and most other governments around the world.  Debating 
the usefulness of torture would have been unthinkable prior to the Bush 
administration’s “war on terror” and for many, this may be that war’s most 
disturbing legacy.  The Bush administration officials who continue to point out 
the effectiveness of their techniques avoid calling “enhanced interrogation” 
methods torture and this reticence has been taken up by the American press.  
According to a 2011 study from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 
American newspapers called waterboarding torture until 2004 when the news 
broke that the Bush II administration did it to at least three detainees.  Since 
2004, the American mainstream media has usually treated the issue of 
waterboarding as “disputed” or “controversial” and avoids labelling it as a form 
of torture.   
Former Bush II administration officials also fail to address other aspects 
of the torture debate, in particular, the legal and moral questions involved in 
using torture to extract information from detainees.  Leaving the morality of 
torture to ethicists, a brief examination of the legality of “enhanced 
interrogation” reveals that the most egregious of the methods, waterboarding, 
violates both international law (including the Convention against Torture) and 
U.S. federal law.  Other methods such as sleep deprivation, hooding, stress 
309
positions, being stripped naked and subjected to loud music and extreme 
temperatures may rise to the level of torture or inhumane treatment, 
particularly when used in combination with each other.  The U.S. government 
frequently condemned these types of interrogation methods prior to the Bush 
II administration.  In fact, in 1947, the U.S. prosecuted a Japanese officer, 
Yukio Asano, for war crimes for waterboarding an American during WWII.  
(Pincus, 2006)  It is impossible to predict how long the stain of having used 
such methods will hang over the U.S., whether an American citizen will be 
subjected to this type of treatment in the future, and what the unintended 
consequences of torture are.  What is known is that the current debate centres 
around whether the “enhanced interrogation” methods used on detainees 
worked, and not on their legality or morality.  Thus, the Bush II administration 
succeeded in lowering the bar to the level of utility as far as torture is 
concerned. 
In his book Torture Team, Sands explored whether the Bush II 
administration lawyers who wrote the legal memos which resulted in detainee 
abuses should be held accountable for their legal advice.  He noted the 
analogy in the legal reasoning between lawyers tried at Nuremberg in the 
Altstotter case and lawyers writing the New Paradigm for the WOT: “domestic 
law and national security needs trump everything, international rules are 
obsolete, a new paradigm exists.”  (Sands, 2008: 187)  In the book, Sands 
questioned Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of Defense, about the 
culpability of lawyers working on the New Paradigm; Feith was 
understandably unhappy with any analogy with Nazi lawyers, pointing out that 
their crimes were part of a regime’s attempt to exterminate an entire race of 
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people.  At the conclusion of their discussion, Sands quoted Feith as saying 
the lawyers working for the Bush II administration “were all grappling with this 
extremely difficult problem of how do you defend the system against enemies 
of this kind, and some people came up with some ideas that were a little over-
enthusiastic and some of these ideas have nothing to do with the war on 
terrorism, they have everything to do with these broader points about 
presidential power.”  (Sands, 2008: 190)  In the end, many of the broader 
points about presidential power will remain unresolved and available as 
precedents for the next administration that feels it is faced with a novel enemy 
and huge security risks.  In theory, it is still possible for some lawyers in the 
Bush II administration to face consequences for promulgating these memos, 
despite the fact that the Obama administration has taken no action to hold 
them accountable for their lawyering.  In practice, it is very unlikely. 
Other rights long considered intrinsic to a liberal democracy such as the 
right to a speedy trial in a civilian court, and the right to hear what one is 
accused of, were curtailed in the Bush administration’s “war on terror” and the 
ramifications are still being felt.  Article I, section 9 of the U.S. Constitution 
permits Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, long considered 
central to the maintenance of liberty, only in “cases of rebellion or invasion.”  
On November 13, 2001 President Bush issued a military order stating that 
non-citizens of the U.S. suspected of terrorist activity would be tried by military 
tribunals due to the “national emergency” he proclaimed on September 14, 
2001. (Greenberg and Dratel, 2005: 25-28)  However, does the 9/11 attack, 
which lasted one day, qualify as a “rebellion or invasion” justifying the 
suspension of habeas corpus?  In addition, on December 28, 2001, two 
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attorneys in the OLC, John Yoo and Patrick Philbin, wrote a memo for the 
legal counsel at the Department of Defense, William Haynes, about “possible 
habeas jurisdiction over aliens held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” (Greenberg 
and Dratel, 2005: 29-37)  In the memo, Yoo and Philbin asserted that “federal 
courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by alien detainees held 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States,” the same position 
espoused by the New Paradigm for the WOT.  Eventually, the U.S. Supreme 
Court disagreed with the Bush administration’s legal reasoning and ruled that 
federal courts did have jurisdiction over the detainees at Guantanamo. But the 
process of hearing cases was slow and this meant that detainees spent years 
in detention without charge and without access to an attorney.  
Another legal debate involving the extreme positions of the New 
Paradigm revolved around the fate of an American citizen, Jose Padilla, 
accused of ties to al Qaeda and plotting to detonate a “dirty bomb.”  Padilla 
was arrested as he stepped off a plane in Chicago on May 8, 2002 and 
President Bush designated him an “enemy combatant” the next month, which 
meant moving him to a military prison where he was held without charge and 
without access to a lawyer for three and a half years.  His detention became 
an issue for civil liberty groups who denounced the Bush administration’s 
claim that Padilla could be held indefinitely without charge.  The precedent of 
detaining an American citizen arrested on American soil, far from the 
battlefields of Afghanistan, and holding him indefinitely without charge struck 
many legal analysts as an anathema to the common law cases inherited from 
Great Britain and incorporated into U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence.  
Padilla’s case slowly wound its way through the federal court system and just 
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as it appeared that the U.S. Supreme Court might issue a ruling that would 
contradict the Bush administration’s preferred legal reasoning, Padilla was 
transferred from military detention to a federal court and charged with several 
criminal offenses.  Several legal commentators believe the transfer was done 
to avoid an adverse Supreme Court ruling on the legality of holding citizens in 
military detention without charge.  In the end, the Bush administration did not 
charge him with plotting to use a dirty bomb but, instead, with conspiracy.  In 
August 2007, he was convicted on all counts.  Padilla was sentenced to 17 
years and 4 months in federal prison; he later sued John Yoo for authoring the 
August 2002 “torture memos” which led to the use of harsh interrogation 
methods.  In his lawsuit, Padilla alleges that he was subjected to extreme 
sleep and sensory deprivation, stress positions, and other illegal forms of 
interrogation as a result of the “torture memos.”  
President Obama promised to close the Guantanamo detention facility 
within one year of taking office, but Congress refused to allocate funding for 
this purpose.  As of June 2012, the prison remains open and is likely to remain 
so, given the political opposition to moving prisoners to facilities in the U.S.  
The Obama administration originally stated it would try Khalid Sheik 
Mohammad in federal court in New York City but had to retract this when it 
became politically unpopular to try him in a civilian court in New York.  The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, expressed concern in 2011 
that the U.S., with all the powers at its disposal, has not been able to close 
Guantanamo and will hold trials in military, not civilian, courts.   
Congress has the power to legislate regarding the trial procedures and 
law-of-war detentions of GITMO prisoners, but it remains reluctant to take the 
political risks involved in resolving issues surrounding the trial rights and 
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detention policies of those accused of ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda.  
According to a Brookings Institution study, this means the U.S. court system, 
on a case by case basis, must fashion a legal regime for “defining the rules of 
military detention.”  Obama’s failure to close GITMO indicates that it is difficult 
to “undo” or reverse a decision made by the previous administration in the 
WOT, and that subsequent American governments may have to resolve the 
issues left by GITMO and other detention facilities. 
Taken together, these cases reveal the pattern of an assertive 
executive, willing to stretch legal doctrines to achieve its goals of indefinite 
detention, coercive interrogations, and maximum flexibility to pursue policies 
in the WOT.  The Bush II administration, true to Koh’s concepts on executive 
initiative and congressional acquiescence, did not seek Congressional input or 
legislative authorization (except for the Iraq invasion) for its most far-reaching 
policies.  For its part, Congress, until the Democratic Party took control after 
the elections of November 2006, went along with the administration’s agenda.  
In fact, the research on the previous three administrations and the Bush II 
administration illustrates that Congress is unlikely to exercise meaningful 
oversight or control over the executive branch when the President and both 
houses of Congress are in the hands of the same political party and the issue 
is national security.  Even after the Democrats took control over both houses 
of Congress in January 2007, the new Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi 
(D-CA.), stated that there would be no impeachment inquiry regarding 
President Bush, thus nullifying the most potent tool the Congress may exert 
over the executive branch.   
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Article II, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution prescribes impeachment of 
the president, vice president, and civil officers of the U.S. for “treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”  Impeachment, which is described 
as the ultimate weapon Congress has to control the executive branch, is rarely 
used; only Andrew Johnston in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998 have been 
impeached, and neither was removed from office.  Therefore, it is a blunt and 
cumbersome method of controlling the executive, but when Pelosi withdrew 
the threat of impeachment after the midterm elections of 2006, the Bush II 
administration realized it was immune from the most drastic form of legislative 
assertiveness for the remainder of its term in office.  Fein, the Reagan 
administration lawyer, contended that Pelosi opposed an impeachment inquiry 
because it would not be good for her political fortunes or the Democratic 
Party.  (Fein Interview and Fein, 2008: 41)  In addition, the failure to seriously 
investigate possible impeachable offenses leaves a dangerous precedent.  As 
he noted, “If Congress does not repudiate the Bush-Cheney abuses and 
usurpations---perpetrated under the pretense that the nation has been forced 
to a permanent war footing with international terrorism threatening to bring a 
Caliphate to Washington, D.C.---a dangerous safe harbor will have been 
created for their successors in the White House.”  (Fein expanded on this 
theme from his book in the interview.) 
Fein also discussed the reasons for congressional inaction regarding 
the excesses of the Bush II administration.  For him, there are primarily two 
explanations; the first is that member of Congress are “generally ignorant of 
the Constitution’s antecedents, history, and philosophy.”  (Fein Interview and 
Fein, 2008: 49)  The second reason for acquiescing to the executive branch is 
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the tendency for members to “routinely subordinate the Constitution to party 
loyalty.”  (Ibid)  In other words, political expediency translates into members of 
Congress consenting to the president’s agenda when they have the same 
party affiliation.  Nothing in the current research contradicts Fein’s theory on 
congressional inaction in the area of national security. 
Another interviewee, Louis Fisher, Congressional Research scholar, 
discussed the interactions between the executive and legislative branches 
regarding the decision to use military force; he firmly believes committing U.S. 
forces to military action requires the collective judgment of both the President 
and Congress.  For Fisher, the historical record on the Founding Fathers 
clearly establishes their desire “to circumscribe the President’s authority to 
take unilateral military actions” except in cases where the President had to 
defend against sudden attacks.  (Fisher Interview and Fisher, 2004: 8)  In his 
extensive scholarly research and the interview, Fisher distinguished between 
offensive and defensive wars.  According to Fisher, from 1789 until Truman 
went to war in Korea without congressional authorization in 1950, the principle 
regulating the use of force gave the President “certain defensive powers to 
repel sudden attacks, but anything of an offensive nature (taking the country 
from a state of peace to a state of war) was reserved to Congress.”  (Fisher 
Interview)  He noted, “Presidents like to control foreign policy without 
constraints from anybody.  Scholars are to blame, also, for pushing the idea 
that the president is all-powerful and need not consult with Congress.”  (Fisher 
Interview) 
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Koh, who is now the Obama administration’s Legal Advisor of the 
Department of State, examined why the President “wins” in foreign affairs 
disputes in his book The National Security Constitution.  As examined in 
chapter 3, Koh identified several reasons, including the tendency for the 
executive branch to take the initiative by construing laws designed to constrain 
actions as authorizations instead.  (Koh, 1990: 117)  In addition, “Congress 
has usually complied with or acquiesced in what the president has done, 
through legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, or 
sheer lack of political will.”  (Ibid)  In the cases discussed in this research, two 
explanations dominate: the first is the lack of political will on the part of 
members of Congress, particularly regarding regulating aspects of the WOT, 
and the second is congressional acquiescence in executive branch initiatives.  
This suggests that future presidents will enjoy a large measure of compliance 
from Congress regarding policies that employ force in fighting terrorism, 
especially when the President’s party controls both houses of Congress.  
The last domestic, political institution that might constrain contemporary 
Presidents in the realm of foreign affairs is the judiciary.  According to Koh, the 
U.S. courts tolerate presidential initiatives “either by refusing to hear 
challenges to those acts or by hearing the challenges and then affirming 
presidential authority on the merits.”  (Ibid)  Although Koh wrote his analysis in 
1990, the pattern and problems he discussed apply equally to the Bush II 
administration and WOT.  For instance, the federal courts did eventually rule 
against some of the worst excesses of the Bush II administration’s New 
Paradigm but only when a specific case with an identifiable plaintiff was 
brought to the courts and rigorously argued by motivated attorneys.  The 
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substantial procedural obstacles that must be overcome before a case will be 
adjudicated by the federal courts are detailed more completely in chapter 3.   
One of the legal principles that the Bush II administration used 
extensively “to declare that momentous questions about its use of executive 
power simply could not be adjudicated, in cases from lawsuits involving 
detainee abuse by the CIA to its warrantless domestic surveillance programs” 
was the state secrets doctrine. (Savage, 2007: 169)  This is actually an 
evidentiary privilege that the government invokes to avoid the disclosure of 
material that could compromise national security; it rests on the case U.S. v. 
Reynolds (1953) from the Truman administration.   According to one analysis, 
from January 2001 to January 2009, the “privilege played a significant role in 
the executive branch’s national security litigation strategy. In one case, the 
administration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times.”  
(Donohue, 2010: 55)  One of the interviewees, Fisher, explained the danger of 
the government relying too much on the state secrets privilege to muzzle 
investigations.  (Fisher Interview)  Fisher and civil libertarians want the courts 
to curtail use of the doctrine by having judges review the evidence involving 
state secrets to determine whether it really does impinge on national security, 
instead of dismissing the entire lawsuit.  As in the original case, U.S. v. 
Reynolds, the state secrets doctrine can be used by the government to 
conceal malfeasance or embarrassing mistakes.   
Currently the courts continue to defer to government claims that 
adjudication would harm national security.  In many cases where the state 
secrets doctrine is invoked by the Department of Justice, the courts defer to 
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the government and the case is dismissed, without any finding that the 
evidence in question actually involved national security.  The case Mohamed 
et al. v. Jeppesen Dataplan is an example of the government successfully 
ending a lawsuit that might have revealed illegality by some members of that 
government.  In 2007, five extraordinary rendition victims filed suit in federal 
court against Jeppesen, a Boeing subsidiary, alleging Jeppesen participated 
in the renditions by providing critical flight planning and logistical support to 
the CIA.  The Bush II administration argued that the lawsuit should be 
dismissed under the state secrets doctrine because further litigation would 
endanger national security.  The Obama administration adopted the same 
approach as the previous administration and urged the court to dismiss the 
case due to state secrets.  In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari (declined to accept the case), thereby ending the lawsuit.  The 
Constitution Project, a nonpartisan think-tank in Washington, criticized the 
dismissal of the lawsuit, noting that it gave the Bush II administration 
“immunity from claims of torture,” and they called on Congress “to pass 
legislation to restore the role of courts as a check on executive power.”  These 
cases suggest that meaningful control over executive excess in pursuing 
terrorists is lacking in the U.S. and will continue to complicate efforts by the 
U.S. to prevent international terrorism while preserving civil liberties.  
Finally, by breaking with the previous three administrations’ practices in 
the areas of detention and interrogation, the Bush II administration record 
makes it much more difficult for the U.S. to curtail other states if they decide to 
indefinitely detain suspects or violate international norms regarding 
interrogations.  The work of multilateral organizations such as the UN also 
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becomes more arduous as far as enforcing human rights standards goes, 
when the world’s superpower flaunts international rules in the name of fighting 
a “war” on terrorism.  The role of international law norms in regulating the use 
of force is discussed in the section below.   
Modification of UN Norms on the Use of Force 
 The purpose of this research was not to identify legal or illegal uses of 
force; rather, the primary research question asks whether the second Bush 
administration’s use of force to combat international terrorism was different 
from the previous three administrations.   There is a great deal written in legal 
journals about the UN Charter and the norms surrounding articles 2(4) and 51 
and whether international law was adequate in dealing with the requirements 
of the WOT. (Garraway, 2006)  One school of thought was founded upon the 
proposition that international law was “completely capable of dealing with the 
various challenges arising out of the terrorism issue.” (Van Krieken, 2002: 9)  
An opposing view, favoured by the lawyers writing the New Paradigm for the 
WOT, is that international law, if it exists, can not constrain the U.S. in taking 
action to protect its nationals, nor was it adequate in dealing with the 
challenges posed by rogue states and terrorists with WMD.  Perhaps the best 
enunciation of this view is from President Bush in December 2003 when he 
said, “International law?  I better call my lawyer. . . I don’t know what you’re 
talking about by international law.”  (Sands, 2005: 205)  This study does not 
evaluate the validity of these views, but attempts to understand how they 
might influence an administration’s use of force. 
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One constant theme in the examination of the four administrations is 
the desire of all the administrations to demonstrate the actions it took 
regarding the use of force were entirely consistent with international law.  So, 
for example, the Reagan administration justified the bombing of Libya in 1986 
to the UN Security Council under the right of self-defence in article 51; the 
U.S. noted that the bombing was taken to deter future terrorist attacks.  (Gray, 
2004: 162)  Similarly, the Clinton administration invoked the right of self-
defence at discussions in the Security Council to illustrate that both the 1993 
bombing of Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad and the 1998 missile 
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan were lawful responses to terrorism.  (Gray, 
2004: 163)  Note that both Reagan and Clinton were careful to avoid 
identifying the use of force as reprisals, which are generally disfavoured under 
international law, and both claimed the actions were legal as measures of self-
defence.  That successive U.S. administrations would attempt to reconcile 
uses of force with the norms and standards of international law is not 
surprising, given that most states couch their actions in presumptive legality 
and the U.S. was instrumental in constructing the legal regime for the use of 
force after World War II.  The contemporary irony is, as explained by Sands in 
Lawless World, the second Bush administration purposefully disavowed the 
UN Charter’s regime for the use of force without proposing an alternative that 
would work as well as the present regime.  (Sands, 2005) 
Another theme, which emerges from the study of the four 
administrations, is the reoccurring school of legal thought justifying the legality 
of using force to prevent international terrorism.  One leading exponent of this 
school, and member of the Reagan administration, is Abraham Sofaer, former 
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legal advisor to the State Department (1985-1990) whose writings continue to 
influence American discourse on this topic.  Writing in the 1980’s, Sofaer 
argued that a narrow view of self-defence under international law tended to 
“give terrorists and their state sponsors substantial advantages in their war 
against the democracies.” (Sofaer, 1989: 91)  More recently, he advocated 
using preventive force to counter threats from terrorist networks before they 
are imminent, even if the use of force would appear to be illegal.  According to 
Sofaer, the use of force in certain situations would be legitimate, even if not 
strictly legal under traditional international law.  In addition, even though the 
Bush II administration is gone, Sofaer maintains that the “objective of 
preventing terrorist threats before they are realized---rather than primarily 
treating terrorism as a crime warranting punishment after the fact---is now 
established as an essential element of US national security.”  (Sofaer, 2010: 
109)  
In a radio interview in December 2010, Sofaer was asked whether the 
Obama administration’s policies regarding preventing international terrorism 
and the use of force were a departure from the Bush II administration.  He 
replied that the difference was in “style, not substance.”  He then elaborated 
on how both the Bush II administration and Obama administrations ask the 
same questions before employing force: 
a) Shall we use force to prevent terrorist attacks?  
b) Shall we attack non-state actors even if they are present in a foreign 
state?  
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c) Shall we attack without UN Security Council authorization if our 
national security requires it?  
Left unaddressed is the broader question of whether this manner of 
preventing international terrorism furthers one of the most important goals 
underlying the UN Charter regime, i.e. the maintenance of international 
peace.  Other problematic elements of Sofaer’s type of counterterrorism 
policy include whether this policy is available to other states such as Russia 
or China.  Finally, does this policy actually reduce the number of terrorist 
attacks worldwide? 
Customary International Law 
The reaction of other states to the U.S. use of force to prevent 
international terrorism is important and relevant regarding customary 
international law.  Unlike treaty law, which is carefully written in conventions 
and treaties, customary international law is the result of state practice and 
opinion juris.  A rule of customary international law traditionally results from 
the following: concordant practice by a number of states and the continuation 
or repetition of this practice over a considerable period of time (state practice); 
and the conception that the practice is required by prevailing international law 
and general acquiescence in this practice by other states (opinion juris).  
(Weston, Falk, and D’Amato, 1990: 80)  Thus, the reactions of the world 
community to American assertions on a disputed doctrine of customary 
international law are factors in determining whether the norms of international 
law are changing in the direction favoured by the U.S.  World reaction to the 
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American use of force against Libya in 1986 was largely negative, with the UN 
General Assembly adopting a resolution condemning the U.S. for the attack.  
(Maogoto, 2005:133)  By 1993, the world response to Clinton’s use of force 
against Baghdad for the attempted assassination of the first President Bush 
was more “tacit acquiescence” and, by 1998, the response from the 
international community was “mixed” after the U.S. cruise missile strikes in 
Afghanistan and Sudan.  (Ibid)  For some legal scholars, this is evidence that 
the world community acquiesces in the use of force to respond or preempt 
terrorist activity where the state in which the activity originates is unable or 
unwilling to curtail the terrorists on its own. 
Anticipatory Self-Defence 
    The doctrine of anticipatory self-defence figures prominently in scholarly 
discussions of the use of force and the “Bush doctrine.”  Under the doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defence, a state is permitted to defend itself prior to an actual 
attack with the use of force as long as certain requirements are satisfied.  The 
requirements are necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.  The concept 
envisions a framework for self-defence in circumstances where a serious 
threat of armed attack exists; the difficulty of acquiring the correct intelligence 
about a possible attack and the possibility of states using the doctrine as a 
pretext for using force first are among the reasons it remains an unsettled 
area of international law.  The theoretical basis for allowing anticipatory self-
defence is that it would unconscionable for states to wait until a devastating 
blow is struck before being lawfully allowed to defend themselves.  The 
doctrine became more imperative, according to some law professors, with the 
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advent of nuclear weapons that could deliver an overwhelming first strike.  As 
many scholars have noted, the UN Charter and its prohibitions on the use of 
force were written prior to the ready availability of weapons of mass 
destruction and the ability of transnational terrorist networks to wreak 
devastation on the scale of a nation-state. 
The requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy are 
based on an 1837 case called The Caroline involving British force on an 
American ship aiding Canadian rebels.  The requirements were expressed as 
a result of the correspondence between the U.S. and Great Britain after the 
Caroline incident.  The agreed formula for a state lawfully claiming self-
defence is the state must show a “necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”  
This formula is still cited and relied upon despite the passage of time and 
improvements to modern weaponry.  In addition to necessity, proportionality, 
and immediacy, an “armed attack” must occur or, at least, be imminent before 
the right to self-defence may be invoked.  It is still debatable whether or not 
the September 11 attacks altered the concept of “armed attack” to include 
non-state actors such as terrorists in the absence of any state complicity.  
(Gray, 2004: 165)  For most states, the question of whether the use of force 
by individuals is an “armed attack” is: has there been a “sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to acts of aggression.”  (Nicaragua Case, 1986) The U.S, during the 
Reagan administration, began to interpret the concept of “armed attack” to 
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include certain terrorist activities; this occurred as part of President Reagan’s 
response to Libyan inspired terrorism like the La Belle disco bombing in 1985.   
Anticipatory self-defence, which is self-defence before an actual attack 
occurs, is grounded in article 51 of the UN Charter and remains controversial 
as few states other than the U.S. and Israel invoke it as justification.  George 
W. Bush gave one of the best-known explanations for it in a speech at West 
Point on June 1, 2002.  After first describing why deterrence and containment 
were not adequate for the post 9/11 world, he said, “If we wait for threats to 
fully materialize, we will have waited too long. … We must take the battle to 
the enemy … and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” (FN 
speech)  Later that year, the Bush II administration released its National 
Security Strategy, which used the words prevention and preemption 
interchangeably, causing confusion about meanings.  As Heisbourg wrote, 
“The ambiguities in the language used by the Bush administration could 
actually hinder further legal innovations and new interpretations of existing 
international laws, while a perfectly good case might be made for preemption 
and, with qualifications, for prevention in existing international legal terms.”  
(Heisbourg, 2003: 79) 
To the extent that the Bush Doctrine embraces anticipatory self-
defence as a viable and lawful concept, many problems are foreseeable if the 
world community accepted this as a norm of international law.  In place of the 
relatively clear prohibitions on the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, there would be more malleable and ambiguous norms regulating 
when a state may resort to military force in attempting to secure its territory 
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and nationals against terrorism.  For example, allowing the state itself, instead 
of the Security Council, to determine a threat to international peace exists, and 
then permitting the state to take action to preempt that threat could result in 
situations very similar to the pre-UN Charter era with anarchistic uses of force.  
General dissatisfaction with how the pre-Charter rules were used and abused 
by states wishing to use force led the international community to adopt clearer 
regulations after the debacle of WWII.  At present, the majority of states do not 
advocate a return to earlier norms regarding the use of force.  It remains to be 
seen whether future American administrations continue to “push the envelope” 
as far as acceptance of anticipatory self-defence is concerned. 
Afghanistan and the Legal Basis for the Use of Force 
Despite the confusion accompanying the notions of prevention and 
preemption in the Bush Doctrine, there are distinctions between the legal 
basis for the use of force in Afghanistan and the use of force in Iraq.  In 
Afghanistan, the domestic legal basis for sending U.S. troops was the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 2001, discussed 
in detail in the section on Afghanistan.  On the international level, the legal 
basis for using force in Afghanistan rests on UN Security Council resolutions 
1368 and 1373.  Resolution 1368, adopted on September 12, 2001, 
immediately after the attacks of 9/11, recognized the right of states to 
individual self-defence in addition to describing the attacks as a “threat to 
international peace and security.”  Less than three weeks later, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001, which expressly 
affirmed the inherent right of self-defence and called upon states to cooperate 
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to suppress terrorist acts.  Significantly, the Security Council and other 
international bodies characterized the 9/11 tragedy as “armed attacks,” even 
though the acts were attributed to a non-state network called al Qaeda.  Prior 
to Resolutions 1368 and 1373, the Security Council had never adopted a 
resolution explicitly encompassing the right of individual and collective self-
defence after a particular terrorist attack.  As one law professor wrote 
regarding the Security Council, the willingness of the UN to “invoke and 
reaffirm self-defence under article 51 in response to the September 11 
terrorist attacks is an important act and for some states, helped legitimize the 
U.S. military response as a  legal use of force.”  (Maogoto, 2005: 120)    
The U.S. use of force in Afghanistan was joined by other states, notably 
the UK and many other states, who agreed that force was justified in closing al 
Qaeda training camps and capturing terrorists in light of the Taliban’s refusal 
to do so.  There was either general acquiescence or agreement to the U.S. 
assertion of a right to use force in the particular circumstances in Afghanistan, 
in contrast to the subsequent situation in Iraq.  Writing in December 2001 
regarding the development of customary international law norms, Kirgis 
expressed his view that the “absence of challenge to the U.S. asserted right of 
self-defense could be taken to indicate acquiescence in an expansion of the 
right to include defense against governments that harbour or support 
organized terrorist groups that commit armed attacks in other countries.”  
(Kirgis, 2001)   Ten years after the attacks, the problematic issue may be the 
question of proportionality, as in, is it proportionate for the U.S. military to 
remain in Afghanistan when the Taliban government no longer exists and al 
Qaeda no longer has a safe haven there.  As noted by several legal 
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authorities, “there has never been any authoritative definition of what is and 
what is not a proportional state response to a terrorist attack.”  (Dinstein, 
2005: 184)    
Iraq and the Legal Basis for the Use of Force 
The use of force in Iraq represents an entirely different situation as 
there had been no “armed attack” from the state of Iraq or any terrorist groups 
operating within Iraq against the U.S.  (Note the last known terrorist act by Iraq 
against the U.S. was the attempted assassination of George H. W. Bush in 
1993.)  For domestic legal purposes, the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force against Iraq passed by Congress on October 16, 2002, provided the 
basis for sending American troops to Iraq in March 2003.  Unlike the use of 
force in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq has generated much more legal 
uncertainty regarding international law.  There are many UN Security 
Resolutions concerning Iraq, its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the UN 
inspections to ensure compliance with the weapons regime.  The most 
relevant for this research is Resolution 1441 adopted unanimously in 
November 2002 after intense lobbying by the Bush II administration.  
Resolution 1441 “deplored” the absence of weapons inspections by the UN in 
Iraq since December 1998 and gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.”  It ended 
with a reminder that “the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face 
serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”  
However, it did not make the use of force against Iraq to enforce previous 
resolutions automatic.   
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The UK and other states advocated a second UN resolution specifically 
authorizing force before the invasion, but it became increasingly clear that 
other states, such as France and Russia, would block the adoption of a 
second, stronger resolution.  The Bush II administration later claimed that a 
second UN resolution was unnecessary; this position is not widely held among 
the world community nor supported by scholarly opinion.  Condoleezza Rice 
claimed in No Higher Honor that the U.S. had simply run out of options for 
dealing with Saddam Hussein and Iraq, thus forcing the U.S to resort to the 
military option.  (Rice, 2011)  For the Bush II administration, the legality of 
using force in Iraq stemmed from a variety of factors including Iraq’s 
unwillingness to allow further weapons inspections, Iraq’s alleged ties to 
terrorist groups, and Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons, which, according to 
President Bush and other administration officials, indicated a willingness to 
share WMD with terrorist networks like al Qaeda.  At a speech in Ohio, 
President Bush claimed, “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level 
contacts that go back a decade.  Some al Qaeda leaders who fled 
Afghanistan went to Iraq.”  Although the asserted links between Iraq and al 
Qaeda seemed tenuous in 2002 and early 2003, the Bush II officials continued 
to cite them as an urgent reason compelling the U.S. to strike first, before Iraq 
gave al Qaeda WMD or associated technology.  It is now evident that the 
“high-level contacts” President Bush spoke of never existed.  Despite the fact 
that many things President Bush and his administration cited as reasons for 
invading Iraq later turned out to be false, the administration has always 
maintained that the invasion of Iraq was lawful. 
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According to the legal analysis of the lawyers in the Bush II 
administration, the invasion of Iraq was lawful on two independent grounds.  
John Yoo wrote an examination of the war’s legality and claimed the first legal 
ground rests on previous UN Security Council resolutions to implement the 
cease-fire agreement that suspended the hostilities in the 1991 Gulf War.  Iraq 
was in material breach of the terms of the cease-fire, permitting the U.S. and 
its allies to suspend the operation of the cease-fire and use force to compel 
Iraqi compliance.  The second legal ground is the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defence.  As Yoo wrote, “international law permitted the use of force against 
Iraq in anticipatory self-defense because of the threat posed by an Iraq armed 
with WMD and in potential cooperation with international terrorist 
organizations.” (Yoo, 2003: 575)  Needless to add, this analysis is not widely 
shared outside of the U.S.  The dangers in using the second legal ground, 
anticipatory self-defence, generate caution on the part of the rest of the 
international community, where fears of returning to a permissive use of force 
regime inhibit policy makers and those who seek to avoid international conflict.   
Expansion of Executive Power 
 This section will examine the expansion of executive power which 
occurred during the Bush II administration, especially those aspects related to 
policies in the WOT.  It also discusses the ramifications of the absence of 
accountability for abuses of power during that administration and attempts to 
predict future behaviour regarding American presidents who confront acts of 
international terrorism.  At the start of President Obama’s term, a Yale law 
professor wrote that the big question was whether the new president would 
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ensure that future presidents could not use “the precedents of the Bush years 
as a springboard for even more extreme assertions of executive authority.”  
(Ackerman, 2009)  These precedents include conducting a warrantless 
wiretapping program, relying on the president’s inherent powers to detain and 
interrogation suspects without congressional oversight, and heavy reliance on 
the doctrines of executive privilege and state secrets. While some of these 
pertain more to domestic issues of governance, others were part of the 
collective campaign known as the WOT and were part of the Bush II 
administration’s governing model.  
 In what may be the most surprising finding of this research, given that 
it involves a political system that champions and celebrates checks and 
balances among the various branches of government, the evidence from the 
four administrations reveals a lack of real, domestic constraints on an 
executive when that executive intends to increase its powers in the realm of 
national security.  As Donohue notes, “in the face of terrorism the legislature’s 
and the judiciary’s ability to offset the executive is severely diminished.”  
(Donohue, 2008: 11)  She also argues that the “drive to increase power is a 
function of the office, not of the political affiliation of those in power.” (Ibid)   
The administrations in this study, three Republican and one 
Democratic, share many tendencies as far as responding to terrorism is 
concerned.  For example, all four presidents viewed the War Powers 
Resolution as unconstitutional and, in practice, no real constraint on their 
power to insert U.S. military forces into hostilities, despite the stated intent of 
the Congress when the WPR was passed in 1973.  The militarization of U.S. 
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foreign policy with the concordant upward trend in funding the U.S. military is 
evident during all four administrations in this research.  All four presidents 
used military force to respond to international terrorism, except George H.W. 
Bush (and that may be partially explained by the fact that he was a one term 
president; he certainly agreed with its use in principle).  Additionally, whenever 
the president uses military force in a counterterrorist campaign, from Reagan’s 
bombing of Libya, to the raid on bin Laden’s compound, the American public 
overwhelmingly supports the use of force.  As Bacevich notes, “The American 
public’s ready acceptance of the prospect of war without foreseeable end and 
of a policy that abandons even the pretence of the United States fighting 
defensively or viewing war as a last resort shows clearly how far the process 
of militarization has advanced.”  (Bacevich, 2005: 19) 
 However, despite these tendencies, it would be a gross 
oversimplification to write that the Bush II administration and its use of force 
broke no new ground vis-à-vis the previous three administrations and 
terrorism.  Pfiffner noted that President Bush was “not the first president to 
take an expansive approach to his constitutional authority.”  (Pfiffner, 2008: 
231)  However, Bush went beyond previous Presidents and “he claimed that 
his constitutional authority as president allowed him to act independently of 
the other two branches of government and to avoid oversight by them.”  (Ibid)  
The final chapter returns to the research questions and analyzes the findings 
to explain this characterization of the Bush record. 
 Winkler examined the second Bush administration’s marshalling of 
terrorism rhetoric to justify the expansion of Commander-in-Chief powers.  By 
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comparing the 9/11 attacks with “two key historical moments when the United 
States had been under attack: the War of 1812 and Pearl Harbor,” George W. 
Bush was able to make the case that a major incident called for broad powers 
to protect the country.  (Winkler, 2006: 168)  Additionally, the administration 
compared al Qaeda to the communist menace of the Cold War, thereby 
implying that the terrorist network was a global danger committed to 
spectacular destruction.  (Ibid)  While Reagan, Bush senior, and Clinton all 
spoke about the dangers of terrorism, no previous administration worked in 
the climate of continuing crisis that engulfed the Bush II administration from 
9/11 onwards.  The fear of more al Qaeda attacks, the anthrax attacks, the 
attempted shoe bombing by Richard Reid, and other near-misses exacerbated 
the administration’s propensity to maintain a “state of war” mentality. 
Lack of Constraints 
 The lack of constraints on the executive’s actions vis-à-vis the 
application of force for counterterrorism is striking.  In theory, according to the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution, the legislative or judicial branch or both 
would work as a check on executive branch agendas but the history of the 
past four administrations reveals this has not worked in practice.  Another 
constraint on the president is law, specifically the domestic laws and 
international laws that exist to regulate the use of force, the treatment of 
detainees, and other issues surrounding hostilities.  International law is 
explored more fully in the section on the UN and international norms.  An 
examination of the historical record of the Bush II administration clearly 
reveals few constraints.  Domestic U.S. law, while enjoying a better reputation 
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than international law during the second Bush administration, was not a 
significant restraint on many areas in the WOT.  To name but a few: federal 
law prohibiting torture was defined by lawyers working on the New Paradigm 
to permit the waterboarding of detainees; FISA, the law overseeing wiretaps, 
was interpreted or bypassed, allowing the Bush administration to ignore its 
provisions on wiretapping; and the WPR, enacted to limit presidential military 
adventures without the input of Congress, did not work as intended to 
increase meaningful legislative consultation on the deployment of US military 
force.    
 Shortly before George W. Bush left office in January 2009, the House 
Judiciary Committee issued a critical report on his presidency.  It 
systematically listed many practices of that administration, noting, “The 
ambitious reach of the Bush Administration’s imperial vision, the audacity with 
which it was pursued, and the extent to which its pursuit was acquiesced in, is 
unprecedented in our Nation’s history. But the imperial impulse – and the 
dangers it poses to democracy, the rule of law, the public welfare, and 
international peace – are all too familiar to students of world history.”   
 Unlike the Reagan, Bush I, or Clinton administrations, the second 
Bush administration consciously attempted to establish a New Paradigm for 
fighting international terrorism.  The goal was maximum flexibility for the 
administration in dealing with detainees, fashioning interrogation methods, 
and implementing governing methods.  The administration planned to evade 
habeas corpus litigation in U.S. federal courts by building Guantanamo prison 
on the island of Cuba.  In a similar fashion, the administration seized on the 
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term “unlawful combatant,” which is not generally defined in international 
humanitarian treaties, as useful terminology to describe a class of detainees.  
The evidence reveals the Bush II lawyers believed this group of detainees 
could be held indefinitely, with fewer rights than those who are designated 
“prisoners of war.”  According to Paust, “what has especially marked the Bush 
administration’s ‘war’ on terrorism are the violations of customary and treaty-
based international law that have been authorized and abetted in connection 
with the detention, rendition, treatment and interrogation of human beings 
within and outside of the united States.”  (Paust, 2007: 45)  This effort to 
achieve maximum flexibility in the war on terror is an important dimension 
distinguishing the Bush II administration from the other administrations. 
Plebiscitary Presidency 
 The best explanatory model for the Bush II executive may be a 
“plebiscitary presidency.”  In his groundbreaking work on the Nixon years, 
Schlesinger described a type of elected monarch or plebiscitary presidency in 
The Imperial Presidency.  This type of presidency meant holding the president 
“accountable only once every four years, shielded in the years between 
elections from congressional and public harassment, empowered by his 
mandate to make war or to make peace, to spend or to impound, to give out 
information or to hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by 
executive order, all in the name of a majority whose choice must prevail till it 
made another choice four years later---unless it wished to embark on the 
drastic and improbable course of impeachment.”  (Schlesinger, 2004: 255)  
Schlesinger viewed foreign affairs as the area where the constitutional 
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balance among the branches of the US government was most likely to be 
disturbed.  Moreover, an international crisis gave any president the 
opportunity to exercise inherent powers and assert almost royal prerogatives.  
This describes the Bush II administration in many aspects; once the Supreme 
Court decided that George Bush won instead of Al Gore in 2000, his 
administration governed as though he could not be held accountable until the 
2004 election.  In addition, the 9/11 tragedy was the international crisis that 
enabled him to exercise inherent powers, facilitating his use of force in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan and other countries where 
drones have been deployed to kill al Qaeda and Taliban suspects. 
  
  Some constitutional law scholars and commentators build upon 
Schlesinger’s analysis of the presidency and predict that the powers of the 
modern presidency will continue to grow unabated by the political checks 
intended by the Founding Fathers.  For instance, Ackerman writes, “while 
Schlesinger was prophetic in sounding the alarm, it [the presidency] has 
become a far more dangerous institution during the forty years since he wrote 
The Imperial Presidency---and these threatening trends promise to accelerate 
over the decades ahead.”  (Ackerman, 2010: 6)  The excesses of the Nixon 
administration led directly to congressional hearings like the Church 
Committee and institutional efforts to ensure the president did not overstep his 
authority, both domestically and in foreign affairs.  In contrast, the Bush II 
administration has resulted in a few congressional hearings but no major 
investigations or institutional reforms to ensure that succeeding presidents do 
not borrow from the precedents of the WOT, either for domestic use 
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(warrantless wiretapping) or in expanding foreign projections of American 
power.  For the student of history, this lapse can only be worrisome. 
 Another significant legacy of the Bush II administration is the fate of 
many senior officials who took questionable actions on behalf of prosecuting 
the WOT.  Unlike officials from the Nixon White House, who were convicted of 
various criminal offenses and punished, very few Bush II administration 
officials have been held accountable.  Nixon himself famously resigned in 
1973 to avoid impeachment.  President Bush and Vice President Cheney, on 
the other hand, have admitted publicly to personally approving waterboarding 
without concern over repercussions.  As Bush wrote in his book, Decision 
Points, the “Department of Justice and CIA lawyers conducted a careful legal 
review,” concluding that it “complied with the Constitution and all applicable 
laws, including those that ban torture.”  (Bush, 2010: 169)  In addition, none of 
the lawyers responsible for fashioning the New Paradigm for the WOT have 
been sanctioned for their questionable lawyering.  For example, Bybee 
became a federal judge while Yoo continues teaching at a prestigious law 
school and writes numerous op-eds for the New York Times, Wall Street
Journal, and other leading newspapers.  The Office of Professional 
Responsibility at the Department of Justice did a five-year investigation of 
Bybee and Yoo and found they were guilty of “professional misconduct.”  This 
meant they might have been subjected to disbarment, resulting in the loss of 
their law licenses, but in 2010, the Obama administration repudiated the 
conclusion, thereby leaving the men free to practice law and, perhaps, advise 
the next Republican administration.  The total lack of accountability regarding 
upholding the rule of law and ensuring respect for democratic principles 
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leaves incentives for future administration officials who feel obliged to stretch 
legal doctrines and bend laws. 
Overall, the costs of fighting terrorism with the use of force in the 
manner of the Bush II administration indicate that they do not outweigh the 
benefits.  The evidence detailing the erosion of civil liberties, deterioration of 
UN norms, and expansion of executive power combine to support preventing 
and responding to terrorism with an emphasis on a law enforcement paradigm 
or a blended diplomacy/war/law enforcement model, not the “war on terror” 
approach advocated by President Bush.  The current administration appears 
on a rhetorical level to embody a change in counterterrorism policies and yet, 
it has increased the use of drones, even in countries where the U.S. is not at 
war (Pakistan), and embraced war paradigm legal justifications for killing bin 
Laden.  In addition, the Obama administration has not closed Guantanamo, 
will be trying some accused terrorists in military tribunals, and keeps open the 
possibility of indefinite detentions.  These indicate it is either unwilling or 
unable to comprehensively change the direction charted by the Bush II 
administration.  Moreover, this research also indicates that the legislative 
branch will usually acquiesce in initiatives undertaken by the executive 
branch, while the judiciary will continue to tolerate executive initiative, only 
rarely intervening to check the most egregious assertions by the executive.  
Needless to add, these are worrisome trends for a liberal democracy such as 
the U.S. 
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 Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
The final chapter returns to the research questions and ties together 
the different strains and themes of the thesis.  The primary question, was the 
Bush administration’s use of force to combat international terrorism different 
from previous American administrations, cannot be answered without 
considerable nuance.  There were important similarities, including the 
continuity of counterterrorism tools across all four administrations.  In addition, 
Congress, although ostensibly jointly responsible with the executive branch for 
the formation of national security decisions, particularly those involving war 
powers, usually complied with the executive’s program and the courts rarely 
intervened.  This confirms the vitality and validity of Koh’s pattern regarding 
national security decision-making of executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance. 
Finally, this thesis examined the administrations’ actions from two legal 
perspectives: the international legal regime for the use of force, and the 
domestic law granting the President the constitutional authority to employ U.S. 
forces.  It argued that international legal norms and domestic laws on the use 
of force were not significant constraints on the Presidents’ ability to exercise 
force which characterized all four administrations.
However, despite the similarities, the Bush II administration was 
different in several important ways from the previous three administrations.  
This thesis examined how a “perfect storm,” -the combination of fear induced 
by the 9/11 tragedy, public acceptance of secrecy and ongoing emergency 
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circumstances, and specific individuals in the Bush administration committed 
to enlarging the powers of the executive branch- occurred which facilitated the 
implementation of the “war on terror.”  Specifically, close examination of the 
primary and secondary sources and the interviews conducted for this thesis 
indicated that the administration’s embrace of a war paradigm, instead of a 
law enforcement approach to counterterrorism, tied in with the administration’s 
goals for a unilateral foreign policy and expanded executive branch 
authorities.  While the second Bush administration borrowed many concepts 
and doctrines from the Reagan administration, it went further in its articulation 
and implementation of executive branch war powers.  One of the most 
important results from this research is, despite the existence of restraints like 
the American system of checks and balances, nothing stopped the second 
Bush administration from implementing its “war on terror.”  The next section 
begins with a consideration of the research questions articulated in chapter 
one. 
Research Questions 
The primary research question was augmented by several secondary 
research questions.  The first question was: What was the administration’s 
policy on the use of force to prevent international terrorism?  A related inquiry 
was: who were the key players in the administrations and were there major 
differences between the departments regarding the use of force?  Answering 
these questions involved examining the four administrations’ rhetorical and 
operational policies towards the “crime versus war” dichotomy defined in the 
literature review chapter.  As explored in chapter 4 on the administration of 
Ronald Reagan, President Reagan declared a policy of “swift and effective 
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retribution” against terrorism; however, as detailed in that chapter, the 
administration pursued this more in its rhetoric than in practice.  Reagan 
ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986 to deter further acts of terrorism. This 
was a watershed event in that Reagan used military force in a counterterrorist 
operation, despite objections from the international community. Several key 
players in Reagan’s administration, including his legal adviser to the State 
Department, Abraham Sofaer, advocated the “proactive” or war against 
terrorism approach.  The major differences between key players in Reagan’s 
administration, examined in chapter 4, involved the dispute between Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger who opposed military action against terrorism 
and Secretary of State George Shultz who viewed terrorism as a form of 
warfare.  The Reagan administration and its “war against terrorism” paradigm 
exerted a great deal of influence on subsequent administrations, particularly 
the Bush II administration. 
Chapter 5 explored the administration of the George H. W. Bush and 
one of its paradoxes.  While the policy statements from that administration 
indicated that it might favour a war paradigm as opposed to a law enforcement 
approach to terrorism, in fact, the administration did not use force in 
combating terrorism, even after the Lockerbie and UTA 772 bombings.  
Instead, the first Bush administration, in cooperation with Great Britain, 
indicted and eventually tried two Libyans for the Lockerbie bombing.  
Explanations for this paradox were developed in that chapter and included the 
urgency of responding to other international crisis in the early 1990’s, the fact 
that George H. W. Bush was a one term President, and Bush’s own personal 
beliefs in fostering a new world order where UN norms would be enforced via 
multilateral action. 
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During the administration of Bill Clinton, the subject of chapter 6, there 
was movement back towards a nuanced law enforcement approach to 
international terrorism with members of the Clinton administration pursuing 
indictments, arrests, and criminal convictions as a method of reducing 
terrorism.  For instance, the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center 
bombing were tried, convicted, and sentenced to life terms.  The most 
important disagreement regarding counterterrorism during the Clinton years 
was the personal tension between the FBI director, Louis Freeh, and Clinton; 
this animosity extended across all areas of policymaking.  Despite the 
emphasis on law enforcement methods, Clinton did use force against 
international terrorism; the first incident occurred in 1993 after the attempted 
assassination of George H. W. Bush.  The second use of force in a 
counterterrorist operation under Clinton, the 1998 cruise missile attacks 
against Afghanistan and Sudan, was in retaliation for al Qaeda’s truck 
bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa.     
Chapters 7 and 8 analyzed the administration of George W. Bush and 
his “war on terror” in great depth.  After 9/11, the administration’s advocacy of 
more aggressive and proactive counterterrorist operations, instead of the law 
enforcement methods derided by Bush surrogates, built upon earlier 
precedents from the Reagan administration.  As a result, the administration 
sent ground troops to Afghanistan to “take the war to the enemy” and find 
Osama bin Laden.  In addition, the second Bush administration’s ability to 
merge the public’s fears of al Qaeda, anxieties about WMD possession by 
terrorists, and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, facilitated its drive 
to effect regime change in Iraq.  As detailed in chapters 7 and 8, President 
Bush’s counterterrorism policies dovetailed neatly with the plans of many in 
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his administration, particularly Vice President Cheney, to expand executive 
branch power.  According to the interviews conducted with former members of 
the Bush II administration, one major area of disagreement occurred shortly 
before the invasion of Iraq, when Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Chief 
of Staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, insisted upon reviewing all the intelligence 
Powell used for his speech to the UN in February 2003.  As Pillar wrote, the 
administration used pre-war intelligence “not to inform decision-making, but to 
justify a decision already made.”  (Pillar, 2008: 234)  Although the research 
concluded at the end of the Bush II administration, some preliminary 
comments about the Obama administration are offered, based on the 
experiences of the previous four administrations.  
Role of Congress 
The next secondary question from chapter one asked: what was the 
role of Congress in making the administration’s use of force policy?  In 
formulating responses to this question, this thesis built upon the foundations of 
Koh’s theory about a national security constitution, which forms the basis for 
chapter 3.  The major premise of Koh’s book was that fundamental defects 
exist in the structure of the American national security decision-making 
process.  Furthermore, foreign policy-making, including war powers, was 
originally based upon the principle of “balanced institutional participation,” 
meaning that all three branches of government had roles in foreign relations.  
(Koh, 1990: 72)  Most foreign relations decisions fall into the sphere of 
concurrent authority, which the president manages, subject to checks 
provided by congressional consultation and judicial review.  However, since 
Vietnam this system of balanced policy-making has been superseded by a 
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pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial 
tolerance.  The research applied this to the phenomena of international 
terrorism where a crisis environment, public demands for action, and 
congressional politics exacerbate the tendency of the executive branch to take 
the initiative and ignore the benefits of balanced institutional policy-making.  
During the second Bush administration, one might say an executive branch on 
steroids pushed forward with plans for a “war on terror” without input from the 
other branches of government.  However, the pattern identified by Koh was 
present in all the administrations.  
The lack of meaningful congressional oversight and guidance in the 
formation and implementation of programs in the “war on terror” came up 
frequently during the interviews.  For instance, Pillar mentioned the need for 
Congress to set standards and regulations regarding the use of drones to 
target individuals suspected of terrorism.  (Pillar Interview)  The issue of when 
an American citizen suspected of terrorism may be targeted remains 
controversial, and the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki on September 30, 2011 
increased the controversy.  Both al-Awlaki and his 16-year-old son, who was 
killed in a drone strike in October 2011, were U.S. citizens.  These men were 
not the first U.S. citizens killed by drone. That happened in November 2001, 
over ten years ago, so Congress has had ample time to study the issue and 
pass legislation or other guidelines.  Moreover, many non-citizens have been 
killed by drones since 9/11, as detailed in chapter 7.  By failing to regulate 
when the President may lawfully order citizens and others killed by drones, 
Congress allows the executive branch to formulate and implement its own 
policies on targeted killings.  Thus far, the judicial system has not been 
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significantly involved to serve as a check on executive initiatives due to the 
state secrets privilege and other doctrines. 
Several interviewees also discussed the failure of Congress to 
adequately oversee the policies on indefinite detention and “ghost detainees.”  
Other interviewees were critical of members of Congress for putting their 
political party affiliations higher in their priorities than the Congress as an 
institution.  Fein, for example, stated that individual members of Congress 
lacked enough knowledge about the American system of checks and balances 
to challenge the executive branch when it needed to be challenged and 
checked.  (Fein Interview)  According to him, this was a dangerous path for 
the U.S. and could result in the end of the country as a republic.  (Ibid) 
All of the interviewees, even those who served in the second Bush 
administration, expressed some scepticism about the conduct of the “war on 
terror,” whether it was the drone program, detention policies, or the 
intelligence that led to the Iraq invasion in 2003.  In general, their attitudes 
indicated great anxiety about George W. Bush’s counterterrorism policies and 
the ability of future administrations to handle the problem of terrorism in light 
of the precedents left by the Bush II administration.  In recording their 
responses to the research questions, Fromkin’s analysis of the strategy of 
terrorism took on new relevance.  Fromkin wrote that terrorism is a “sort of 
jujitsu” in which an opponent’s own strength is used against him by the 
terrorist group.  “By itself, . . . terror can accomplish nothing in terms of 
political goals; it can only aim at obtaining a response that will achieve those 
goals for it.”  (Fromkin, 1975: 11)  Many of the interviewees noted that al 
Qaeda could not defeat the U.S militarily, but al Qaeda could prompt the U.S. 
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to overreact with the use of military force and thereby spend too much on wars 
and discreet military operations, while at the same time damaging America’s 
reputation. 
International Legal Constraints on the Use of Force
In seeking to compare and contrast the Bush II administration with the 
previous three administrations, the research questions also probed the legal 
constraints on the use of force.  This was part of the multidisciplinary focus of 
the research detailed in chapter one.  Specifically, one research question 
focused on international legal norms with this question: did international legal 
norms on the use of force operate as a constraint in the administrations?  As 
the chapters on the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations 
clarified, the UN Charter sets forth the parameters for the use of force in the 
post-WWII era including the prohibition on the use or threat of the use of force 
under article 2(4).  Article 51, however, acknowledges that states continue to 
exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs.   
The U.S has interpreted these norms broadly to allow various uses of 
force in response to terrorist attacks, which the U.S. deems are serious 
enough to qualify as “armed attacks.”  Therefore, for example, Reagan 
bombed Libya in 1986 after a series of bombings and provocations by 
Gaddafi, which the Reagan administration construed as an “armed attack.”  
Clinton opted for force twice as counterterrorism operations: the first time, in 
1993, after the attempted assassination of President George H. W. Bush, and 
then in 1998 when he ordered cruise missiles after al Qaeda bombed two 
embassies in Africa.  The Clinton administration argued that these were lawful 
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uses of force under Article 51 and the doctrine of self-defence.  Then the Bush 
II administration, building on these foundations, used a war paradigm to 
launch its military action against Afghanistan after 9/11.  The most disputed 
use of force was, of course, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was linked to 
the campaign against al Qaeda by the second Bush administration.  As 
detailed in the chapters, international legal norms did not significantly 
constrain the administrations, although they may have influenced how the 
administrations explained and justified their uses of force to the world 
community. 
American Legal Constraints on the Use of Force 
The next research question also concentrated on legal aspects of the 
problem and revolved around American domestic factors.  The research 
question was: did American legal norms on the use of force operate as a 
constraint in the administrations? This inquiry focused on whether the 
President had the constitutional authority to use force and involved 
examinations of the War Powers Resolution (WPR), the National Security Act, 
and several authorizations for the use of force.  Since the WPR became law in 
1973, Presidents in all the administrations have declared it an unconstitutional 
intrusion into the executives’ war powers, but they have issued war powers 
letters to Congress anyway, often in pro forma manner.  (Baker, 2007: 184)  
The WPR requires consultation prior to introducing U.S. forces into hostilities, 
but “consultation” under the WPR has dissolved into informing select 
members of Congress shortly before the use of force begins.  Under these 
circumstances, the WPR, despite what its drafters intended, is no real check 
on the executive branch when it decides to use military force.  In fact, as Koh 
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noted in his book, the executive branch often construes statutes meant to 
constrain executive branch initiatives as authorizations.  (Koh, 1990: 117)   
The second Bush administration clearly followed the precedents 
established by other administrations vis-à-vis the WPR and other practices 
intended to increase executive branch power.  In addition, this administration 
utilized the words in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force against 
Terrorists (2001) and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force against 
Iraq (2002) as broad authority to detain suspects, interrogate them with 
unconventional methods, and other actions (wiretapping without warrants) not 
contemplated by Congress when it passed both authorizations.  Under the 
American system of checks and balances, the legislature would, in theory, 
serve as a check on executive branch excesses, but in the area regarding the 
use of force in counterterrorism, there is very little evidence this operated as 
envisaged. 
Common Themes 
The final research question from chapter one posed the question: are 
there common themes in the four administrations?  Several themes are 
common from the administrations studied in this thesis and have been 
identified in chapters 4 through 8.  The most compelling themes are the 
increasing reliance Americans put on the U.S. military to accomplish non-
traditional goals, the emergence of a large executive branch national security 
apparatus, and the effects of technology on responses to terrorism by the four 
administrations. The first, the increasing tendency of Americans to rely on the 
U.S. military for all types of operations, including counterterrorism, concerns 
both liberals and conservatives in intellectual circles in the U.S.  Bacevich, for 
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example, warned that overconfidence in the U.S. military and its capabilities 
combined with a mission to spread American values all over the globe is a 
recipe for imperial overstretch.  (Bacevich, 2005)  Maddow, from the left of the 
political spectrum, analyzed the drift towards unending wars that involve 
exorbitant funding without substantial gain, or input from the American people.  
(Maddow, 2012)  As Lawrence Wilkerson pointed out during an interview, the 
military is a very blunt tool, but increasingly Presidents see it as their best 
option for solving international problems.  (Wilkerson Interview)      
The second theme, the emergence of a large and unwieldy national 
security apparatus in the executive branch since passage of the National 
Security Act in 1947, formed the core of several works exploring executive 
branch power.  For example, Wills traced the enlarged powers of the 
President in the post-World War II environment to the invention of the atomic 
bomb, accomplished with an atmosphere of secrecy that Americans have 
come to accept, and with an enormous destructive power that is unmatched.  
(Wills, 2010)  Another scholarly work explored the contemporary “emergency 
state” where the CIA, Department of Defense, and White House National 
Security Council coordinate policy to respond to the never-ending 
emergencies in the pursuit of total security; the emergencies began with 
WWII, continued with the Cold War, and have now morphed into the war on 
terror.  (Unger, 2012)  The huge costs of an emergency state and its many 
bureaucratic agencies monitoring all aspects of security form the core of 
another recent work that questioned whether proper, democratic oversight of 
such a large and secretive bureaucracy is possible.  (Priest and Arkin, 2011)  
Several interviewees commented on the expanding and typically secret 
agencies that were established by the executive branch, many after 9/11, to 
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ostensibly “enhance American security.”  (Donohue Interview, Fein Interview, 
Interviewee A, and Wilkerson Interview)  One question suitable for further 
research is the extent to which this is in the long-term interests of either real 
security or democratic institutions. 
The final theme, the effects of technology on responses to international 
terrorism, is particularly germane to the contemporary reliance on drone 
technology as a means of counterterrorism.  As detailed in the Reagan 
chapter, Reagan ordered a bombing raid on Libya in 1986 using 45 U.S. 
military aircraft in Operation El Dorado Canyon.  In addition to civilian 
casualties on the ground, two U.S. Air Force captains were killed when their F-
111 fighter bomber crashed in the Gulf of Sidra.  At the time, the Reagan 
administration claimed this was a precision bombing, but clearly the 
technology available resulted in civilian and military (both Libyan and 
American) deaths.     
 In the next decade, the Clinton administration employed newer 
technology when it launched cruise missiles against Iraq in 1993, and against 
Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 after terrorist incidents.  The cruise missiles 
were perceived as more efficient technology due to their precision targeting 
and the fact that no American military members were put directly at risk by 
flying over the targets.  However, the cruise missiles “delivered limited punch, 
and it took roughly six hours to get a presidential authorization to fire, then 
program the missiles, spin their gyroscopes, and finally fly them to the target,” 
which meant the terrorists could escape.  (Benjamin and Simon, 2003: 294).  
According to Coll, after the 1998 embassy bombings, the Clinton White House 
worked on obtaining good intelligence from tribal sources in Afghanistan on 
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the location of bin Laden.  (Coll, 2004: 421)  Eventually, the counterterrorism 
office reduced the time frame “from a presidential order to missile impact in 
Afghanistan to as little as four hours.”  (Ibid)  Nevertheless, the Clinton 
administration was unable to use cruise missiles to significantly destroy al 
Qaeda’s leadership by killing bin Laden. 
 As examined in the section on discreet military operations in chapter 
7, drones were used by the Clinton administration for intelligence and 
surveillance.  After the 9/11 attacks, the second Bush administration 
embraced drone technology as an innovation in precision bombing in the “war” 
it declared against terrorism.  In November 2001, a drone strike killed al 
Qaeda’s military commander, Mohammed Atef, in Afghanistan.  One year 
later, in November 2002, the first drone strike outside of the Afghan battlefield 
occurred in Yemen as the man suspected of planning the USS Cole bombing 
was killed, along with five other men, including an American citizen.  The 
second Bush administration, seemingly without consultation with Congress, 
expanded the use of drones so that they could cover territories far beyond 
traditional battlefields and target anybody, including U.S. citizens.  The 
administration calculated that the advantages of drone technology, particularly 
their ability to take immediate action without placing American military 
personnel at risk, outweighed the risks of civilian deaths and alienating 
populations subjected to drones. 
By 2008, the second Bush administration extended drone strikes to 
incorporate “signature strikes” in which anonymous men are targeted based 
on their behaviour as militants, in addition to the targeting of specific, named 
individuals. This permitted the U.S. to target convoys of vehicles in Pakistan, if 
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the risk to civilians was deemed low, when they bore the characteristics of al 
Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the run.  (Schmitt and Sanger, 2008)  Clearly, 
the technological advances from the bombing raid against Libya in 1986 to the 
deployment of drones in the “war on terror” were considerable but the 
precision of drones remains dependent on the sufficiency of intelligence 
applied in their targeting.   
 The Obama administration, building on the drone program it inherited 
from the Bush II administration, increased the use of drones and now deploys 
them in Yemen and Somalia.  Considerable issues regarding drone use 
remain including their legality under the norms of international human rights 
law, their coordination with broader American foreign policy goals, 
transparency, and oversight.  (Zenko, 2013: 9)  Despite the questions 
regarding their use, most foreign policy analysts expect the U.S. to continue to 
rely on drone technology as its primary counterterrorism tool.   
The Perfect Storm of the Bush II Administration 
As this thesis argued, despite some similarities, it would be a gross 
oversimplification to write that the Bush II administration and its use of force 
broke no new ground vis-à-vis the previous three administrations and 
terrorism.  First, an expansion of executive power is part of a larger pattern 
evident in many governments confronted with the problem of terrorism, but 
this trend was acerbated in the Bush II administration by officials who 
advocated expanding executive power and established the New Paradigm for 
the WOT.  President George W. Bush selected many officials dedicated to 
increasing the power of the President like Vice President Dick Cheney for his 
administration.  Cheney explicitly advocated expanding the power of the 
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president, even before the tragedy of 9/11 provided the opportunity.  Others in 
the Bush II administration believed in enlarging executive branch power, 
including Donald Rumsfeld, John Yoo, and Alberto Gonzales.  Cheney’s staff 
supported these goals, particularly David Addington and Scooter Libby, and 
these personalities combined with the 9/11 attacks resulted in the “perfect 
storm” for expanding the powers of the executive branch.   
 The New Paradigm borrowed from, and expanded upon, legal 
concepts and theories from the Reagan administration and many of the junior 
lawyers in the Reagan administration returned to government service under 
the Bush II administration.  The second Bush administration gave new life to 
the unitary executive theory and signing statements.  These were used to 
justify a number of contentious policies like invalidating McCain’s amendment 
banning torture in 2005 with a signing statement intended to give the 
President the power to construe the amendment as he wished.  An expansive 
interpretation of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, articulated by 
Reagan’s State Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer, reappeared in 
Bush II administration justifications for invading Iraq.  Theories extolling the 
ability of the executive to take action in national security without significant 
input from the legislative branch formed the basis for Cheney’s minority report 
in the Iran-Contra scandal and reappeared in the second Bush administration 
as a roadmap.  As summarized by Fisher, the theory underlying the Bush 
administration’s view of executive power to initiate war is that there are “only 
two legislative constraints: impeachment and the power of Congress to deny 
funds after the president take the country to war.” (Fisher Interview)   
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President Bush, who called himself a war President, wrote, “we had to 
fight this war on the offense, by attacking the terrorists overseas before they 
could attack us again at home.”  (Bush, 2010: 137)  He often cited his 
Commander-in-Chief and inherent powers under the U.S. Constitution when 
taking controversial actions in the WOT.  None of the previous three 
administrations went so far or pressed so hard to establish precedents for an 
unfettered President in national security policy-making.  When combined with 
the administration’s assumptions that the battlefield was worldwide and the 
war was potentially endless, the result was a plebiscitary president, 
accountable to the electorate every four years only, with inherent powers to 
pursue aggressive use of force operations against suspected terrorists and 
state supporters of terrorism all over the world, with very few constraints. 
 The final way in which the Bush II administration differed from the 
previous administrations was the sheer scale of the use of force. Presidents 
Reagan and Clinton merely used discreet bombing missions and short 
applications of force in their counterterrorist campaigns.  On the other hand, 
President George W. Bush sent ground troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq 
and claimed the authority to effect regime change in rogue states attempting 
to acquire WMD.  The administration also asserted the right, in the 2002 
National Security Strategy, to use force preemptively against “rogue states 
and terrorists,” thereby making military preemption a legitimate strategy.  The 
use of force in Afghanistan transformed from a small operation to capture al 
Qaeda and topple the Taliban government into a prolonged counterinsurgency 
campaign; more than ten years after the 9/11 tragedy, the U.S. remains there.  
The invasion of Iraq, which occurred after “intelligence was used selectively to 
support the president’s decision to go to war, and the intelligence was in some 
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ways politicized,” was envisioned as a shock and awe campaign that would 
quickly find WMD and change the regime.  (Pfiffner and Phythian, 2008: 4)  
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 stands as proof of President George W. Bush’s 
belief in his administration’s rhetoric about “going on the offense,” in contrast 
to previous administrations that did not launch ground wars in the same 
manner. 
In fact, the Bush II administration embraced a war paradigm that 
diminished the importance of law enforcement methods in containing terrorism 
and began two real wars to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda.  None of his 
predecessors went that far, and it remains to be seen if future Presidents can 
walk back counterterrorism to more of a law enforcement approach without 
being labelled “weak” on national defence.  One pertinent question for further 
research is the extent to which the Obama administration’s use of drones will 
become the norm in counterterrorist operations in the future and how other 
states will adjust.  If another large-scale terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil, 
another perfect storm combining demands for action, an environment of 
continuing crisis, acceptance of secrecy, and executive branch officials 
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Art 2 (4) 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
Art 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. 
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APPENDIX 2 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973 
Public Law 93-148 
93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542 
November 7, 1973 
Joint Resolution 
Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President. 
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SHORT TITLE 
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers 
Resolution". 
PURPOSE AND POLICY 
SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective 
judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the 
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such 
situations. 
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that 
the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers 
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof. 
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to  
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, 
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed  forces. 
CONSULTATION 
SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress 
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with 
the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in 
hostilities or have been removed from such situations. 
REPORTING 
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SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United 
States Armed Forces are introduced-- 
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances; 
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for 
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, 
repair, or training of such forces; or 
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces 
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall 
submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of  Representatives and to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-- 
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces; 
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction 
took place; and 
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. 
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may 
request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to 
committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces 
abroad 
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or 
into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President 
shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities 
or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities 
or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or 
situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once 
every six months. 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be 
transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report 
so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress 
has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three 
calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned 
by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall 
jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider 
the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section. 
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be 
submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall 
terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such 
report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) 
has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of 
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, 
or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the 
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United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an 
additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress 
in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United 
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the 
course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.  
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed 
Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its 
possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory 
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress 
so directs by concurrent resolution. 
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION 
OR BILL 
SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at 
least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period 
specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint 
resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four 
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such 
section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.  
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business 
of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall 
be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be 
voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall 
otherwise determine by yeas and nays. 
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the 
committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported 
out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day 
period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall 
become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on 
within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall 
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.  
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with  
respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be 
promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a 
report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days 
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the 
event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report 
back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in 
either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or 
concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be 
acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period. 
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT 
RESOLUTION 
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SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at 
least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period 
specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be 
reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within 
fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the 
yeas and nays.  
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business 
of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall 
be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be 
voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall 
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.  
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the 
committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported 
out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen 
calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such 
House and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been 
reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.  
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with  
respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be  
promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a 
report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after 
the legislation is referred to the committee of conference.  
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference 
reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such 
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six 
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees 
are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective 
Houses in disagreement. 
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION 
SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities 
or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances shall not be inferred-- 
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the 
enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any 
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such 
situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory 
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or  
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is 
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is 
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
this joint resolution.  
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(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further 
specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed 
Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more 
foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military 
commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint 
resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by 
the United States prior to such date. 
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States 
Armed Forces" includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to  
command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the 
regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when 
such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such 
forces will become engaged, in hostilities. 
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution-- 
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the 
President, or the provision of existing treaties; or (2) shall be construed as 
granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which 
authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution. 
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE 
SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution 
and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance 
shall not be affected thereby. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment. 
CARL ALBERT 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
JAMES O. EASTLAND 
President of the Senate pro tempore. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S., 
November 7, 1973. 
The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution 
(H. J. Res 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of 
Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States 
with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it 
was Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of 
Representatives agreeing to pass the same. 
Attest: 
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W. PAT JENNINGS 
Clerk. 
I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives. 
W. PAT JENNINGS 
Clerk. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
November 7, 1973 
The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J.  
Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress 
and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his  
objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originate, it was 
Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the 
Senators present having voted in the affirmative. 
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APPENDIX 3 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST 
TERRORISTS 
Public Law 107-40 
107th Congress  
Joint Resolution 
    To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those  
     responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United  
           States. <<NOTE: Sept. 18, 2001 -  [S.J. Res. 23]>>  
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were  
    committed against the United States and its citizens; and 
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the  
    United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect  
    United States citizens both at home and abroad; and 
Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign  
    policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence;  
    and 
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat  
    to the national security and foreign policy of the United States;  
    and 
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take  
    action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against  
    the United States: Now, therefore, be it 
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United  
States of America in Congress assembled, <<NOTE: Authorization for Use  
of Military Force. 50 USC 1541 note.>>  
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
    This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization for Use of  
Military Force''. 
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
FORCES. 
    (a)  <<NOTE: President.>> In General.--That the President is  
authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those  
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,  
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,  
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any  
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such  
nations, organizations or persons. 
    (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.-- 
            (1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with  
        section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress  
        declares that this section is intended to constitute specific  
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        statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of  
        the War Powers Resolution. 
[[Page 115 STAT. 225]] 
            (2) Applicability of other requirements.--Nothing in this  
        resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers  
        Resolution. 
    Approved September 18, 2001. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S.J. Res. 23 (H.J. Res. 64): 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 147 (2001): 
            Sept. 14, considered and passed Senate and House. 
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 37 (2001): 
            Sept. 18, Presidential statement. 
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APPENDIX 4  
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ 
RESOLUTION OF 2002 
H.J.Res.114 
One Hundred Seventh Congress 
of the 
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 
the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two 
Joint Resolution 
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. 
Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal 
occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate 
Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United 
States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to 
Iraq; 
Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United 
Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally 
agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its 
support for international terrorism; 
Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States 
intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had 
large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons 
program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development 
program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than 
intelligence reporting had previously indicated; 
Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to 
thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally 
resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998; 
Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that 
Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital 
United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to 
be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and 
urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the 
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Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into 
compliance with its international obligations'; 
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the 
United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region 
and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international 
obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a 
significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a 
nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist 
organizations; 
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population 
thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing 
to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by 
Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property 
wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait; 
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its 
own people; 
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility 
toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 
1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands 
of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in 
enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; 
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for 
attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq; 
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist 
organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of 
United States citizens; 
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, 
underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction by international terrorist organizations; 
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of 
mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those 
weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed 
Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the 
extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its 
citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to 
defend itself; 
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes 
the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel 
Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, 
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including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or 
obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian 
population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 
(1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in 
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994); 
Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 
(Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United 
States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 
660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677'; 
Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports 
the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's 
repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and 
stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all 
necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 688'; 
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the 
sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support 
efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the 
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime; 
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United 
States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common 
challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while 
also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and 
the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be 
unavoidable'; 
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism 
and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its 
development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its 
obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security 
Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the 
United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant 
United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the 
use of force if necessary; 
Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism 
through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to 
take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist 
organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations; 
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Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all 
appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored such persons or organizations; 
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in 
order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United 
States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and 
Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore 
international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be 
it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'. 
SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. 
The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to-- 
(1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant 
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and encourages him in those 
efforts; and 
(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that 
Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly 
and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding 
Iraq. 
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
FORCES. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces 
of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in 
order to-- 
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing 
threat posed by Iraq; and 
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding 
Iraq. 
(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the 
authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to 
such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 
hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his 
determination that-- 
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means 
alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United 
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to 
enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions 
regarding Iraq; and 
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(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States 
and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against 
international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, 
organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements- 
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 
8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section 
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this joint 
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution. 
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. 
(a) REPORTS- The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the 
Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions 
taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status 
of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are 
completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation 
Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). 
(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT- To the extent that the submission of 
any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any 
other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be 
submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War 
Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), all such reports may be submitted as 
a single consolidated report to the Congress. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- To the extent that the information required by 
section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 
(Public Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such 
report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such 
resolution. 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
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APPENDIX 5 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
1. Peter Bergen 
National security analyst for CNN, fellow at the New America Foundation and 
New York University’s Center on Law & Security, and author of several books 
on al Qaeda, including Holy War, Inc., The Osama Bin Laden I Know and The 
Longest War.  His latest book is Manhunt: The Ten Year Search for bin Laden 
from 9/11 to Abbottabad.   Bergen is one of the few Western journalists to 
have interviewed Osama Bin Laden.  
 2. Bruce Fein
Former Reagan administration lawyer and author of several books on 
constitutional law, including American Empire Before the Fall and
Constitutional Peril:  The Life and Death Struggle for our Constitution and 
Democracy. He is a Visiting Fellow for Constitutional Studies at the Heritage 
Foundation, Adjunct Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Guest 
Lecturer at the Brookings Institute.  He was also Research Director for the 
House Republicans on the Joint Congressional Committee on Covert Arms 
Sales to Iran from 1986-1987. 
3. Louis Fisher  
Former Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. He is the author of many books on constitutional government 
including Presidential War Power and The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring 
Threats to America’s Freedoms. 
4. Paul Pillar  
Former deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the CIA from 1997 to 
1999.  He was appointed National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and 
South Asia in October 2000. He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1977 
and served in a variety of positions, including chief of analytic units covering 
portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. He previously 
served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of 
its Analytic Group. He is the author of Terrorism and US Foreign Policy. 
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5.  Lawrence Wilkerson 
Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005.  
Prior to that he was Associate Director of the State Department's Policy 
Planning staff under the directorship of Ambassador Richard N. Haass, and 
member of that staff responsible for East Asia and the Pacific, political-military 
and legislative affairs (2001-2002). Before serving at the State Department, 
Wilkerson served 31 years in the U.S. Army, including as Deputy Executive 
Officer to then-General Colin Powell when he commanded the U.S. Army 
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